Network Working Group                                   W. Mark Townsley
Internet-Draft                                          Carlos Pignataro
Expiration Date: August 2006                               Scott Wainner
                                                           cisco Systems
                                                               Ted Seely
February 2005
                                                        Jeffery S. Young

                                                           February 2006

    Encapsulation of MPLS over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 3


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   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.


   The Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol, Version 3, (L2TPv3) defines a
   protocol for tunneling a variety of payload types over IP networks.
   This document defines how to carry an MPLS label or label stack and its
   payload over L2TPv3. This enables an application which traditionally
   requires an MPLS-enabled core network to utilize an L2TPv3
   encapsulation over an IP network instead.


   Status of this Memo..........................................    1

   1. Introduction..............................................    2

   2. MPLS over L2TPv3 Encoding.................................    2    3

   3. Assigning the L2TPv3 Session ID and Cookie................    4

   4. Applicability.............................................    4

   5. Security Considerations...................................    5    6
      5.1 In the Absence of IPsec...............................    6
      5.2 Context Validation....................................    7
      5.3 Securing the Tunnel with IPsec........................    7

   6. IANA Considerations.......................................    6    8

   7. Acknowledgments...........................................    6 Acknowledgements..........................................    8

   8. References................................................    6    8
      8.1 Normative References..................................    6    8
      8.2 Informative References................................    6    9

   9. Contacts..................................................    6 Authors' Addresses........................................   10

Specification of Requirements

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1. Introduction

   This document defines how to encapsulate an MPLS label or label stack and its
   payload over L2TPv3. After defining the MPLS over L2TPv3
   encapsulation procedure, other MPLS over IP encapsulation options
   including IP, GRE and IPsec are discussed in context with MPLS over
   L2TPv3 in an Applicability section. This document only describes
   encapsulation and does not concern itself with all possible MPLS-
   based applications which may be enabled over L2TPv3.

2. MPLS over L2TPv3 Encoding

   MPLS over L2TPv3 allows tunneling of an MPLS stack [RFC3032] and its
   payload over an IP network utilizing the L2TPv3 encapsulation defined
   in [RFC3931].  The MPLS Label Stack and payload is are carried in its their
   entirety after IP (either IPv4 or IPv6) and L2TPv3.

         |        IP         |
         |      L2TPv3       |
         | MPLS Label Stack  |
         |    MPLS Payload   |

   Figure 2.1 MPLS Stack Packet over L2TPv3/IP

   The L2TPv3 encapsulation carrying a single MPLS label stack entry is
   as follows:

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 |                          Session ID                           |
 |               Cookie (optional, maximum 64 bits)...
                               ...                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Label
 |                Label                  | Exp |S|       TTL     | Stack
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Entry

              Figure 2.2 MPLS label over L2TPv3 encapsulation

   When encapsulating MPLS over L2TPv3, the L2TPv3 L2-Specific-Sublayer
   MAY be present.  It is generally not present and hence not included
   in Figure 2.2.  The L2TPv3 Session ID MUST be present. The Cookie MAY
   be present.

   Session ID

      The L2TPv3 Session ID is a 32-bit identifier field locally
      selected as a lookup key for the context of an L2TP Session.  An
      L2TP Session contains necessary context for processing a received
      L2TP packet. At a minimum, such context contains whether the
      Cookie (see description below) is present, the value it was
      assigned, the presence and type of an L2TPv3 L2-Specific-Sublayer,
      as well as what type of tunneled encapsulation follows (i.e.,
      Frame Relay, Ethernet, MPLS, etc). etc.)


      The L2TPv3 Cookie field contains a variable length (maximum 64
      bits) randomly assigned value.  It is intended to provide an
      additional level of guarantee that a data packet has been directed
      to the proper L2TP session by the Session ID.  While the Session
      ID may be encoded and assigned any value (perhaps optimizing for
      local lookup capabilities, redirection in a distributed forwarding
      architecture, etc.), the Cookie MUST be selected as a
      cryptographically random value [RFC1750], [RFC4086], with the added
      restriction that it not be the same as a recently used value for a
      given Session ID.  A well-chosen Cookie will prevent inadvertent
      misdirection of a stray packet containing a recently reused
      Session ID, a Session ID that is subject to packet corruption, and
      protection against some specific malicious packet insertion
      attacks as described in more detail in Section 4 of this document.

   Label Stack Entry

      An MPLS label stack entry as defined in [RFC3032].

   The optional L2-Specific-Sublayer defined in [RFC3931] is generally
   not present for MPLS over L2TPv3.

   Generic IP encapsulation procedures such as fragmentation and MTU
   considerations, handling of TTL, EXP and DSCP bits, etc. are the same
   as the "Common Procedures" for IP encapsulation of MPLS defined in
   Section 5 of
   [MPLS-IP-GRE] [RFC4023] and are not reiterated here.

3. Assigning the L2TPv3 Session ID and Cookie

   Much like an MPLS label, the L2TPv3 Session ID and Cookie must be
   selected and exchanged between participating nodes before L2TPv3 can
   operate. These values may be configured manually, or distributed via
   a signaling protocol. This document concerns itself only with the
   encapsulation of MPLS over L2TPv3, thus the particular method of
   assigning the Session ID and Cookie is out of scope.

4. Applicability

   The methods defined [MPLS-IP-GRE], [RFC4023], [MPLS-IPSEC] and this document all
   describe methods for carrying MPLS over an IP network. Cases where
   MPLS over L2TPv3 may be applicable compared to other alternatives are
   discussed in this section.

   It is generally simpler to have one's border routers refuse to accept
   an MPLS packet than to configure a router to refuse to accept certain
   MPLS packets carried in IP or GRE to or from certain IP sources or
   destinations. Thus, the use of IP or GRE to carry MPLS labels packets
   increases the opportunity for MPLS label spoofing attacks. L2TPv3
   provides an additional level of protection against packet spoofing
   before allowing a packet to enter a VPN (much like IPsec provides an
   additional level of protection at a PE rather than relying on ACL
   filters). Checking the value of the L2TPv3 Cookie is similar to any
   sort of ACL which inspects the contents of a packet header, except
   that we give ourselves the luxury of "seeding" the L2TPv3 header with
   a very difficult to spoof value.

   MPLS over L2TPv3 may be favorable compared to [MPLS-IP-GRE], [RFC4023], if:

      Two routers are "adjacent" over an L2TPv3 tunnel that exists for
      some reason outside the scope of this document, and those two
      routers need to send MPLS packets over that adjacency.

      Implementation considerations dictate the use of MPLS over L2TPv3.
      For example, a hardware device may be able to take advantage of
      the L2TPv3 encapsulation for faster or distributed processing.

      Packet spoofing and insertion is insertion, service integrity and resource
      protection are of concern. concern, especially given the fact that an IP
      tunnel potentially exposes the router to rogue or inappropriate IP
      packets from unknown or untrusted sources.  IP ACLs and numbering
      methods may be used to protect the PEs from rogue IP sources, but
      may be subject to error and cumbersome to maintain at all edge
      points at all times.  The L2TPv3 Cookie
      allows provides a simple validation, over and above that of IP ACLs, means of
      validating the source of an L2TPv3 packet before allowing
      processing to continue. This validation offers an additional level
      of protection over and above IP ACLs, and a validation that the
      Session ID was not corrupted in transit or suffered an internal
      lookup error upon receipt and processing. If the Cookie value is
      assigned and distributed automatically, it is less subject to
      operator error, and if selected in a cryptographically random
      nature, less subject to blind guesses than source IP addresses (in
      the event that a hacker can insert packets within a VPN core

   (The first two of the above applicability statements were adopted
   from [MPLS-IP-GRE]) [RFC4023])

   In summary, L2TPv3 can provide a balance between the limited security
   against IP spoofing attacks offered by [MPLS-IP-GRE] [RFC4023] vs. the greater
   security and associated operational and processing overhead offered
   by [MPLS-IPSEC].  Further, MPLS over L2TPv3 may be faster in some
   hardware, particularly if it is already optimized to classify
   incoming L2TPv3 packets carrying IP framed in a variety of ways. For
   example, IP encapsulated by HDLC or Frame Relay over L2TPv3 may be
   considered not that far removed from IP encapsulated by MPLS over

5. Security Considerations

   The L2TPv3 Cookie does not provide protection via encryption.

   There are three main concerns when used with a sufficiently random 64-bit value which transporting MPLS labeled traffic
   between PEs using IP tunnels. The first is
   kept secret from a hacker, the L2TPv3 Cookie possibility that a
   third party may be used as insert packets into a simple
   yet effective packet source authentication check which stream between two PEs.
   The second is quite
   resistent to brute force that a third party might view the packet stream between
   two PEs. The third is that a third party may alter packets in a
   stream between two PEs.  The security requirements of the
   applications whose traffic is being sent through the tunnel
   characterizes how significant these issues are.  Operators may use
   multiple methods to mitigate the risk including access lists,
   authentication, encryption, and context validation. Operators needs
   to consider the cost to mitigate the risk.

   Security is also discussed as part of the applicability discussion in
   section 4 of this document.

5.1 In the Absence of IPsec

   If the tunnels are not secured with IPsec, then some other method
   should be used to ensure that packets are decapsulated and processed
   by the tunnel tail only if those packets were encapsulated by the
   tunnel head.  If the tunnel lies entirely within a single
   administrative domain, address filtering at the boundaries can be
   used to ensure that no packet with the IP source address of a tunnel
   endpoint or with the IP destination address of a tunnel endpoint can
   enter the domain from outside.

   However, when the tunnel head and the tunnel tail are not in the same
   administrative domain, this may become difficult, and filtering based
   on the destination address can even become impossible if the packets
   must traverse the public Internet.

   Sometimes only source address filtering (but not destination address
   filtering) is done at the boundaries of an administrative domain.  If
   this is the case, the filtering does not provide effective protection
   at all unless the decapsulator of MPLS over L2TPv3 validates the IP
   source address of the packet.

   Additionally, the "Data Packet Spoofing" considerations in Section
   8.2. of [RFC3931] and the "Context Validation" considerations in
   Section 5.2 of this document apply. Those two sections highlight the
   benefits of the L2TPv3 Cookie.

5.2 Context Validation

   The L2TPv3 Cookie does not provide protection via encryption.
   However, when used with a sufficiently random 64-bit value which is
   kept secret from a hacker, the L2TPv3 Cookie may be used as a simple
   yet effective packet source authentication check which is quite
   resistant to brute force packet spoofing attacks. It also alleviates
   the need to rely solely on filter lists based on a list of valid
   source IP addresses, and thwarts attacks which could benefit by
   spoofing a permitted source IP address.  The L2TPv3 Cookie provides a
   means of validating the currently assigned Session ID on the packet
   flow, providing context protection, and may be deemed complimentary
   to securing the tunnel utilizing IPsec.  In the absence of
   cryptographic security on the data plane (such as that provided by
   IPsec), the L2TPv3 Cookie provides a simple method of validating the
   Session ID lookup performed on each L2TPv3 packet. If the Cookie is
   sufficiently random and remains unknown to an attacker (that is, the
   attacker has no way to predict Cookie values or monitor traffic
   between PEs) then the Cookie provides an additional measure of
   protection against malicious spoofed packets inserted at the PE over
   and above that of typical IP address and port ACLs.

5.3 Securing the Tunnel with IPsec

   L2TPv3 tunnels may also be secured using IPsec. IPsec, as specified in
   Section 4.1.3. of [RFC3931].  IPSec may provide authentication,
   privacy protection, integrity checking and replay protection.  These
   functions may be deemed necessary by the operator.  When using IPsec,
   the tunnel head and head and the tunnel tail should be treated as the
   endpoints of a Security Association.  A single IP address of the
   tunnel head is used as the source IP address, and a single IP address
   of the tunnel tail is used as the destination IP address.  The means
   by which each node knows the proper address of the other is outside
   the scope of this document.  However, if a control protocol is used
   to set up the tunnels, such control protocol MUST have an
   authentication mechanism, and this MUST be used when the tunnel is
   set up.  If the tunnel tail should be treated is set up automatically as the
   endpoints result of, for
   example, information distributed by BGP, then the use of a Security Association. BGP's MD5-
   based authentication mechanism can serve this purpose.

   The MPLS over L2TPv3 encapsulated packets should be considered as
   originating at the tunnel head and as being destined for the tunnel
   tail; IPsec transport mode should SHOULD thus be used.

   Note that the tunnel tail and the tunnel head are LSP adjacencies
   (label distribution adjacencies, see [RFC3031]), which means that the
   topmost label of any packet sent through the tunnel must be one that
   was distributed by the tunnel tail to the tunnel head.  The tunnel
   tail MUST know precisely which labels it has distributed to the
   tunnel heads of IPsec-secured tunnels.  Labels in this set MUST NOT
   be distributed by the tunnel tail to any LSP adjacencies other than
   those that are tunnel heads of IPsec-secured tunnels.  If an MPLS
   packet is received without an IPsec encapsulation, and if its topmost
   label is in this set, then the packet MUST be discarded.

   Securing L2TPv3 using IPsec MUST provide authentication and
   integrity.  (Note that the authentication and integrity provided will
   apply to the entire MPLS packet, including the MPLS label stack.)
   Consequently, the implementation MUST support ESP with null
   encryption.  ESP with encryption MAY be supported if a source
   requires confidentiality.  If ESP is used, the tunnel tail MUST check
   that the source IP address of any packet received on a given SA is
   the one expected.

   Key distribution may be done either manually or automatically.

   Security is also discussed as part automatically by
   means of the applicability discussion IKE [RFC2409].  Manual keying MUST be supported.  If
   automatic keying is implemented, IKE in
   section 4 of main mode with preshared keys
   MUST be supported.  A particular application may escalate this document.
   requirement and request implementation of automatic keying.  Manual
   key distribution is much simpler, but also less scalable, than
   automatic key distribution. If replay protection is regarded as
   necessary for a particular tunnel, automatic key distribution should
   be configured.

6. IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations for this document.

7. Acknowledgments Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Robert Raszuk, Clarence Filsfils and Eric Rosen for their
   review of this document. Some text was adopted from [MPLS-IP-GRE]. [RFC4023].

8. References

8.1 Normative References

   [RFC3931]     J.     Lau, M. J., Townsley, M., and I. Goyret, "Layer Two
                 Tunneling Protocol (Version 3)", work in progress,
                 draft-ietf-l2tpext-l2tp-base-15.txt, December 2004. - Version 3 (L2TPv3)", RFC 3931,
                 March 2005.

   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


   [RFC4023]     Worster, Y. T., Rekhter, Y., and E. Rosen, "Encapsulating
                 MPLS in IP or Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)",
                 work in progress, draft-ietf-mpls-in-ip-or-gre-08.txt,
                 June 2004.
                 RFC 4023, March 2005.

8.2 Informative References

   [RFC2547]     E. Rosen, Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS VPNs", RFC 2547, March 1999.

   [RFC3032]     R.     Rosen, et. al., E., Tappan, D., Fedorkow, G., Rekhter, Y.,
                 Farinacci, D., Li, T., and A. Conta, "MPLS Label Stack Encoding,"
                 Encoding", RFC 3032, January 2001.

   [RFC4086]     Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
                 Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
                 June 2005.

   [MPLS-IPSEC]  E.  Rosen, J. De Clercq, O/ Paridaens, Y. T'Joens,
                 C. Sargor, "Use E., "Architecture for the Use of PE-PE IPsec
                 Tunnels in RFC2547 BGP/MPLS IP VPNs",
                 draft-ietf-l3vpn-ipsec-2547-05 (work in progress, draft-ietf-l3vpn-ipsec-2547-01.txt, progress),
                 August 2003. 2005.

   [RFC2409]     Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
                 (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC3031]     Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon,
                 "Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture", RFC 3031,
                 January 2001.

9. Contacts Authors' Addresses

   W. Mark Townsley
   cisco Systems


   Carlos Pignataro
   cisco Systems
   7025 Kit Creek Road
   PO Box 14987
   Research Triangle Park, NC 27709


   Scott Wainner
   cisco Systems
   13600 Dulles Technology Drive
   Herndon, VA 20171


   Ted Seely


   Jeffrey S. Young


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