draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15.txt   rfc8692.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Request for Comments: 8692 Cisco Systems
Updates: 3279 (if approved) Q. Dang Updates: 3279 Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Category: Standards Track NIST
Expires: January 22, 2020 July 21, 2019 ISSN: 2070-1721 December 2019
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15
Abstract Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates, and
CRLs. This document updates the "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). This document updates the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Revocation List Profile" (RFC3279) and describes the conventions for Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 certificates and Profile" (RFC 3279) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE
revocation lists as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic function family in Internet X.509 certificates and revocation lists
signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for the as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and
associated subject public keys are also described. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature
algorithms. The conventions for the associated subject public keys
are also described.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2020. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Identifiers
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Use in PKIX
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Signatures
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. Public Keys
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. IANA Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Security Considerations
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. References
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1. Normative References
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Informative References
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Acknowledgements
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-15:
* Minor editorial nits.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-14:
* Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128
and SHA256.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-13:
* Addressing one applicable comment from Dan M. about sec levels
while in secdir review of draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes.
* Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about
references in the abstract.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12:
* Nits identified by Roman, Eric V. Ben K., Barry L. in ballot
position review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11:
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nits.
* Added text name allocation for SHAKEs in IANA considerations.
* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-08:
* Small nits from Russ while in WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-07:
* Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-06:
* Added informative references.
* Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.
* Updated IANA considerations.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05:
* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
section 5.1.1.
* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from
RFCs.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.
* Various ASN.1 fixes.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Added ASN.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF,
according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01:
* Changed titles and section names.
* Removed DSA after WG discussions.
* Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.
* Updated RSASSA-PSS section.
* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC3279] defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for the [RFC3279] defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for the
Internet X.509 Certificate and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
profile [RFC5280]. This document updates RFC3279 and defines Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280]. This document updates RFC
identifiers for several cryptographic algorithms that use variable 3279 and defines identifiers for several cryptographic algorithms
length output SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used that use variable-length output SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3]
with . which can be used with RFC 5280.
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs) are
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function defined: SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Four other hash function instances,
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also defined but are
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a variable-length hash
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output is a d-bits-long
is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision digest of message M. The corresponding collision and second-
and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2, 128) and
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits, respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]). min(d, 128) bits, respectively (see Appendix A.1 of [SHA3]). And the
And the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths for
strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, SHAKE256 are min(d/2, 256) and min(d, 256) bits, respectively.
respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and message to be signed) in RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-
as the hash in the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS. PSS) [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and as the hash in the mask
generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.
3. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
4. Identifiers 3. Identifiers
This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA- This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs), for RSASSA-
PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm PSS and ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm
identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS. identifiers can be used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 } 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 } 31 }
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below. below.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 } 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 } 33 }
The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 specify the required output length for each
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In summary,
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of SHAKE128 and
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits, respectively. When the SHAKEs are
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output used as MGFs in RSASSA-PSS, their output length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) -
length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, respectively, where n is the
respectively, where n is the RSA modulus size in bits. RSA modulus size in bits.
5. Use in PKIX 4. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures 4.1. Signatures
Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As
shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509 shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509
certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
contains the actual signature. contains the actual signature.
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING } signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the The identifiers defined in Section 3 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in
X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are
absent as explained in Section 4. absent, as explained in Section 3.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations MUST specify
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or the algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming when encoding RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in
client implementations that process certificates and CRLs using certificates and CRLs. Conforming client implementations that
RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. process certificates and CRLs using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS
specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480], respectively. and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480],
respectively.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
Refer to Section 7 for more details. Refer to Section 6 for more details.
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 (specified in Section 3) is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the PSS-params that is used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer, and salt are embedded in
OID definition. the OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm used as the mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS MUST be algorithm used as the MGF in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same: both
the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the hash algorithm
hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) or that hashes the message SHALL be 32 bytes (for SHAKE128) or 64 bytes
64 bytes (for SHAKE256). (for SHAKE256).
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The MGF takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of length as input and outputs an octet string of the desired length.
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that MGF, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that uses the hash function in
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in multiple iterations, as specified in Appendix B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as other words, the MGF is defined as the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS- the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed from which the mask is
the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As explained in Step 9 of
explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length Section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length of the MGF is emLen -
of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message length ceil((n-1)/8),
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and 64 bytes for id-
and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. Thus,
respectively. Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is
length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For example,
respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output when RSA modulus n is 2048 bits, the output length of SHAKE128 or
length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528 bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively.
respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField
MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
0xBC [RFC8017]. 0xBC [RFC8017].
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures 4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID id-
ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256. ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. [X9.62], the output length of the hash function must be explicitly
The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be determined. The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in
256 or 512 bits, respectively. ECDSA MUST be 256 or 512 bits, respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures
with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with with a deterministically generated, nonrandom k in accordance with
all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate
such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in
[X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires
conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively, and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively,
can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as can be used instead of 256- and 512-bit output hash algorithms such
SHA256 and SHA512. as SHA256 and SHA512.
5.2. Public Keys 4.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and is an OID with optionally associated parameters. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public key algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 are as specified in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279],
of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480]. Section 3.1 of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key
owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to
RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to
limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with
SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4 SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3
SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
sequence [RFC5280]. Conforming client implementations that process sequence [RFC5280]. Conforming client implementations that process
RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when processing certificates and
CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key
algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when
encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. encoding ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs.
Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE
public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the public keys when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. corresponding OIDs.
The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 4, MUST be absent. The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent.
6. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A has been
for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier"
registry: (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry:
+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------+--------------------------+------------+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +=========+==========================+============+
| TBD | id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | | 94 | id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------+--------------------------+------------+
IANA is requested to update the SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms Table 1
[SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry with four additional entries:
+---------+------------------------+--------------------+ IANA has updated the "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms"
| Decimal | Description | References | (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry [SMI-PKIX] with four additional entries:
+---------+------------------------+--------------------+
| TBD1 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
| TBD2 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
| TBD3 | id-ecdsa-with-shake128 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
| TBD4 | id-ecdsa-with-shake256 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+------------------------+--------------------+
IANA is also requested to update the Hash Function Textual Names +---------+------------------------+------------+
Registry [Hash-Texts] with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and | Decimal | Description | References |
SHAKE256: +=========+========================+============+
| 30 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 31 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 32 | id-ecdsa-with-shake128 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 33 | id-ecdsa-with-shake256 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+ Table 2
| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
7. Security Considerations IANA has updated the "Hash Function Textual Names" registry
[Hash-Texts] with two additional entries for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256:
This document updates [RFC3279]. The security considerations section +--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
+====================+=========================+===========+
| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | RFC 8692 |
+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | RFC 8692 |
+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 3
6. Security Considerations
This document updates [RFC3279]. The Security Considerations section
of that document applies to this specification as well. of that document applies to this specification as well.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
various security scenarios. various security scenarios.
SHAKE128 with output length of 256-bits offers 128-bits of collision SHAKE128 with output length of 256 bits offers 128 bits of collision
and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification
are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit are RECOMMENDED with 2048- (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit
security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256 bits (128-bit
security). SHAKE256 with 512-bits output length offers 256-bits of security). SHAKE256 with a 512-bit output length offers 256 bits of
collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this
specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or
curves with group order of at least 521-bits (256-bit security). curves with a group order of at least 512 bits, such as the NIST
Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 15360-bit Curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that we recommended a 4096-bit
modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's RSA because we would need a 15360-bit modulus for 256 bits of
technology. security, which is impractical for today's technology.
8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad and Eric Rescorla for
their valuable contributions to this document.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.
9. References 7. References
9.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
skipping to change at page 12, line 5 skipping to change at line 390
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
"SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable- Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Output Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015, Functions", DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, FIPS PUB 202,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard- August 2015, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202>.
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
9.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[Hash-Texts] [Hash-Texts]
IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names", July 2017, IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-
names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml>. names/>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SMI-PKIX] [SMI-PKIX] IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms",
IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", March 2019, <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6>.
[SP800-107] [SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved "Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
Hash Algorithms", May 2014, Algorithms", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1, Revision 1,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/ NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-107, August 2012,
rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>. <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1>.
[SP800-78-4] [SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for "Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal
Personal Identity Verification", May 2014, Identity Verification", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4, NIST
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800- Special Publication (SP) 800-78-4, May 2015,
78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf>. <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI), [X9.62] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
"X9.62-2005: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 2005.
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This
module does not come from any existing RFC. module does not come from any previously existing RFC. This module
references [RFC5912].
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(TBD) } id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL; -- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFC5912] -- FROM RFC 5912
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- FROM [RFC5912] -- FROM RFC 5912
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec, RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec,
CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
; ;
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
-- --
DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands DigestAlgorithms from [RFC5912] -- This expands DigestAlgorithms from RFC 5912
mda-shake128 | mda-shake128 |
mda-shake256, mda-shake256,
... ...
} }
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
--
-- SHAKE128 --
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { -- One-Way Hash Functions
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes. --
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE256 -- SHAKE128
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
} }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 } hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- -- SHAKE256
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { }
-- This expands PublicKeys from [RFC5912] id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256, csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
... hashAlgs(2) 12 }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128 --
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128 -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length --
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- modulus in bits. -- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912
-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1. pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 ...
KEY RSAPublicKey }
PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256 -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
-- modulus in bits. -- modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1. -- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1.
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module -- -- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign } keyCertSign, cRLSign }
} }
-- -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-) -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912] -- modulus in bits.
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 | -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 | IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256, KEY RSAPublicKey
... PARAMS ARE absent
} -- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- --
-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-) -- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
-- --
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912] -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps | sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps, sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
... ...
} }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128 --
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 --
PARAMS ARE absent SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128 -- The expands SMimeCaps from RFC 5912
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128 sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
-- modulus in bits. sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1 ...
}
HASHES { mda-shake128 } -- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 } IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
} PARAMS ARE absent
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
TBD1 } -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
-- modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
30 }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256 -- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256 -- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256 -- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length -- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the
-- RSA modulus in bits. -- RSA modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1. -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
31 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE128
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
32 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 } HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
} }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 } 33 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE128 END
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE256 Acknowledgements
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 }
END We would like to thank Sean Turner, Jim Schaad, and Eric Rescorla for
their valuable contributions to this document.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang Quynh Dang
NIST NIST
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA United States of America
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
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