--- 1/draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-01.txt 2014-12-12 08:15:32.618852839 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-02.txt 2014-12-12 08:15:32.626853038 -0800 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ Internet Engineering Task Force J. Scudder Internet-Draft K. Kompella Updates: 6790 (if approved) Juniper Networks -Intended status: Standards Track July 23, 2014 -Expires: January 24, 2015 +Intended status: Standards Track December 12, 2014 +Expires: June 15, 2015 Deprecation of BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute - draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-01 + draft-ietf-mpls-deprecate-bgp-entropy-label-02 Abstract RFC 6790 defines the BGP Entropy Label Capability attribute. Regrettably, it has a bug: although RFC 6790 mandates that Entropy Label-incapable routers must remove the attribute, in practice this requirement can't be guaranteed to be fulfilled. This specification deprecates the attribute. A forthcoming document will propose a replacement. @@ -25,21 +25,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 24, 2015. + This Internet-Draft will expire on June 15, 2015. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -58,43 +58,43 @@ process entropy labels. Sadly, this requirement cannot be fulfilled with the ELCA as specified, because it is an optional, transitive attribute: by definition, a node that does not support the ELCA will propagate the attribute. (This is a general property of optional, transitive attributes, see [RFC4271].) But such an ELCA-oblivious node is likely to also be entropy label-incapable and is exactly the one that we desire to remove the attribute! This specification updates RFC 6790 by deprecating the version of ELCA defined in Section 5.2 of that document. A forthcoming document - will propose a replacement. + will propose a replacement. All other sections of RFC 6790 are + unchanged. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 2. Deprecation of ELCA This document deprecates the ELCA path attribute. This means that - any implementation done subsequent to the publication of this - document MUST NOT generate the attribute. If received it MUST be - treated as any other unrecognized optional transitive attribute as - per [RFC4271], until and unless the code point is reused by some new - specification. (To the authors' best knowledge, there are no - implementations of ELCA at the time of writing.) + any implementation MUST NOT generate the attribute. If received it + MUST be treated as any other unrecognized optional transitive + attribute as per [RFC4271], until and unless the code point is reused + by some new specification. (To the authors' best knowledge, there + are no implementations of ELCA at the time of writing.) 3. IANA Considerations For the reasons given in Section 1, IANA is requested to mark - attribute 28 in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry as "deprecated", - reference this RFC. + attribute 28 in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry as "deprecated" + and reference this RFC. 4. Security Considerations ELCA as defined in [RFC6790] S. 5.2, has in common with other optional, transitive path attributes the property that it will be "tunneled" through intervening routers that don't implement the relevant specification. Unfortunately, as discussed elsewhere in this document, implementations of [RFC6790] S. 5.2 receiving such "tunneled" attributes could -- sometimes improperly -- rely on them. The consequence of so doing could be a black hole in the forwarding