INTERNET-DRAFT                                      Editor: R. Harrison
draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-09.txt
draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-10.txt                         Novell, Inc.
Obsoletes: 2251, 2829, 2830                             5 December                                  10 February 2003
Intended Category: Draft Standard

                     LDAP: Authentication Methods
                                  and
                 Connection Level Security Mechanisms

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
   revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.  Technical discussion of
   this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Revision Working
   Group mailing list <ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org>.  Please send
   editorial comments directly to the author
   <roger_harrison@novell.com>.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes authentication methods and connection level
   security mechanisms of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
   (LDAP).

   This document also details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer
   Security) using the Start TLS operation.

   This document also details the simple Bind authentication method
   including anonymous, unauthenticated, and plain-text password
   methods and the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) Bind
   authentication method including the use of DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL
   mechanisms.

   This document also details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer
   Security) using the Start TLS operation.

   This document describes various authentication and authorization
   states through which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the
   actions that trigger these state changes.

1. Introduction

   The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Protocol] is a
   powerful access protocol for directories. It offers means

Table of
   searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content, and ways Contents

   1. Introduction................................................3
   1.1. Relationship to access a rich set Other Documents...........................5
   2. Conventions Used in this Document...........................5
   2.1. Glossary of security functions.

   It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all
   LDAP clients Terms.........................................5
   2.2. Security Terms and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be
   a minimum subset Concepts...............................5
   2.3. Keywords..................................................6
   3. Start TLS Operation.........................................6
   3.1. Sequencing of security functions that is common to all
   implementations that claim LDAP conformance.

   Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include:

   (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval
       operations,

   (2) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication
       information by monitoring others' access,

   (3) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others'
       access,

   (4) Unauthorized modification the Start TLS Operation ....................6
   3.1.1. Start TLS Request.......................................6
   3.1.2. Start TLS Response......................................7
   3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation.................................7
   3.1.4. Discovery of directory data,

   (5) Unauthorized modification Resultant Security Level...................7
   3.1.5. Server Identity Check...................................7
   3.1.6. Refresh of configuration information,

   (6) Unauthorized or excessive use Server Capabilities Information..............8
   3.2. Effects of resources (denial TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity.......8
   3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects....................9
   3.2.2. Client Assertion of service), Authorization Identity..............9
   3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects..........................9
   4. Bind Operation..............................................9
   4.1. Simple Authentication.....................................9
   4.2. SASL Authentication.......................................9
   5. Anonymous LDAP Association on Unbound Connections......... 10
   6. Anonymous Authentication ................................. 10
   7. Simple Authentication..................................... 10
   8. SASL Authentication Profile............................... 11
   8.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP.............................. 11
   8.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and

   (7) Spoofing Protocol Exchange.... 11
   8.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect.. 12
   8.4. Determination of directory: Tricking a client into believing Supported SASL Mechanisms.............. 12
   8.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers.................... 13
   9. SASL EXTERNAL Mechanism................................... 13
   9.1. Implicit Assertion...................................... 13
   9.2. Explicit Assertion...................................... 14
   9.3. SASL Authorization Identity............................. 14
   9.4 Authorization Identity Syntax............................ 14
   10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism................................ 15
   11. General Requirements for Password-based Authentication .. 15
   12. Invalidated Associations................................. 16
   13. TLS Ciphersuites......................................... 16
   13.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations....................... 17
   14. Security Considerations ................................. 18
   14.1. Start TLS Security Considerations...................... 18
   15. IANA Considerations...................................... 19
   Acknowledgements............................................. 19
   Normative References......................................... 19
   Informative References....................................... 21
   Author's Address............................................. 21
   Appendix A. LDAP Association State Transition Tables......... 21
   A.1. LDAP Association States................................. 21
   A.2. Actions that
       information came from the directory when in fact it did not,
       either by modifying data Affect LDAP Association State.............. 22
   A.3. Decisions Used in transit or misdirecting the client's
       connection. Also, tricking a client into sending privileged
       information Making LDAP Association State Changes. 22
   A.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table................. 22
   Appendix B. Example Deployment Scenarios..................... 23
   Appendix C. Authentication and Authorization Concepts........ 24
   C.1. Access Control Policy................................... 24
   C.2. Access Control Factors ................................. 24
   C.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity .................. 25
   C.4. Authorization Identity ................................. 25
   Appendix D. RFC 2829 Change History ......................... 25
   Appendix E. RFC 2830 Change History ......................... 29
   Appendix F. RFC 2251 Change History ......................... 30
   Appendix G. Change History to a hostile entity that appears Combined Document.............. 30
   Appendix H. Issues to be the directory
       but Resolved............................ 41

1. Introduction

   The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Protocol] is not.

   Threats (1), (4), (5) a
   powerful access protocol for directories. It offers means of
   searching, retrieving and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats
   (2), (3) manipulating directory content, and (7) are due ways
   to hostile agents on the path between
   client and server or hostile agents posing as access a server.

   LDAP can be protected with the following security mechanisms:

   (1) Client authentication by means rich set of the Secure Authentication security functions.

   It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all
   LDAP clients and
       Security Layer (SASL) [SASL] mechanism set, possibly backed by servers on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [TLS] credentials exchange
       mechanism,
   (2) Client authorization by means of access control based on the
       requestor's authenticated identity,

   (3) Data integrity protection by means Internet; therefore there has to be
   a minimum subset of TLS or SASL mechanisms
       with security layers functions that provide is common to all
   implementations that claim LDAP conformance.

   Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include:

   (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval
       operations,

   (2) Unauthorized access to directory data integrity services,

   (4) Data confidentiality protection against snooping by means monitoring others'
       access,

   (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication
       information by monitoring others' access,

   (4) Unauthorized modification of the
       TLS protocol or SASL mechanisms that provide data
       confidentiality services, directory data,
   (5) Server resource usage limitation by means Unauthorized modification of administrative
       service limits configured on the server, and configuration information,

   (6) Server authentication by means Denial of the TLS protocol Service: Use of resources (commonly in excess) in a
       manner intended to deny service to others. and

   (7) Spoofing: Tricking a user or SASL
       mechanism.

   At client into believing that
       information came from the moment, imposition of access controls is done directory when in fact it did not,
       either by means
   outside the scope of LDAP.

   It seems clear that allowing any implementation, faced with modifying data in transit or misdirecting the
   above requirements, client's
       connection. Tricking a user or client into sending privileged
       information to simply pick and choose among the possible
   alternatives is not a strategy hostile entity that is likely to lead appears to
   interoperability. In the absence of mandates, clients will be
   written that do not support any security function supported by the
   server, or worse, they will support only mechanisms like the LDAP
   simple bind using clear text passwords that provide inadequate
   security for most circumstances.

   Given the presence of the Directory, there directory
       server but is not. Tricking a strong desire to see
   mechanisms where identities take the form of an LDAP distinguished
   name [LDAPDN] and authentication data can be stored in the
   directory. This means directory server into believing
       that this data must be updated outside the
   protocol or only updated information came from a particular client when in sessions well protected against
   snooping. It is also desirable to allow authentication methods fact it
       came from a hostile entity.

   (8) Hijacking of prototocol sessions.

   Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to
   carry identities not represented as LDAP DNs that hostile clients. Threats
   (2), (3) and (7) are familiar due to hostile agents on the user path between
   client and server or that are used in other systems.

     The set of security mechanisms provided in hostile agents posing as a server, e.g. IP
   spoofing.

   LDAP and described in
     this document is intended to meet offers the following security needs for a wide
     range mechanisms:

   (1) Authentication by means of deployment scenarios and still provide the Bind operation.  The Bind
       operation provides a high degree of
     interoperability among various LDAP implementations simple method which supports anonymous,
       unauthenticated, and authenticated with password mechanisms, and
     deployments. Appendix A contains example deployment scenarios that
     list
       the Secure Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) method which
       supports a wide variety of authentication mechanisms that might and which
       may be used extended to achieve a reasonable
     level support additional methods of security in various circumstances.

1.1. Relationship to Other Documents

   This document is an integral part authentication.

   (2) Client authorization by means of access control based on the LDAP Technical
   Specification [Roadmap].

   This document obsoletes RFC 2829.

   Sections 2 and 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted
       requestor's authenticated identity,

   (3) Data integrity protection by [Protocol].  The
   remainder means of RFC 2830 is obsoleted TLS or SASL mechanisms
       with security layers that provide data integrity services,

   (4) Data confidentiality protection against snooping by this document.

2. Conventions Used in this Document

2.1. Glossary means of Terms

   The following terms are used in this document. To aid the reader,
   these terms are defined here.

     - "user" represents any human or application entity which is
       accessing the directory using a directory client.  A directory
       client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent
       (DUA).

     - "connection" and "LDAP connection" both refer to the underlying
       transport protocol connection between two
       TLS protocol peers.

     - "TLS connection" refers to a TLS-protected LDAP connection.

     - "association" and "LDAP association" both refer to the
       association or SASL mechanisms that provide data
       confidentiality services,

   (5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative
       service limits configured on the LDAP connection server, and its current

   (6) Server authentication and authorization state.

2.2. Security Terms and Concepts

   In general, security terms in this document are used consistently
   with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several
   terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and
   authorization are presented in Appendix B by means of this document. While the formal definition TLS protocol or SASL
       mechanism.

   At the moment, imposition of these terms and concepts access controls is done by means
   outside the scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite LDAP.

   It seems clear that allowing any implementation, faced with the
   above requirements, to
   understanding much simply pick and choose among the possible
   alternatives is not a strategy that is likely to lead to
   interoperability. In the absence of mandates, clients will be
   written that do not support any security function supported by the material in this document. Readers who are
   unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged
   server, or worse, they will support only clear text passwords that
   provide inadequate security for most circumstances.

   Given the presence of the Directory, there is a strong desire to review
   Appendix B before reading see
   mechanisms where identities take the remainder form of this document.

2.3. Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", an LDAP distinguished
   name [LDAPDN] and "OPTIONAL" authentication data can be stored in the
   directory. This means that this
   document are to data must be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Bind Operation

   The Bind operation defined updated outside the
   protocol or only updated in section 4.2 of [Protocol] allows
   authentication information sessions well protected against
   snooping. It is also desirable to be exchanged between the client and
   server allow authentication methods to establish a new
   carry identities not represented as LDAP association. DNs that are familiar to
   the user or that are used in other systems.

   The new LDAP association
   is established upon successful completion set of the authentication
   exchange.

3.1. Implied Anonymous Bind on security mechanisms provided in LDAP Association

   Prior and described in
   this document is intended to meet the successful completion of security needs for a Bind operation and during
   any subsequent authentication exchange, the session has an anonymous wide
   range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of
   interoperability among various LDAP association. Among other things this implies implementations and deployments.
   Appendix B contains example deployment scenarios that list the client
   need not send
   mechanisms that might be used to achieve a Bind Request in the first PDU reasonable level of the connection. The
   client may send any operation request prior
   security in various circumstances.

1.1. Relationship to binding, and the
   server MUST treat it as if it had been performed after an anonymous
   bind operation. Other Documents

   This authentication state on an LDAP association document is
   sometimes referred to as an implied anonymous bind.

3.2. Simple Authentication

   The simple authentication choice provides minimal facilities for
   establishing an anonymous association or for establishing an LDAP
   association based upon credentials consisting integral part of a name (in the form
   of an [LDAPDN] LDAP Technical
   Specification [Roadmap].

   This document obsoletes RFC 2829.

   Sections 2 and a password. 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted by [Protocol].  The simple authentication choice provides two different methods
   for establishing an anonymous association: anonymous bind and
   unauthenticated bind (see section 5.1).
   remainder of RFC 2830 is obsoleted by this document.

2. Conventions Used in this Document

2.1. Glossary of Terms

   The simple authentication choice provides one method for
   establishing a non-anonymous association: simple password bind.

3.3. SASL Authentication Profile

   LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP
   includes native anonymous and plaintext authentication methods, the
   ANONYMOUS [ANONYMOUS] and PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanisms following terms are
   typically not used with LDAP.

   Each protocol that utilizes SASL services is required to supply
   certain information profiling the way they are exposed through in this document. To aid the
   protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of reader,
   these
   profiling requirements terms are met by LDAP.

3.3.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP

   The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", defined here.

     - "user" represents any human or application entity which has been registered
   with is
       accessing the IANA directory using a directory client.  A directory
       client (or client) is also known as a GSSAPI service name.

3.3.2. SASL authentication initiation directory user agent
       (DUA).

     - "connection" and protocol exchange

   SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP bind request
   ([Protocol] section 4.2) with "LDAP connection" both refer to the following parameters:

      - The version is 3. underlying
       transport protocol connection between two protocol peers.

     - The AuthenticationChoice is sasl. "TLS connection" refers to a TLS-protected [TLS] LDAP
       connection.

     - The mechanism element of the SaslCredentials sequence contains
        the value of "association" and "LDAP association" both refer to the desired SASL mechanism.
      - The optional credentials field
       association of the SaslCredentials sequence
        may be used to provide an initial client response for
        mechanisms that are defined to have the client send data first
        (see [SASL] sections 5 LDAP connection and 5.1).

   In general, a SASL its current
       authentication protocol exchange consists of a
   series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of
   which authorization state.

2.2. Security Terms and Concepts
   In general, security terms in this document are specific used consistently
   with the definitions provided in [Glossary]. In addition, several
   terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and defined by
   authorization are presented in Appendix C of this document. While
   the SASL mechanism. Thus for
   some SASL authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the
   client to respond to one or more server challenges by invoking the
   BindRequest multiple times. A challenge formal definition of these terms and concepts is indicated by the server
   sending a BindResponse with outside the resultCode set
   scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite to
   saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the server requires
   understanding much of the
   client to send a new bind request, material in this document. Readers who are
   unfamiliar with the same sasl mechanism security-related concepts are encouraged to
   continue the authentication process.

   To review
   Appendix C before reading the encapsulating protocol, these challenges remainder of this document.

2.3. Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and responses "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are
   opaque binary tokens to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Keyword].

3. Start TLS Operation

   The Start Transport Layer Security (Start TLS) operation defined in
   section 4.13 of arbitrary length. LDAP servers use [Protocol] provides the
   serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a bind response message ability to transmit each challenge. establish [TLS]
   on an LDAP connection.

3.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation

   This section describes the overall procedures clients use and servers
   must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into
   consideration various aspects of the credentials field,
   an OCTET STRING, in overall security of the SaslCredentials sequence LDAP
   association including discovery of a bind request
   message to transmit each response. resultant security level and
   assertion of the client's authorization identity.

   Note that unlike some Internet
   protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text-based, thus no Base64
   transformations are performed on these challenge and response
   values.

   Clients sending a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHOULD
   NOT send precise effects, on a value client's authorization identity,
   of establishing TLS on an LDAP connection are described in the name field. Servers receiving a bind request
   with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value detail in the name
   field.
   section 3.2.

3.1.1. Start TLS Request

   A client may abort send the Start TLS extended request at any time after
   establishing an LDAP connection, except:

      - when TLS is currently established on the connection,
      - when a multi-stage SASL bind negotiation by sending a BindRequest
   with a different value is in progress on the mechanism field of SaslCredentials,
        connection, or
   an AuthenticationChoice other than sasl.

   If the client sends a BindRequest with the sasl mechanism field as
   an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with
   authMethodNotSupported as the resultCode. This will allow clients to
   abort a negotiation if it wishes to try again with
      - when there are outstanding LDAP operations on the same SASL
   mechanism. connection.

   The server indicates completion result of the SASL challenge-response
   exchange by responding with violating any of these requirements is a bind response in which the resultCode
   is either success, or an error indication.

   The serverSaslCreds field of
   operationsError, as described in the bind response can be used [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2. Client
   implementers should note that it is possible to
   include an optional challenge with receive a resultCode
   of success notification for
   mechanisms which are defined to have a Start TLS operation that is sent on a connection
   with outstanding LDAP operations if the server send additional data
   along with has sufficient time
   to process them prior to its receiving the indication Start TLS request.
   Implementors of successful completion.

3.3.3. Octet where negotiated security mechanisms take effect

   When negotiated, SASL security layers take effect following the
   transmission by the server and reception by clients should ensure that they do not inadvertently
   depend upon this race condition.

   There is no requirement that the client of the final
   BindResponse in the exchange.

   Once a SASL security layer providing integrity have or confidentiality
   services takes effect, the layer remains in effect until have not already
   performed a new layer
   is installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final
   BindResponse of the bind Bind operation that caused (section 4) before sending a Start TLS
   operation request.

   If the new layer to take
   effect).

3.3.4. Determination of supported SASL mechanisms

   An LDAP client may determine did not establish a TLS connection before sending some
   other request, and the SASL mechanisms server requires the client to establish a TLS
   connection before performing that request, the server supports MUST reject
   that request by performing sending a search request on the root DSE, requesting the
   supportedSASLMechanisms attribute. The values resultCode of this attribute, if
   any, list the mechanisms the confidentialityRequired or
   strongAuthRequired.

   An LDAP server supports.

3.3.5. Rules for using SASL security layers

   If which requests that clients provide their certificate
   during TLS negotiation MAY use a SASL local security layer is negotiated, policy to determine
   whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client SHOULD discard
   information about the did
   not present a certificate which could be validated.

3.1.2. Start TLS Response

   The server it obtained prior to will return an extended response with the initiation resultCode of
   the SASL negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms.

   If a lower level security layer (such as TLS)
   success if it is negotiated, any
   SASL security services SHALL be layered on top of such security
   layers regardless of the order of their negotiation. In all other
   respects, SASL security services willing and able to negotiate TLS.  It will return
   other security layers act
   independently, e.g. resultCode values (documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2)
   if both it is unwilling or unable to do so.

   In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer
   LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS and SASL security service are in
   effect removing negotiation
   or close the SASL security service does not affect connection. The client will send PDUs in the
   continuing service of TLS and vice versa.

   Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients
   and servers should allow Record
   Protocol directly over the user underlying transport connection to specify what mechanisms are
   acceptable and allow only those mechanisms the
   server to initiate [TLS] negotiation.

3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation

   Negotiating the version of TLS to be used.

3.3.6. Use used is a part of EXTERNAL SASL Mechanism

   A client can use the EXTERNAL SASL [SASL] mechanism TLS
   Handshake Protocol [TLS]. Please refer to request the that document for details.

3.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level

   After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP server connection, both
   parties must individually decide whether or not to make use of continue based on
   the security credentials exchanged by a lower level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's
   security layer (such as level is implementation dependent and accomplished by
   communicating with one's respective local TLS authentication or IP-level security
   [RFC2401]). implementation.

   If the client's authentication credentials have not been established
   at a lower security layer, client or server decides that the SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a
   resultCode level of inappropriateAuthentication.  Any client authentication and authorization state of the LDAP association or
   security is
   lost, so not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully
   close the LDAP association is in an anonymous state TLS connection immediately after the
   failure TLS negotiation has
   completed (see [Protocol] section 4.2.1). In such a situation, 4.13.3.1 and section 3.2.3 below).
   If the
   state of any established security layer is unaffected.

   A client decides to continue, it may either implicitly request that its LDAP authorization
   identity be derived from a lower layer or gracefully close the TLS
   connection and attempt to Start TLS again, it may explicitly provide send an authorization identity and assert that unbind
   request, or it be used in combination
   with its authenticated TLS credentials. may send any other LDAP request.

3.1.5. Server Identity Check

   The former is known as an
   implicit assertion, and client MUST check its understanding of the latter as an explicit assertion.

3.3.6.1. Implicit Assertion

   An implicit authorization server's hostname
   against the server's identity assertion as presented in the server's
   Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

   Matching is performed by
   invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using according to these rules:

     - The client MUST use the EXTERNAL
   mechanism name that SHALL NOT include server provided by the optional credentials octet
   string (found within user (or other
       trusted entity) as the SaslCredentials sequence in value to compare against the Bind
   Request). The server will derive name
       as expressed in the client's authorization identity server's certificate. A hostname derived
       from the authentication identity supplied user input is to be considered provided by the security layer user
       only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC).

     - If a public key certificate used during TLS establishment)
   according to local policy. The underlying mechanics subjectAltName extension of how this is
   accomplished are implementation specific.

3.3.6.2. Explicit Assertion

   An explicit authorization identity assertion type dNSName is performed by
   invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL
   mechanism name that SHALL include present in the credentials octet string. This
   string MUST
       certificate, it SHOULD be constructed used as documented in section 3.4.1.

   The server MUST that the client's authentication identity as
   supplied in its TLS credentials is permitted to be mapped to source of the
   asserted authorization server's
       identity.

     - Matching is case-insensitive.

     - The server MUST reject the Bind
   operation with an invalidCredentials resultCode in the Bind response
   if the client "*" wildcard character is not so authorized.

3.3.6.3. SASL Authorization Identity

   When allowed.  If present, it applies
       only to the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism left-most name component.

       For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but
       it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com.  If
       more than one identity of a given type is being negotiated, if present in the
   SaslCredentials credentials field
       certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any
       one of the set is present, it contains an
   authorization identity. Other mechanisms define considered acceptable.

   If the location of hostname does not match the
   authorization dNSName-based identity in the credentials field. In
   certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either case,
   notify the
   authorization identity is represented in user (clients may give the authzId form described
   below.

3.3.6.4 Authorization Identity Syntax

   The authorization identity is a string of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode]
   characters corresponding to user the following [ABNF] grammar:

   authzId = dnAuthzId / uAuthzId

   DNCOLON  = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:"
   UCOLON = %x75 %x3a ; "u:"

   ; distinguished-name-based authz id.
   dnAuthzId = DNCOLON distinguishedName

   ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded.
   uAuthzId = UCOLON userid
   userid = *UTF8    ; syntax unspecified

   where opportunity to
   continue with the <distinguishedName> production is defined connection in section 3 of
   [LDAPDN] any case) or terminate the
   connection and <UTF8> production indicate that the server's identity is defined in section 1.3 of
   [Models].

   In order to support additional specific authorization suspect.
   Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or
   logging an error indicating that the server's identity
   forms, future updates to is suspect.

   Beyond the server identity checks described in this specification may add new choices
   supporting other forms may section, clients
   SHOULD be added prepared to the authzId production.

   The dnAuthzId choice allows clients do further checking to assert authorization
   identities in ensure that the form of a distinguished name server
   is authorized to be matched in
   accordance with provide the distinguishedName matching rule [Syntaxes]. The
   decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity service it is observed to have
   access provide. The
   client may need to the requested authorization identity is a matter make use of local policy ([SASL] section 4.2). For information in making
   this reason there is no requirement
   that determination.

3.1.6. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information

   Upon TLS session establishment, the asserted dn be that client SHOULD discard or refresh
   all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation
   of an entry in directory.

   The uAuthzId choice allows for compatibility with clients that wish
   to assert an authorization identity to a local directory but do the TLS negotiation and not
   have obtained through secure mechanisms.
   This protects against active-intermediary attacks that identity in distinguished name form. The value contained
   within a uAuthzId MUST be prepared using [SASLPrep] before being
   compared octet-wise. The format of utf8string is defined as only a
   sequence of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode] characters, and further
   interpretation is subject to may have
   altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior agreement between the client and
   server.

   For example, to TLS
   establishment.

   The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS
   establishment. In particular, the userid could identify a user value of a specific
   directory service or supportedSASLMechanisms
   may be a login name or different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the local-part of an RFC 822
   email address. A uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed
   EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be globally
   unique.

4. Start listed only
   after a TLS Operation

   The Start Transport Layer Security (Start TLS) operation defined in
   section 4.13 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish [TLS]
   on an LDAP association.

4.1. Sequencing negotiation has been performed).

3.2. Effects of the Start TLS Operation on a Client's Authorization Identity
   This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers
   must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into
   consideration various aspects of the overall security of the LDAP
   association including discovery of resultant security level and
   assertion of the client's authorization identity.

   Note that the precise effects, effects on a client's authorization identity,
   of
   identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP association connection.
   The default effects are described in detail
   in section 4.2.

4.1.1. Start TLS Request

   The client MAY send first, and next the Start TLS extended request at any time after
   establishing an LDAP connection, except:

      - when TLS is currently established on facilities for
   client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including
   error conditions. Finally, the connection,
      - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on effects of closing the
        connection, or
      - when there TLS connection
   are one described.

   Authorization identities and related concepts are described in
   Appendix C.

3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects

   The decision to keep or more outstanding LDAP operations on invalidate the
        connection.

   The result of violating any of these requirements established authentication
   and authorization identities in place after TLS closure is a resultCode matter
   of
   operationsError, as described in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2. local server policy.

3.2.2. Client
   implementers should note that it is possible to receive a resultCode Assertion of success for Authorization Identity

   After successfully establishing a Start TLS operation that is sent on session, a connection
   with outstanding LDAP operations and the server has sufficient time
   to process them prior to client may request
   that its receiving credentials exchanged during the Start TLS request.
   Implementors of clients should ensure that they do not inadvertently
   depend upon this race condition.

   In particular, there is no requirement that establishment be
   utilized to authenticate the LDAP association and thus determine the
   client's authorization status. The client have or have
   not already performed a accomplishes this via an
   LDAP Bind operation before sending request specifying a Start SASL mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL]
   (section 9). LDAP server implementations SHOULD support this
   authentication method.

3.2.3. TLS
   operation request. Connection Closure Effects

   The client may have already performed a Bind
   operation when it sends a Start TLS request, decision to keep or invalidate the client might
   have not yet bound.

   If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending any
   other requests, established authentication
   and the server requires the client to establish a authorization identities in place after TLS connection before performing a particular request, the server
   MUST reject that request by sending closure is a resultCode matter
   of
   confidentialityRequired or strongAuthRequired.

4.1.2. Start TLS Response

   The local server will return an extended response with the resultCode of
   success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS.  It will return
   other resultCode values (documented policy.

4. Bind Operation

   The Bind operation defined in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2)
   if it is unwilling or unable 4.2 of [Protocol] allows
   authentication information to do so.

   In the successful case, be exchanged between the client (which has ceased and
   server to transfer establish a new LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin association.

   Upon receipt of a TLS negotiation
   or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record
   Protocol directly over Bind request, the underlying transport connection LDAP association is moved to an
   anonymous state and only upon successful completion of the
   server to initiate [TLS] negotiation.

4.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation

   Negotiating
   authentication exchange (and the version of TLS or SSL to be used Bind operation) is a part of the
   [TLS] Handshake Protocol. Please refer association
   moved to that document for details.

4.1.4. Discovery an authenticated state.

4.1. Simple Authentication

   The simple authentication choice of Resultant Security Level

   After a TLS connection is established on the Bind Operation provides
   minimal facilities for establishing an anonymous association
   (section 6) or for establishing an LDAP association, both
   parties must individually decide whether or not to continue association based on
   the security level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's
   security level is implementation dependent and accomplished by
   communicating with one's respective local TLS implementation.

   If the client or server decides that upon
   credentials consisting of a name (in the level form of an LDAP
   distinguished name [LDAPDN]) and a password (section 7).

4.2. SASL Authentication
   The sasl authentication or
   security is not high enough choice of the Bind Operation provides
   facilities for it authenticating via SASL mechanisms (sections 8-10).

5. Anonymous LDAP Association on Unbound Connections

   Prior to continue, it SHOULD gracefully
   close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has
   completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 successful completion of a Bind operation and section 4.2.3 below).
   If the client decides to continue, it may gracefully close during
   any subsequent authentication exchange, the TLS
   connection and attempt to Start TLS again, it may send session has an unbind
   request, or it may send any other anonymous
   LDAP request.

4.1.5. Server Identity Check
   The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname
   against association. Among other things this implies that the server's identity as presented client
   need not send a Bind Request in the server's
   Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

   Matching is performed according to these rules:

     - first PDU of the connection. The
   client MUST use the server provided by the user (or other
       trusted entity) as the value may send any operation request prior to compare against binding, and the
   server name MUST treat it as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname derived
       from the user input is to be considered provided by the user
       only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC).

     - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
       certificate, it SHOULD be used had been performed after an anonymous
   bind operation. This authentication state on an LDAP association is
   sometimes referred to as the source an implied anonymous bind.

6. Anonymous Authentication

   Directory operations that modify entries or access protected
   attributes or entries generally require client authentication.
   Clients that do not intend to perform any of these operations
   typically use anonymous authentication.

   An LDAP client may explicitly establish an anonymous association by
   sending a Bind Request with the server's
       identity.

     - Matching is case-insensitive.

     - The "*" wildcard character is allowed.  If present, it applies
       only to simple authentication choice
   containing a value--construed as the password--of zero length. A
   bind request where both the left-most name component.

       For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but
       it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com.  If
       more than one identity password are of a given type zero length is present in
   said to be an anonymous bind. A bind request where the
       certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), name, a match in any
       one DN,
   is of non-zero length, and the set password is considered acceptable.

   If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the
   certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either
   notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity of zero length is said to
   continue
   be an unauthenticated bind. Both variations produce an anonymous
   association.

   Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see
   section 14). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind
   requests with the connection in any case) or terminate the
   connection a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and indicate that the server's identity is suspect.
   Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or
   logging may
   need to actively detect situations where they would make an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect.

   Beyond the
   unauthenticated bind request.

   An LDAP server identity checks described in this section, clients
   SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that may use other information about the server
   is authorized to provide client provided
   by the service it is observed lower layers or external means to provide. The grant or deny access even
   to anonymously authenticated clients.

   LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication.

7. Simple Authentication

   An LDAP client may need to make use establish an LDAP association by sending a Bind
   Request with a name value consisting of local policy information an LDAP distinguished name
   [LDAPDN] and specifying the simple authentication choice with a
   password value.

   DSAs that map the DN sent in making
   this determination.

4.1.6. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information

   Upon TLS session establishment, the client SHOULD discard bind request to a directory entry
   with an associated set of one or refresh
   all information about more passwords will compare the server it obtained prior
   presented password to the initiation set of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms.
   This protects against active-intermediary attacks passwords associated with that may have
   altered
   entry. If the presented password matches any member of that set,
   then the server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS
   establishment.

   The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS
   establishment. In particular, will respond with a success resultCode, otherwise
   the value of supportedSASLMechanisms
   may be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the
   EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only
   after a TLS negotiation has been performed).

4.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity

   This section describes the effects on a client's authorization
   identity brought about by establishing TLS on server will respond with an LDAP association. invalidCredentials resultCode.

   The default effects are described first, and next the facilities simple authentication choice is not suitable for
   client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including
   error conditions. Finally, authentication
   in environments where there is no network or transport layer
   confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support authentication
   with the effects of closing "simple" authentication choice when the TLS connection
   are described.

   Authorization identities and related concepts are described is
   protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined in
   Appendix B.

4.2.1. section 4.
   LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication with the
   "simple" authentication choice unless the data on the connection is
   protected using TLS Connection Establishment Effects

   The decision to keep or invalidate the established other data confidentiality and data integrity
   protection.

8. SASL Authentication Profile

   LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP
   includes native anonymous and authorization identities in place after TLS is negotiated is a
   matter of local server policy. If a server chooses to invalidate
   established plaintext authentication methods, the
   ANONYMOUS [ANONYMOUS] and authorization identities after TLS PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanisms are
   typically not used with LDAP.

   Each protocol that utilizes SASL services is
   negotiated, it MUST reply required to subsequent valid operation requests
   until supply
   certain information profiling the next TLS closure or successful bind request with a
   resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that way they are exposed through the client needs
   to bind to reestablish its authentication. If
   protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of these
   profiling requirements are met by LDAP.

8.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP

   The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", which has been registered
   with the client attempts to
   bind using IANA as a method the server GSSAPI service name.

8.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange

   SASL authentication is unwilling to support, it responds
   to the initiated via an LDAP bind request
   ([Protocol] section 4.2) with a resultCode the following parameters:

      - The version is 3.
      - The AuthenticationChoice is sasl.
      - The mechanism element of authMethodNotSupported (per [Protocol])
   to indicate that a different authentication method should be used.

4.2.2. Client Assertion the SaslCredentials sequence contains
        the value of Authorization Identity

   After successfully establishing a TLS session, a client may request
   that its the desired SASL mechanism.
      - The optional credentials exchanged during field of the TLS establishment SaslCredentials sequence
        may be
   utilized used to determine the client's authorization status. The client
   accomplishes this via provide an LDAP Bind request specifying a SASL
   mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL]. See section 3.3.6 initial client response for additional
   details.

4.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects

   The decision
        mechanisms that are defined to keep or invalidate have the established authentication client send data first
        (see [SASL] sections 5 and authorization identities in place after TLS closure is 5.1).

   In general, a matter SASL authentication protocol exchange consists of local server policy. If a
   series of server chooses challenges and client responses, the contents of
   which are specific to invalidate
   established authentication and authorization identities after TLS is
   negotiated, defined by the SASL mechanism. Thus for
   some SASL authentication mechanisms, it MUST reply to subsequent valid operation requests
   until may be necessary for the next TLS closure
   client to respond to one or successful bind request with more server challenges by invoking the
   BindRequest multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the server
   sending a BindResponse with the resultCode of strongAuthRequired set to indicate
   saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the client needs
   to bind to reestablish its authentication. If server requires the
   client attempts to
   bind using send a method new bind request with the server is unwilling to support, it responds same sasl mechanism to
   continue the with a resultCode of authMethodNotSupported (per [Protocol])
   to indicate that a different authentication method should be used.

5. Anonymous Authentication
   Directory operations that modify entries or access protected
   attributes or entries generally require client authentication.
   Clients that do not intend to perform any of process.

   To the encapsulating protocol, these operations
   typically use anonymous authentication.

   LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication, as
   defined in section 5.1.

   LDAP implementations MAY support anonymous authentication with TLS,
   as defined in section 5.2.

   While there may be access control restrictions to prevent access to
   directory entries, an challenges and responses are
   opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length. LDAP server SHOULD allow servers use the
   serverSaslCreds field, an anonymously-bound
   client OCTET STRING, in a bind response message
   to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root
   DSE.

   An transmit each challenge. LDAP server may clients use other information about the client provided
   by credentials field,
   an OCTET STRING, in the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even SaslCredentials sequence of a bind request
   message to anonymously authenticated clients.

5.1. Anonymous Authentication Procedure

   Prior to successfully completing a Bind operation, the LDAP
   association transmit each response. Note that unlike some Internet
   protocols where SASL is anonymous. See section 3.1.

   An used, LDAP client may also explicitly establish an anonymous
   association by is not text-based, thus no Base64
   transformations are performed on these challenge and response
   values.

   Clients sending a Bind Request bind request with the simple authentication
   option and sasl choice selected SHOULD
   NOT send a password of zero length. A bind request where both value in the name and password are of zero length is said to be an anonymous
   bind. A field. Servers receiving a bind request where
   with the name, a DN, is of non-zero length,
   and sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in the password is of zero length is said to be an unauthenticated
   bind. Both variations produce an anonymous association.

   Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see
   section 10). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated name
   field.

   A client may abort a SASL bind
   requests negotiation by sending a BindRequest
   with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may
   need to actively detect situations where they would make an
   unauthenticated bind request.

5.2. Anonymous Authentication and TLS

   An LDAP client may use the Start TLS operation (section 5) to
   negotiate different value in the use mechanism field of [TLS] security. SaslCredentials, or
   an AuthenticationChoice other than sasl.

   If the client has not bound
   beforehand, then until the client uses sends a BindRequest with the EXTERNAL SASL sasl mechanism
   to negotiate the recognition of the client's certificate, field as
   an empty string, the client
   is anonymously authenticated.

   Recommendations on TLS ciphersuites are given in section 9.

   An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate
   during TLS negotiation MAY use MUST return a local security policy to determine
   whether BindResponse with
   authMethodNotSupported as the resultCode. This will allow clients to successfully complete TLS
   abort a negotiation if the client did
   not present a certificate which could be validated.

6. Password-based Authentication

   This section discusses various options for performing password-based
   authentication it wishes to LDAP compliant servers and try again with the environments
   suitable for their use. same SASL
   mechanism.

   The transmission server indicates completion of passwords in the clear--typically for
   authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk.
   This risk can be avoided by using SASL challenge-response
   exchange by responding with a bind [SASL] mechanisms that
   do not transmit passwords response in which the clear and by negotiating transport resultCode
   is either success, or session layer confidentiality services before transmitting
   password values.

   To mitigate an error indication.

   The serverSaslCreds field in the security risks associated bind response can be used to
   include an optional challenge with the use of passwords, a success notification for
   mechanisms which are defined to have the server implementation MUST implement a configuration that at send additional data
   along with the
   time indication of authentication or password modification, requires:

     1) A Start TLS encryption layer has been successfully negotiated.

      OR

     2) Some other confidentiality mechanism that protects successful completion.

8.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect

   SASL security layers take effect following the transmission by the password
        value from snooping has been provided.

      OR

     3) The
   server returns a resultCode and reception by the client of confidentialityRequired for the operation (i.e. simple bind with password value, SASL bind
        transmitting a password value final successful
   BindResponse in the clear, add or modify
        including exchange.

   Once a userPassword value, etc.), even if SASL security layer providing integrity or confidentiality
   services takes effect, the password
        value is correct.

6.1. Simple Authentication

   The LDAP "simple" authentication choice is not suitable for
   authentication layer remains in environments where there effect until a new layer
   is no network or
   transport installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final
   BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support
   authentication with to take
   effect).

8.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms

   Clients may determine the "simple" authentication choice when SASL mechanisms a server supports by
   reading the
   connection is protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined
   in 'supportedSASLMechanisms ' attribute from the root DSE
   (DSA-Specific Entry) ([Models] section 4. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication
   with 5.1).  The values of this
   attribute, if any, list the "simple" authentication choice unless mechanisms the data on server supports in the
   connection is protected using TLS or other data confidentiality and
   data integrity protection.

6.2. Digest Authentication
   current LDAP session state.

   LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism
   (other than simple anonymous bind) MUST implement the SASL
   DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5].  This provides SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound client
   authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping
   attacks, but does not provide protection against active intermediary
   attacks.  DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data
   confidentiality capabilities.

   Support for subsequent authentication is OPTIONAL in clients and
   servers.

   Implementors must take care to ensure that they maintain retrieve
   the
   semantics supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data
   that has different semantics in root DSE.

8.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers

   If a SASL security layer is negotiated, the LDAP protocol.
   For example, client SHOULD discard
   information about the SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication mechanism utilizes
   realm and username values ([DigestAuth section 2.1) which are
   syntactically simple strings and semsantically simple realm server it obtained prior to the initiation of
   the SASL negotiation and
   username values. These values are not LDAP DNs, and there obtained through secure mechanisms.

   If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is no
   requirement that they negotiated, any
   SASL security services SHALL be represented or treated as such. Username layered on top of such security
   layers regardless of the order of their negotiation. In all other
   respects, SASL security services and realm values that look like LDAP DNs in form, other security layers act
   independently, e.g. <cn=bob,
   dc=example,dc=com>, are syntactically allowed, however DIGEST-MD5
   treats them as simple strings for comparison purposes. To illustrate
   further, the two DNs <cn=Bob,dc=example,dc=com> (upper case "B") if both TLS and
   <cn=bob,dc=example,dc=com> (lower case "b") SASL security service are equivalent when
   being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is
   defined to be case insensitive, however in
   effect removing the two values are SASL security service does not
   equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because
   [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5.

6.3. simple authentication choice under TLS encryption

   Following affect the negotiation
   continuing service of an appropriate TLS ciphersuite
   providing connection confidentiality, a and vice versa.

   Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients
   and servers should allow the user to specify what mechanisms are
   acceptable and allow only those mechanisms to be used.

9. SASL EXTERNAL Mechanism

   A client MAY authenticate can use the EXTERNAL SASL [SASL] mechanism to a
   directory that supports request the simple authentication choice by
   performing a simple bind operation

   Simple authentication with TLS encryption protection is performed as
   follows:

      1. The client will use the Start TLS operation [Protocol]
   LDAP server to
        negotiate the make use of security credentials exchanged by a lower
   security layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security [TLS] on the connection to
        the LDAP server. The client need not have bound to the
        directory beforehand.

         For
   [SecArch]).

   If the subsequent client's authentication procedure to be performed
         securely, the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite
         which contains credentials have not been established
   at a bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate
         strength. Recommendations on cipher suites are given in
         section 9.

      2. Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, lower security layer, the
         client MUST send an LDAP SASL EXTERNAL bind request MUST fail with the version number
         of 3, the name field containing a DN,
   resultCode of inappropriateAuthentication.  Any client
   authentication and authorization state of the simple
         authentication choice, containing a password.

6.3.1. simple Authentication Choice

   DSAs that map LDAP association is
   lost, so the DN sent LDAP association is in the bind request to a directory entry
   with an associated set of one or more passwords will compare anonymous state after the
   presented password to
   failure (see [Protocol] section 4.2.1). In such a situation, the set
   state of passwords associated with that
   entry. If the presented password matches any member of established security layer is unaffected.

   A client may either implicitly request that set,
   then the server will respond with its LDAP authorization
   identity be derived from a success resultCode, otherwise
   the server will respond with lower layer or it may explicitly provide
   an invalidCredentials resultCode.

6.4. Other authentication choices authorization identity and assert that it be used in combination
   with its authenticated TLS

   It is also possible, following credentials. The former is known as an
   implicit assertion, and the negotiation of TLS, to perform latter as an explicit assertion.

9.1. Implicit Assertion

   An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by
   invoking a Bind request of the SASL authentication form using the EXTERNAL
   mechanism name that does not involve include the exchange of plaintext
   reusable passwords. In this case optional credentials octet
   string (found within the client and server need not
   negotiate a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality if SaslCredentials sequence in the only
   service required is data integrity.

7. Certificate-based authentication

   LDAP Bind
   Request). The server implementations SHOULD support authentication via a
   client certificate in TLS, as defined in section 7.1.

7.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS

   A user who has a public/private key pair in which will derive the public key has
   been signed client's authorization identity
   from the authentication identity supplied by the security layer
   (e.g., a Certification Authority may use this public key pair to
   authenticate to the directory server if the user's certificate used during TLS establishment)
   according to local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is
   requested
   accomplished are implementation specific.

9.2. Explicit Assertion

   An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by the server. The user's certificate subject field SHOULD
   be the name
   invoking a Bind request of the user's directory entry, and SASL form using the Certification
   Authority EXTERNAL
   mechanism name that issued includes the user's certificate must credentials octet string. This
   string MUST be sufficiently
   trusted by the directory server constructed as documented in order for the section 3.4.1.

   The server to process MUST verify that the certificate. The means by which servers validate certificate
   paths client's authentication identity as
   supplied in its TLS credentials is outside permitted to be mapped to the scope of this document.

   A server MAY support mappings for certificates in which the subject
   field name is different from the name of the user's directory entry.
   A
   asserted authorization identity. The server which supports mappings of names MUST be capable of being
   configured to support certificates for which no mapping is required.

   The client will use reject the Start TLS Bind
   operation [Protocol] to negotiate
   the use of TLS security [TLS] on with an invalidCredentials resultCode in the connection to Bind response
   if the LDAP server.
   The client need is not have bound to the directory beforehand.

   In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The
   client will provide its certificate to so authorized.

9.3. SASL Authorization Identity

   When the server, and EXTERNAL SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the server
   MUST perform a private key-based encryption, proving
   SaslCredentials credentials field is present, it has the
   private key associated with contains an
   authorization identity. Other mechanisms define the certificate.

   In deployments that require protection location of sensitive data in transit, the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite that contains a
   bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations
   of cipher suites are given
   authorization identity in section 9.

   The server MUST verify that the client's certificate credentials field. In either case, the
   authorization identity is valid. The
   server will normally check that represented in the certificate authzId form described
   below.

9.4 Authorization Identity Syntax

   The authorization identity is issued by a known
   certification authority (CA), and that none string of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode]
   characters corresponding to the certificates on following [ABNF] grammar:

   authzId = dnAuthzId / uAuthzId

   DNCOLON  = %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:"
   UCOLON = %x75 %x3a ; "u:"

   ; distinguished-name-based authz id.
   dnAuthzId = DNCOLON distinguishedName

   ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded.
   uAuthzId = UCOLON userid
   userid = *UTF8    ; syntax unspecified

   where the client's certificate chain are invalid or revoked. There are
   several procedures by which the server can perform these checks.

   Following the successful completion <distinguishedName> production is defined in section 3 of TLS negotiation, the client
   will send an LDAP bind request with the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism.

8. LDAP Association State Transition Tables

   To comprehensively diagram the various authentication
   [LDAPDN] and TLS states
   through hich an LDAP association may pass, this <UTF8> production is defined in section provides a
   state transition table 1.3 of
   [Models].

   In order to represent a state diagram for the various
   states through which an LDAP association support additional specific authorization identity
   forms, future updates to this specification may pass during add new choices
   supporting other forms may be added to the course
   of its existence and authzId production.

   The dnAuthzId choice allows clients to assert authorization
   identities in the actions that cause these changes form of a distinguished name to be matched in state.

8.1. LDAP Association States
   accordance with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes].
   The following table lists decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity to have
   access to the valid LDAP association states and
   provides requested authorization identity is a description matter of each state. The ID for each state local
   policy ([SASL] section 4.2). For this reason there is used
   in no requirement
   that the state transition table asserted dn be that of an entry in section 8.4.

   ID State Description
   -- --------------------------------------------------------------
   S1 Anonymous
          no Authentication ID is associated directory.

   The uAuthzId choice allows for compatibility with the LDAP connection
          no Authorization ID is clients that wish
   to assert an authorization identity to a local directory but do not
   have that identity in force
   S2 Authenticated
          Authentication ID = I
          Authorization ID = X
   S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID
          Authentication ID = J
          Authorization ID = Y
   S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID
          Authentication ID = J
          Authorization ID = Z

8.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State distinguished name form. The following table lists the actions that can affect value contained
   within a uAuthzId MUST be prepared using [SASLPrep] before being
   compared octet-wise. The format of userid is defined as only a
   sequence of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode] characters, and further
   interpretation is subject to prior agreement between the
   authentication client and authorization state
   server.

   For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific
   directory service or be a login name or the local-part of an RFC 822
   email address. A uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally
   unique.

10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism

   LDAP association. The
   ID for each action is used in the state transition table in section
   8.4.

   ID  Action
   --  --------------------------------------------------------------
   A1  Client bind request fails
   A2  Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind
   A3  Client successfully performs unauthenticated simple bind
   A4  Client successfully performs servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism
   other than simple anonymous bind with name and
        password OR MUST implement the SASL bind with any
   DIGEST-MD5 mechanism except EXTERNAL using
        an authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X
   A5  Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of
        authorization ID (section 3.3.6.1)]. The current [DIGEST-MD5].  This provides client
   authentication ID maps to authorization ID = Y.
   A6  Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of
        authorization ID = Z (section 3.3.6.2)]
   A7  Client abandons a bind operation, and server processes the
        abandon
   A8  Client abandons a bind operation, and server protection against passive eavesdropping attacks
   but does not process
        the abandon
   A9  Client Start TLS request fails
   A10 Client Start TLS request succeeds
   A11 Client or Server: graceful TLS closure ([Protocol] provide protection against active intermediary attacks.
   DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data confidentiality
   capabilities.

   Support for subsequent authentication ([DIGEST-MD5] section
        4.13.3.1.)

8.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes

   Certain changes 2.2) is
   OPTIONAL in the authentication clients and authorization state of an
   LDAP association are only allowed if servers.

   Implementers must take care to ensure that they maintain the server can affirmatively
   answer a question. These questions are applied as part
   semantics of the
   criteria for allowing or disallowing a state transition DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data
   that has different semantics in the state
   transition table in section 8.4.

   ID Decision Question
   -- --------------------------------------------------------------
   D1 Are lower-layer credentials available?
   D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped asserted
       AuthZID "L"?

8.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table

   The LDAP Association table below lists protocol.
   For example, the valid SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication mechanism utilizes
   realm and
   authorization states for an username values ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.1) which are
   syntactically simple strings and semantically simple realm and
   username values. These values are not LDAP association DNs, and the actions there is no
   requirement that
   could affect them. For any given row in the table, the Current State
   column gives the state of an they be represented or treated as such. Username
   and realm values that look like LDAP association, the Action column
   gives an action that could affect DNs in form, e.g. <cn=bob,
   dc=example,dc=com>, are syntactically allowed, however DIGEST-MD5
   treats them as simple strings for comparison purposes. To illustrate
   further, the state of an LDAP assocation, two DNs <cn=Bob,dc=example,dc=com> (upper case "B") and
   <cn=bob,dc=example,dc=com> (lower case "b") are equivalent when
   being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the Next State column gives cn attribute is
   defined to be case insensitive, however the resulting state two values are not
   equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because
   [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5.

11. General Requirements for Password-based Authentication

   The transmission of an LDAP
   association after passwords in the action occurs.

   S1, clear--typically for
   authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk.
   This risk can be avoided by using SASL authentication [SASL]
   mechanisms that do not transmit passwords in the initial state clear or by
   negotiating transport or session layer confidentiality services
   before transmitting password values.

   To mitigate the security risks associated with the use of passwords,
   a server implementation MUST implement a configuration that at the
   time of authentication or password modification, requires:

     1) A Start TLS encryption layer has been successfully negotiated.

      OR

     2) Some other confidentiality mechanism that protects the password
        value from snooping has been provided.

      OR

     3) The server returns a resultCode of confidentialityRequired for
        the state machine described operation (i.e. simple bind with password value, SASL bind
        transmitting a password value in this table,
   is the authentication state when an LDAP connection clear, add or modify
        including a userPassword value, etc.), even if the password
        value is initially
   established.

   Current            Next
    State  Action     State  Comment
   ------- -------    -----  ---------------------------------------
     Any   A1          S1    [Protocol] section 4.2.1
     Any   A2          S1    Section 6
     Any   A3          S1    Section 6
     Any   A4          S2    Sections 6.1, 6.2
     Any   A5,         S1    Failed bind, section 3.3.6
            D1=no
     Any   A5,         S3
            D1=yes
     Any   A6,         S1    failed bind, section 3.3.6
            D1=no
     Any   A6,         S1 correct.

12. Invalidated Associations

   The server may, at any time, invalidate the association, e.g. if the
   established security association between the client and server has
   unexpectedly failed bind, section 3.3.6.2
            D1=yes,
            D2=no
     Any   A6,         S4
            D1=yes,
            D2=yes
     Any   A7          S1    [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients
                               cannot detect this state.
     Any   A8          no    [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients
                      change  cannot detect this state.
     Any   A9          no    [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2
                      change
     Any   A10         no    Section 4.2.1
                      change
     Any   A11         S1    Section 4.2.3

9. or been compromised.  The association remains
   invalidated until the next successful bind request.  While the
   association is invalidated, the server may reject any operation
   request other than Bind, Unbind, and Start TLS by responding with a
   resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that the client needs
   to bind to reestablish its authentication state before performing
   the requested operation.

13. TLS Ciphersuites

        A client or server that supports TLS MUST support
   TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA and MAY
        TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. Servers SHOULD NOT support other
        weaker ciphersuites
   offering equivalent or better protection. unless other data integrity and
        confidentiality protection (such as a SASL security layer) is
        in place

   Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites
   that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues
   include the following:

     - The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality
       protection for passwords and other data sent over the LDAP
       connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that
       some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection
       while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality
       protection may be vulnerable to being cracked using brute force
       methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that
       reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks.

       Client and server implementers SHOULD carefully consider the
       value of the password or data being protected versus the level
       of confidentially protection provided by the ciphersuite to
       ensure that the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite
       is appropriate.

     - The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the-
       middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
       attacks SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive
       data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger
       of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable.

9.1.

13.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations

   As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations
   regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are
   constantly changing, this list must not be considered exhaustive,
   but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for
   implementers.

   The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] MUST NOT be used for
   confidentiality protection of passwords or data:

         TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
         TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
         TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA

   The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] can be cracked easily
   (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000) and are NOT
   RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality protection of passwords or
   data.

         TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
         TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
         TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
         TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA

   The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
   attacks:

         TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
         TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
         TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
         TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

10.

14. Security Considerations

   Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the
   (unsurprising) unsurprising
   conclusion is that mandatory security is important and that session
   confidentiality protection is required when snooping is a problem.

   Servers are encouraged to prevent modifications by anonymous users.

   Servers can minimize denial of service attacks by timing out idle
   connections, and returning the unwillingToPerform resultCode rather
   than performing computationally expensive operations requested by
   unauthorized clients.

   The use of cleartext passwords and other unprotected authentication
   credentials is strongly discouraged over open networks when the
   underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality.

   Operational experience shows that clients can (and frequently do)
   misuse unauthenticated bind (see section 5.1).  For example, a
   client program might make a decision to grant access to non-
   directory information on the basis of completing a successful bind
   operation. Some LDAP server implementations will return a success
   response to an unauthenticated bind thus leaving the client with the
   impression that the server has successfully authenticated the
   identity represented by the user name, when in effect, an anonymous
   LDAP association has been created. Clients that use the results from
   a simple bind operation to make authorization decisions should
   actively detect unauthenticated bind requests (via the empty
   password value) and react appropriately.

   Access control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive
   information or updating directory information.

   A connection on which the client has not performed the established connection
   integrity and privacy services (e.g via Start TLS
   operation TLS, IPSec or negotiated a
   suitable SASL mechanism for connection
   integrity and encryption services mechanism) is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to
   view and modify information in transit.

10.1.

14.1. Start TLS Security Considerations

   The goals of using the TLS protocol with LDAP are to ensure
   connection confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide
   for authentication. [TLS] expressly provides these capabilities.

   All security gained via use of the Start TLS operation is gained by
   the use of TLS itself. The Start TLS operation, on its own, does not
   provide any additional security.

   Once established, TLS only provides for and ensures confidentiality
   and integrity of the operations and data in transit over the LDAP
   association--and
   connection--and only if the implementations on the client and server
   support and negotiate it. The use of TLS does not provide or ensure
   for confidentiality and/or non-repudiation of the data housed by an
   LDAP-based directory server. Nor does it secure the data from
   inspection by the server administrators.

   The level of security provided though the use of TLS depends
   directly on both the quality of the TLS implementation used and the
   style of usage of that implementation. Additionally, an active-
   intermediary attacker can remove the Start TLS extended operation
   from the supportedExtension supported attribute of the root DSE. Therefore, both
   parties SHOULD independently ascertain and consent to the security
   level achieved once TLS is established and before beginning use of
   the TLS connection. For example, the security level of the TLS
   connection might have been negotiated down to plaintext.

   Clients SHOULD either warn the user when the security level achieved
   does not provide data confidentiality and/or integrity protection,
   or be configurable to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level
   of security.

   Client and server implementors SHOULD take measures to ensure proper
   protection of credentials and other confidential data where such
   measures are not otherwise provided by the TLS implementation.

   Server implementors SHOULD allow for server administrators to elect
   whether and when connection confidentiality and/or integrity is
   required, as well as elect whether and when client authentication
   via TLS is required.

   Additional security considerations relating to the EXTERNAL
   mechanism to negotiate TLS can be found in [SASL] and [TLS].

11.

15. IANA Considerations

   The following IANA considerations apply to this document:

   Please update the GSSAPI service name registry to point to [Roadmap]
   and this document.

   [To be completed]

Acknowledgements

   This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829
   and RFC 2830. The editor acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit
   Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan ,
   and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents.

   This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working
   group. The contributions and suggestions made by its members in
   shaping the contents and technical accuracy of this document is
   greatly appreciated.

Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
   [ABNF]       Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
                Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.

   [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P. C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest
                Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-
      xx.txt, draft-ietf-sasl-
                rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt

   [Keyword]    Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [LDAPDN]     Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String
                Representation of Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, draft-ietf-
                ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [Models]     Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory
                Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt,
                a work in progress.

   [Protocol]   Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf-
                ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [Roadmap]    K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map",
                draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [SASL]       Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and
                Security Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-
                xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [SASLPrep]   Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and
                passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in
                progress).

   [StringPrep] Hoffman P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
                Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", draft-hoffman-
       rfc3454bis-xx.txt, draft-
                hoffman-rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [Syntaxes]   Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules",
                draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [TLS]        Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version
                1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in
                progress.

   [UTF-8]      Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
                10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.

   [Unicode]    The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
                3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version
                3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), 0-201-
                61633-5), as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex
                #27: Unicode 3.1"
                (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the ÷Unicode
                "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2"
                (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).

Informative References

   [ANONYMOUS]  Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga-
       sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga-sasl-
       plain-xx.txt, draft-
                zeilenga-sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress.

    [RFC2828]

   [Glossary]   Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May
                2000.

   [RFC2401]

   [PLAIN]      Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga-
                sasl-plain-xx.txt, a work in progress.

   [SecArch]    Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
                the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

Author's Address

   Roger Harrison
   Novell, Inc.
   1800 S. Novell Place
   Provo, UT 84606
   USA
   +1 801 861 2642
   roger_harrison@novell.com

Appendix A. A. LDAP Association State Transition Tables

   This section provides a state transition table to represent a state
   diagram for the various authentication and TLS states through which
   an LDAP association may pass during the course of its existence and
   the actions that cause these changes in state.

   This section is based entirely on information found in this document
   and other documents that are part of the LDAP Technical
   Specification [Roadmap]. As such, it is strictly informational in
   nature.

A.1. LDAP Association States

   The following table lists the valid LDAP association states and
   provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used
   in the state transition table in section A.4.

   ID State Description
   -- --------------------------------------------------------------
   S1 Anonymous
          no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection
          no Authorization ID is in force
   S2 Authenticated
          Authentication ID = I
          Authorization ID = X
   S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID
          Authentication ID = J
          Authorization ID = Y
   S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID
          Authentication ID = J
          Authorization ID = Z

A.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State

   The following table lists the actions that can affect the
   authentication and authorization state of an LDAP association. The
   ID for each action is used in the state transition table in section
   A.4.

   ID  Action
   --  --------------------------------------------------------------
   A1  Client bind request fails
   A2  Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind
   A3  Client successfully performs unauthenticated simple bind
   A4  Client successfully performs simple bind with name and
        password OR SASL bind with any mechanism except EXTERNAL using
        an authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X
   A5  Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of
        authorization ID (section 3.3.6.1)]. The current
        authentication ID maps to authorization ID = Y.
   A6  Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of
        authorization ID = Z (section 3.3.6.2)]
   A7  Client abandons a bind operation, and server processes the
        abandon
   A8  Client abandons a bind operation, and server does not process
        the abandon
   A9  Client Start TLS request fails
   A10 Client Start TLS request succeeds
   A11 Client or Server: graceful TLS closure ([Protocol] section
        4.13.3.1.)

A.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes

   Certain changes in the authentication and authorization state of an
   LDAP association are only allowed if the server can affirmatively
   answer a question. These questions are applied as part of the
   criteria for allowing or disallowing a state transition in the state
   transition table in section A.4.

   ID Decision Question
   -- --------------------------------------------------------------
   D1 Are lower-layer credentials available?
   D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped to
       asserted AuthZID "L"?

A.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table

   The LDAP Association table below lists the valid authentication and
   authorization states for an LDAP association and the actions that
   could affect them. For any given row in the table, the Current State
   column gives the state of an LDAP association, the Action column
   gives an action that could affect the state of an LDAP assocation,
   and the Next State column gives the resulting state of an LDAP
   association after the action occurs.

   S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table,
   is the authentication state when an LDAP connection is initially
   established.

   Current            Next
    State  Action    State  Comment
   ------- -------   -----  ---------------------------------------
     Any   A1          S1    [Protocol] section 4.2.1
     Any   A2          S1    Section 6
     Any   A3          S1    Section 6
     Any   A4          S2    Sections 6.1, 6.2
     Any   A5,         S1    Failed bind, section 3.3.6
            D1=no
     Any   A5,         S3
            D1=yes
     Any   A6,         S1    failed bind, section 3.3.6
            D1=no
     Any   A6,         S1    failed bind, section 3.3.6.2
            D1=yes,
            D2=no
     Any   A6,         S4
            D1=yes,
            D2=yes
     Any   A7          S1    [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients
                               cannot detect this state.
     Any   A8          no    [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients
                      change  cannot detect this state.
     Any   A9          no    [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2
                      change
     Any   A10         no    Section 4.2.1
                      change
     Any   A11         S1    Section 4.2.3

Appendix B. Example Deployment Scenarios

   The following scenarios are typical for LDAP directories on the
   Internet, and have different security requirements. (In the
   following discussion, "sensitive data" refers to information whose
   disclosure, alteration, destruction, or loss would adversely affect
   the interests or business of its owner or user. Also note that there
   may be data that is protected but not sensitive.) This is not
   intended to be a comprehensive list; other scenarios are possible,
   especially on physically protected networks.

   (1) A read-only directory, containing no sensitive data, accessible
       to "anyone", and TCP connection hijacking or IP spoofing is not
       a problem. Anonymous authentication, described in section 7, is
       suitable for this type of deployment, and requires no additional
       security functions except administrative service limits.

   (2) A read-only directory containing no sensitive data; read access
       is granted based on identity. TCP connection hijacking is not
       currently a problem. This scenario requires data confidentiality
       for sensitive authentication information AND data integrity for
       all authentication information.

   (3) A read-only directory containing no sensitive data; and the
       client needs to ensure the identity of the directory server and
       that the directory data is not modified while being returned
       from the server. A data origin authentication service AND data
       integrity service are required.

   (4) A read-write directory, containing no sensitive data; read
       access is available to "anyone", update access to properly
       authorized persons. TCP connection hijacking is not currently a
       problem. This scenario requires data confidentiality for
       sensitive authentication information AND data integrity for all
       authentication information.

   (5) A directory containing sensitive data. This scenario requires
       data confidentiality protection AND secure authentication.

Appendix B. C. Authentication and Authorization: Definitions and Authorization Concepts

   This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships
   regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity.
   These concepts are used in describing how various security
   approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization.

B.1.

C.1. Access Control Policy

   An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection
   of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or
   other entities accessing those resources. A common expression of an
   access control policy is an access control list. Security objects and
   mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of
   access control policies and their enforcement. Access control
   policies are typically expressed in terms of access control factors
   as described below.

B.2.

C.2. Access Control Factors

   A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated
   with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of
   [Protocol]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and
   how to process the request. These are called access control factors
   (ACFs). They might include source IP address, encryption strength,
   the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Some
   factors may be specific to the request itself, others may be
   associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted,
   others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental".

   Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control
   factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y
   on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for
   such expressions is implementation-specific.

B.3.

C.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity

   Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to
   another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user)
   who is attempting to establish an association with the other party
   (typically a server). Authentication is the process of generating,
   transmitting, and verifying these credentials and thus the identity
   they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a
   credential.

   There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used
   depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by
   the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets,
   simple identity and password pairs. Note that an authentication
   mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used
   with it.

B.4.

C.4. Authorization Identity

   An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It
   is the name of the user or other entity that requests that
   operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed
   in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform
   operation Y on resource Z.

   The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly
   the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but
   it may be different. SASL allows clients to specify an authorization
   identity distinct from the authentication identity asserted by the
   client's credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to
   authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access
   privileges of the identity for which they are proxying [SASL]. Also,
   the form of authentication identity supplied by a service like TLS
   may not correspond to the authorization identities used to express a
   server's access control policy, requiring a server-specific mapping
   to be done. The method by which a server composes and validates an
   authorization identity from the authentication credentials supplied
   by a client is implementation-specific.

Appendix C. D. RFC 2829 Change History

   This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2829 in
   preparing this document.

C.0.

D.0. General Editorial Changes
   Version -00

     - Changed other instances of the term LDAP to LDAP where v3 of the
       protocol is implied. Also made all references to LDAP use the
       same wording.

     - Miscellaneous grammatical changes to improve readability.

     - Made capitalization in section headings consistent.

   Version -01

     - Changed title to reflect inclusion of material from RFC 2830 and
       2251.

C.1.

D.1. Changes to Section 1

   Version -01

     - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section.

C.2.

D.2. Changes to Section 2

   Version -01

     - Moved section to an appendix.

C.3.

D.3. Changes to Section 3

   Version -01

     - Moved section to an appendix.

C.4

D.4 Changes to Section 4

   Version -00

     - Changed "Distinguished Name" to "LDAP distinguished name".

C.5.

D.5. Changes to Section 5

   Version -00

     - Added the following sentence: "Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients
       with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or
       access sensitive information in directory entries."

C.5.1.

D.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1

   Version -00

     - Replaced the text describing the procedure for performing an
       anonymous bind (protocol) with a reference to section 4.2 of RFC
       2251 (the protocol spec).

   Version -01

     - Brought text describing procedure for performing an anonymous
       bind from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 bis.  This text will be
       removed from the draft standard version of that document.

C.6.

D.6. Changes to Section 6.

   Version -00

     Reorganized text in section 6.1 as follows:

     1. Added a new section (6.1) titled "Simple Authentication" and
       moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into
       section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating:

        a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where
        confidentiality is not available.

        b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple
        authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity
        mechanisms are in force.

     2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP
       implementations MUST support authentication with a password...")
       to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2).

C.6.1.

D.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1.

   Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2

     - Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the
       DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAP
       implementations

C.6.2.

D.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2

   Version -00

     - Renamed section to 6.3

     - Reworded first paragraph to remove reference to user and the
       userPassword password attribute Made the first paragraph more
       general by simply saying that if a directory supports simple
       authentication that the simple bind operation MAY performed
       following negotiation of a TLS ciphersuite that supports
       confidentiality.

     - Replaced "the name of the user's entry" with "a DN" since not
       all bind operations are performed on behalf of a "user."

     - Added Section 6.3.1 heading just prior to paragraph 5.

     - Paragraph 5: replaced "The server" with "DSAs that map the DN
       sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a
       userPassword attribute."

C.6.3.

D.6.3. Changes to section 6.3.

     Version -00

     - Renamed to section 6.4.

C.7.

D.7. Changes to section 7.

   none

C.7.1.

D.7.1. Changes to section 7.1.

   Version -00

     - Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase
       "to have issued the certificate" immediately after
       "Certification Authority."

C.8.

D.8. Changes to section 8.

   Version -00

     - Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is
       covered explicitly in section 6.

     - Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph.

     - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph.

     - Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph.

   Version -01

     - Moved entire section 8 of RFC 2829 into section 3.4 (Using SASL
       for Other Security Services) to bring material on SASL
       mechanisms together into one location.

C.9.

D.9. Changes to section 9.

   Version -00

     - Paragraph 2: changed "EXTERNAL mechanism" to "EXTERNAL SASL
       mechanism."

     - Added section 9.1. heading.

     - Modified a comment in the ABNF from "unspecified userid" to
       "unspecified authz id".

     - Deleted sentence, "A utf8string is defined to be the UTF-8
       encoding of one or more ISO 10646 characters," because it is
       redundant.

     - Added section 9.1.1. heading.

     - Added section 9.1.2. heading.

   Version -01

     - Moved entire section 9 to become section 3.5 so that it would be
       with other SASL material.

C.10.

D.10. Changes to Section 10.

   Version -00

     - Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to
       be a day of CPU time in 2000.

     - Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use...
       and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the
       second list of ciphersuites.

     - Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering
       equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the
       section.

C.11.

D.11. Changes to Section 11.

   Version -01

     - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material.

C.12.

D.12. Changes to Section 12.

   Version -00

     - Inserted new section 12 that specifies when SASL protections
       begin following SASL negotiation, etc. The original section 12
       is renumbered to become section 13.

   Version -01

     - Moved to section 3.7 to be with other SASL material.

C.13.

D.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12).

   None

Appendix D. E. RFC 2830 Change History

   This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2830 in
   preparing this document.

D.0.

E.0. General Editorial Changes

     - Material showing the PDUs for the Start TLS response was broken
       out into a new section.

     - The wording of the definition of the Start TLS request and Start
       TLS response was changed to make them parallel. NO changes were
       made to the ASN.1 definition or the associated values of the
       parameters.

     - A separate section heading for graceful TLS closure was added
       for parallelism with section on abrupt TLS closure.

Appendix E. F. RFC 2251 Change History

   This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in
   preparing this document.

E.0.

F.0. General Editorial Changes

     - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this
       document.

     - A new section was created for the Bind Request

     - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved
       after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the
       presentation of the Start TLS operations. The section was also
       subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being
       described within it.

     - All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within
       the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 -
       4.7).

Appendix F. G. Change History to Combined Document

F.1.

G.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02

   General

     - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections
       within the document, and fixed broken references.

     - General editorial changes--punctuation, spelling, formatting,
       etc.

   Section 1.

     - Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings

   Section 2.

     - Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in
       line with IETF security glossary.

   Section 3.

     - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security
       glossary.

     - Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS
       negotiation must be discarded

     -Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL
       negotiation must be discarded

     - Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify
       intent

   Section 4.4.

     - Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism
       not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this
       statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN
       SASL mechanisms.)

   Section 5.3.6

     - Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname
       check.

   Section 6

     - Added LDAP Association State Transition Tables to show the
       various states through which an LDAP association may pass along
       with the actions and decisions required to traverse from state
       to state.

   Appendix A

     - Brought security terminology in line with IETF security glossary
       throughout the appendix.

F.2.

G.2. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-03

   General

     - Added introductory notes and changed title of document and
       references to conform to WG chair suggestions for the overall
       technical specification.

     - Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without
       requiring changes to the document.

   Section 3

     - Removed reference to /etc/passwd file and associated text.

   Section 4
     - Removed sections 4.1, 4.2 and parts of section 4.3. This
       information was being duplicated in the protocol specification
       and will now reside there permanently.
   Section 4.2

     - changed words, "not recommended" to "strongly discouraged"

   Section 4.3

     - Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two sentences were
       added indicating that clients SHOULD NOT send a DN value when
       binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value
       received in this circumstance.
     -

   Section 8.3.1

     - Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any
       specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry
       as a "user" entry.

   Section 11

     - Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated
       access.

     - Added security consideration requiring access control to be
       applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be
       applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory
       information.

F.3.

G.3. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-04

   General

     - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible.
       (References to works in progress still use [name] format.)
     - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in
       line with specification in [Protocol] draft.

     - Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without
       requiring changes to the document.

   Section 4.4.1.

     - Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in
       the model draft.

   Section 5

     - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to
       [Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change.
     -
   Section 6

     - Reviewed LDAP Association State table for completeness and
       accuracy. Renumbered actions A3, A4, and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4
       respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure
       that actions are in ascending order (makes analyzing the table
       much more logical). Added action A2 to several states where it
       was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to
       states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue G.28. H.28.

   Section 11

     - Modified security consideration (originally added in -03)
       requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated
       users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have
       access control applied to limit permissible actions.
     -
   Section 13

     - Verified all normative references and moved informative
       references to a new section 14.

F.4.

G.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05

   General

     - General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line
       length issues, etc.
     - Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references
       throughout.
     - Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with
       several changes to correct improper usage.

   Abstract
     - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed
       due to movement of material on Bind and Start TLS operations to
       [Protocol] in this revision.

   Section 3.

     - Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAP Security Mechanisms" and
       removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the
       motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the
       previous section title, "Required Security Mechanisms", and
       other text found in the section that everything in the section
       was a requirement

     - Information from several removed paragraphs that describe
       deployment scenarios will be added Appendix A in the next
       revision of the draft.

     - Paragraph beginning, " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST
       discard all information..." was moved to section 5.1.7 and
       integrated with related material there.

     - Paragraph beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..."
       was moved to section 4.2

   Section 4.l.

     - Changed wording of first paragraph to clarify meaning.

   Section 4.2.
     - Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL
       security layer is negotiated..."

   Section 4.3.3.
     - Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the
       section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL
       mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document.

   Section 4.4.1.

     - Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client
       applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization
       identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry.
       This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus.

     - Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The
       uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..."

   Section 5.1.1.

     - Made minor clarifying edits in the last paragraph of the
       section.

   Section 5.1.7.

     - Wording from section 3 paragraph beginning " If TLS is
       negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was
       moved to this section and integrated with existing text.

   Section 5.2.

     - Changed usage of "TLS connection" to "TLS session" throughout.

     - Removed empty section 5.2.1 and renumbered sections it had
       previously contained.

   Section 8.

     - Added introductory paragraph at beginning of section.

   Section 8.1.

     - Changed term  "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be
       consistent with usage in rest of document.

   Section 8.2.

     - Changed first paragraph to require implementations that
       implement *password-based* authentication to implement and
       support DIGEST-MD5 SASL authentication.

   Section 11.

     - First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session
       confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest
       of document.

   Appendix A. B.

     - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios
       removed from section 3.

F.5.

G.5. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-06

   General

     - Combined Section 2 (Introduction) and Section 3 (Motivation) and
       moved Introduction to section 1. All following sections numbers
       were decremented by one as result.

     - Edits to fix typos, I-D nits, etc.

     - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from
       WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further
       discussion.

   Section 1

     - Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7).

   Section 2.1

     - Changed definition of "LDAP association" and added terms,
       "connection" and "TLS connection" to bring usage in line with
       [Protocol].

   Section 4.1.6

     - Clarified sentence stating that the client MUST NOT use derived
       forms of DNS names.

   Section 5.1

     - Began edits to LDAP Association state table to clarify meaning
       of various states and actions.

     - Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added
       appropriate transitions to the state transition table to
       accommodate it.

   Section 7.2

     - Replaced first paragraph to clarify that the "DIGEST-MD5" SASL
       mechanism is required to implement.

   Section 9

     - Rewrote the section to make the advice more applicable over the
       long term, i.e. more "timeless." The intent of content in the
       original section was preserved.

   Section 10

     - Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse
       of unauthenticated access.

F.6.

G.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-07

   General

     - Updated external and internal references to accommodate changes
       in recent drafts.

     - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from
       WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further
       discussion.

   Section 3

     - Rewrote much of section 3.3 to meet the SASL profile
       requirements of draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt section 5.

     - Changed treatement of SASL ANONYMOUS and PLAIN mechanisms to
       bring in line with WG consensus.

   Section 4

     - Note to implementers in section 4.1.1 based on operational
       experience.

     - Clarification on client continuing by performing a Start TLS
       with TLS already established in section 4.1.4.

     - Moved verification of mapping of client's authentication ID to
       asserted authorization ID to apply only to explicit assertion.
       The local policy in place for implicit assertion is adequate.

   Section 7
     - Removed most of section 7.2 as the information is now covered
       adequately via the new SASL profile in section 3.3. Added note
       to implementors regarding the treatment of username and realm
       values in DIGEST-MD5.

     - Section 7.3. Minor clarifications in wording.

     - Section 7.3.1. Clarification that a match of the presented value
       to any member of the set of stored passwords constitutes a
       successful authentication.

F.6.

G.7. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-08

   General

     - Changed usage from LDAPv3 to LDAP for usage consistency across
       LDAP technical specification.

     - Fixed a number of usage nits for consistency and to bring doc in
       conformance with publication guidelines.

   Abstract

     - Significant cleanup and rewording of abstract based on WG
       feedback.

   Section 2.1

     - New definition of user.

   Section 3

     - Added 1.5 sentences at end of introductory paragraph indicating
       the effect of the Bind op on the LDAP association.

   Section 3.1

     - Retitled section and clarified wording

   Section 3.2

     - Clarified that simple authentication choice provides three types
       of authentication: anonymous, unauthenticated, and simple
       password.

   Section 3.3.3

     - New wording clarifying when negotiated security mechanisms take
       effect.

   Section 3.3.5
     - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched
       prior to SASL negotiation from MUST to SHOULD to allow for
       information obtained through secure mechanisms.

   Section 3.3.6

     - Simplified wording of first paragraph based on suggestion from
       WG.

   Section 3.4

     - Minor clarifications in wording.

   Section 3.4.1

     - Minor clarifications in wording in first sentence.
     - Explicitly called out that the DN value in the dnAuthzID form is
       to be matched using DN matching rules.
     - Called out that the uAuthzID MUST be prepared using SASLprep
       rules before being compared.
     - Clarified requirement on assuming global uniqueness by changing
       a "generally... MUST" wording to "SHOULD".

   Section 4.1.1

     - Simplified wording describing conditions when Start TLS cannot
       be sent.
     - Simplified wording in note to implementers regarding race
       condition with outstanding LDAP operations on connection.

   Section 4.1.5

     - Removed section and moved relevant text to section 4.2.2.

   Section 4.1.6

     - Renumbered to 4.1.5.
     - Updated server identity check rules for server's name based on
       WG list discussion.

   Section 4.1.7

     - Renumbered to 4.1.6
     - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched
       prior to TLS negotion from MUST to SHOULD to allow for
       information obtained through secure mechanisms.

   Section 6.1

     - Clarified wording.
     - Added definition of anonymous and unauthenticated binds.

   Section 10
     - Added security consideration (moved from elsewhere) discouraging
       use of cleartext passwords on unprotected communication
       channels.

   Section 11

     - Added an IANA consideration to update GSSAPI service name
       registry to point to [Roadmap] and [Authmeth]

F.7.

G.8. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-09

   General

     - Updated section references within document
     - Changed reference tags to match other docs in LDAP TS
     - Used non-quoted names for all SAL mechanisms

   Abstract

     - Inspected keyword usage and removed several improper usages.

     - Removed sentence saying DIGEST-MD5 is LDAP's mandatory-to-
       implement mechanism. This is covered elsewhere in document.

     - Moved section 5, authentication state table, of -08 draft to
       section 8 of -09 and completely rewrote it.

   Section 1

     - Reworded sentence beginning, "It is also desireable to allow
       authentication methods to carry identities based on existing¨
       non-LDAP DN¨forms..." DN-forms..."
     - Clarified relationship of this document to other documents in
       the LDAP TS.

   Section 3.3.5

     - Removed paragraph beginning,"If the client is configured to
       support multiple SASL mechanisms..." because the actions
       specified in the paragraph do not provide the protections
       indicated. Added a new paragraph indicating that clients and
       server should allow specification of acceptable mechanisms and
       only allow those mechanisms to be used.

     - Clarified independent behavior when TLS and SASL security layers
       are both in force (e.g. one being removed doesn't affect the
       other).

   Section 3.3.6

     - Moved most of section 4.2.2, Client Assertion of Authorization
       Identity, to sections 3.3.6, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2.

   Section 3.3.6.4

     - Moved some normative comments into text body.

   Section 4.1.2

     - Non success resultCode values are valid if server is *unwilling*
       or unable to negotiate TLS.

   Section 4.2.1

     - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback.

   Section 4.2.2

     - Moved most of this section to 3.3.6 for better document flow.

   Section 4.2.3

     - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback.

   Section 5.1

     - Moved imperative language regarding unauthenticated access from
       security considerations to here.

   Section 6

     - Added several paragraphs regarding the risks of transmitting
       passwords in the clear and requiring server implementations to
       provide a specific configuration that reduces these risks.

   Section 6.2

     - Added sentence describing protections provided by DIGEST-MD5
       method.
     - Changed DNs in exmple to be dc=example,dc=com.

   Section 10

     - Updated consideration on use of cleartext passwords to include
       other unprotected authentication credentials
     - Substantial rework of consideration on misuse of unauthenticated
       bind.

G.9. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-10

     - Reorganized content of sections 3-9 to improve document flow and
       reduce redundancy.
     - Resolved issue of effect of Start TLS and TLS closure on LDAP
       association state.
     - Made numerous minor wording changes based on WG feedback.
     - Updated list of threats for Section 1.

     - Recommendation that servers should not support weaker TLS
       ciphersuites unless other protection is in place.
     - Moved authentication state table to appendix and relettered
       appendices.

Appendix G. H. Issues to be Resolved

   This appendix lists open questions and issues that need to be
   resolved before work on this document is deemed complete.

G.1.

H.1.

   Section 1 lists 6 security mechanisms that can be used by LDAP
   servers. I'm not sure what mechanism 5, "Resource limitation by
   means of administrative limits on service controls" means.

   Status: resolved. Changed wording to "administrative service limits"
   to clarify meaning.

G.2.

H.2.

   Section 2 paragraph 1 defines the term, "sensitive." Do we want to
   bring this term and other security-related terms in alignment with
   usage with the IETF security glossary (RFC 2828)?

   Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that we should do this, so
   the appropriate changes have been made.

G.3.

H.3.

   Section 2, deployment scenario 2: What is meant by the term "secure
   authentication function?"

   Status: resolved. Based on the idea that a "secure authentication
   function" could be provided by TLS, I changed the wording to require
   data confidentiality for sensitive authentication information and
   data integrity for all authentication information.

G.4.

H.4.

   Section 3, deployment scenario 3: What is meant by the phrase,
   "directory data is authenticated by the server?"

   Status: resolved. I interpreted this to mean the ability to ensure
   the identity of the directory server and the integrity of the data
   sent from that server to the client, and explictly stated such.

G.5.

H.5.

   Section 4 paragraph 3: What is meant by the phrase, "this means that
   either this data is useless for faking authentication (like the Unix
   "/etc/passwd" file format used to be)?"
   Status: resolved. Discussion at IETF 52 along with discussions with
   the original authors of this material have convinced us that this
   reference is simply too arcane to be left in place. In -03 the text
   has been modified to focus on the need to either update password
   information in a protected fashion outside of the protocol or to
   update it in session well protected against snooping, and the
   reference to /etc/passwd has been removed.

G.6.

H.6.

   Section 4 paragraph 7 begins: "For a directory needing session
   protection..." Is this referring to data confidentiality or data
   integrity or both?

   Status: resolved. Changed wording to say, "For a directory needing
   data security (both data integrity and data confidentiality)..."

G.7.

H.7.

   Section 4 paragraph 8 indicates that "information about the server
   fetched prior to the TLS negotiation" must be discarded. Do we want
   to explicitly state that this applies to information fetched prior
   to the *completion* of the TLS negotiation or is this going too far?

   Status: resolved. Based on comments in the IETF 51 LDAPBIS WG
   meeting, this has been changed to explicitly state, "fetched prior
   to the initiation of the TLS negotiation..."

G.8.

H.8.

   Section 4 paragraph 9 indicates that clients SHOULD check the
   supportedSASLMechanisms list both before and after a SASL security
   layer is negotiated to ensure that they are using the best available
   security mechanism supported mutually by the client and server. A
   note at the end of the paragraph indicates that this is a SHOULD
   since there are environments where the client might get a list of
   supported SASL mechanisms from a different trusted source.

   I wonder if the intent of this could be restated more plainly using
   one of these two approaches (I've paraphrased for the sake of
   brevity):

        Approach 1: Clients SHOULD check the supportedSASLMechanisms
        list both before and after SASL negotiation or clients SHOULD
        use a different trusted source to determine available supported
        SASL mechanisms.

        Approach 2: Clients MUST check the supportedSASLMechanisms list
        both before and after SASL negotiation UNLESS they use a
        different trusted source to determine available supported SASL
        mechanisms.

   Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that Approach 1 was
   probably best. I ended up keeping the basic structure similar to the
   original to meet this intent.

G.9.

H.9.

   Section 6.3.1 states: "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request
   to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute will... compare
   [each value in the named user's entry]... with the presented
   password."  This implies that this applies only to user entries with
   userPassword attributes.  What about other types of entries that
   might allow passwords and might store in the password information in
   other attributes?  Do we want to make this text more general?

   Status: resolved in -03 draft by generalizing section 8.3.1 to not
   refer to any specific password attribute and by removing the term
   "user" in referring to the directory entry specified by the DN in
   the bind request.

G.10

H.10 userPassword and simple bind

   We need to be sure that we don't require userPassword to be the only
   attribute used for authenticating via simple bind. (See 2251 sec 4.2
   and authmeth 6.3.1. Work with Jim Sermersheim on resolution to this.
   On publication state something like: "This is the specific
   implementation of what we discussed in our general reorg
   conversation on the list." (Source: Kurt Zeilenga)

   Status: resolved in -03 draft by generalizing section 8.3.1 to not
   refer to any specific password attribute and by removing the term
   "user" in referring to the directory entry specified by the DN in
   the bind request.

G.11.

H.11. Meaning of LDAP Association

   The original RFC 2830 uses the term "LDAP association" in describing
   a connection between an LDAP client and server regardless of the
   state of TLS on that connection. This term needs to be defined or
   possibly changed.

   Status: resolved. at IETF 51 Bob Morgan indicated that the term
   "LDAP association" was intended to distinguish the LDAP-level
   connection from the TLS-level connection.  This still needs to be
   clarified somewhere in the draft. Added "LDAP association" to a
   glossary in section 1.

G.12.

H.12. Is DIGEST-MD5 mandatory for all implementations?

   Reading 2829bis I think DIGEST-MD5 is mandatory ONLY IF your server
   supports password based authentication...but the following makes it
   sound mandatory to provide BOTH password authentication AND DIGEST-
   MD5:

   "6.2. Digest authentication
   LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password
   using the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism for password protection, as
   defined in section 6.1."

   The thing is for acl it would be nice (though not critical) to be
   able to default the required authentication level for a subject to a
   single "fairly secure" mechanism--if there is no such mandatory
   authentication scheme then you cannot do that. (Source: Rob Byrne)

   Status: resolved. -00 version of the draft added a sentence at the
   beginning of section 8.2 stating that LDAP server implementations
   must support this method.

G.13.

H.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested

   Again on the subject of authentication level, is it possible to
   define an ordering on authentication levels which defines their
   relative "strengths" ? This would be useful in acl as you could say
   things like"a given aci grants access to a given subject at this
   authentication level AND ABOVE". David Chadwick raised this before
   in the context of denying access to a subject at a given
   authentication level, in which case he wanted to express "deny
   access to this subject at this authentication level AND TO ALL
   IDENTITIES AUTHENTICATED BELOW THAT LEVEL". (Source: Rob Byrne)

   Status: out of scope. This is outside the scope of this document and
   will not be addressed.

G.14.

H.14. Document vulnerabilities of various mechanisms

   While I'm here...in 2829, I think it would be good to have some
   comments or explicit reference to a place where the security
   properties of the particular mandatory authentication schemes are
   outlined. When I say "security properties" I mean stuff like "This
   scheme is vulnerable to such and such attacks, is only safe if the
   key size is > 50, this hash is widely considered the best, etc...".
   I think an LDAP implementor is likely to be interested in that
   information, without having to wade through the security RFCs.
   (Source: Rob Byrne)

   Status: out of scope. This is outside the scope of this document and
   will not be addressed.

G.15.

H.15. Include a Start TLS state transition table

   The pictoral representation it is nominally based on is here (URL
   possibly folded):

   http://www.stanford.edu/~hodges/doc/LDAPAssociationStateDiagram-
   1999-12-14.html

   (Source: Jeff Hodges)
   Status: Resolved.

   Table provided in -03. Review of content for accuracy in -04.
   Additional review is needed, plus comments from WG members indicate
   that additional description of each state's meaning would be
   helpful.

   Did a significant revision of state transition table in -09. Changes
   were based on suggestions from WG and greatly simplified overall
   table.

G.16.

H.16. Empty sasl credentials question

   I spent some more time looking microscopically at ldap-auth-methods
   and ldap-ext-tls drafts. The drafts say that the credential must
   have the form dn:xxx or u:xxx or be absent, and although they don't
   say what to do in the case of an empty octet string I would say that
   we could send protocolError (claim it is a bad PDU).

   There is still the question of what to do if the credential is 'dn:'
   (or 'u:') followed by the empty string. (Source: ariel@columbia.edu
   via Jeff Hodges)

   Status: resolved. Kurt Zeilenga indicated during ldapbis WG
   discussion at IETF 52 that SASL AuthzID credentials empty and absent
   are equivalent in the latest SASL ID. This resolves the issue.

G.17.

H.17. Hostname check from MUST to SHOULD?

   I am uneasy about the hostname check. My experience from PKI with
   HTTP probably is a contributing factor; we have people using the
   short hostname to get to a server which naturally has the FQDN in
   the certificate, no end of problems. I have a certificate on my
   laptop which has the FQDN for the casse when the system is on our
   Columbia network with a fixed IP; when I dial in however, I have
   some horrible dialup name, and using the local https server becomes
   annoying. Issuing a certificate in the name 'localhost' is not a
   solution! Wildcard match does not solve this problem. For these
   reasons I am inclined to argue for 'SHOULD' instead of
   'MUST' in paragraph...

   Also, The hostname check against the name in the certificate is a
   very weak means of preventing man-in-the-middle attacks; the proper
   solution is not here yet (SecureDNS or some equivalent). Faking out
   DNS is not so hard, and we see this sort of thing in the press on a
   pretty regular basis, where site A hijacks the DNS server for site B
   and gets all their requests. Some mention of this should be made in
   the draft. (Source: ariel@columbia.edu via Jeff Hodges)

   Status: resolved. Based on discussion at IETF 52 ldapbis WG meeting,
   this text will stand as it is. The check is a MUST, but the behavior
   afterward is a SHOULD. This gives server implementations the room to
   maneuver as needed.

G.18.

H.18. Must SASL DN exist in the directory?

   If the 'dn:' form of sasl creds is used, is it the intention of the
   draft(ers) that this DN must exist in the directory and the client
   will have the privileges associated with that entry, or can the
   server map the sasl DN to perhaps some other DN in the directory,
   in an implementation-dependent fashion?

   We already know that if *no* sasl credentials are presented, the DN
   or altname in the client certificate may be mapped to a DN in an
   implementation-dependent fashion, or indeed to something not in the
   directory at all. (Right?)  (Source: ariel@columbia.edu via Jeff
   Hodges)

   Status: resolved. (11/12/02)Based on my research I propose that the
   DN MUST exist in the directory when the DN form of sasl creds is
   used. I have made this proposal to the ldapbis mailing list.

   (11/21/02) Feedback from mailing list has proposed removing this
   paragraph entirely because (1) explicit assertion of authorization
   identity should only be done when proxying (2) mapping of the
   asserted authorization identity is implementation specific and
   policy driven [SASL] section 4.2, and (3) keeping this paragraph is
   not required for interoperability.

G.19.

H.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism

   We need to specify whether the DN field in Bind operation can/cannot
   be used when SASL mechanism is specified. (source: RL Bob)

   Status: resolved. (-03) Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two
   sentences were added to section 4.3 indicating that clients SHOULD
   NOT send a DN value when binding with the sasl choice and servers
   SHALL ignore any value received in this circumstance. During edits
   for -04 version of draft it was noted that [Protocol] section 4.2
   conflicts with this draft. The editor of [Protocol] has been
   notified of the discrepancy, and they have been handled.

G.20.

H.20. Bind states

   Differences between unauthenticated and anonymous. There are four
   states you can get into. One is completely undefined (this is now
   explicitly called out in [Protocol]).  This text needs to be moved
   from [Protocol] to this draft. (source: Jim Sermersheim)

   Status: Resolved. There are four states: (1) no name, no password
   (anon); (2) name, no password (anon); (3) no name, password
   (invalid); (4) name, password (simple bind).  States 1, 2, and 4 are
   called out in [AuthMeth]. State 3 is called out in [Protocol]; this
   seems appropriate based on review of alternatives.

G.21.

H.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access
   Add a security consideration that operational experience shows that
   clients can misuse unauthenticated access (simple bind with name but
   no password).  Servers SHOULD by default reject authentication
   requests that have a DN with an empty password with an error of
   invalidCredentials. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga and Chris Newman (Sun))

   Status: Resolved. Added to security considerations in -03.

G.22.

H.22. Need to move Start TLS protocol information to [Protocol]

   Status: Resolved. Removed Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 for -04 and
   they are [Protocol] -11.

G.23.

H.23. Split Normative and Non-normative references into separate
sections.

   Status: Resolved. Changes made in -04

G.24.

H.24. What is the authentication state if a Bind operation is
abandoned?

   Status: Resolved.

   (3/24/03) This following text appears in section 4.2.1 of [Protocol]
   revision -13 to cover what happens if a bind operation is abandoned:

   A failed or abandoned Bind Operation has the effect of leaving the
   connection in an anonymous state. To arrive at a known
   authentication state after abandoning a bind operation, clients may
   unbind, rebind, or make use of the BindResponse.

   (6/28/03): The state table in section 6 of [AuthMeth] has been
   updated to reflect this wording.

G.25.

H.25. Difference between checking server hostname and server's
canonical DNS name in Server Identity Check?

   Section 4.1.6: I now understand the intent of the check (prevent
   man-in-the-middle attacks).  But what is the subtle difference
   between the "server hostname" and the "server's canonical DNS name"?
   (Source: Tim Hahn)

   Status: Resolved.

   (11/12/02) Sent suggested wording change to this paragraph to the
   ldapbis mail list and also asked for opinion as to whether we should
   discuss the distinction between server DNS hostname and server
   canonical DNS hostname in [AuthMeth].

   (11/21/02): RL Bob Morgan will provide wording that allows
   derivations of the name that are provided securely.

   (6/28/03): posted to the WG list asking Bob or any other WG member
   who is knowledgeable about the issues involved to help me with
   wording or other information I can use to make this change and close
   the work item.

   (10/08/03): Based on WG list feedback, I've updated this text to
   read what I judge to be the WG consensus, "The client MUST use the
   server provided by the user (or other trusted entity) as the value
   to compare against the server name as expressed in the server's
   certificate. A hostname derived from the user input is to be
   considered provided by the user only if derived in a secure fashion
   (e.g., DNSSEC)."

G.26.

H.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records

   Section 4.1.6: What should be done if the server was found using SRV
   records based on the "locate" draft/RFC? (Source: Tim Hahn).

   Status: Resolved. Section 5 of draft-ietf-ldapext-locate-08
   specifically calls out how the server identity should be performed
   if the server is located using the method defined in that draft.
   This is the right location for this information, and the coverage
   appears to be adequate.

G.27

H.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association.

   Section 4.4.1 of authmeth -03 (section 4.1 of RFC2830) states that
   TLS closure alert will leave the LDAP association intact. Contrast
   this with Section 4.5.2 (section 5.2 of RFC2830) that says that the
   closure of the TLS connection MUST cause the LDAP association to
   move to an anonymous authentication.

   Status: Resolved. (11/12/02) This is actually a [Protocol] issue
   because these sections have now been moved to [Protocol] -11. I have
   proposed the following text for Section 4.4.1 of [AuthMeth] -03
   (section 4.13.3.1 of [Protocol]) to resolve this apparent
   discrepancy:

   "Either the client or server MAY terminate the TLS connection on an
   LDAP association by sending a TLS closure alert.  The LDAP
   connection remains open for further communication after TLS closure
   occurs although the authentication state of the LDAP connection is
   affected (see [AuthMeth] section 4.2.2).

   (11/21/02): resolution to this is expected in [Protocol] -12

   (06/28/03): [Protocol]-15 clarifies that a TLS closure alert
   terminates the TLS connection while leaving the LDAP connection
   intact. The authentication state table in [AuthMeth] specifies the
   effect on the LDAP association.

G.28

H.28 Ordering of external sources of authorization identities

   Section 4.3.2 implies that external sources of authorization
   identities other than TLS are permitted. What is the behavior when
   two external sources of authentication credentials are available
   (e.g. TLS and IPsec are both present (is this possible?)) and a SASL
   EXTERNAL Bind operation is performed?

   Status: resolved. 11/20/02: Resolved by Section 4.2 of [SASL] which
   states that the decision to allow or disallow the asserted identity
   is based on an implementation defined policy.

G.29

H.29 Rewrite of Section 9, TLS Ciphersuites

   This section contains anachronistic references and needs to be
   updated/rewritten in a way that provides useful guidance for future
   readers in a way that will transcend the passage of time.

   Status: Resolved. (6/28/03): Rewrote the section to cover the
   general issues and considerations involved in selecting TLS
   ciphersuites.

G.30

H.30 Update to Appendix A, Example Deployment Scenarios

   This section needs to be updated to indicate which security
   mechanisms and/or combinations of security mechanisms described
   elsewhere in the document can provide the types of protections
   suggested in this appendix.

G.31

H.31 Use of PLAIN SASL Mechanism

   At least one LDAP server implementer has found the SASL "PLAIN"
   mechanism useful in authenticating to legacy systems that do not
   represent authentication identities as DNs. Section 3.3.1 appears to
   implicitly disallow the use of the SASL "PLAIN" mechanism with LDAP.
   Should we allow the use of this mechanism? I.e. is this "SASL"
   "PLAIN" MUST NOT be used with LDAP, or is it simply that LDAP
   doesn't define bindings for these mechanism. If SASL "PLAIN" is
   allowed, the following adjustments will be needed to section 3.3.1:
   (a) change section heading, (b) remove reference to "PLAIN" in the
   section, (c) ensure wording of last sentence regarding non-DN
   AuthZIDs is consistent with rest of the section.

   Status: Resolved.

   (6/28/03): email to WG list stating issue and asking if we should
   remove the reference to SASL "PLAIN".

   For -07 draft I've generalized the SASL profile in section 3.3 to
   allow any SASL mechanism.

G.32

H.32 Clarification on use of SASL mechanisms

   Section 3.3.1: BTW, what _are_ the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL
   mechanisms?  They are not defined in RFC2222.  If you refer to other
   SASL mechanisms than those in rfc2222, Maybe you should only list
   which mechanisms _are_used, instead of which ones are _not. (Source:
   Hallvard Furuseth)

   I (Kurt Zeilenga) note[s] as well that the ANONYMOUS/PLAIN section
   (4.2) should
   be deleted.  ANONYMOUS and PLAIN, like in other mechanism,
   can be used in LDAP if a) supported and b) enabled.  I note
   that they each offer capabilities not found in their simple
   bind equivalents (and hence are used in some deployments).
   For example, PLAIN (over TLS) is quite useful when interacting
   with legacy authentication subsystems.  (Source: Kurt Zeilenga)

   Status: Resolved.

   For -07 draft I've generalized the SASL profile in section 3.3 to
   allow any SASL mechanism.

G.33

H.33 Clarification on use of password protection based on AuthZID form

   Section 3.3.1: "If an authorization identity of a form different
   from a DN is requested by the client, a mechanism that protects the
   password in transit SHOULD be used." What has that to do with DNs?
   A mechanism that protects the password in transit should be used in
   any case, shouldn't it?

   Status: Resolved.

   In -08 draft this text was removed. There is already a general
   security consideration that covers this issue.

G.34

H.34 Clarification on use of matching rules in Server Identity Check

   The text in section 4.1.6 isn't explicit on whether all rules apply
   to both CN and dNSName values.  The text should be clear as to which
   rules apply to which values....  in particular, the wildcard
   rules. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga)

G.35

H.35 Requested Additions to Security Considerations

   Requested to mention hostile servers which the user might have been
   fooled to into contacting. Which mechanisms that are standardized by
   the LDAP standard do/do not disclose the user's password to the
   server? (Or to servers doing man-in-the-middle attack? Or is that a
   stupid question?)

   Requested to mention denial of service attacks.

   Requested list of methods that need/don't need the server to know
   the user's plaintext password. (I say 'know' instead of 'store'
   because it could still store the password encrypted, but in a way
   which it knows how to decrypt.)

   (Source: Hallvard Furuseth)

G.36

H.36 Add reference to definition of DIGEST-MD5

   Need a reference to the definition of DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism in
   section 7.2 (Source: Hallvard Furuseth)

   Status: Resolved. A reference to to the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism,
   [DigestAuth], is included in the -07 revision.

G.37

H.37 Clarification on procedure for certificate-based authentication

   8.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS states: "Following
   the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client will send
   an LDAP bind request with the SASL "EXTERNAL" mechanism." Is this
   immediately following, or just some time later? Should the wording,
   "the client will send..." actually read, "the client MUST send..."?

G.38

   Status: Resolved. In -10 this text has been absorbed into the SASL
   EXTERNAL mechanism section.

H.38 Effect of Start TLS on authentication state

   Should the server drop all knowledge of connection, i.e. return to
   anonymous state, if it gets a Start TLS request on a connection that
   has successfully bound using the simple method?

G.39

   Status: Resolved. In -09 the effect on an LDAP association by a
   Start TLS operation is made a matter of local policy. This is based
   on editorĂs perception of WG consensus gaged by conversations at
   IETF 58 and subsequent discussion on the WG  mail list.

H.39 Be sure that there is a consideration in [SCHEMA] that discusses
multiple password values in userPassword

   Allowing multiple values obviously does raise a number of security
   considerations and these need to be discussed in the document.

   Certainly applications which intend to replace the userPassword with
   new value(s) should use modify/replaceValues (or
   modify/deleteAttribute+addAttribute). Additionally, server
   implementations should be encouraged to provide administrative
   controls which, if enabled, restrict userPassword to one value.

G.40.

H.40. Clarify need to verify mapping between authentication identity
and resulting authorization identity on implicit assertion of AuthZID.

   4.2.2.3. Error Conditions

   "For either form of assertion, the server MUST verify that the
   client's authentication identity as supplied in its TLS credentials
   is permitted to be mapped to the asserted authorization identity."

   This makes sense for the explicit assertion case, but seems to be
   ambiguous for the implicit case.
   IMHO, the mapping can be done as two steps:
   a). deriving LDAP authentication identity from TLS credentials; If t
   this steps fails, EXTERNAL mechanism returns failure.
   b). verify that the authorization identity is allowed for the
   derived authentication identity. This is always "noop" for the
   implicit case.
   I am not sure that the text is saying this.
   (Source: Alexey Melnikov email 8/1/2003 5:30:43 PM)

   Status: Resolved in -07. After reading the comments and the text of
   the draft, I believe that this should be clarified. The local policy
   used to map the AuthNID to the AuthZID in the implicit case is
   sufficient and that no additional verification is useful or needed.
   This text has been moved to apply only to the explicit assertion
   case.

G.41.

H.41. Section 7.2 contains unnecessary and misleading detail.

   " I am not sure why this section is required in the document.
   DIGEST-MD5 is defined in a separate document and there should be
   nothing magical about its usage in LDAP. If DIGEST-MD5 description
   creates confusion for LDAP implementors, let's fix the DIGEST-MD5
   document! Also, this section tries to redefine DIGEST-MD5 behavior,
   which is explicitly prohibited by the SASL specification."
   (Source: Alexey Melnikov: email 8/1/2003 5:30:43 PM)

   Status: Resolved.

   After reading the comments and the text of the draft plus the
   related text in draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-02.txt plus
   http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-
   02.txt, I am inclined to agree with Alexey. In -07 I rewrote section
   3.3 (SASL mechanisms) to match the profiling requirements
   rfc2831bis. I then dramatically reduced the material in section 7.2
   to a bare minimum and let the SASL profile stand on its own.

G.42.

H.42. Does change for G.41 H.41 cause interoperability issue?

   There is one issue with the way the authmeth draft is currently
   written that changes the SASL DIGEST-MD5 behavior on the way the
   server responds with the subsequent authentication information .
   This has been documented in this fashion since RFC 2829 (section
   6.1) was originally published and may cause an interoperability
   issue at this point if it changed to follow the DIGEST-MD5 spec (as
   it was in -07 of AuthMeth). Take this issue to the list.

   Status: Resolved
   (10/08/03) This item was discussed on the WG list between 5/2/03 and
   5/9/03. Consensus apppears to support the notion that RFC 2829 was
   in error and that the semantics of RFC 2831 are correct and should
   be reflected in authmeth. This is already the case as of the -07
   draft.

G.43.

H.43. DIGEST-MD5 Realms recommendations for LDAP

   From http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-
   02.txt: A protocol profile SHOULD provide a guidance how realms are
   to be constructed and used in the protocol and MAY further restrict
   its syntax and protocol-specific semantics."

   I don't believe that any such guidance exists within the LDAP TS.
   The most likely place for this to reside is in the authmeth draft.

   Related email from Alexey Melnikov (8/4/2003 1:08:40 PM):

   "The problem I have with the document is that it references realm
   without explaining what it is (or at least some examples of valid
   values). For LDAP, some recommendations should be given. For
   example:
   1). Use a hardcoded string as the realm (one of the implementations
   I worked on was doing that)
   2). Use hostname (realm==host) or domain/cluster name (realm
   includes multiple hosts).
   3). Use a node in DIT above user entry, for example for "cn=Barbara
   Jensen, ou=Accounting, o=Ace Industry, c=US"
    and "cn=John Doe, ou=Accounting, o=Ace Industry, c=US" realm can be
   "ou=Accounting, o=Ace Industry, c=US"
   (or "o=Ace Industry, c=US"); for "cn=Gern Jensen, ou=Product
   Testing,o=Ace Industry, c=US" realm can be "ou=Product Testing,
   o=Ace Industry, c=US".

   Of course other choices are possible.

   Alexey

   To summarize:  I'd like authmeth to define a realm name for use with
   Digest-MD5 that corresponds to LDAP DNs known to this server.
   Authzid is okay, but perhaps could be better put into context.

   John  McMeeking (5/12/2003)

   Status: Resolved.

   draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-03.txt no longer requires this
   information in a SASL protocol. In addition, the ldapbis WG chairs
   have ruled this work out of scope. Individuals are welcome to make
   submissions to provide guidance on the use of realm and realm values
   in LDAP.

G.44.

H.44. Use of DNs in usernames and realms in DIGEST-MD5
   In reading the discussion on the mailing list, I reach the following
   conclusions:

   DIGEST-MD5 username and realm are simple strings. The syntax of
   these strings allows strings that look like DNs in form, however,
   DIGEST-MD5 treats them a simple strings for comparision purposes.
   For example, the DNs cn=roger, o=US and cn=roger,o=us are equivalent
   when being compared semantically as DNs, however, these would be
   considered two different username values in DIGEST-MD5 because
   simple octet-wise semantics (rather than DN semantics) are used to
   compare username values in DIGEST-MD5. Ditto for realm values.

   Status: Resolved.

   In -07 revision I added notes to implementors expressing this issue
   in section 7.2.

G.45:

H.45: Open Issue: Is Simple+TLS mandatory to implement?

   Going forward, it would be much better to clarify that simple
   +TLS is to be used for DN/password credentials and DIGEST-MD5
   (or PLAIN+TLS) be used for username/password credentials. (Kurt
   Zeilenga, 5/12/2003)

   I don't believe you can mandate simple/TLS! At the time RFC 2829 was
   debated, a large number on the WG wanted this. They did not get
   their way because of the complexity of the solution. It was argued
   that a password-based method would be better. I think they believed
   it would still be DN/password, though. (Ron Ramsay, 5/12/2003)

   This was officially opened as an issue by WG co-chair Kurt Zeilenga
   on 5/12/03. Little direct discussion has occurred since, however
   there has been significant discussion on the use of DN values as the
   username for DIGEST-MD5.

   Status: Resolved.

   Based on WG list discussion, Kurt Zeilenga has gaged a lack of WG
   consensus that Simple+TLS should be mandatory to implement. No
   further discussion is necessary.

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