Internet Engineering Task Force                                 J. Arkko
MMUSIC Working Group                                          E. Carrara
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               F. Lindholm
Expires: August 2003 February 2004                                        M. Naslund
                                                              K. Norrman
                                                                Ericsson
                                                          February,
                                                             August 2003

            Key Management Extensions for Session Description
          Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)
                   <draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-07.txt>
                   <draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-08.txt>

Status of this memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines general extensions for SDP and RTSP to carry
   the security information needed by a key management protocol, in
   order to secure the media. These extensions are presented as a
   framework, to be used by one or more key management protocols. As
   such, its use is meaningful only when it is completed by the key
   management protocol in use.

   General guidelines are also given on how the framework should be used
   together with SIP and RTSP.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

   1. Introduction.....................................................2
   1.1. Notational Conventions.........................................3
   2. Extensions to SDP and RTSP.......................................3 RTSP.......................................4
   2.1. SDP Extensions.................................................4
   2.2. RTSP Extensions................................................5 Extensions................................................4
   3. Usage with SIP and RTSP..........................................5
   3.1. General SDP processing.........................................5
   3.2. SIP usage......................................................7
   3.3. RTSP usage.....................................................8
   3.4. Example scenarios..............................................9
   4. Adding further Key management protocols.........................11
   5. Security Considerations.........................................11 Considerations.........................................12
   6. IANA Considerations.............................................12 Considerations.............................................13
   6.1. SDP Attribute Registration....................................12 Registration....................................13
   6.2. Protocol Identifier Registration..............................13
   7. Conclusions.....................................................13
   8. Acknowledgments.................................................13 Acknowledgments.................................................14
   9. Author's Addresses..............................................14
   10. References.....................................................14 References.....................................................15
   10.1. Normative References.........................................14 References.........................................15
   10.2. Informative References.......................................15

1. Introduction

      [Editor remark] All instances of RFC xxxx should be replaced with
      the RFC number of this document, when published. Furthermore, all
      instances of RFC yyyy should be replaced with the RFC number of
      the MIKEY (Multimedia Internet KEYing) document [MIKEY], when
      published.

   There has recently been work to define a security framework for the
   protection of real-time applications running over RTP, [SRTP].
   However, a security protocol needs a key management infrastructure to
   exchange keys and security parameters, managing manage and refreshing refresh keys, etc.

   A key management protocol is executed prior to the security protocol
   execution. The key management protocol's main goal is to, in a secure
   and reliable way, establish a so-called security association for the security
   protocol. This includes one or several more cryptographic keys and a the set of
   necessary parameters for the security protocol, e.g., cipher and
   authentication algorithm to be used. The key management protocol has
   similarities with, e.g., SIP [SIP] and RTSP [RTSP] in the sense that
   it negotiates necessary information in order to be able to setup the
   session.

   The focus in the following sections is to describe a new SDP
   attribute
   extensions and RTSP header extensions extension to support key management, and
   a possible
   the integration within SIP and RTSP. A framework is therefore
   described in the following. Such a This framework will need to be is completed by one or
   more key management protocols, to describe how the framework is used,
   e.g. which is the data to be carried in the extensions.

   Some of the motivations to create a framework with the possibility to
   include the key management in the session establishment are:

   * Just as the codec information is a description of how to encode and
      decode the audio (or video) stream, the key management data is a
      description of how to encrypt and decrypt the data.

   * The possibility to negotiate the security for the entire multimedia
      session at the same time.

   * The knowledge of the media at the session establishment makes it
      easy to tie the key management to the multimedia sessions.

   * This approach may be more efficient than setting up the security
      later, as that approach might force extra roundtrips, possibly
      also a separate set-up for each stream, hence implying more delay
      to the actual setup of the media session.

   * The possibility to negotiate keying material end-to-end without
      applying end-to-end protection of the SDP (instead, hop-by-hop
      security mechanisms can be used which may be useful if
      intermediate proxies needs access to the SDP).

   Currently in SDP [SDPnew], one field exists to transport keys, i.e.
   the "key=" "k=" field. However, this is not enough for a key management
   protocol as there are many more parameters that need to be
   transported. The approach here is to use and extend the SDP
   description to transport the key management offer/answer and also to
   associate it with the media sessions. SIP uses the offer/answer model
   [OAM] whereby extensions to SDP will be enough. However, RTSP [RTSP]
   does
   [RTSP]does not use the offer/answer model. This makes it impossible to send
   back an answer to the server. To solve this, model with SDP, so a new header
   is introduced in which the to convey key management data can be included. data.

1.1. Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119. [RFC2119].

2. Extensions to SDP and RTSP

   This section describes common attributes that are to be included in
   an SDP description or in an RTSP header when an integrated key
   management protocol is used. The attribute values MUST follow the
   general SDP or RTSP guidelines. guidelines (see [SDPnew] and [RTSP]).

   For the both SDP description, the key management attributes MAY be defined
   at session level (i.e. before and RTSP, the media descriptor lines) and/or at
   media level. If general method of adding the key
   management attributes are defined at media
   level, they will only apply protocol is to that specific media. If the key
   management attributes are defined at both session and media level,
   the media level definition overrides introduce new attributes, one identifier to
   identify the session level definition for
   that specific media.

   The following SDP attribute is defined:

   key-mgmt:<identifier> <opaque-data>

   <identifier> is the name of the key management protocol protocol, and the
   opaque-data is a one data field to transport
   where the key management protocol data. data is placed. The key management
   protocol data contains the necessary information to establish the
   security protocol, e.g., keys and cryptographic parameters. All
   parameters and keys are protected by the key management. Note that if the key management protocol fails, e.g., the
   receiver does not accept any of the proposed security parameters, or
   simply does not understand the key management protocol, the security
   setup will fail. Consequently, it is impossible to establish a secure
   session. So, if the key management fails, the offer must be rejected.

2.1. SDP Extensions

   This section provides an Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) grammar
   (as used in [SDPnew]) for the key management extensions to SDP.

   Note that the new definitions are compliant with the definition of an
   attribute field, i.e.

   attribute    = (att-field ":" att-value) | att-field

   One new attribute for SDP is defined:

   key-mgmt     = "key-mgmt: " prtcl-id keymgmt-data

   prtcl-id     = non-ws-string
                  ; e.g. "mikey"

   keymgmt-data = text

   where non-ws-string and text are as defined in SDP [SDPnew]. The
   attribute may be used at session level, media level level, or at both
   levels. An attribute defined at media level overrides an attribute
   defined at session level. Note that the prtcl-id name will be case
   sensitive and it is therefore RECOMMENDED that attributes registered
   be
   are in lower case letters. Section 3 describes in detail how the
   attributes are used and how the SDP is handled in different usage
   scenarios.

2.2. RTSP Extensions

   To support the needed attribute described, attribute, the following RTSP header is
   defined:

   KeyMgmt = "keymgmt" ":" 1#key-mgmt-spec

   key-mgmt-spec = "prot" "=" token ";" "data" "=" quoted-string

   token
   "token" and quoted-string "quoted-string" are as defined in the RTSP specification
   [RTSP].

   The KeyMgmt header should be possible to use in the messages
   described in the table below.

   Method      Direction     Requirement
   DESCRIBE    C->S          required
   SETUP       C->S          required
   ANNOUNCE    C->S, S->C    optional (required: if re-key should
                                       be is supported)

3. Usage with SIP and RTSP

   This section

   Note: Section 3 describes in detail how the RTSP extensions are used.

3. Usage with SIP and RTSP

   This section gives recommendations of how/when to include the defined
   key management attribute when SIP and/or RTSP are used together with
   SDP.

   When a key management protocol is integrated with SIP/SDP and RTSP,
   the following requirements are put placed on the key management:

   * It MUST be possible to execute the key management protocol in at
      most one roundtrip in case the answerer accepts the offer.

   * It MUST be possible from the SIP/SDP and RTSP application, using
      the key management API, to receive key management data, and
      information of whether a message is accepted or not.

   Today, the MIKEY protocol [MIKEY] has adopted the key management
   extensions to work together with SIP and RTSP. Other protocols MAY
   use the described attribute and header, e.g. Kerberos [KERB].

3.1. General SDP processing

   When an SDP message is created, the following procedure should be
   applied:

   * The identifier of the key management protocol used (e.g. MIKEY or
      Kerberos) MUST be put placed in the prtcl-id field.

   * The keymgmt-data field MUST be created as follows. The key
      management protocol MUST be used to create the key management
      message. This message SHALL be base64 encoded [RFC3548] by the SDP
      application and then encapsulated in the keymgmt-data attribute.
      The data may e.g. be a MIKEY message (see [MIKEY], Section 7) or
      Kerberos ticket.

   A received SDP message that contains the key management attributes
   SHOULD process these attributes be processed in the following manner:

   * The key management protocol used MUST be is identified by checking according to the prtcl-id field in the key management attribute.
      field.

   * The key management data from the keymgmt-data field MUST be
      extracted, base64 decoded to reconstruct the original message, and
      then passed to the key management protocol for further processing. protocol. Note that depending on
      key management protocol, some extra parameters might of course be
      requested by the specific API, such as the source/destination
      network address/port(s) for the specified media (however, this
      will be implementation specific depending on the key management interface specification should
      specify this). actual API).

   * Depending on the outcome of the key management processing (i.e.
      whether it was accepted successful or not), the processing can proceed
      according to normal processing rules (e.g. according to the offer/answer
      model, see also Section 3.2).

   Note that the key management attribute MAY be repeated more than once
   (e.g., one at session level and one at media level). Consequently,
   the process is repeated for each key management attribute detected.
   However, in case of failure of the key management (on either session
   or media level), the session setup SHALL be aborted (see also Section
   3.2 and Section 3.3 for more details).

   If more than one key management protocol is supported, multiple
   instances of the key management attribute MAY be included in the
   initial offer, each transporting a different key management data,
   thus indicating alternatives supported. supported alternatives.

   If the sender includes more than one key management protocol
   attributes
   attribute at session level (analogous for the media level), these
   SHOULD be listed in order of preference (with the (the first being the
   preferred). The receiver chooses selects the key management protocol it
   supports. When answering,
   wishes to use and includes only the accepted key management protocol that attribute MUST be included. in the answer. If the
   receiver does not support any of the sender's suggested key
   management protocols, the receiver answers
   with returns an error message (see SIP
   section 3.2 and RTSP), section 3.3), whereby the sender MUST put
   down abort the
   current setup procedure.

   Note that the placement of multiple key management offers in a single
   message has the disadvantage that the message expands and the
   computational workload for the offerer will increase drastically.

   The possibility to support multiple key management protocols may
   introduce bidding down attacks. To avoid this, the list of
   identifiers of the proposed key management protocols MUST be
   authenticated, which
   authenticated. The authentication MUST be done separately by each key management.

   This puts the requirement that
   management protocol (see e.g. Section 7.1 in [MIKEY]).

   Accordingly, it MUST be specified (in the key management protocol
   specification itself or in a companion document) how the list of key
   management protocol identifiers could can be authenticated from the offerer
   to the
   responder answerer by the use of the specific key management protocol. Note that
   even if only one key management protocol is used, that still
   must MUST
   authenticate its own protocol identifier. If the key management
   protocol fails to authenticate the protocol list, it MUST return an
   error message to SDP.

   The list of protocol identifiers MUST be given to the selected key
   management protocol by the SDP application with ";" separated
   identifiers. All the offered protocol identifiers MUST be included,
   in the same order as they appear in the corresponding SDP
   description.

   The protocol list can formally be described as

   prtcl-list   =  prtcl-id *(";" prtcl-id)

   prtcl-id     = non-ws-string

     Example

   For example, if the SDP is:

        v=0
        o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.downunder.dom lost.example.com
        s=Secret discussion
        t=0 0
        c=IN IP4 lost.downunder.dom lost.example.com
        a=key-mgmt:mikey <data1>
        a=key-mgmt:keyp1 <data2>
        a=key-mgmt:keyp2 <data3>
        m=audio 39000 RTP/SAVP 98
        a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
        m=video 42000 RTP/SAVP 31
        a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

        The protocol list, "mikey;keyp1;keyp2", would be generated from
        the SDP description and used as input to the selected each specified key
        management protocol (together with the data for that protocol).

   If more than one protocol is supported by the offerer, it is
   RECOMMENDED that he offers all to him acceptable protocols are included in the first
   offer, rather than making single, subsequent alternative offers in
   response to error messages, see "Security Considerations".

3.2. SIP usage

   The

   When used with SIP and the offer/answer model, the offerer SHOULD
   include the key management data within an offer that contains the
   media description it should apply to. The answerer MUST check with
   the key management protocol if the attribute values are valid, and
   then obtain from the key management the data to include in the
   answer.

   If the offer is not accepted, the answerer SHOULD return a "606 Not
   Acceptable" message, including one or more Warning headers (at least
   a 306). 306 "Attribute not understood"). The offer MUST session is then abort the security setup. aborted (and
   it is up to local policy or end user to decide how to continue).

   Re-keying can be handled as a new offer, i.e. a re-INVITE should be
   sent with the new proposed parameters. The answerer treats this as a
   new offer where the key management is the issue of change. In
   general, the re-INVITE (and the key exchange) must be finalized
   before the security protocol can change the keys. The synchronization
   method used when changing keys are dependent on the security and same key
   management protocol used. The same protocol used in the original INVITE SHALL also be used in
   the re-INVITE carrying re-keying. If the re-INVITE carrying re-keying
   fails (e.g., the authentication verification fails), the answerer
   SHOULD send a "606 Not Acceptable" message, including one or more
   Warning headers (at least a 306). The offer MUST then abort the
   security setup.

3.3. RTSP usage

   RTSP does not use the offer/answer model, as SIP does. This causes
   some problems, as it is not possible (without abusing RTSP) to send
   back an answer to the server (as the server will in most cases be the
   one initiating the security parameter exchange). To solve this, a new
   header has been introduced (Section 2.2). This also assumes that the
   key management also has some kind of binding to the media, so that
   the response to the server will be processed as required.

   The processing of a key management header in RTSP should be done
   analogous of the SDP message processing. The initial key management message from a server should be sent to
   the client using SDP. When responding to this, the client uses the
   new RTSP header to send back an answer (included in the SETUP
   message). If a server receives a SETUP message in which it expects a
   key management message, but none is included, a 403 Forbidden SHOULD
   be returned to the client, whereby the current setup MUST be aborted.

   The processing of creating a key management header in RTSP SHOULD be
   as follow:

   * The identifier of the key management protocol used (e.g. MIKEY or
      Kerberos) MUST be placed in the "prot" field of the header.

   * The keymgmt-data field MUST be created as follows. The key
      management protocol MUST be used to create the key management
      message. This message SHALL be base64 encoded by the SDP
      application and then encapsulated in the "data" field of the
      header. The data may e.g. be a MIKEY message (see [MIKEY], Section
      7) or Kerberos ticket.

   A received key management header SHOULD be processed in the following
   manner:

   * The key management protocol is identified according to the "prot"
      field.

   * The key management data from the "data" field MUST be extracted,
      base64 decoded to reconstruct the original message, and then
      passed to the key management protocol. Note that depending on the
      key management protocol, some extra parameters might of course be
      requested by the specific API, such as the source/destination
      network address/port(s) for the specified media (however, this
      will be implementation specific depending on the actual API).

   * Depending on the outcome of the key management processing (i.e.
      whether it was successful or not), the processing can proceed
      according to normal rules (see also below).

   The server MAY provide re-keying/updating facilities by sending a new
   key management message in an ANNOUNCE messages. The ANNOUNCE message
   contains an SDP message including the key management parameters. The
   response message is put in the new RTSP header in the response from
   the client to the server. Note that the ANNOUNCE messages MUST be
   supported if this feature is to be used.

3.4. Example scenarios

   Example 1 (SIP)

   A SIP call is taking place between Alice and Bob. Alice sends an
   Invite message consisting of the following offer:

   v=0
   o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com w-land.example.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=alice@w-land.org
   e=alice@w-land.example.com
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com w-land.example.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   i.e. Alice proposes to set up one audio stream and one video stream
   that run over SRTP. To set up the security parameters for SRTP, she
   uses MIKEY. Note that MIKEY is negotiating the crypto suite for both
   streams (as it is placed at the session level).

   Bob accepts the offer and sends an answer back to Alice:

   v=0
   o=bob 2891092897 2891092897 IN IP4 found.somewhere.com foo.example.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=bob@null.org
   e=bob@foo.example.com
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 found.somewhere.com foo.example.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey skaoqDeMkdwRW278HjKVB...
   m=audio 49030 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   Example 2 (SDP)

   This example shows how Alice would have done in the previous example if she wished to protect
   only the audio stream.

   v=0
   o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com w-land.example.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=alice@w-land.org
   e=alice@w-land.example.com
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com w-land.example.com
   m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=video 52230 RTP/AVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   Note that even if the key management attribute is were specified at
   session level, the video part will would not be affected by this (as a
   security profile is not used).

   Example 3 (RTSP)

   A client wants to set up a streaming session and requests a media
   description from the streaming server.

   DESCRIBE rtsp://server.example.com/fizzle/foo RTSP/1.0
   CSeq: 312
   Accept: application/sdp
   From: user@client.com user@example.com

   The server sends back an OK message including an SDP description.

   RTSP/1.0 200 OK
   CSeq: 312
   Date: 23 Jan 1997 15:35:06 GMT
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   v=0
   o=actionmovie 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 movie.somewhere.com movie.example.com
   s=Action Movie
   e=action@movie.somewhere.com
   e=action@movie.example.com
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 movie.somewhere.com movie.example.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=audio 0 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   control:rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/audio
   control:rtsp://movie.example.com/action/audio
   m=video 0 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000
   control:rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/video
   control:rtsp://movie.example.com/action/video

   The client is now ready to setup the sessions. It includes the key
   management data in the first message going back to the server (i.e.
   the SETUP message).

   SETUP rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/audio rtsp://movie.example.com/action/audio RTSP/1.0
   CSeq: 313
   Transport: RTP/SAVP/UDP;unicast;client_port=3056-3057
   keymgmt: prot=mikey; data="skaoqDeMkdwRW278HjKVB..."

   The server processes the request including checking the validity of
   the key management header.

   RTSP/1.0 200 OK
   CSeq: 313
   Session: 12345678
   Transport: RTP/SAVP/UDP;unicast;client_port=3056-3057;
                         server_port=5000-5001

   The RTSP then proceeds as usual (with e.g. a SETUP message for the
   video followed by a PLAY message).

4. Adding further Key management protocols

   This framework cannot be used with all key management protocols. The
   key management protocol needs to comply with the requirements
   described in Section 3. To be able to use a key management protocol
   with this framework, the following MUST be specified:

   * the key management protocol identifier that should be used in the
      protocol identifier fields in both SDP and RTSP (e.g. "mikey" for
      MIKEY).

   * the information the key management needs from SDP and RTSP (Section
      3 gives a guideline of what SDP and RTSP needs from the key
      management). The exact API is implementation specific, but it
      SHOULD at least support to exchange the specified information.

      Note that in particular, the key management MUST always be given
      the protocol identifier(s) of the key management protocol(s)
      included in the offer in the correct order as they appear.

   The key management data MUST be base64 encoded in the SDP and RTSP
   fields. Therefore, considerations of possible conversion from the
   normal key management representation to base64 SHOULD be taken into
   account.

5. Security Considerations

   The nature of this document is to allow SDP and RTSP to support
   negotiation of the security of the media sessions. It is therefore
   not a primary intention of this document to describe possible
   security solutions or to define possible security problems. The
   defined SDP and RTSP extensions are not believed to introduce any new
   security risks to SDP and RTSP, if used as specified.

   Note that the purpose of the key management fields is to provide
   information to secure the media streams. Under the assumption that
   the key management schemes are secure, the SDP can be passed along
   unprotected without affecting the key management, and the media
   streams will still be secure even if some attackers gained knowledge
   of the SDP contents.

   However, if the SDP messages are not sent authenticated between the
   parties, it is possible for an active attacker to change attributes
   without being detected. As the key management protocol may
   (indirectly) rely on some of the session information from SDP (e.g.,
   address information), an attack on SDP may have indirect consequences
   on the key management. Even if the key management protocol does not
   rely on parameters of SDP and will not be affected by manipulation of
   these, different DoS attacks aimed at SDP (e.g. the SIMCAP
   extensions) may lead to undesired interruption in the setup.

   In general, it is therefore a good thing, not only to try to secure
   the session, but also to secure the session setup. However, a solution
   for this the
   security of the session setup might not necessarily need to be end-to-end, possible on an end-to-end
   basis, but could also may require to be hop-by-hop depending protected on a hop-by-hop basis (this is
   generally the trust model case for SIP/SDP when intermediate proxies needs to
   obtain information about the specific use case. sessions etc). In fact, the focus of
   this framework is mainly when end-to-end protection of the session
   setup is not used, but where the media streams needs to be end-to-end
   protected.

   Note that it is impossible to assure the authenticity of a declined
   offer, since even if it comes from the true respondent, the fact that
   the answerer declines the offer usually means that he does not
   support the protocol(s) offered, and consequently cannot be expected
   to authenticate the response either. This means that if the initiator
   is unsure of which protocol(s) the responder supports, we RECOMMEND
   that the initiator offers all acceptable protocols in a single offer.
   If not, this opens up the possibility for a "man-in-the-middle"
   (MITM) to affect the outcome of the eventually agreed upon protocol,
   by faking unauthenticated error messages until the initiator
   eventually offers a protocol "to the liking" of the MITM. This is not
   really a security problem, but rather a mild form of denial of
   service that can be avoided by following the above recommendation.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. SDP Attribute Registration

   A new SDP attribute needs to be defined registered for the purpose of key
   management protocol integration with SDP.

        Contact:      Fredrik Lindholm
                      mailto: fredrik.lindholm@era.ericsson.se fredrik.lindholm@ericsson.com
                      tel: +46 8 58531705

      SDP Attribute ("att-field"):

        Name:               key-mgmt
        Long form:          key management protocol
        Type of name:       att-field
        Type of attribute:  Media and session level
        Purpose:            See RFC xxxx, Section 2.
        Reference:          RFC xxxx, Section 2.1
        Values:             See registrations below

6.2. Protocol Identifier Registration

   This document defines one new name space associated with the above
   registered key-mgmt attribute i.e., the protocol identifier (see also
   Section 2.1 and Section 2.2).

   A new registry needs to be set up for "prtcl-id" parameter of the
   "key-mgmt" attribute, with the following registration created
   initially: "mikey".

        Contact:      Fredrik Lindholm
                      mailto: fredrik.lindholm@era.ericsson.se fredrik.lindholm@ericsson.com
                      tel: +46 8 58531705

        Value name:     mikey
        Long name:      Multimedia Internet KEYing
        Purpose:        Usage of MIKEY with the key-mgmt attribute
        Reference:      Section 7 in RFC yyyy
   Further entries may be registered according to the "Specification
   Required" policy as defined in RFC 2434 [GWISC]. [RFC2434]. Each new registration needs
   to indicate the parameter name and the syntax of possible additional
   arguments. Note that the parameter name is case sensitive and it is
   recommended that the name should be in lower case letters. For each
   new registration, it is mandatory that a permanent, stable, and
   publicly accessible document exists that specifies the semantics of
   the registered parameter, the syntax and semantics of its parameters
   as well as all the requested details of interaction between the key
   management protocol and SDP, as specified in this document.

7. Conclusions

   A security solution for real-time applications needs a key management
   infrastructure. Integrating the key management scheme with the
   session establishment protocol could be done efficiently in most of
   the scenarios. This draft proposes a framework that integrates a key
   management protocol (e.g., MIKEY) into SIP and RTSP, and which can be
   accompanied by different key management protocols. A set of new
   attributes and headers has been defined in SDP and RTSP to support
   this.

8. Acknowledgments

   Thanks to: Rolf Blom, Magnus Westerlund, and the rest involved in the
   MMUSIC WG and the MSEC WG.

   A special thanks to Joerg Ott and Colin Perkins.

9. Author's Addresses

     Jari Arkko
     Ericsson
     02420 Jorvas             Phone:  +358 40 5079256
     Finland                  Email:  jari.arkko@ericsson.com

     Elisabetta Carrara
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 50877040
     Sweden                   EMail:  elisabetta.carrara@era.ericsson.se  elisabetta.carrara@ericsson.com

     Fredrik Lindholm
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 58531705
     Sweden                   EMail:  fredrik.lindholm@era.ericsson.se  fredrik.lindholm@ericsson.com

     Mats Naslund
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 58533739
     Sweden                   EMail:  mats.naslund@era.ericsson.se  mats.naslund@ericsson.com

     Karl Norrman
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 4044502
     Sweden                   EMail:  karl.norrman@era.ericsson.se  karl.norrman@ericsson.com

10. References

10.1. Normative References

   [OAM] Rosenberg, J. and Schulzrinne, H., "An Offer/Answer Model with
   the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", IETF, RFC 3264.

   [RTSP] Schulzrinne, H., Rao, A., and Lanphier, R., "Real Time
   Streaming Protocol (RTSP)", IETF, RFC 2326.

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S. "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels", IETF, RFC 2119.

   [SDPnew] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and Perkins, C., "SDP: Session
   Description Protocol", Internet Draft, IETF, Work in progress
   (MMUSIC).
   (MMUSIC), draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-new-13.txt.

   [SIP] Handley, M., Schulzrinne, H., Schooler, E., and Rosenberg, J.,
   "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", IETF, RFC 2543.

   [GWISC] 3261.

   [RFC2434] Narten, T. and Alvestrand, H., "Guidelines for Writing an
   IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", IETF, RFC 2434.

   [RFC3548] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
   Encodings", IETF, RFC 3548.

10.2. Informative References

   [KERB] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication
   Service (V5)", IETF, RFC 1510.

   [MIKEY] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and
   Norrman, K., "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", IETF, RFC yyyy,
   [Internet Draft, Work in progress (MSEC)].

   [SRTP] Baugher, M., Blom, R., Carrara, E., McGrew, D., Naslund, M,
   Norrman, K., and Oran, D., "The Secure Real Time Transport Protocol",
   Internet Draft, IETF, Work in Progress (AVT).

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   This Internet-Draft expires in August 2003. February 2004.