draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-05.txt   draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-06.txt 
Internet-Draft Editor: R. Harrison INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: R. Harrison
Intended Category: Draft Standard Novell, Inc. draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-06.txt Novell, Inc.
Document: draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-05.txt March 2003 Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 28 June 2003
Obsoletes: RFC 2829, RFC 2830 Intended Category: Draft Standard
LDAP: Authentication Methods LDAP: Authentication Methods
and and
Connection Level Security Mechanisms Connection Level Security Mechanisms
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
progress." progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This document describes LDAPv3 (Lightweight Directory Access This document describes LDAPv3 (Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol v3) authentication methods and connection level security Protocol v3) authentication methods and connection level security
mechanisms that are required of all conforming LDAPv3 server mechanisms that are required of all conforming LDAPv3 server
implementations and makes recommendations for combinations of these implementations and makes recommendations for combinations of these
mechanisms to be used in various deployment circumstances. mechanisms to be used in various deployment circumstances.
Among the mechanisms described are Among the mechanisms described are
- various forms of authentication including anonymous - various forms of authentication including anonymous
authentication, password-based authentication, and certificate authentication, password-based authentication, and certificate
based authentication based authentication
- the use of SASL mechanisms with LDAPv3 - the use of SASL mechanisms with LDAPv3
- the use of TLS (Transport Layer Security) with LDAPv3 - the use of TLS (Transport Layer Security) with LDAPv3
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- the various authentication and authorization states through - the various authentication and authorization states through
which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the actions which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the actions
that trigger these state changes. that trigger these state changes.
1. Conventions Used in this Document 1. Introduction
1.1. Glossary of Terms
The following terms are used in this document. To aid the reader,
these terms are defined here.
- "user" represents any application which is an LDAP client using
the directory to retrieve or store information.
- "LDAP association" is used to distinguish the LDAP-level
connection from any underlying TLS-level connection that may or
may not exist.
1.2. Security Terms and Concepts
In general, security terms in this document are used consistently
with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several
terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and
authorization are presented in Appendix B of this document. While
the formal definition of these terms and concepts is outside the
scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite to
understanding much of the material in this document. Readers who are
unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review
Appendix B before reading the remainder of this document.
1.3. Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical
Specification [ROADMAP]. This document replaces RFC 2829 and Specification [ROADMAP]. This document replaces RFC 2829 and
portions of RFC 2830. Changes to RFC 2829 are summarized in Appendix portions of RFC 2830. Changes to RFC 2829 are summarized in Appendix
C and changes to RFC 2830 are summarized in Appendix D. C and changes to RFC 2830 are summarized in Appendix D.
LDAPv3 is a powerful access protocol for directories. It offers LDAPv3 is a powerful access protocol for directories. It offers
means of searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content, means of searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content,
and ways to access a rich set of security functions. and ways to access a rich set of security functions.
It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all
LDAP clients and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be LDAP clients and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be
a minimum subset of security functions that is common to all a minimum subset of security functions that is common to all
implementations that claim LDAPv3 conformance. implementations that claim LDAPv3 conformance.
Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include: Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include:
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
(1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval
operations, operations,
(2) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication (2) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication
information by monitoring others' access, information by monitoring others' access,
(3) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' (3) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others'
access, access,
(4) Unauthorized modification of directory data, (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data,
(5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information, (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information,
(6) Unauthorized or excessive use of resources (denial of service), (6) Unauthorized or excessive use of resources (denial of service),
and and
(7) Spoofing of directory: Tricking a client into believing that (7) Spoofing of directory: Tricking a client into believing that
information came from the directory when in fact it did not, information came from the directory when in fact it did not,
either by modifying data in transit or misdirecting the client's either by modifying data in transit or misdirecting the client's
connection. connection. Also, tricking a client into sending privileged
information to a hostile entity that appears to be the directory
but is not.
Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats
(2), (3) and (7) are due to hostile agents on the path between (2), (3) and (7) are due to hostile agents on the path between
client and server or hostile agents posing as a server. client and server or hostile agents posing as a server.
The LDAP protocol suite can be protected with the following security The LDAP protocol suite can be protected with the following security
mechanisms: mechanisms:
(1) Client authentication by means of the SASL [RFC2222] mechanism (1) Client authentication by means of the SASL [RFC2222] mechanism
set, possibly backed by the TLS [RFC2246] credentials exchange set, possibly backed by the TLS [RFC2246] credentials exchange
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(5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative (5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative
service limits configured on the server, and service limits configured on the server, and
(6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL (6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL
mechanism. mechanism.
At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means
outside the scope of the LDAPv3 protocol. outside the scope of the LDAPv3 protocol.
3. Rationale for LDAPv3 Security Mechanisms
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
It seems clear that allowing any implementation, faced with the It seems clear that allowing any implementation, faced with the
above requirements, to simply pick and choose among the possible above requirements, to simply pick and choose among the possible
alternatives is not a strategy that is likely to lead to alternatives is not a strategy that is likely to lead to
interoperability. In the absence of mandates, clients will be interoperability. In the absence of mandates, clients will be
written that do not support any security function supported by the written that do not support any security function supported by the
server, or worse, they will support only mechanisms like the LDAPv3 server, or worse, they will support only mechanisms like the LDAPv3
simple bind using clear text passwords that provide inadequate simple bind using clear text passwords that provide inadequate
security for most circumstances. security for most circumstances.
Given the presence of the Directory, there is a strong desire to see Given the presence of the Directory, there is a strong desire to see
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authentication services. authentication services.
The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAPv3 and described in The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAPv3 and described in
this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide
range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of
interoperability among various LDAPv3 implementations and interoperability among various LDAPv3 implementations and
deployments. Appendix A contains example deployment scenarios that deployments. Appendix A contains example deployment scenarios that
list the mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level list the mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level
of security in various circumstances. of security in various circumstances.
4. Bind Operation 2. Conventions Used in this Document
The Bind operation defined in section 4.2 of [Protocol] allows 2.1. Glossary of Terms
The following terms are used in this document. To aid the reader,
these terms are defined here.
- "user" represents any application which is an LDAP client using
the directory to retrieve or store information.
- "connection" and "LDAP connection" both refer to the underlying
transport protocol connection between two protocol peers.
- "TLS connection" refers to a TLS-protected LDAP connection.
- "association" and "LDAP association" both refer to the
association of the LDAP connection and its current
authentication and authorization state.
2.2. Security Terms and Concepts
In general, security terms in this document are used consistently
with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several
terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and
authorization are presented in Appendix B of this document. While
the formal definition of these terms and concepts is outside the
scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite to
understanding much of the material in this document. Readers who are
unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review
Appendix B before reading the remainder of this document.
2.3. Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Bind Operation
The Bind operation defined in section 4.2 of [PROTOCOL] allows
authentication information to be exchanged between the client and authentication information to be exchanged between the client and
server. server.
4.1. Unbound Connection Treated as Anonymous ("Implied Anonymous Bind") 3.1. Unbound Connection Treated as Anonymous ("Implied Anonymous Bind")
Unlike LDAP version 2, the client need not send a Bind Request in Unlike LDAP version 2, the client need not send a Bind Request in
the first PDU of the connection. The client may send any operation the first PDU of the connection. The client may send any operation
request prior to binding, and the server MUST treat it as if it had request prior to binding, and the server MUST treat it as if it had
been performed after an anonymous bind operation. If the server been performed after an anonymous bind operation. If the server
requires that the client bind before browsing or modifying the requires that the client bind before browsing or modifying the
directory, the server MAY reject a request other than binding, directory, the server MAY reject a request other than binding,
unbinding or an extended request with the "operationsError" result. unbinding or an extended request with the "operationsError" result.
4.2. Simple Authentication 3.2. Simple Authentication
The simple authentication option provides minimal authentication The simple authentication option provides minimal authentication
facilities, with the contents of the authentication field consisting facilities, with the contents of the authentication field consisting
only of a cleartext password. Note that the use of cleartext only of a cleartext password. Note that the use of cleartext
passwords is strongly discouraged over open networks when the passwords is strongly discouraged over open networks when the
underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality (see underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality (see
section 8). section 8).
4.3. SASL Authentication 3.3. SASL Authentication
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
The sasl authentication option allows for any mechanism defined for The sasl authentication option allows for any mechanism defined for
use with SASL [RFC2222] not specifically prohibited by this document use with SASL [RFC2222] not specifically prohibited by this document
(see section 4.3.1). (see section 3.3.1).
Clients sending a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHOULD Clients sending a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHOULD
NOT send a value in the name field. Servers receiving a bind request NOT send a value in the name field. Servers receiving a bind request
with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in the name with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in the name
field. field.
The mechanism field in SaslCredentials contains the name of the The mechanism field in SaslCredentials contains the name of the
mechanism. The credentials field contains the arbitrary data used mechanism. The credentials field contains the arbitrary data used
for authentication, inside an OCTET STRING wrapper. Note that unlike for authentication, inside an OCTET STRING wrapper. Note that unlike
some Internet application protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not some Internet application protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not
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allows the client to detect active attacks that remove supported allows the client to detect active attacks that remove supported
SASL mechanisms from the supportedSASLMechanisms list and allows the SASL mechanisms from the supportedSASLMechanisms list and allows the
client to ensure that it is using the best mechanism supported by client to ensure that it is using the best mechanism supported by
both client and server. (This requirement is a SHOULD to allow for both client and server. (This requirement is a SHOULD to allow for
environments where the supportedSASLMechanisms list is provided to environments where the supportedSASLMechanisms list is provided to
the client through a different trusted source, e.g. as part of a the client through a different trusted source, e.g. as part of a
digitally signed object.) digitally signed object.)
The client can request that the server use authentication The client can request that the server use authentication
information from a lower layer protocol by using the SASL EXTERNAL information from a lower layer protocol by using the SASL EXTERNAL
mechanism (see section 5.2.2.). mechanism (see section 4.2.2.).
4.3.1. Use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN SASL Mechanisms 3.3.1. Use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN SASL Mechanisms
As LDAP includes native anonymous and plaintext authentication As LDAP includes native anonymous and plaintext authentication
methods, the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL mechanisms are not used methods, the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL mechanisms are not used
with LDAP. If an authorization identity of a form different from a with LDAP. If an authorization identity of a form different from a
DN is requested by the client, a data confidentiality mechanism that DN is requested by the client, a data confidentiality mechanism that
protects the password in transit should be used. protects the password in transit should be used.
4.3.2. Use of EXTERNAL SASL Mechanism 3.3.2. Use of EXTERNAL SASL Mechanism
The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism can be used to request the LDAP server The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism can be used to request the LDAP server
make use of security credentials exchanged by a lower layer. If a make use of security credentials exchanged by a lower layer. If a
TLS session has not been established between the client and server TLS session has not been established between the client and server
prior to making the SASL EXTERNAL Bind request and there is no other prior to making the SASL EXTERNAL Bind request and there is no other
external source of authentication credentials (e.g. IP-level external source of authentication credentials (e.g. IP-level
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
security [RFC2401]), or if during the process of establishing the security [RFC2401]), or if during the process of establishing the
TLS session, the server did not request the client's authentication TLS session, the server did not request the client's authentication
credentials, the SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of credentials, the SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of
inappropriateAuthentication. Any client authentication and inappropriateAuthentication. Any client authentication and
authorization state of the LDAP association is lost, so the LDAP authorization state of the LDAP association is lost, so the LDAP
association is in an anonymous state after the failure (see association is in an anonymous state after the failure (see
[Protocol] section 4.2.1). [PROTOCOL] section 4.2.1).
4.3.3. Other SASL Mechanisms 3.3.3. Other SASL Mechanisms
Other SASL mechanisms may be used with LDAP, but their usage is not Other SASL mechanisms may be used with LDAP, but their usage is not
considered in this document. considered in this document.
4.4. SASL Authorization Identity 3.4. SASL Authorization Identity
The authorization identity is carried as part of the SaslCredentials The authorization identity is carried as part of the SaslCredentials
credentials field in the Bind request and response. credentials field in the Bind request and response.
When the "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the When the "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the
credentials field is present, it contains an authorization identity credentials field is present, it contains an authorization identity
of the authzId form described below. of the authzId form described below.
Other mechanisms define the location of the authorization identity Other mechanisms define the location of the authorization identity
in the credentials field. in the credentials field.
4.4.1. Authorization Identity Syntax 3.4.1. Authorization Identity Syntax
The authorization identity is a string in the UTF-8 character set, The authorization identity is a string in the UTF-8 character set,
corresponding to the following ABNF grammar [RFC2234]: corresponding to the following ABNF grammar [RFC2234]:
; Specific predefined authorization (authz) id schemes are ; Specific predefined authorization (authz) id schemes are
; defined below -- new schemes may be defined in the future. ; defined below -- new schemes may be defined in the future.
authzId = dnAuthzId / uAuthzId authzId = dnAuthzId / uAuthzId
DNCOLON = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:" DNCOLON = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:"
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DNCOLON = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:" DNCOLON = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:"
UCOLON = %x75 %x3a ; "u:" UCOLON = %x75 %x3a ; "u:"
; distinguished-name-based authz id. ; distinguished-name-based authz id.
dnAuthzId = DNCOLON dn dnAuthzId = DNCOLON dn
dn = utf8string ; with syntax defined in [LDAPDN] section 3. dn = utf8string ; with syntax defined in [LDAPDN] section 3.
; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded. ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded.
uAuthzId = UCOLON userid uAuthzId = UCOLON userid
userid = utf8string ; syntax unspecified userid = utf8string ; syntax unspecified
The dnAuthzId choice allows client applications to assert The dnAuthzId choice allows client applications to assert
authorization identities in the form of a distinguished name. The authorization identities in the form of a distinguished name. The
decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity to have decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity to have
access to the requested authorization identity is a matter of local access to the requested authorization identity is a matter of local
policy ([SASL] section 4.2). For this reason there is no requirement policy ([SASL] section 4.2). For this reason there is no requirement
that the asserted dn be that of an entry in directory. that the asserted dn be that of an entry in directory.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
The uAuthzId choice allows for compatibility with client The uAuthzId choice allows for compatibility with client
applications that wish to assert an authorization identity to a applications that wish to assert an authorization identity to a
local directory but do not have that identity in distinguished name local directory but do not have that identity in distinguished name
form. The format of utf8string is defined as only a sequence of UTF- form. The format of utf8string is defined as only a sequence of UTF-
8 encoded ISO 10646 characters, and further interpretation is 8 encoded ISO 10646 characters, and further interpretation is
subject to prior agreement between the client and server. subject to prior agreement between the client and server.
For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific
directory service, or be a login name or the local-part of an RFC directory service, or be a login name or the local-part of an RFC
822 email address. In general, a uAuthzId MUST NOT be assumed to be 822 email address. In general, a uAuthzId MUST NOT be assumed to be
globally unique. globally unique.
Additional authorization identity schemes MAY be defined in future Additional authorization identity schemes MAY be defined in future
versions of this document. versions of this document.
4.5. SASL Service Name for LDAP 3.5. SASL Service Name for LDAP
For use with SASL [RFC2222], a protocol must specify a service name For use with SASL [RFC2222], a protocol must specify a service name
to be used with various SASL mechanisms, such as GSSAPI. For LDAP, to be used with various SASL mechanisms, such as GSSAPI. For LDAP,
the service name is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA the service name is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA
as a GSSAPI service name. as a GSSAPI service name.
4.6. SASL Integrity and Privacy Protections 3.6. SASL Integrity and Privacy Protections
Any negotiated SASL integrity and privacy protections SHALL start on Any negotiated SASL integrity and privacy protections SHALL start on
the first octet of the first LDAP PDU following successful the first octet of the first LDAP PDU following successful
completion of the SASL bind operation. If lower level security layer completion of the SASL bind operation. If lower level security layer
is negotiated, such as TLS, any SASL security services SHALL be is negotiated, such as TLS, any SASL security services SHALL be
layered on top of such security layers regardless of the order of layered on top of such security layers regardless of the order of
their negotiation. their negotiation.
5. Start TLS Operation 4. Start TLS Operation
The Start Transport Layer Security (StartTLS) operation defined in The Start Transport Layer Security (StartTLS) operation defined in
section 4.13 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish section 4.13 of [PROTOCOL] provides the ability to establish
Transport Layer Security [RFC2246] on an LDAP association. Transport Layer Security [RFC2246] on an LDAP association.
5.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation 4.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation
This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers
must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into
consideration various aspects of the overall security of the LDAP consideration various aspects of the overall security of the LDAP
association including discovery of resultant security level and association including discovery of resultant security level and
assertion of the client's authorization identity. assertion of the client's authorization identity.
Note that the precise effects, on a client's authorization identity, Note that the precise effects, on a client's authorization identity,
of establishing TLS on an LDAP association are described in detail of establishing TLS on an LDAP association are described in detail
in section 5.5. in section 4.5.
5.1.1. Requesting to Start TLS on an LDAP Association 4.1.1. Requesting to Start TLS on an LDAP Association
The client MAY send the Start TLS extended request at any time after The client MAY send the Start TLS extended request at any time after
establishing an LDAP association, except that in the following cases establishing an LDAP association, except that in the following cases
the client MUST NOT send a Start TLS extended request: the client MUST NOT send a Start TLS extended request:
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- if TLS is currently established on the connection, or - if TLS is currently established on the connection, or
- during a multi-stage SASL negotiation, or - during a multi-stage SASL negotiation, or
- if there are any LDAP operations outstanding on the - if there are any LDAP operations outstanding on the
connection. connection.
The result of violating any of these requirements is a resultCode of The result of violating any of these requirements is a resultCode of
operationsError, as described above in [Protocol] section 14.3.2.2. operationsError, as described above in [PROTOCOL] section 14.3.2.2.
In particular, there is no requirement that the client have or have In particular, there is no requirement that the client have or have
not already performed a Bind operation before sending a Start TLS not already performed a Bind operation before sending a Start TLS
operation request. The client may have already performed a Bind operation request. The client may have already performed a Bind
operation when it sends a Start TLS request, or the client might operation when it sends a Start TLS request, or the client might
have not yet bound. have not yet bound.
If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending any If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending any
other requests, and the server requires the client to establish a other requests, and the server requires the client to establish a
TLS connection before performing a particular request, the server TLS connection before performing a particular request, the server
MUST reject that request by sending a resultCode of MUST reject that request by sending a resultCode of
confidentialityRequired or strongAuthRequired. In response, the confidentialityRequired or strongAuthRequired. In response, the
client MAY send a Start TLS extended request, or it MAY choose to client MAY send a Start TLS extended request, or it MAY choose to
close the connection. close the connection.
5.1.2. Starting TLS 4.1.2. Starting TLS
The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of
success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. It will return success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. It will return
other resultCodes (documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) if it other resultCodes (documented in [PROTOCOL] section 4.13.2.2) if it
is unable to do so. is unable to do so.
In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer
LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation
or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record
Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the
server to initiate TLS negotiation [RFC2246]. server to initiate TLS negotiation [RFC2246].
5.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation 4.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation
Negotiating the version of TLS or SSL to be used is a part of the Negotiating the version of TLS or SSL to be used is a part of the
TLS Handshake Protocol, as documented in [RFC2246]. Please refer to TLS Handshake Protocol, as documented in [RFC2246]. Please refer to
that document for details. that document for details.
5.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level 4.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level
After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP association, both After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP association, both
parties MUST individually decide whether or not to continue based on parties MUST individually decide whether or not to continue based on
the privacy level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's the privacy level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's
privacy level is implementation dependent, and accomplished by privacy level is implementation dependent, and accomplished by
communicating with one's respective local TLS implementation. communicating with one's respective local TLS implementation.
If the client or server decides that the level of authentication or If the client or server decides that the level of authentication or
privacy is not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully privacy is not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully
close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has
completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 5.2.3 below). completed (see [PROTOCOL] section 4.13.3.1 and section 4.2.3 below).
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
If the client decides to continue, it MAY attempt to Start TLS If the client decides to continue, it MAY attempt to Start TLS
again, it MAY send an unbind request, or it MAY send any other LDAP again, it MAY send an unbind request, or it MAY send any other LDAP
request. request.
5.1.5. Assertion of Client's Authorization Identity 4.1.5. Assertion of Client's Authorization Identity
The client MAY, upon receipt of a Start TLS response indicating The client MAY, upon receipt of a Start TLS response indicating
success, assert that a specific authorization identity be utilized success, assert that a specific authorization identity be utilized
in determining the client's authorization status. The client in determining the client's authorization status. The client
accomplishes this via an LDAP Bind request specifying a SASL accomplishes this via an LDAP Bind request specifying a SASL
mechanism of "EXTERNAL" [RFC2222] (see section 5.5.1.2 below). mechanism of "EXTERNAL" [RFC2222] (see section 4.5.1.2 below).
5.1.6. Server Identity Check 4.1.6. Server Identity Check
The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname
against the server's identity as presented in the server's against the server's identity as presented in the server's
Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Matching is performed according to these rules: Matching is performed according to these rules:
- The client MUST use the server hostname it used to open the LDAP - The client MUST use the server hostname it used to open the LDAP
connection as the value to compare against the server name as connection as the value to compare against the server name as
expressed in the server's certificate. The client MUST NOT use expressed in the server's certificate. The client MUST NOT use
the any other derived form of name including the server's any other derived form of name (including that derived by DNS
canonical DNS name. canonicalization).
- If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's
identity. identity.
- Matching is case-insensitive. - Matching is case-insensitive.
- The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies
only to the left-most name component. only to the left-most name component.
For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but it For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but
would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If more it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If
than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate more than one identity of a given type is present in the
(e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any one of the set is certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any
considered acceptable. one of the set is considered acceptable.
If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the
certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either
notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to
continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the
connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect. connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect.
Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or
logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect.
Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients
SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server
is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The
client MAY need to make use of local policy information. client MAY need to make use of local policy information.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3 4.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information
5.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information
Upon TLS session establishment, the client MUST discard all Upon TLS session establishment, the client MUST discard all
information about the server fetched prior to the initiation of the information about the server fetched prior to the initiation of the
TLS negotiation and MUST refresh any cached server capabilities TLS negotiation and MUST refresh any cached server capabilities
information (e.g. from the server's root DSE; see section 3.4 of information (e.g. from the server's root DSE; see section 3.4 of
[Protocol]). This is necessary to protect against active- [PROTOCOL]). This is necessary to protect against active-
intermediary attacks that may have altered any server capabilities intermediary attacks that may have altered any server capabilities
information retrieved prior to TLS establishment. information retrieved prior to TLS establishment.
The server MAY advertise different capabilities after TLS The server MAY advertise different capabilities after TLS
establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms
MAY be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the MAY be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the
EXTERNAL mechanism or the proposed PLAIN mechanism are likely to EXTERNAL mechanism or the proposed PLAIN mechanism are likely to
only be listed after a TLS negotiation has been performed). only be listed after a TLS negotiation has been performed).
5.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity 4.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity
This section describes the effects on a client's authorization This section describes the effects on a client's authorization
identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP association. identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP association.
The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for
client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including
error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection
are described. are described.
Authorization identities and related concepts are described in Authorization identities and related concepts are described in
Appendix B. Appendix B.
5.2.1. Default Effects 4.2.1. Default Effects
Upon establishment of the TLS session onto the LDAP association, any Upon establishment of the TLS session onto the LDAP association, any
previously established authentication and authorization identities previously established authentication and authorization identities
MUST remain in force, including anonymous state. This holds even in MUST remain in force, including anonymous state. This holds even in
the case where the server requests client authentication via TLS -- the case where the server requests client authentication via TLS --
e.g. requests the client to supply its certificate during TLS e.g. requests the client to supply its certificate during TLS
negotiation (see [RFC2246]). negotiation (see [RFC2246]).
5.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity 4.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity
A client MAY either implicitly request that its LDAP authorization A client MAY either implicitly request that its LDAP authorization
identity be derived from its authenticated TLS credentials or it MAY identity be derived from its authenticated TLS credentials or it MAY
explicitly provide an authorization identity and assert that it be explicitly provide an authorization identity and assert that it be
used in combination with its authenticated TLS credentials. The used in combination with its authenticated TLS credentials. The
former is known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an former is known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an
explicit assertion. explicit assertion.
5.2.2.1. Implicit Assertion 4.2.2.1. Implicit Assertion
An implicit authorization identity assertion is accomplished after An implicit authorization identity assertion is accomplished after
TLS establishment by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using TLS establishment by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using
the "EXTERNAL" mechanism name [RFC2222] [Protocol] that SHALL NOT the "EXTERNAL" mechanism name [RFC2222] [PROTOCOL] that SHALL NOT
include the optional credentials octet string (found within the include the optional credentials octet string (found within the
SaslCredentials sequence in the Bind Request). The server will SaslCredentials sequence in the Bind Request). The server will
derive the client's authorization identity from the authentication derive the client's authorization identity from the authentication
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
identity supplied in the client's TLS credentials (typically a identity supplied in the client's TLS credentials (typically a
public key certificate) according to local policy. The underlying public key certificate) according to local policy. The underlying
mechanics of how this is accomplished are implementation specific. mechanics of how this is accomplished are implementation specific.
5.2.2.2. Explicit Assertion 4.2.2.2. Explicit Assertion
An explicit authorization identity assertion is accomplished after An explicit authorization identity assertion is accomplished after
TLS establishment by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using TLS establishment by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using
the "EXTERNAL" mechanism name [RFC2222] [Protocol] that SHALL the "EXTERNAL" mechanism name [RFC2222] [PROTOCOL] that SHALL
include the credentials octet string. This string MUST be include the credentials octet string. This string MUST be
constructed as documented in section 4.4.1. constructed as documented in section 3.4.1.
5.2.2.3. Error Conditions 4.2.2.3. Error Conditions
For either form of assertion, the server MUST verify that the For either form of assertion, the server MUST verify that the
client's authentication identity as supplied in its TLS credentials client's authentication identity as supplied in its TLS credentials
is permitted to be mapped to the asserted authorization identity. is permitted to be mapped to the asserted authorization identity.
The server MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials The server MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials
resultCode in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized. resultCode in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized.
Additionally, with either form of assertion, if a TLS session has Additionally, with either form of assertion, if a TLS session has
not been established between the client and server prior to making not been established between the client and server prior to making
the SASL EXTERNAL Bind request and there is no other external source the SASL EXTERNAL Bind request and there is no other external source
of authentication credentials (e.g. IP-level security [RFC2401]), or of authentication credentials (e.g. IP-level security [RFC2401]), or
if during the process of establishing the TLS session, the server if during the process of establishing the TLS session, the server
did not request the client's authentication credentials, the SASL did not request the client's authentication credentials, the SASL
EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a result code of EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a result code of
inappropriateAuthentication. inappropriateAuthentication.
After the above Bind operation failures, any client authentication After the above Bind operation failures, any client authentication
and authorization state of the LDAP association is lost (see and authorization state of the LDAP association is lost (see
[Protocol] section 4.2.1), so the LDAP association is in an [PROTOCOL] section 4.2.1), so the LDAP association is in an
anonymous state after the failure. The TLS session state is anonymous state after the failure. The TLS session state is
unaffected, though a server MAY end the TLS session, via a TLS unaffected, though a server MAY end the TLS session, via a TLS
close_notify message, based on the Bind failure (as it MAY at any close_notify message, based on the Bind failure (as it MAY at any
time). time).
5.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects 4.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects
Closure of the TLS session MUST cause the LDAP association to move Closure of the TLS session MUST cause the LDAP association to move
to an anonymous authentication and authorization state regardless of to an anonymous authentication and authorization state regardless of
the state established over TLS and regardless of the authentication the state established over TLS and regardless of the authentication
and authorization state prior to TLS session establishment. and authorization state prior to TLS session establishment.
6. LDAP Association State Transition Tables 5. LDAP Association State Transition Tables
To comprehensively diagram the various authentication and TLS states To comprehensively diagram the various authentication and TLS states
through which an LDAP association may pass, this section provides a through which an LDAP association may pass, this section provides a
state transition table to represent a state diagram for the various state transition table to represent a state diagram for the various
states through which an LDAP association may pass during the course states through which an LDAP association may pass during the course
of its existence and the actions that cause these changes in state. of its existence and the actions that cause these changes in state.
6.1. LDAP Association States 5.1. LDAP Association States
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
The following table lists the valid LDAP association states and The following table lists the valid LDAP association states and
provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used
in the state transition table in section 6.4. in the state transition table in section 5.4.
ID State Description ID State Description
-- -------------------------------------------------------------- -- --------------------------------------------------------------
S1 no Auth ID S1 Anonymous
no AuthZ ID no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection
[TLS: no Creds, OFF] no Authorization ID is in force
No security layer is in effect.
No TLS credentials have been provided
TLS: no Creds, OFF]
S2 no Auth ID S2 no Auth ID
no AuthZ ID no AuthZ ID
[TLS: no Creds, ON] [TLS: no Creds, ON]
S3 no Auth ID S3 no Auth ID
no AuthZ ID no AuthZ ID
[TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON] [TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON]
S4 Auth ID = Xn S4 Auth ID = Xn
AuthZ ID= Y AuthZ ID= Y
[TLS: no Creds, OFF] [TLS: no Creds, OFF]
S5 Auth ID = Xn S5 Auth ID = Xn
skipping to change at page 12, line 37 skipping to change at page 12, line 49
S6 Auth ID = Xn S6 Auth ID = Xn
AuthZ ID= Yn AuthZ ID= Yn
[TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON] [TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON]
S7 Auth ID = I S7 Auth ID = I
AuthZ ID= J AuthZ ID= J
[TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON] [TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON]
S8 Auth ID = I S8 Auth ID = I
AuthZ ID= K AuthZ ID= K
[TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON] [TLS: Creds Auth ID "I", ON]
6.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State 5.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State
The following table lists the actions that can affect the state of The following table lists the actions that can affect the state of
an LDAP association. The ID for each action is used in the state an LDAP association. The ID for each action is used in the state
transition table in section 6.4. transition table in section 5.4.
ID Action ID Action
-- ------------------------------------------------ -- ------------------------------------------------
A1 Client binds anonymously A1 Client binds anonymously
A2 Inappropriate authentication: client attempts an anonymous A2 Inappropriate authentication: client attempts an anonymous
bind or a bind without supplying credentials to a server that bind or a bind without supplying credentials to a server that
requires the client to provide some form of credentials. requires the client to provide some form of credentials.
A3 Client Start TLS request A3 Client Start TLS request
Server: client auth NOT required Server: client auth NOT required
A4 Client: Start TLS request A4 Client: Start TLS request
Server: client creds requested Server: client creds requested
Client: [TLS creds: Auth ID "I"] Client: [TLS creds: Auth ID "I"]
A5 Client or Server: send TLS closure alert ([Protocol] section A5 Client or Server: send TLS closure alert ([PROTOCOL] section
X) X)
A6 Client: Bind w/simple password or SASL mechanism (e.g. DIGEST- A6 Client: Bind w/simple password or SASL mechanism (e.g. DIGEST-
MD5 password, Kerberos, etc. except EXTERNAL [Auth ID "X" MD5 password, Kerberos, etc. -- except EXTERNAL [Auth ID "X"
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
maps to AuthZ ID "Y"] maps to AuthZ ID "Y"]
A7 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with credentials: AuthZ ID "J" A7 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with credentials: AuthZ ID "J"
[Explicit Assertion (section 5.2.1.2.2)] [Explicit Assertion (section 4.2.1.2.2)]
A8 Client Bind SASL EXTERNAL without credentials [Implicit A8 Client Bind SASL EXTERNAL without credentials [Implicit
Assertion (section 5.2 .1.2.1)] Assertion (section 4.2.1.2.1)]
A9 Client abandons a bind operation or bind operation fails
6.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes 5.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes
Certain changes in the state of an LDAP association are only allowed Certain changes in the state of an LDAP association are only allowed
if the server can affirmatively answer a question. These questions if the server can affirmatively answer a question. These questions
are applied as part of the criteria for allowing or disallowing a are applied as part of the criteria for allowing or disallowing a
state change in the state transition table in section 6.4. state change in the state transition table in section 5.4.
ID Decision Question ID Decision Question
-- -------------------------------------------------------------- -- --------------------------------------------------------------
D1 Can TLS Credentials Auth ID "I" be mapped to AuthZ ID "J"? D1 Can TLS Credentials Auth ID "I" be mapped to AuthZ ID "J"?
D2 Can a valid AuthZ ID "K" be derived from TLS Credentials Auth D2 Can a valid AuthZ ID "K" be derived from TLS Credentials Auth
ID "I"? ID "I"?
6.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table 5.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table
The LDAP Association table below lists the valid states for an LDAP The LDAP Association table below lists the valid states for an LDAP
association and the actions that could affect them. For any given association and the actions that could affect them. For any given
row in the table, the Current State column gives the state of an row in the table, the Current State column gives the state of an
LDAP association, the Action column gives an action that could LDAP association, the Action column gives an action that could
affect the state of an LDAP assocation, and the Next State column affect the state of an LDAP assocation, and the Next State column
gives the resulting state of an LDAP association after the action gives the resulting state of an LDAP association after the action
occurs. occurs.
The initial state for the state machine described in this table is The initial state for the state machine described in this table is
skipping to change at page 14, line 4 skipping to change at page 14, line 19
S1 A8 ? identity could be provided by S1 A8 ? identity could be provided by
another underlying mechanism such another underlying mechanism such
as IPSec. as IPSec.
S2 A1 S2 S2 A1 S2
S2 A2 S2 Error: Inappropriate authentication S2 A2 S2 Error: Inappropriate authentication
S2 A5 S1 S2 A5 S1
S2 A6 S5 S2 A6 S5
S2 A7 ? identity could be provided by S2 A7 ? identity could be provided by
another underlying mechanism such another underlying mechanism such
as IPSec. as IPSec.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
S2 A8 ? identity could be provided by S2 A8 ? identity could be provided by
another underlying mechanism such another underlying mechanism such
as IPSec. as IPSec.
S3 A1 S3 S3 A1 S3
S3 A2 S3 Error: Inappropriate authentication S3 A2 S3 Error: Inappropriate authentication
S3 A5 S1 S3 A5 S1
S3 A6 S6 S3 A6 S6
S3 A7 and D1=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials S3 A7 and D1=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials
S3 A7 and D1=YES S7 S3 A7 and D1=YES S7
S3 A8 and D2=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials S3 A8 and D2=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials
skipping to change at page 15, line 4 skipping to change at page 15, line 19
S7 A2 S7 Error: Inappropriate Authentication S7 A2 S7 Error: Inappropriate Authentication
S7 A5 S1 S7 A5 S1
S7 A6 S6 S7 A6 S6
S7 A7 S7 S7 A7 S7
S7 A8 and D2=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials S7 A8 and D2=NO S3 Error: InvalidCredentials
S7 A8 and D2=YES S8 S7 A8 and D2=YES S8
S8 A1 S3 S8 A1 S3
S8 A2 S8 Error: Inappropriate Authentication S8 A2 S8 Error: Inappropriate Authentication
S8 A5 S1 S8 A5 S1
S8 A6 S6 S8 A6 S6
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
S8 A7 and D1=NO S6 Error: InvalidCredentials S8 A7 and D1=NO S6 Error: InvalidCredentials
S8 A7 and D1=YES S7 S8 A7 and D1=YES S7
S8 A8 S8 S8 A8 S8
Any A9 S1 See [Protocol] section 4.2.1.
7. Anonymous Authentication 6. Anonymous Authentication
Directory operations that modify entries or access protected Directory operations that modify entries or access protected
attributes or entries generally require client authentication. attributes or entries generally require client authentication.
Clients that do not intend to perform any of these operations Clients that do not intend to perform any of these operations
typically use anonymous authentication. Servers SHOULD NOT allow typically use anonymous authentication. Servers SHOULD NOT allow
clients with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or clients with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or
access sensitive information in directory entries. access sensitive information in directory entries.
LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication, as LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication, as
defined in section 7.1. defined in section 6.1.
LDAP implementations MAY support anonymous authentication with TLS, LDAP implementations MAY support anonymous authentication with TLS,
as defined in section 7.2. as defined in section 6.2.
While there MAY be access control restrictions to prevent access to While there MAY be access control restrictions to prevent access to
directory entries, an LDAP server SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound directory entries, an LDAP server SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound
client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root
DSE. DSE.
An LDAP server MAY use other information about the client provided An LDAP server MAY use other information about the client provided
by the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even by the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even
to anonymously authenticated clients. to anonymously authenticated clients.
7.1. Anonymous Authentication Procedure 6.1. Anonymous Authentication Procedure
An LDAPv3 client that has not successfully completed a bind An LDAPv3 client that has not successfully completed a bind
operation on a connection is anonymously authenticated. See section operation on a connection is anonymously authenticated. See section
4.3.3. 3.3.3.
An LDAP client MAY also choose to explicitly bind anonymously. A An LDAP client MAY also choose to explicitly bind anonymously. A
client that wishes to do so MUST choose the simple authentication client that wishes to do so MUST choose the simple authentication
option in the Bind Request (see section 4.1) and set the password to option in the Bind Request (see section 3.1) and set the password to
be of zero length. (This is often done by LDAPv2 clients.) Typically be of zero length. (This is often done by LDAPv2 clients.) Typically
the name is also of zero length. the name is also of zero length.
7.2. Anonymous Authentication and TLS 6.2. Anonymous Authentication and TLS
An LDAP client MAY use the Start TLS operation (section 5) to An LDAP client MAY use the Start TLS operation (section 5) to
negotiate the use of TLS security [RFC2246]. If the client has not negotiate the use of TLS security [RFC2246]. If the client has not
bound beforehand, then until the client uses the EXTERNAL SASL bound beforehand, then until the client uses the EXTERNAL SASL
mechanism to negotiate the recognition of the client's certificate, mechanism to negotiate the recognition of the client's certificate,
the client is anonymously authenticated. the client is anonymously authenticated.
Recommendations on TLS ciphersuites are given in section 10. Recommendations on TLS ciphersuites are given in section 9.
An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate
during TLS negotiation MAY use a local security policy to determine during TLS negotiation MAY use a local security policy to determine
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client did whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client did
not present a certificate which could be validated. not present a certificate which could be validated.
8. Password-based Authentication 7. Password-based Authentication
This section discusses various options for performing password-based This section discusses various options for performing password-based
authentication to LDAPv3 compliant servers and the environments authentication to LDAPv3 compliant servers and the environments
suitable for their use. suitable for their use.
8.1. Simple Authentication 7.1. Simple Authentication
The LDAP "simple" authentication choice is not suitable for The LDAP "simple" authentication choice is not suitable for
authentication in environments where there is no network or authentication in environments where there is no network or
transport layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support transport layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support
authentication with the "simple" authentication choice when the authentication with the "simple" authentication choice when the
connection is protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined connection is protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined
in section 5. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication in section 4. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication
with the "simple" authentication choice unless the data on the with the "simple" authentication choice unless the data on the
connection is protected using TLS or other data confidentiality and connection is protected using TLS or other data confidentiality and
data integrity protection. data integrity protection.
8.2. Digest Authentication 7.2. Digest Authentication
LDAP servers that implement any password-based authentication method LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism
MUST support authentication with a password using the DIGEST-MD5 (other than simple anonymous bind) MUST implement the SASL
SASL mechanism for password protection. DIGEST-MD5 mechanism.
An LDAP client MAY determine whether the server supports this An LDAP client MAY determine whether the server supports this
mechanism by performing a search request on the root DSE, requesting mechanism by performing a search request on the root DSE, requesting
the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute, and checking whether the the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute, and checking whether the
string "DIGEST-MD5" is present as a value of this attribute. string "DIGEST-MD5" is present as a value of this attribute.
In the first stage of authentication, when the client is performing In the first stage of authentication, when the client is performing
an "initial authentication" as defined in section 2.1 of [RFC2831], an "initial authentication" as defined in section 2.1 of [RFC2831],
the client sends a bind request in which the version number is 3, the client sends a bind request in which the version number is 3,
the authentication choice is sasl, the sasl mechanism name is the authentication choice is sasl, the sasl mechanism name is
skipping to change at page 17, line 4 skipping to change at page 17, line 20
The client will send a bind request with a distinct message id, in The client will send a bind request with a distinct message id, in
which the version number is 3, the authentication choice is sasl, which the version number is 3, the authentication choice is sasl,
the sasl mechanism name is "DIGEST-MD5", and the credentials contain the sasl mechanism name is "DIGEST-MD5", and the credentials contain
the string defined by "digest-response" in section 2.1.2 of the string defined by "digest-response" in section 2.1.2 of
[RFC2831]. The serv-type is "ldap". [RFC2831]. The serv-type is "ldap".
The server will respond with a bind response in which the resultCode The server will respond with a bind response in which the resultCode
is either success, or an error indication. If the authentication is is either success, or an error indication. If the authentication is
successful and the server does not support subsequent successful and the server does not support subsequent
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
authentication, then the credentials field is absent. If the authentication, then the credentials field is absent. If the
authentication is successful and the server supports subsequent authentication is successful and the server supports subsequent
authentication, then the credentials field contains the string authentication, then the credentials field contains the string
defined by "response-auth" in section 2.1.3 of [RFC2831]. Support defined by "response-auth" in section 2.1.3 of [RFC2831]. Support
for subsequent authentication is OPTIONAL in clients and servers. for subsequent authentication is OPTIONAL in clients and servers.
8.3. "simple" authentication choice under TLS encryption 7.3. "simple" authentication choice under TLS encryption
Following the negotiation of an appropriate TLS ciphersuite Following the negotiation of an appropriate TLS ciphersuite
providing connection confidentiality [RFC2246], a client MAY providing connection confidentiality [RFC2246], a client MAY
authenticate to a directory that supports the simple authentication authenticate to a directory that supports the simple authentication
choice by performing a simple bind operation. choice by performing a simple bind operation.
The client will use the Start TLS operation [Protocol] to negotiate The client will use the Start TLS operation [PROTOCOL] to negotiate
the use of TLS security [RFC2246] on the connection to the LDAP the use of TLS security [RFC2246] on the connection to the LDAP
server. The client need not have bound to the directory beforehand. server. The client need not have bound to the directory beforehand.
For this authentication procedure to be successful, the client and For this authentication procedure to be successful, the client and
server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite which contains a bulk encryption server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite which contains a bulk encryption
algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations on cipher suites algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations on cipher suites
are given in section 10. are given in section 9.
Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client
MUST send an LDAP bind request with the version number of 3, the MUST send an LDAP bind request with the version number of 3, the
name field containing a DN, and the "simple" authentication choice, name field containing a DN, and the "simple" authentication choice,
containing a password. containing a password.
8.3.1. "simple" Authentication Choice 7.3.1. "simple" Authentication Choice
DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry
with an associated set of one or more passwords will compare the with an associated set of one or more passwords will compare the
presented password to the set of passwords associated with that presented password to the set of passwords associated with that
entry. If there is a match, then the server will respond with entry. If there is a match, then the server will respond with
resultCode success, otherwise the server will respond with resultCode success, otherwise the server will respond with
resultCode invalidCredentials. resultCode invalidCredentials.
8.4. Other authentication choices with TLS 7.4. Other authentication choices with TLS
It is also possible, following the negotiation of TLS, to perform a It is also possible, following the negotiation of TLS, to perform a
SASL authentication that does not involve the exchange of plaintext SASL authentication that does not involve the exchange of plaintext
reusable passwords. In this case the client and server need not reusable passwords. In this case the client and server need not
negotiate a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality if the only negotiate a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality if the only
service required is data integrity. service required is data integrity.
9. Certificate-based authentication 8. Certificate-based authentication
LDAP server implementations SHOULD support authentication via a LDAP server implementations SHOULD support authentication via a
client certificate in TLS, as defined in section 5.2.2. client certificate in TLS, as defined in section 4.2.2.
9.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS 8.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS
A user who has a public/private key pair in which the public key has A user who has a public/private key pair in which the public key has
been signed by a Certification Authority may use this key pair to been signed by a Certification Authority may use this key pair to
authenticate to the directory server if the user's certificate is authenticate to the directory server if the user's certificate is
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
requested by the server. The user's certificate subject field SHOULD requested by the server. The user's certificate subject field SHOULD
be the name of the user's directory entry, and the Certification be the name of the user's directory entry, and the Certification
Authority that issued the user's certificate must be sufficiently Authority that issued the user's certificate must be sufficiently
trusted by the directory server in order for the server to process trusted by the directory server in order for the server to process
the certificate. The means by which servers validate certificate the certificate. The means by which servers validate certificate
paths is outside the scope of this document. paths is outside the scope of this document.
A server MAY support mappings for certificates in which the subject A server MAY support mappings for certificates in which the subject
field name is different from the name of the user's directory entry. field name is different from the name of the user's directory entry.
A server which supports mappings of names MUST be capable of being A server which supports mappings of names MUST be capable of being
configured to support certificates for which no mapping is required. configured to support certificates for which no mapping is required.
The client will use the Start TLS operation [Protocol] to negotiate The client will use the Start TLS operation [PROTOCOL] to negotiate
the use of TLS security [RFC2246] on the connection to the LDAP the use of TLS security [RFC2246] on the connection to the LDAP
server. The client need not have bound to the directory beforehand. server. The client need not have bound to the directory beforehand.
In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The
client will provide its certificate to the server, and the server client will provide its certificate to the server, and the server
MUST perform a private key-based encryption, proving it has the MUST perform a private key-based encryption, proving it has the
private key associated with the certificate. private key associated with the certificate.
In deployments that require protection of sensitive data in transit, In deployments that require protection of sensitive data in transit,
the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite that contains a the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite that contains a
bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations
of cipher suites are given in section 10. of cipher suites are given in section 9.
The server MUST verify that the client's certificate is valid. The The server MUST verify that the client's certificate is valid. The
server will normally check that the certificate is issued by a known server will normally check that the certificate is issued by a known
certification authority (CA), and that none of the certificates on certification authority (CA), and that none of the certificates on
the client's certificate chain are invalid or revoked. There are the client's certificate chain are invalid or revoked. There are
several procedures by which the server can perform these checks. several procedures by which the server can perform these checks.
Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client
will send an LDAP bind request with the SASL "EXTERNAL" mechanism. will send an LDAP bind request with the SASL "EXTERNAL" mechanism.
10. TLS Ciphersuites 9. TLS Ciphersuites
A client or server that supports TLS MUST support
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA and MAY support other ciphersuites
offering equivalent or better protection.
Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites
that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues
include the following:
- The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality
protection for passwords and other data sent over the LDAP
connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that
some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection
while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality
protection may be vulnerable to being cracked using brute force
methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that
reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks.
Client and server implementers SHOULD carefully consider the
value of the password or data being protected versus the level
of confidentially protection provided by the ciphersuite to
ensure that the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite
is appropriate.
- The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the-
middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive
data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger
of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable.
9.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations
As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations
regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are
constantly changing, this list must not be considered exhaustive,
but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for
implementers.
The following ciphersuites defined in [RFC2246] MUST NOT be used for The following ciphersuites defined in [RFC2246] MUST NOT be used for
confidentiality protection of passwords or data: confidentiality protection of passwords or data:
TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
The following ciphersuites defined in [RFC2246] can be cracked The following ciphersuites defined in [RFC2246] can be cracked
easily (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000). easily (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000) and
These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality are NOT RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality protection of
protection of passwords or data. Client and server implementers passwords or data.
SHOULD carefully consider the value of the password or data being
protected before using these ciphersuites:
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks, and SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive attacks:
data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger of a
man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable:
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
A client or server that supports TLS MUST support 10. Security Considerations
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA and MAY support other ciphersuites
offering equivalent or better protection.
11. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the
(unsurprising) conclusion is that mandatory security is important (unsurprising) conclusion is that mandatory security is important
and that session confidentiality protection is required when and that session confidentiality protection is required when
snooping is a problem. snooping is a problem.
Servers are encouraged to prevent modifications by anonymous users. Servers are encouraged to prevent modifications by anonymous users.
Servers may also wish to minimize denial of service attacks by Servers may also wish to minimize denial of service attacks by
timing out idle connections, and returning the unwillingToPerform timing out idle connections, and returning the unwillingToPerform
result code rather than performing computationally expensive result code rather than performing computationally expensive
operations requested by unauthorized clients. operations requested by unauthorized clients.
Operational experience shows that clients can misuse unauthenticated Operational experience shows that clients can misuse unauthenticated
access (simple bind with name but no password). For this reason, access (simple bind with name but no password). For example, a
servers SHOULD by default reject authentication requests that have a client program might authenticate a user via LDAP and then grant
DN with an empty password with an error of invalidCredentials. access to information not stored in the directory on the basis of
completing a successful bind. Some implementations will return a
success response to a simple bind that consists of a user name and
an empty password thus leaving the impression that the client has
successfully authenticated the identity represented by the user
name, when in reality, the directory server has simply performed an
anonymous bind. For this reason, servers SHOULD by default reject
authentication requests that have a DN with an empty password with
an error of invalidCredentials.
Access control SHOULD be applied when reading sensitive information Access control SHOULD be applied when reading sensitive information
or updating directory information. or updating directory information.
A connection on which the client has not performed the Start TLS A connection on which the client has not performed the Start TLS
operation or negotiated a suitable SASL mechanism for connection operation or negotiated a suitable SASL mechanism for connection
integrity and encryption services is subject to man-in-the-middle integrity and encryption services is subject to man-in-the-middle
attacks to view and modify information in transit. attacks to view and modify information in transit.
11.1. Start TLS Security Considerations 10.1. Start TLS Security Considerations
The goals of using the TLS protocol with LDAP are to ensure The goals of using the TLS protocol with LDAP are to ensure
connection confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide connection confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide
for authentication. TLS expressly provides these capabilities, as for authentication. TLS expressly provides these capabilities, as
described in [RFC2246]. described in [RFC2246].
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
All security gained via use of the Start TLS operation is gained by All security gained via use of the Start TLS operation is gained by
the use of TLS itself. The Start TLS operation, on its own, does not the use of TLS itself. The Start TLS operation, on its own, does not
provide any additional security. provide any additional security.
Once established, TLS only provides for and ensures confidentiality Once established, TLS only provides for and ensures confidentiality
and integrity of the operations and data in transit over the LDAP and integrity of the operations and data in transit over the LDAP
association--and only if the implementations on the client and association--and only if the implementations on the client and
server support and negotiate it. The use of TLS does not provide or server support and negotiate it. The use of TLS does not provide or
ensure for confidentiality and/or non-repudiation of the data housed ensure for confidentiality and/or non-repudiation of the data housed
by an LDAP-based directory server. Nor does it secure the data from by an LDAP-based directory server. Nor does it secure the data from
skipping to change at page 20, line 46 skipping to change at page 21, line 46
measures are not otherwise provided by the TLS implementation. measures are not otherwise provided by the TLS implementation.
Server implementors SHOULD allow for server administrators to elect Server implementors SHOULD allow for server administrators to elect
whether and when connection confidentiality and/or integrity is whether and when connection confidentiality and/or integrity is
required, as well as elect whether and when client authentication required, as well as elect whether and when client authentication
via TLS is required. via TLS is required.
Additional security considerations relating to the EXTERNAL Additional security considerations relating to the EXTERNAL
mechanism to negotiate TLS can be found in [RFC2222] and [RFC2246]. mechanism to negotiate TLS can be found in [RFC2222] and [RFC2246].
12. Acknowledgements 11. IANA Considerations
The following IANA considerations apply to this document:
[To be completed]
Contributors
This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829 This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829
and RFC 2830. The author acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit and RFC 2830. The editor acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit
Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan , Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan ,
and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents. and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents.
RFC 2829 and RFC 2830 were products of the IETF LDAPEXT Working
Group. RFC 2251 was a product of the ASID Working Group. Acknowledgements
This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working
group. The contributions of its members is greatly appreciated. group. The contributions and suggestions made by its members in
shaping the contents and technical accuracy of this document is
greatly appreciated.
13. Normative References Normative References
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2222] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer [RFC2222] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)", draft-myers-saslrev-xx.txt, a work in progress. (SASL)", draft-myers-saslrev-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999. RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as [RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as
a SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000. a SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000.
[LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of
Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in
progress. progress.
[Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf- [PROTOCOL] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf-
ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[ROADMAP] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map", [ROADMAP] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map",
draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress.
14. Informative References Informative References
[RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May
2000. 2000.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
15. Author's Address Author's Address
Roger Harrison Roger Harrison
Novell, Inc. Novell, Inc.
1800 S. Novell Place 1800 S. Novell Place
Provo, UT 84606 Provo, UT 84606
+1 801 861 2642 +1 801 861 2642
roger_harrison@novell.com roger_harrison@novell.com
16. Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English. English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
skipping to change at page 23, line 5 skipping to change at page 24, line 14
from the server. A data origin authentication service AND data from the server. A data origin authentication service AND data
integrity service are required. integrity service are required.
(4) A read-write directory, containing no sensitive data; read (4) A read-write directory, containing no sensitive data; read
access is available to "anyone", update access to properly access is available to "anyone", update access to properly
authorized persons. TCP connection hijacking is not currently a authorized persons. TCP connection hijacking is not currently a
problem. This scenario requires data confidentiality for problem. This scenario requires data confidentiality for
sensitive authentication information AND data integrity for all sensitive authentication information AND data integrity for all
authentication information. authentication information.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
(5) A directory containing sensitive data. This scenario requires (5) A directory containing sensitive data. This scenario requires
data confidentiality protection AND secure authentication. data confidentiality protection AND secure authentication.
Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization: Definitions and Concepts Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization: Definitions and Concepts
This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships
regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity. regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity.
These concepts are used in describing how various security These concepts are used in describing how various security
approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization. approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization.
B.1. Access Control Policy B.1. Access Control Policy
An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection
of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or
other entities accessing those resources. A common expression of an other entities accessing those resources. A common expression of an
access control policy is an access control list. Security objects access control policy is an access control list. Security objects
and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression
of access control policies and their enforcement. Access control of access control policies and their enforcement. Access control
policies are typically expressed in terms of access control policies are typically expressed in terms of access control factors
attributes as described below. as described below.
B.2. Access Control Factors B.2. Access Control Factors
A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated
with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of
[Protocol]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and [PROTOCOL]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and
how to process the request. These are called access control factors how to process the request. These are called access control factors
(ACFs). They might include source IP address, encryption strength, (ACFs). They might include source IP address, encryption strength,
the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Some the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Some
factors may be specific to the request itself, others may be factors may be specific to the request itself, others may be
associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted, associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted,
others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental". others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental".
Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control
factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y
on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for
skipping to change at page 24, line 5 skipping to change at page 25, line 15
they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a
credential. credential.
There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used
depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by
the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets,
simple identity and password pairs. Note that an authentication simple identity and password pairs. Note that an authentication
mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used
with it. with it.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
B.4. Authorization Identity B.4. Authorization Identity
An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It
is the name of the user or other entity that requests that is the name of the user or other entity that requests that
operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed
in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform
operation Y on resource Z. operation Y on resource Z.
The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly
the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but
skipping to change at page 25, line 4 skipping to change at page 26, line 14
C.1. Changes to Section 1 C.1. Changes to Section 1
Version -01 Version -01
- Moved conventions used in document to a separate section. - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section.
C.2. Changes to Section 2 C.2. Changes to Section 2
Version -01 Version -01
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- Moved section to an appendix. - Moved section to an appendix.
C.3. Changes to Section 3 C.3. Changes to Section 3
Version -01 Version -01
- Moved section to an appendix. - Moved section to an appendix.
C.4 Changes to Section 4 C.4 Changes to Section 4
skipping to change at page 26, line 5 skipping to change at page 27, line 16
moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into
section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating: section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating:
a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where
confidentiality is not available. confidentiality is not available.
b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple
authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity
mechanisms are in force. mechanisms are in force.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP 2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP
implementations MUST support authentication with a passwordÓ") implementations MUST support authentication with a password...")
to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2). to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2).
C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1.
Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2 Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2
- Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the - Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the
DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAPv3 DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAPv3
implementations implementations
skipping to change at page 27, line 5 skipping to change at page 28, line 15
C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1.
Version -00 Version -00
- Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase - Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase
"to have issued the certificate" immediately after "to have issued the certificate" immediately after
"Certification Authority." "Certification Authority."
C.8. Changes to section 8. C.8. Changes to section 8.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
Version -00 Version -00
- Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is - Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is
covered explicitly in section 6. covered explicitly in section 6.
- Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph. - Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph.
- Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph. - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph.
- Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph. - Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph.
skipping to change at page 28, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 14
Version -00 Version -00
- Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to - Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to
be a day of CPU time in 2000. be a day of CPU time in 2000.
- Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use... - Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use...
and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the
second list of ciphersuites. second list of ciphersuites.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering - Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering
equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the
section. section.
C.11. Changes to Section 11. C.11. Changes to Section 11.
Version -01 Version -01
- Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material.
skipping to change at page 29, line 5 skipping to change at page 30, line 15
Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History
This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in
preparing this document. preparing this document.
E.0. General Editorial Changes E.0. General Editorial Changes
- All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this
document. document.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- A new section was created for the Bind Request - A new section was created for the Bind Request
- Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved
after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the
presentation of the Start TLS operations. The section was also presentation of the Start TLS operations. The section was also
subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being
described within it. described within it.
- All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within - All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within
the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 - the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 -
skipping to change at page 29, line 28 skipping to change at page 30, line 36
Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document
F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02 F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02
General General
- Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections
within the document, and fixed broken references. within the document, and fixed broken references.
- General editorial changes¨punctuation, spelling, formatting, - General editorial changes
--
-
-
punctuation, spelling, formatting,
etc. etc.
Section 1. Section 1.
- Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings - Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings
Section 2. Section 2.
- Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in - Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in
line with IETF security glossary. line with IETF security glossary.
skipping to change at page 29, line 50 skipping to change at page 31, line 4
Section 3. Section 3.
- Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security
glossary. glossary.
- Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS - Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS
negotiation must be discarded negotiation must be discarded
-Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL -Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL
negotiation must be discarded negotiation must be discarded
- Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify - Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify
intent intent
Section 4.4. Section 4.4.
- Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism - Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism
not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this
statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN
SASL mechanisms.) SASL mechanisms.)
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
Section 5.3.6 Section 5.3.6
- Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname - Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname
check. check.
Section 6 Section 6
- Added LDAP Association State Transition Tables to show the - Added LDAP Association State Transition Tables to show the
various states through which an LDAP association may pass along various states through which an LDAP association may pass along
skipping to change at page 31, line 5 skipping to change at page 32, line 16
binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value
received in this circumstance. received in this circumstance.
- -
Section 8.3.1 Section 8.3.1
- Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any - Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any
specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry
as a "user" entry. as a "user" entry.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
Section 11 Section 11
- Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated - Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated
access. access.
- Added security consideration requiring access control to be - Added security consideration requiring access control to be
applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be
applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory
information. information.
F.3. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-04 F.3. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-04
General General
- Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible. - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible.
(References to works in progress still use [name] format.) (References to works in progress still use [name] format.)
- Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in
line with specification in [Protocol] draft. line with specification in [PROTOCOL] draft.
- Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were resolved without - Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were resolved without
requiring changes to the document. requiring changes to the document.
Section 4.4.1. Section 4.4.1.
- Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in - Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in
the model draft. the model draft.
Section 5 Section 5
- Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to
[Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change. [PROTOCOL]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change.
- -
Section 6 Section 6
- Reviewed LDAP Association State table for completeness and - Reviewed LDAP Association State table for completeness and
accuracy. Renumbered actions A3, A4, and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4 accuracy. Renumbered actions A3, A4, and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4
respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure
that actions are in ascending order (makes analyzing the table that actions are in ascending order (makes analyzing the table
much more logical). Added action A2 to several states where it much more logical). Added action A2 to several states where it
was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to
states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue G.28. states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue G.28.
Section 11 Section 11
- Modified security consideration (originally added in -03) - Modified security consideration (originally added in -03)
requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated
users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have
access control applied to limit permissible actions. access control applied to limit permissible actions.
- -
Section 13 Section 13
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- Verified all normative references and moved informative - Verified all normative references and moved informative
references to a new section 14. references to a new section 14.
F.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05 F.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05
General General
- General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line - General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line
length issues, etc. length issues, etc.
- Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references - Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references
throughout. throughout.
- Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with - Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with
several changes to correct improper usage. several changes to correct improper usage.
Abstract Abstract
- Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed
due to movement of material on Bind and Start TLS operations to due to movement of material on Bind and Start TLS operations to
[Protocol] in this revision. [PROTOCOL] in this revision.
Section 3. Section 3.
- Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAPv3 Security Mechanisms" - Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAPv3 Security Mechanisms"
and removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the and removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the
motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the
previous section title, "Required Security Mechanisms", and previous section title, "Required Security Mechanisms", and
other text found in the section that everything in the section other text found in the section that everything in the section
was a requirement was a requirement
skipping to change at page 33, line 5 skipping to change at page 34, line 18
- Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL - Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL
security layer is negotiated..." security layer is negotiated..."
Section 4.3.3. Section 4.3.3.
- Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the - Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the
section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL
mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document. mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document.
Section 4.4.1. Section 4.4.1.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
- Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client - Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client
applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization
identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry. identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry.
This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus. This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus.
- Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The - Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The
uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..." uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..."
Section 5.1.1. Section 5.1.1.
skipping to change at page 34, line 5 skipping to change at page 35, line 16
- First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session - First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session
confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest
of document. of document.
Appendix A. Appendix A.
- Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios
removed from section 3. removed from section 3.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3 F.5. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-06
General
- Combined Section 2 (Introduction) and Section 3 (Motivation) and
moved Introduction to section 1. All following sections numbers
were decremented by one as result.
- Edits to fix typos, I-D nits, etc.
- Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from
WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further
discussion.
Section 1
- Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7).
Section 2.1
- Changed definition of "LDAP association" and added terms,
"connection" and "TLS connection" to bring usage in line with
[Protocol].
Section 4.1.6
- Clarified sentence stating that the client MUST NOT use derived
forms of DNS names.
Section 5.1
- Began edits to LDAP Association state table to clarify meaning
of various states and actions.
- Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added
appropriate transitions to the state transition table to
accommodate it.
Section 7.2
- Replaced first paragraph to clarify that the "DIGEST-MD5" SASL
mechanism is required to implement.
Section 9
- Rewrote the section to make the advice more applicable over the
long term, i.e. more "timeless." The intent of content in the
original section was preserved.
Section 10
- Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse
of unauthenticated access.
Appendix G. Issues to be Resolved Appendix G. Issues to be Resolved
This appendix lists open questions and issues that need to be This appendix lists open questions and issues that need to be
resolved before work on this document is deemed complete. resolved before work on this document is deemed complete.
G.1. G.1.
Section 1 lists 6 security mechanisms that can be used by LDAP Section 1 lists 6 security mechanisms that can be used by LDAP
servers. I'm not sure what mechanism 5, "Resource limitation by servers. I'm not sure what mechanism 5, "Resource limitation by
skipping to change at page 35, line 4 skipping to change at page 37, line 16
Section 4 paragraph 3: What is meant by the phrase, "this means that Section 4 paragraph 3: What is meant by the phrase, "this means that
either this data is useless for faking authentication (like the Unix either this data is useless for faking authentication (like the Unix
"/etc/passwd" file format used to be)?" "/etc/passwd" file format used to be)?"
Status: resolved. Discussion at IETF 52 along with discussions with Status: resolved. Discussion at IETF 52 along with discussions with
the original authors of this material have convinced us that this the original authors of this material have convinced us that this
reference is simply too arcane to be left in place. In -03 the text reference is simply too arcane to be left in place. In -03 the text
has been modified to focus on the need to either update password has been modified to focus on the need to either update password
information in a protected fashion outside of the protocol or to information in a protected fashion outside of the protocol or to
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
update it in session well protected against snooping, and the update it in session well protected against snooping, and the
reference to /etc/passwd has been removed. reference to /etc/passwd has been removed.
G.6. G.6.
Section 4 paragraph 7 begins: "For a directory needing session Section 4 paragraph 7 begins: "For a directory needing session
protection..." Is this referring to data confidentiality or data protection..." Is this referring to data confidentiality or data
integrity or both? integrity or both?
Status: resolved. Changed wording to say, "For a directory needing Status: resolved. Changed wording to say, "For a directory needing
skipping to change at page 36, line 5 skipping to change at page 38, line 16
both before and after SASL negotiation UNLESS they use a both before and after SASL negotiation UNLESS they use a
different trusted source to determine available supported SASL different trusted source to determine available supported SASL
mechanisms. mechanisms.
Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that Approach 1 was Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that Approach 1 was
probably best. I ended up keeping the basic structure similar to the probably best. I ended up keeping the basic structure similar to the
original to meet this intent. original to meet this intent.
G.9. G.9.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
Section 6.3.1 states: "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request Section 6.3.1 states: "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request
to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute will... compare to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute will... compare
[each value in the named user's entry]... with the presented [each value in the named user's entry]... with the presented
password." This implies that this applies only to user entries with password." This implies that this applies only to user entries with
userPassword attributes. What about other types of entries that userPassword attributes. What about other types of entries that
might allow passwords and might store in the password information in might allow passwords and might store in the password information in
other attributes? Do we want to make this text more general? other attributes? Do we want to make this text more general?
Status: resolved in -03 draft by generalizing section 8.3.1 to not Status: resolved in -03 draft by generalizing section 8.3.1 to not
refer to any specific password attribute and by removing the term refer to any specific password attribute and by removing the term
skipping to change at page 37, line 4 skipping to change at page 39, line 16
sound mandatory to provide BOTH password authentication AND DIGEST- sound mandatory to provide BOTH password authentication AND DIGEST-
MD5: MD5:
"6.2. Digest authentication "6.2. Digest authentication
LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password
using the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism for password protection, as using the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism for password protection, as
defined in section 6.1." defined in section 6.1."
The thing is for acl it would be nice (though not critical) to be The thing is for acl it would be nice (though not critical) to be
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
able to default the required authentication level for a subject to a able to default the required authentication level for a subject to a
single "fairly secure" mechanism--if there is no such mandatory single "fairly secure" mechanism--if there is no such mandatory
authentication scheme then you cannot do that. (Source: Rob Byrne) authentication scheme then you cannot do that. (Source: Rob Byrne)
Status: resolved. -00 version of the draft added a sentence at the Status: resolved. -00 version of the draft added a sentence at the
beginning of section 8.2 stating that LDAP server implementations beginning of section 8.2 stating that LDAP server implementations
must support this method. must support this method.
G.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested G.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested
skipping to change at page 38, line 5 skipping to change at page 40, line 15
http://www.stanford.edu/~hodges/doc/LDAPAssociationStateDiagram- http://www.stanford.edu/~hodges/doc/LDAPAssociationStateDiagram-
1999-12-14.html 1999-12-14.html
(Source: Jeff Hodges) (Source: Jeff Hodges)
Status: In Process. Table provided in -03. Review of content for Status: In Process. Table provided in -03. Review of content for
accuracy in -04. Additional review is needed, plus comments from WG accuracy in -04. Additional review is needed, plus comments from WG
members indicate that additional description of each state's meaning members indicate that additional description of each state's meaning
would be helpful. would be helpful.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
G.16. Empty sasl credentials question G.16. Empty sasl credentials question
I spent some more time looking microscopically at ldap-auth-methods I spent some more time looking microscopically at ldap-auth-methods
and ldap-ext-tls drafts. The drafts say that the credential must and ldap-ext-tls drafts. The drafts say that the credential must
have the form dn:xxx or u:xxx or be absent, and although they don't have the form dn:xxx or u:xxx or be absent, and although they don't
say what to do in the case of an empty octet string I would say that say what to do in the case of an empty octet string I would say that
we could send protocolError (claim it is a bad PDU). we could send protocolError (claim it is a bad PDU).
There is still the question of what to do if the credential is 'dn:' There is still the question of what to do if the credential is 'dn:'
(or 'u:') followed by the empty string. (Source: ariel@columbia.edu (or 'u:') followed by the empty string. (Source: ariel@columbia.edu
skipping to change at page 39, line 4 skipping to change at page 41, line 16
If the 'dn:' form of sasl creds is used, is it the intention of the If the 'dn:' form of sasl creds is used, is it the intention of the
draft(ers) that this DN must exist in the directory and the client draft(ers) that this DN must exist in the directory and the client
will have the privileges associated with that entry, or can the will have the privileges associated with that entry, or can the
server map the sasl DN to perhaps some other DN in the directory, server map the sasl DN to perhaps some other DN in the directory,
in an implementation-dependent fashion? in an implementation-dependent fashion?
We already know that if *no* sasl credentials are presented, the DN We already know that if *no* sasl credentials are presented, the DN
or altname in the client certificate may be mapped to a DN in an or altname in the client certificate may be mapped to a DN in an
implementation-dependent fashion, or indeed to something not in the implementation-dependent fashion, or indeed to something not in the
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
directory at all. (Right?) (Source: ariel@columbia.edu via Jeff directory at all. (Right?) (Source: ariel@columbia.edu via Jeff
Hodges) Hodges)
Status: resolved. (11/12/02)Based on my research I propose that the Status: resolved. (11/12/02)Based on my research I propose that the
DN MUST exist in the directory when the DN form of sasl creds is DN MUST exist in the directory when the DN form of sasl creds is
used. I have made this proposal to the ldapbis mailing list. used. I have made this proposal to the ldapbis mailing list.
(11/21/02) Feedback from mailing list has proposed removing this (11/21/02) Feedback' from mailing list has proposed removing this
paragraph entirely because (1) explicit assertion of authorization paragraph entirely because (1) explicit assertion of authorization
identity should only be done when proxying (2) mapping of the identity should only be done when proxying (2) mapping of the
asserted authorization identity is implementation specific and asserted authorization identity is implementation specific and
policy driven [SASL] section 4.2, and (3) keeping this paragraph is policy driven [SASL] section 4.2, and (3) keeping this paragraph is
not required for interoperability. not required for interoperability.
G.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism G.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism
We need to specify whether the DN field in Bind operation can/cannot We need to specify whether the DN field in Bind operation can/cannot
be used when SASL mechanism is specified. (source: RL Bob) be used when SASL mechanism is specified. (source: RL Bob)
Status: resolved. (-03) Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two Status: resolved. (-03) Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two
sentences were added to section 4.3 indicating that clients SHOULD sentences were added to section 4.3 indicating that clients SHOULD
NOT send a DN value when binding with the sasl choice and servers NOT send a DN value when binding with the sasl choice and servers
SHALL ignore any value received in this circumstance. During edits SHALL ignore any value received in this circumstance. During edits
for -04 version of draft it was noted that [Protocol] section 4.2 for -04 version of draft it was noted that [PROTOCOL] section 4.2
conflicts with this draft. The editor of [Protocol] has been conflicts with this draft. The editor of [PROTOCOL] has been
notified of the discrepancy, and they have been handled. notified of the discrepancy, and they have been handled.
G.20. Bind states G.20. Bind states
Differences between unauthenticated and anonymous. There are four Differences between unauthenticated and anonymous. There are four
states you can get into. One is completely undefined (this is now states you can get into. One is completely undefined (this is now
explicitly called out in [Protocol]). This text needs to be moved explicitly called out in [PROTOCOL]). This text needs to be moved
from [Protocol] to this draft. (source: Jim Sermersheim) from [PROTOCOL] to this draft. (source: Jim Sermersheim)
Status: Resolved. There are four states: (1) no name, no password Status: Resolved. There are four states: (1) no name, no password
(anon); (2) name, no password (anon); (3) no name, password (anon); (2) name, no password (anon); (3) no name, password
(invalid); (4) name, password (simple bind). States 1, 2, and 4 are (invalid); (4) name, password (simple bind). States 1, 2, and 4 are
called out in [AuthMeth]. State 3 is called out in [Protocol]; this called out in [AuthMeth]. State 3 is called out in [PROTOCOL]; this
seems appropriate based on review of alternatives. seems appropriate based on review of alternatives.
G.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access G.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access
Add a security consideration that operational experience shows that Add a security consideration that operational experience shows that
clients can misuse unauthenticated access (simple bind with name but clients can misuse unauthenticated access (simple bind with name but
no password). Servers SHOULD by default reject authentication no password). Servers SHOULD by default reject authentication
requests that have a DN with an empty password with an error of requests that have a DN with an empty password with an error of
invalidCredentials. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga and Chris Newman (Sun)) invalidCredentials. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga and Chris Newman (Sun))
Status: Resolved. Added to security considerations in ű03. Status: Resolved. Added to security considerations in -
-03.
G.22. Need to move StartTLS protocol information to [Protocol] G.22. Need to move StartTLS protocol information to [PROTOCOL]
Status: Resolved. Removed Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 for -04 and Status: Resolved. Removed Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 for -04 and
they are [Protocol] -11. they are [PROTOCOL] -11.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
G.23. Split Normative and Non-normative references into separate G.23. Split Normative and Non-normative references into separate
sections. sections.
Status: Resolved. Changes made in -04 Status: Resolved. Changes made in -04
G.24. What is the authentication state if a Bind operation is G.24. What is the authentication state if a Bind operation is
abandoned? abandoned?
Status: In process. (11/12/02) This text was suggested to be added Status: Resolved.
to [Protocol] -11 to cover what happens if a bind operation is
abandoned:
"If a server receives an Abandon request for a Bind operation, the (3/24/03) This following text appears in section 4.2.1 of [PROTOCOL]
server SHOULD leave the connection in the anonymous state. Clients revision -13 to cover what happens if a bind operation is abandoned:
that abandon a Bind operation MUST rebind after abandoning the Bind
request in order to have a known authentication state on the
connection."
(11/21/02) Jim Sermersheim prposed the following wording on the A failed or abandoned Bind Operation has the effect of leaving the
ldapbis mail list: "Authentication from earlier binds are connection in an anonymous state. To arrive at a known
subsequently ignored. A failed or abandoned Bind Operation has the authentication state after abandoning a bind operation, clients may
effect of leaving the connection in an anonymous state. Clients MUST unbind, rebind, or make use of the BindResponse.
rebind after abandoning a bind operation in order to determine a
known authentication state."
Once this is resolved in [Protocol] the state table in section 6 of (6/28/03): The state table in section 6 of [AuthMeth] has been
[AuthMeth] will need to be updated to reflect the consensus wording. updated to reflect this wording.
G.25. Difference between checking server hostname and server's G.25. Difference between checking server hostname and server's
canonical DNS name in Server Identity Check? canonical DNS name in Server Identity Check?
Section 5.1.6: I now understand the intent of the check (prevent Section 4.1.6: I now understand the intent of the check (prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks). But what is the subtle difference man-in-the-middle attacks). But what is the subtle difference
between the "server hostname" and the "server's canonical DNS name"? between the "server hostname" and the "server's canonical DNS name"?
(Source: Tim Hahn) (Source: Tim Hahn)
Status: In Process. (11/12/02) Sent suggested wording change to this Status: In Process.
paragraph to the ldapbis mail list and also asked for opinion as to
whether we should discuss the distinction between server DNS (11/12/02) Sent suggested wording change to this paragraph to the
hostname and server canonical DNS hostname in [AuthMeth]. ldapbis mail list and also asked for opinion as to whether we should
discuss the distinction between server DNS hostname and server
canonical DNS hostname in [AuthMeth].
(11/21/02): RL Bob Morgan will provide wording that allows (11/21/02): RL Bob Morgan will provide wording that allows
derivations of the name that are provided securely. derivations of the name that are provided securely.
6.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records (6/28/03): posted to the WG list asking Bob or any other WG member
who is knowledgeable about the issues involved to help me with
wording or other information I can use to make this change and close
the work item.
Section 5.1.6: What should be done if the server was found using SRV G.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records
Section 4.1.6: What should be done if the server was found using SRV
records based on the "locate" draft/RFC? (Source: Tim Hahn). records based on the "locate" draft/RFC? (Source: Tim Hahn).
Status: Resolved. Section 5 of draft-ietf-ldapext-locate-08 Status: Resolved. Section 5 of draft-ietf-ldapext-locate-08
specifically calls out how the server identity should be performed specifically calls out how the server identity should be performed
if the server is located using the method defined in that draft. if the server is located using the method defined in that draft.
Authentication Methods for LDAPv3
This is the right location for this information, and the coverage This is the right location for this information, and the coverage
appears to be adequate. appears to be adequate.
G.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association. G.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association.
Section 5.4.1 of authmeth -03 (section 4.1 of RFC2830) states that Section 4.4.1 of authmeth -03 (section 4.1 of RFC2830) states that
TLS closure alert will leave the LDAP association intact. Contrast TLS closure alert will leave the LDAP association intact. Contrast
this with Section 5.5.2 (section 5.2 of RFC2830) that says that the this with Section 4.5.2 (section 5.2 of RFC2830) that says that the
closure of the TLS connection MUST cause the LDAP association to closure of the TLS connection MUST cause the LDAP association to
move to an anonymous authentication. move to an anonymous authentication.
Status: in process. (11/12/02) This is actually a [Protocol] issue Status: Resolved. (11/12/02) This is actually a [PROTOCOL] issue
because these sections have now been moved to [Protocol] -11. I have because these sections have now been moved to [PROTOCOL] -11. I have
proposed the following text for Section 5.4.1 of [AuthMeth] -03 proposed the following text for Section 4.4.1 of [AuthMeth] -03
(section 4.13.3.1 of [Protocol]) to resolve this apparent (section 4.13.3.1 of [PROTOCOL]) to resolve this apparent
discrepancy: discrepancy:
"Either the client or server MAY terminate the TLS connection on an "Either the client or server MAY terminate the TLS connection on an
LDAP association by sending a TLS closure alert. The LDAP LDAP association by sending a TLS closure alert. The LDAP
connection remains open for further communication after TLS closure connection remains open for further communication after TLS closure
occurs although the authentication state of the LDAP connection is occurs although the authentication state of the LDAP connection is
affected (see [AuthMeth] section 5.2.2). affected (see [AuthMeth] section 4.2.2).
(11/21/02): resolution to this is expected in [Protocol] -12 (11/21/02): resolution to this is expected in [PROTOCOL] -12
(06/28/03): [PROTOCOL]-15 clarifies that a TLS closure alert
terminates the TLS connection while leaving the LDAP connection
intact. The authentication state table in [AuthMeth] specifies the
effect on the LDAP association.
G.28 Ordering of external sources of authorization identities G.28 Ordering of external sources of authorization identities
Section 4.3.2 implies that external sources of authorization Section 4.3.2 implies that external sources of authorization
identities other than TLS are permitted. What is the behavior when identities other than TLS are permitted. What is the behavior when
two external sources of authentication credentials are available two external sources of authentication credentials are available
(e.g. TLS and IPsec are both present (is this possible?)) and a SASL (e.g. TLS and IPsec are both present (is this possible?)) and a SASL
EXTERNAL Bind operation is performed? EXTERNAL Bind operation is performed?
Status: resolved. 11/20/02: Resolved by Section 4.2 of [SASL] which Status: resolved. 11/20/02: Resolved by Section 4.2 of [SASL] which
states that the decision to allow or disallow the asserted identity states that the decision to allow or disallow the asserted identity
is based on an implementation defined policy. is based on an implementation defined policy.
G.29 Rewrite of Section 10, TLS Ciphersuites G.29 Rewrite of Section 9, TLS Ciphersuites
This section contains anachronistic references and needs to be This section contains anachronistic references and needs to be
updated/rewritten in a way that provides useful guidance for future updated/rewritten in a way that provides useful guidance for future
readers in a way that will transcend the passage of time. readers in a way that will transcend the passage of time.
Status: Resolved. (6/28/03): Rewrote the section to cover the
general issues and considerations involved in selecting TLS
ciphersuites.
G.30 Update to Appendix A, Example Deployment Scenarios G.30 Update to Appendix A, Example Deployment Scenarios
This section needs to be updated to indicate which security This section needs to be updated to indicate which security
mechanisms and/or combinations of security mechanisms described mechanisms and/or combinations of security mechanisms described
elsewhere in the document can provide the types of protections elsewhere in the document can provide the types of protections
suggested in this appendix. suggested in this appendix.
G.31 Use of PLAIN SASL Mechanism
At least one LDAP server implementer has found the SASL "PLAIN"
mechanism useful in authenticating to legacy systems that do not
represent authentication identities as DNs. Section 3.3.1 appears to
implicitly disallow the use of the SASL "PLAIN" mechanism with LDAP.
Should we allow the use of this mechanism? I.e. is this "SASL"
"PLAIN" MUST NOT be used with LDAP, or is it simply that LDAP
doesn't define bindings for these mechanism. If SASL "PLAIN" is
allowed, the following adjustments will be needed to section 3.3.1:
(a) change section heading, (b) remove reference to "PLAIN" in the
section, (c) ensure wording of last sentence regarding non-DN
AuthZIDs is consistent with rest of the section.
Status: In process.
(6/28/03): email to WG list stating issue and asking if we should
remove the reference to SASL "PLAIN".
G.32 Clarification on use of SASL mechanisms
Section 3.3.1: BTW, what _are_ the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL
mechanisms? They are not defined in RFC2222. If you refer to other
SASL mechanisms than those in rfc2222, Maybe you should only list
which mechanisms _are_used, instead of which ones are _not. (Source:
Hallvard Furuseth)
G.33 Clarification on use of password protection based on AuthZID form
Section 3.3.1: "If an authorization identity of a form different
from a DN is requested by the client, a mechanism that protects the
password in transit SHOULD be used." What has that to do with DNs?
A mechanism that protects the password in transit should be used in
any case, shouldn't it?
G.34 Clarification on use of matching rules in Server Identity Check
The text in section 4.1.6 isn't explicit on whether all rules apply
to both CN and dNSName values. The text should be clear as to which
rules apply to which values.... in particular, the wildcard
rules. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga)
G.35 Requested Additions to Security Considerations
Requested to mention hostile servers which the user might have been
fooled to into contacting. Which mechanisms that are standardized by
the LDAP standard do/do not disclose the user's password to the
server? (Or to servers doing man-in-the-middle attack? Or is that a
stupid question?)
Requested to mention denial of service attacks. (Source: Hallvard
Furuseth)
 End of changes. 

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