--- 1/draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-00.txt	2014-07-23 09:14:30.782752843 -0700
+++ 2/draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-01.txt	2014-07-23 09:14:30.794753134 -0700
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
 
 Internet Engineering Task Force                               J. Scudder
 Internet-Draft                                               K. Kompella
 Updates: 6790 (if approved)                             Juniper Networks
-Intended status: Standards Track                           June 23, 2014
-Expires: December 25, 2014
+Intended status: Standards Track                           July 23, 2014
+Expires: January 24, 2015
 
          Deprecation of BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute
-             draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-00
+             draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-01
 
 Abstract
 
    RFC 6790 defines the BGP Entropy Label Capability attribute.
    Regrettably, it has a bug: although RFC 6790 mandates that Entropy
    Label-incapable routers must remove the attribute, in practice this
    requirement can't be guaranteed to be fulfilled.  This specification
    deprecates the attribute.  A forthcoming document will propose a
    replacement.
 
@@ -25,21 +25,21 @@
    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
    Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 25, 2014.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 24, 2015.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
@@ -66,62 +66,72 @@
    This specification updates RFC 6790 by deprecating the version of
    ELCA defined in Section 5.2 of that document.  A forthcoming document
    will propose a replacement.
 
 1.1.  Requirements Language
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
 
-2.  IANA Considerations
+2.  Deprecation of ELCA
+
+   This document deprecates the ELCA path attribute.  This means that
+   any implementation done subsequent to the publication of this
+   document MUST NOT generate the attribute.  If received it MUST be
+   treated as any other unrecognized optional transitive attribute as
+   per [RFC4271], until and unless the code point is reused by some new
+   specification.  (To the authors' best knowledge, there are no
+   implementations of ELCA at the time of writing.)
+
+3.  IANA Considerations
 
    For the reasons given in Section 1, IANA is requested to mark
    attribute 28 in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry as "deprecated",
    reference this RFC.
 
-3.  Security Considerations
+4.  Security Considerations
 
    ELCA as defined in [RFC6790] S. 5.2, has in common with other
    optional, transitive path attributes the property that it will be
    "tunneled" through intervening routers that don't implement the
    relevant specification.  Unfortunately, as discussed elsewhere in
    this document, implementations of [RFC6790] S. 5.2 receiving such
    "tunneled" attributes could -- sometimes improperly -- rely on them.
    The consequence of so doing could be a black hole in the forwarding
    path for the affected routes.  Whether this is a new security issue
    or not is somewhat debatable, since to be exploited an attacker would
    have to be part of the control plane path for the route in question,
    and under those circumstances an attacker already has a panoply of
    mischief-making tools available, as discussed in [RFC4272].
 
    In any case, this document renders any real or imagined security
    issues with ELCA moot, by deprecating it.
 
-4.  Acknowledgements
+5.  Acknowledgements
 
    Thanks to Alia Atlas, Bruno Decraene, Martin Djernaes, John Drake,
    Adrian Farrell, Keyur Patel, Ravi Singh and Kevin Wang for their
    discussion of this issue.
 
-5.  References
+6.  References
 
-5.1.  Normative References
+6.1.  Normative References
 
    [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
    [RFC6790]  Kompella, K., Drake, J., Amante, S., Henderickx, W., and
               L. Yong, "The Use of Entropy Labels in MPLS Forwarding",
               RFC 6790, November 2012.
 
-5.2.  Informative References
+6.2.  Informative References
 
    [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
               Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
 
    [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", RFC
               4272, January 2006.
 
 Authors' Addresses
 
    John G. Scudder