Internet Engineering Task Force - MSEC WG
   Internet Draft                                            M. Euchner
   Intended Category: Proposed Standard
   Expires: March July 2005                                      January 2005                                     October 2004

                HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY
                   <draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-07.txt>
                   <draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-08.txt>

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             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

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             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

Abstract

   This document describes a light-weight point-to-point key management
   protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) protocol
   MIKEY, as defined in RFC 3830.  In particular, this variant deploys
   the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for key
   establishment featuring perfect forward secrecy in conjunction with a
   keyed hash message authentication code for achieving mutual
   authentication and message integrity of the key management messages
   exchanged.  This protocol addresses the security and performance
   constraints of multimedia key management in MIKEY.

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2].

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction..................................................3
   1.1. Definitions.................................................6
   1.2. Abbreviations...............................................6 Abbreviations...............................................7
   2. Scenario......................................................7 Scenario......................................................8
   2.1. Applicability...............................................8 Applicability...............................................9
   2.2. Relation to GKMARCH........................................10 GKMARCH........................................11
   3. DHHMAC Security Protocol.....................................10

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004 Protocol.....................................11
   3.1. TGK re-keying..............................................12 re-keying..............................................13
   4. DHHMAC payload formats.......................................13 formats.......................................14
   4.1. Common header payload (HDR)................................14 (HDR)................................15
   4.2. Key data transport payload (KEMAC).........................15 (KEMAC).........................16
   4.3. ID payload (ID)............................................15 (ID)............................................16
   4.4. General Extension Payload..................................15 Payload..................................16
   5. Security Considerations......................................16 Considerations......................................17
   5.1. Security environment.......................................16 environment.......................................17
   5.2. Threat model...............................................16 model...............................................17
   5.3. Security features and properties...........................19 properties...........................20
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

   5.4. Assumptions................................................23 Assumptions................................................25
   5.5. Residual risk..............................................24 risk..............................................25
   5.6. Authorization and Trust Model..............................25 Model..............................27
   6. IANA considerations..........................................25   Acknowledgments............................................27
   Conclusions.....................................................27
   7. References...................................................27
   7.1. IANA considerations..........................................28
   8. References...................................................28
   8.1  Normative References.......................................27
   7.2. References.......................................28
   8.2  Informative References.....................................27
   8. Acknowledgments..............................................29 References.....................................29
   Full Copyright Statement........................................31
   Expiration Date.................................................32
   Revision History................................................33
   Author's Addresses..............................................35

1. Introduction

  There is work done in IETF to develop key management schemes. For
  example, IKE [14] is a widely accepted unicast scheme for IPsec, and
  the MSEC WG is developing other schemes, addressed to group
  communication [24], [25]. For reasons discussed below, there is
  however a need for a scheme with low latency, suitable for demanding
  cases such as real-time data over heterogeneous networks, and small
  interactive groups.

  As pointed out in MIKEY (see [3]), secure real-time multimedia
  applications demand a particular adequate light-weight key management
  scheme that cares for how to securely and efficiently establish
  dynamic session keys in a conversational multimedia scenario.
  In general, MIKEY scenarios cover peer-to-peer, simple-one-to-many
  and small-sized groups.  MIKEY in particular, describes three key
  management schemes for the peer-to-peer case that all finish their
  task within one round trip:
     -   a symmetric key distribution protocol (MIKEY-PS) based upon
         pre-shared master keys;

     -   a public-key encryption-based key distribution protocol

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
         (MIKEY-PK) assuming a public-key infrastructure with RSA-based
         (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) private/public keys and digital
         certificates;
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     -   and a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (MIKEY-DHSIGN)
         deploying digital signatures and certificates.

  All these three key management protocols are designed such that they
  complete their work within just one round trip.  This requires
  depending on loosely synchronized clocks and deploying timestamps
  within the key management protocols.

  However, it is known [7] that each of the three key management
  schemes has its subtle constraints and limitations:
      -  The symmetric key distribution protocol (MIKEY-PS) is simple
         to implement but does not nicely scale in any larger
         configuration of potential peer entities due to the need of
         mutually pre-assigned shared master secrets.

         Moreover, the security provided does not achieve the property
         of perfect forward secrecy; i.e. compromise of the shared
         master secret would render past and even future session keys
         susceptible to compromise.

         Further, the generation of the session key happens just at the
         initiator.  Thus, the responder has to fully trust the
         initiator on choosing a good and secure session secret; the
         responder neither is able to participate in the key generation
         nor to influence that process.  This is considered as a
         specific limitation in less trusted environments.

      -  The public-key encryption scheme (MIKEY-PK) depends upon a
         public-key infrastructure that certifies the private-public
         keys by issuing and maintaining digital certificates.  While
         such a key management scheme provides full scalability in large
         networked configurations, public-key infrastructures are still
         not widely available and in general, implementations are
         significantly more complex.

         Further, additional round trips and computational processing
         might be necessary for each
         side end system in order to ascertain
         verification of the digital certificates.  For example, typical
         PKIX operations such as validating of digital certificates (RFC
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004  January 2005

         3029, [31]), ascertaining the revocation status of digital
         certificates (RFC 2560, [30]) and asserting certificate
         policies, construction of certification path(s) ([33]),
         requesting and obtaining necessary certificates (RFC 2511,
         [32]) and management of certificates for such purposes ([29])
         may involve extra network communication handshakes with the
         public-key infrastructure and with certification authorities
         and may typically involve additional processing steps in the
         end systems.  Such steps and tasks all result in further delay
         of the key agreement or key establishment phase among the end
         systems, negatively impacting setup time.  Any extra PKI
         handshakes and processing are not in scope of MIKEY and since
         this document deploys symmetric security mechanisms only,
         aspects of PKI, digital certificates and related processing are
         not further covered in this document.

         Finally, as in the symmetric case, the responder depends
         completely upon the initiator choosing good and secure session
         keys.

      -  The third MIKEY-DHSIGN key management protocol deploys the
         Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme and authenticates the
         exchange of the Diffie-Hellman half-keys in each direction by
         using a digital signature upon. signature.  As in the previous method, this
         introduces the dependency upon a public-key infrastructure with
         its strength on scalability but also the limitations on
         computational costs in performing the asymmetric long-integer
         operations and the potential need for additional communication
         for verification of the digital certificates.

         However, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is known for
         its subtle security strengths in that it is able to provide
         full perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and further have both
         parties actively involved in session key generation.  This
         special security property - despite the somewhat higher
         computational costs - makes Diffie-Hellman techniques
         attractive in practice.

  In order to overcome some of the limitations as outlined above, a
  special need has been recognized for another efficient key agreement
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  protocol variant in MIKEY.  This protocol variant aims to provide the
  capability of perfect forward secrecy as part of a key agreement with
  low latency without dependency on a public-key infrastructure.

  This document describes such a fourth light-weight key management
  scheme for MIKEY that could somehow be seen as a synergetic
  optimization between the pre-shared key distribution scheme and the
  Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

  The idea of that protocol is to apply the Diffie-Hellman key
  agreement but instead of deploying a digital signature for
  authenticity of the exchanged keying material rather uses a keyed-
  hash upon using symmetrically pre-assigned shared secrets.  This
  combination of security mechanisms is called the HMAC-authenticated
  Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement for MIKEY (DHHMAC).

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

  The DHHMAC variant closely follows the design and philosophy of MIKEY
  and reuses MIKEY protocol payload components and MIKEY mechanisms to
  its maximum benefit and for best compatibility.

  Like the MIKEY Diffie-Hellman protocol, DHHMAC does not scale beyond
  a point-to-point constellation; thus, both MIKEY Diffie-Hellman
  protocols do not support group-based keying for any group size larger
  than two entities.

  1.1.   Definitions

  The definitions and notations in this document are aligned with
  MIKEY, see [3] and [3] sections 1.3 - 1.4.

  All large integer computations in this document should be understood
  as being mod p within some fixed group G for some large prime p; see
  [3] section 3.3; however, the DHHMAC protocol is applicable in
  general to other appropriate finite, cyclical groups as well.

  It is assumed that a pre-shared key s is known by both entities
  (initiator and responder).  The authentication key auth_key is
  derived from the pre-shared secret s using the pseudo-random function
  PRF; see [3] sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.5.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  In this text, [X] represents an optional piece of information.
  Generally throughout the text, X SHOULD be present unless certain
  circumstance MAY allow X being optional and not be present thereby
  resulting in weaker security potentially.  Likewise [X, Y] represents
  an optional compound piece of information where the pieces X and Y
  SHOULD be either both present or MAY optionally be both absent.  {X}
  denotes zero or more occurrences of X.

  1.2.   Abbreviations

     auth_key        pre-shared authentication key, PRF-derived from
                     pre-shared key s.
     DH              Diffie-Hellman
     DHi             public Diffie-Hellman half key g^(xi) of the
                     Initiatior
     DHr             public Diffie-Hellman half key g^(xr) of the
                     Responder
     DHHMAC          HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman
     DoS             Denial-of-service

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
     G               Diffie-Hellman group
     HDR             MIKEY common header payload
     HMAC            keyed Hash Message Authentication Code
     HMAC-SHA1       HMAC using SHA1 as hash function (160-bit result)
     IDi             Identity of initiator
     IDr             Identity of receiver
     IKE             Internet Key Exchange
     IPSec
     IPsec           Internet Protocol Security
     MIKEY           Multimedia Internet KEYing
     MIKEY-DHHMAC    MIKEY Diffie-Hellman key management protocol using
                     HMAC
     MIKEY-DHSIGN    MIKEY Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
     MIKEY-PK        MIKEY public-key encryption-based key distribution
                     protocol
     MIKEY-PS        MIKEY pre-shared key distribution protocol
     p               Diffie-Hellman prime modulus
     PKI             Public-key Infrastructure
     PKIX            Public-key Infrastructure Operation
     PRF             MIKEY pseudo-random function (see [3] section
                     4.1.3.)
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     RSA             Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
     s               pre-shared key
     SDP             Session Description Protocol
     SOI             Son-of-IKE, IKEv2
     SP              MIKEY Security Policy (Parameter) Payload
     T               timestamp
     TEK             Traffic Encryption Key
     TGK             MIKEY TEK Generation Key as the common Diffie-
                     Hellman shared secret
     TLS             Transport Layer Security
     xi              secret, (pseudo) random Diffie-Hellman key of the
                     Initiator
     xr              secret, (pseudo) random Diffie-Hellman key of the
                     Responder

2. Scenario

  The HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (DHHMAC)
  for MIKEY addresses the same scenarios and scope as the other three
  key management schemes in MIKEY address.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

  DHHMAC is applicable in a peer-to-peer group where no access to a
  public-key infrastructure can be assumed available.  Rather, pre-
  shared master secrets are assumed available among the entities in
  such an environment.

  In a pair-wise group, it is assumed that each client will be setting
  up a session key for its outgoing links with it's peer using the DH-
  MAC key agreement protocol.

  As is the case for the other three MIKEY key management protocol,
  DHHMAC assumes loosely synchronized clocks among the entities in the
  small group.

  Note: To synchronize the clocks in a secure manner, some operational
  or procedural means are recommended.  However, MIKEY-DHHMAC does not
  describe any secure time synchronization measures and leaves such
  tasks to the discretion of the implementation.  The reader is
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  referred to [3] section 5.4 and [3] section 9.3 that give guidance on
  clock synchronization and timestamps.

  2.1.   Applicability

  MIKEY-DHHMAC as well as the other MIKEY key management protocols are
  optimized and targeted for the purpose of multimedia applications
  with application-level key management needs under real-time session
  setup and session management constraints.

  As the MIKEY-DHHMAC key management protocol terminates in one
  roundtrip, DHHMAC is applicable for integration into two-way
  handshake session- or call signaling protocols such as

  a) SIP/SDP (see [5]) where the encoded MIKEY messages are
     encapsulated and transported in SDP containers of the SDP
     offer/answer handshake,
  b) H.323 (see [22]) where the encoded MIKEY messages are transported
     in the H.225.0 fast start call signaling handshake.

  MIKEY-DHHMAC is offered as option to the other MIKEY key management
  variants (MIKEY-pre-shared, MIKEY-public-key and MIKEY-DH-SIGN) for
  all those cases where DHHMAC has its peculiar strengths (see section
  5).

  2.1.1. Usage in H.235

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   This section provides informative overview how MIKEY-DHHMAC can be
   applied in some H.323-based multimedia environments.  Generally,
   MIKEY is applicable for multimedia applications including IP
   telephony.  [22] describes various use cases of the MIKEY key
   management protocols (MIKEY-PS, MIKEY-PK, MIKEY-DHSIGN and MIKEY-
   DHHMAC) with the purpose to establish TGK keying material among H.323
   endpoints.  The TGKs are then used for media encryption by applying
   SRTP [27].  Addressed scenarios include point-to-point with one or
   more intermediate gatekeepers (trusted or partially trusted) in-
   between.
   One particular use case addresses MIKEY-DHHMAC to establish a media
   connection from an endpoint B calling (through a gatekeeper) to
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

   another endpoint A that is located within that same gatekeeper zone.
   While EP-A and EP-B typically do not share any auth_key a priori,
   some separate protocol exchange means are achieved outside the actual
   call setup procedure to establish an auth_key for the time while
   endpoints are being registered with the gatekeeper; such protocols
   exist [22] but are not shown in this document.  The auth_key between
   the endpoints is being used to authenticate and integrity protect the
   MIKEY-DHHMAC messages.

   To establish a call, it is assumed that endpoint B has obtained
   permission from the gatekeeper (not shown).  Endpoint B as the caller
   builds the MIKEY-DHHMAC I_message(see section 3) and sends the
   I_message encapsulated within the H.323-SETUP to endpoint A.  A
   routing gatekeeper (GK) would forward this message to endpoint B; in
   case of a non-routing gatekeeper, endpoint B sends the SETUP directly
   to endpoint A.  In either case, H.323 inherent security mechanisms
   [28] are applied to protect the (encapsulation) message during
   transfer.  This is not depicted here.  The receiving endpoint A is
   able to verify the conveyed I_message and can compute a TGK.
   Assuming that endpoint A would accept the call, EP-A then builds the
   MIKEY-DHHMAC R_message and sends the response as part of the
   CallProceeding-to-Connect message back to the calling endpoint B
   (possibly through a routing gatekeeper).  Endpoint B processes the
   conveyed R_message to compute the same TGK as the called endpoint A.

   1.) EP-B -> (GK) -> EP-A: SETUP(I_fwd_message [, I_rev_message])
   2.) EP-A -> (GK) -> EP-B: CallProceeding-to-CONNECT(R_fwd_message [,
   R_rev_message])

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   Notes:   If it is necessary to establish directional TGKs for full-
            duplex links in both directions B->A and A->B, then the
            calling endpoint B instantiates the DHHMAC protocol twice:
            once in the direction B->A using I_fwd_message and another
            run in parallel in the direction A->B using I_rev_message.
            In that case, two MIKEY-DHHMAC I_messages are encapsulated
            within SETUP (I_fwd_message and I_rev_message) and two
            MIKEY-DHHMAC R_messages (R_fwd_message and R_rev_message)
            are encapsulted within CallProceeding-to-CONNECT.  The
            I_rev_message corresponds with the I_fwd_message.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

            Alternatively, the called endpoint A may instantiate the
            DHHMAC protocol in a separate run with endpoint B (not
            shown); however, this requires a third handshake to
            complete.

            For more details on how the MIKEY protocols may be deployed
            with H.235, please refer to [22].

  2.2.   Relation to GKMARCH

     The Group key management architecture (GKMARCH) [26] describes a
     generic architecture for multicast security group key management
     protocols.  In the context of this architecture, MIKEY-DHHMAC may
     operate as a registration protocol, see also [3] section 2.4.  The
     main entities involved in the architecture are a group
     controller/key server (GCKS), the receiver(s), and the sender(s).
     Due to the pair-
  wise pair-wise nature of the Diffie-Hellman operation and the
     1-roundtrip constraint, usage of MIKEY-DHHMAC rules out any
     deployment as a group key management protocol with more than two
     group entities.  Only the degenerate case with two peers is
     possible where for example the responder acts as the group
     controller.

     Note that MIKEY does not provide re-keying in the GKMARCH sense,
     only updating of the keys by normal unicast messages.

3. DHHMAC Security Protocol

     The following figure defines the security protocol for DHHMAC:

                  Initiator                        Responder

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

      I_message = HDR, T, RAND, [IDi], IDr,
                  {SP}, DHi, KEMAC
                       ----------------------->   R_message = HDR, T,
                                                   [IDr], IDi, DHr,
                                                   DHi, KEMAC
                       <----------------------
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

      Figure 1: HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key based exchange,
         where xi and xr are (pseudo) randomly chosen respectively
                    by the initiator and the responder.

     The DHHMAC key exchange SHALL be done according to Figure 1. The
     initiator chooses a (pseudo) random value xi, and sends an HMACed
     message including g^(xi) and a timestamp to the responder. It is
     recommended that the initiator SHOULD always include the identity
     payloads IDi and IDr within the I_message; unless the receiver can
     defer the initiator's identity by some other means, then IDi MAY
     optionally be omitted.  The initiator SHALL always include the
     recipient's identity.

     The group parameters (e.g., the group G) are a set of parameters
     chosen by the initiator.  Note, that like in the MIKEY protocol,
     both sender and receiver explicitly transmit the Diffie-Hellman
     group G within the Diffie-Hellman payload DHi or DHr through an
     encoding (e.g., OAKELEY group numbering, see [3] section 6.4); the
     actual group parameters g and p however are not explicitly
     transmitted but can be deduced from the Diffie-Hellman group G.
     The responder chooses a (pseudo) random positive integer xr, and
     sends an HMACed message including g^(xr) and the timestamp to the
     initiator. The responder SHALL always include the initiator's
     identity IDi regardless of whether the I_message conveyed any IDi.
     It is RECOMMENDED that the responder SHOULD always include the
     identity payload IDr within the R_message; unless the initiator can
     defer the reponder's identity by some other means, then IDr MAY
     optionally be left out.

     Both parties then calculate the TGK as g^(xi * xr).

     The HMAC authentication provides authentication of the DH half-
     keys, and is necessary to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

     This approach is less expensive than digitally signed Diffie-
     Hellman.  It requires first of all, that both sides compute one
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     exponentiation and one HMAC, then one HMAC verification and finally
     another Diffie-Hellman exponentiation.

     With off-line pre-computation, the initial Diffie-Hellman half-key
     MAY be computed before the key management transaction and thereby
     MAY further reduce the overall round trip delay as well as reduce
     the risk of denial-of-service attacks.

     Processing of the TGK SHALL be accomplished as described in MIKEY
     [3] chapter 4.

     The computed HMAC result SHALL be conveyed in the KEMAC payload
     field where the MAC fields holds the HMAC result.  The HMAC SHALL
     be computed over the entire message excluding the MAC field using
     auth_key, see also section 4.2.

  3.1.   TGK re-keying

     TGK re-keying for DHHMAC generally proceeds as described in [3]
     section 4.5.  Specifically, figure 2 provides the message exchange
     for the DHHMAC update message.

                  Initiator                        Responder

      I_message = HDR, T, [IDi], IDr,
                  {SP}, [DHi], KEMAC
                       ----------------------->   R_message = HDR, T,
                                                   [IDr], IDi,
                                                   [DHr, DHi], KEMAC
                       <----------------------

                      Figure 2: DHHMAC update message

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

     TGK re-keying supports two procedures:

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     a) True re-keying by exchanging new and fresh Diffie-Hellman half-
         keys.  For this, the initiator SHALL provide a new, fresh DHi
         and the responder SHALL respond with a new, fresh DHr and the
         received DHi.

     b) Non-key related information update without any Diffie-Hellman
         half-keys included in the exchange.  Such transaction does not
         change the actual TGK but updates other information like
         security policy parameters for example.  To only update the
         non-key related information, [DHi] and [DHr, DHi] SHALL be left
         out.

4. DHHMAC payload formats

  This section specifies the payload formats and data type values for
  DHHMAC, see also [3] chapter 6 for a definition of the MIKEY
  payloads.

  This document does not define new payload formats but re-uses MIKEY
  payloads for DHHMAC as referenced:

  * Common header payload (HDR), see section 4.1 and [3] section 6.1

  * SRTP ID sub-payload, see [3] section 6.1.1,

  * Key data transport payload (KEMAC), see section 4.2 and [3] section
    6.2

  * DH data payload, see [3] section 6.4

  * Timestamp payload, [3] section 6.6

  * ID payload, [3] section 6.7

  * Security Policy payload (SP), [3] section 6.10

  * RAND payload (RAND), [3] section 6.11

  * Error payload (ERR), [3] section 6.12
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004  January 2005

  * General Extension Payload, [3] section 6.15

  4.1.   Common header payload (HDR)

     Referring to [3] section 6.1, for DHHMAC the following data types
     SHALL be used:

        Data type     | Value | Comment
     -------------------------------------------------------------
        DHHMAC init   |     7 | Initiator's DHHMAC exchange message
        DHHMAC resp   |     8 | Responder's DHHMAC exchange message
        Error         |     6 | Error message, see [3] section 6.12

     Table 4.1.a

     Note: A responder is able to recognize the MIKEY DHHMAC protocol
     by evaluating the data type field as 7 or 8.  This is how the
     responder can differentiate between MIKEY and MIKEY DHHMAC.

     The next payload field SHALL be one of the following values:
     Next payload| Value |       Section
     ----------------------------------------------------------------
     Last payload|     0 | -
     KEMAC       |     1 | section 4.2 and [3] section 6.2
     DH          |     3 | [3] section 6.4
     T           |     5 | [3] section 6.6
     ID          |     6 | [3] section 6.7
     SP          |    10 | [3] section 6.10
     RAND        |    11 | [3] section 6.11
     ERR         |    12 | [3] section 6.12
     General Ext.|    21 | [3] section 6.15

     Table 4.1.b

     Other defined next payload values defined in [3] SHALL not be
     applied to DHHMAC.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     The responder in case of a decoding error or of a failed HMAC
     authentication verification SHALL apply the Error payload data
     type.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

  4.2.   Key data transport payload (KEMAC)

     DHHMAC SHALL apply this payload for conveying the HMAC result along
     with the indicated authentication algorithm. KEMAC when used in
     conjunction with DHHMAC SHALL not convey any encrypted data; thus
     Encr alg SHALL be set to 2 (NULL), Encr data len SHALL be set to 0
     and Encr data SHALL be left empty. The AES key wrap method (see
     [23]) SHALL not be applied for DHHMAC.

     For DHHMAC, this key data transport payload SHALL be the last
     payload in the message.  Note that the Next payload field SHALL be
     set to Last payload.  The HMAC is then calculated over the entire
     MIKEY message excluding the MAC field using auth_key as described
     in [3] section 5.2 and then stored within MAC field.

        MAC alg       | Value |           Comments
     ------------------------------------------------------------------
        HMAC-SHA-1    |     0 | Mandatory, Default (see [4])
        NULL          |     1 | Very restricted use, see
                              | [3] section 4.2.4

     Table 4.2.a

     HMAC-SHA-1 is the default hash function that SHALL MUST be implemented as
     part of the DHHMAC.  The length of the HMAC-SHA-1 result is 160
     bits.

  4.3.   ID payload (ID)

     For DHHMAC, this payload SHALL only hold a non-certificate based
     identity.

  4.4.   General Extension Payload
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     For DHHMAC and to avoid bidding-down attacks, this payload SHALL
     list all key management protocol identifiers of a surrounding
     encapsulation protocol such as for example, SDP [5].  The General
     Extension Payload SHALL be integrity-protected with the HMAC using
     the shared secret.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

     Type      | Value | Comments
     SDP IDs   |     1 | List of SDP key management IDs (allocated for
                         use in [5]); see also [3] section 6.15.

     Table 4.4.a

5. Security Considerations

  This document addresses key management security issues throughout.
  For a comprehensive explanation of MIKEY security considerations,
  please refer to MIKEY [3] section 9.

  In addition to that, this document addresses security issues
  according to [8] where the following security considerations apply in
  particular to this document:

  5.1.   Security environment

  Generally, the DHHMAC security protocol described in this document
  focuses primarily on communication security; i.e. the security issues
  concerned with the MIKEY DHHMAC protocol.  Nevertheless, some system
  security issues are of interest as well that are not explicitly
  defined by the DHHMAC protocol, but should be provided locally in
  practice.

  The system where that runs the DHHMAC protocol entity runs upon SHALL provide the
  capability to generate (pseudo) random numbers as input to the
  Diffie-Hellman operation (see [9], [15]).  Furthermore, the system
  SHALL be capable of storing the generated (pseudo) random data,
  secret data, keys and other secret security parameters securely (i.e.
  confidential and safe from unauthorized tampering).

  5.2.   Threat model
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  The threat model that this document adheres to cover the issues of
  end-to-end security in the Internet generally; without ruling out the
  possibility that MIKEY DHHMAC be deployed in a corporate, closed IP
  environment.  This also includes the possibility that MIKEY DHHMAC be
  deployed on a hop-by-hop basis with some intermediate trusted "MIKEY
  DHHMAC proxies" involved.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

  Since DHHMAC is a key management protocol, the following security
  threats are of concern:

  * Unauthorized interception of plain TGKs.
    For DHHMAC this threat does not occur since the TGK is not actually
    transmitted on the wire (not even in encrypted fashion).

  * Eavesdropping of other, transmitted keying information:
    DHHMAC protocol does not explicitly transmit the TGK at all.
    Rather, by the Diffie-Hellman "encryption" operation, that conceals
    the secret (pseudo) random values, only partial information (i.e.
    the DH- half key) for construction of the TGK is transmitted.  It
    is fundamentally assumed that availability of such Diffie-Hellman
    half-keys to an eavesdropper does not result in any substantial
    security risk; see 5.4.  Furthermore, the DHHMAC carries other data
    such as timestamps, (pseudo) random values, identification
    information or security policy parameters; eavesdropping of any
    such data is considered not to yield any significant security risk.

  * Masquerade of either entity:
    This security threat must be avoided and if a masquerade attack
    would be attempted, appropriate detection means must be in place.
    DHHMAC addresses this threat by providing mutual peer entity
    authentication.

  * Man-in-the-middle attacks:
    Such attacks threaten the security of exchanged, non-authenticated
    messages.  Man-in-the-middle attacks usually come with masquerade
    and or loss of message integrity (see below).  Man-in-the-middle
    attacks must be avoided, and if present or attempted must be
    detected appropriately.  DHHMAC addresses this threat by providing
    mutual peer entity authentication and message integrity.

  * Loss of integrity:

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    This security threat relates to unauthorized replay, deletion,
    insertion and manipulation of messages.  While any such attacks
    cannot be avoided they must be detected at least.  DHHMAC addresses
    this threat by providing message integrity.

  * Bidding-down attacks:
     When multiple key management protocols each of a distinct security
     level are offered (e.g., such as is possible by SDP [5]), avoiding
     bidding-down attacks is of concern.  DHHMAC addresses this threat

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
     by reusing the MIKEY General Extension Payload mechanism, where all
     key management protocol identifiers are be listed within the MIKEY
     General Extension Payload.

  Some potential threats are not within the scope of this threat model:

  * Passive and off-line cryptanalysis of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm:
    Under certain reasonable assumptions (see 5.4 below) it is widely
    believed that DHHMAC is sufficiently secure and that such attacks
    be infeasible although the possibility of a successful attack
    cannot be ruled out completely.

  * Non-repudiation of the receipt or of the origin of the message:
    These are not requirements of this environment and thus related
    countermeasures are not provided at all.

  * Denial-of-service or distributed denial-of-service attacks:
    Some considerations are given on some of those attacks, but DHHMAC
    does not claim to provide full countermeasure against any of those
    attacks.  For example, stressing the availability of the entities
    are not thwarted by means of the key management protocol; some
    other local countermeasures should be applied.  Further, some DoS
    attacks are not countered such as interception of a valid DH-
    request and its massive instant duplication.  Such attacks might at
    least be countered partially by some local means that are outside
    the scope of this document.

  * Identity protection:
    Like MIKEY, identity protection is not a major design requirement
    for MIKEY-DHHMAC either, see [3].  No security protocol is known so
    far, that is able to provide the objectives of DHHMAC as stated in
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    section 5.3 including identity protection within just a single
    roundtrip.  MIKEY-DHHMAC trades identity protection for better
    security for the keying material and shorter roundtrip time. Thus,
    MIKEY-DHHMAC does not provide identity protection on its own but
    may inherit such property from a security protocol underneath that
    actually features identity protection.  On the other hand, it is
    expected that MIKEY-DHHMAC is typically being deployed within
    SDP/SIP ([20], [5]); both those protocols do not provide end-to-end
    identity protection either.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

    The DHHMAC security protocol (see section 3) and the TGK re-keying
    security protocol (see section 3.1) provide the option not to
    supply identity information.  This option is only applicable if
    some other means are available of supplying trustworthy identity
    information; e.g., by relying on secured links underneath of MIKEY
    that supply trustworthy identity information otherwise.  However,
    it is understood that without identity information present, the
    MIKEY key management security protocols might be subject to
    security weaknesses such as masquerade, impersonation and
    reflection attacks particularly in end-to-end scenarios where no
    other secure means of assured identity information is provided.
    Leaving identity fields optional if possible thus should not be
    seen as a privacy method either, but rather as a protocol
    optimization feature.

  5.3.   Security features and properties

  With the security threats in mind, this draft provides the following
  security features and yields the following properties:

  * Secure key agreement with the establishment of a TGK at both peers:
    This is achieved using an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
    management protocol.

  * Peer-entity authentication (mutual):
    This authentication corroborates that the host/user is authentic in
    that possession of a pre-assigned secret key is proven using keyed
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    HMAC.  Authentication occurs on the request and on the response
    message, thus authentication is mutual.

    The HMAC computation corroborates for authentication and message
    integrity of the exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys and associated
    messages.  The authentication is absolutely necessary in order to
    avoid man-in-the-middle attacks on the exchanged messages in
    transit and in particular, on the otherwise non-authenticated
    exchanged Diffie-Hellman half keys.

    Note: This document does not address issues regarding
    authorization; this feature is not provided explicitly.  However,

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
    DHHMAC authentication means support and facilitate realization of
    authorization means (local issue).

  * Cryptographic integrity check:
    The cryptographic integrity check is achieved using a message
    digest (keyed HMAC).  It includes the exchanged Diffie-Hellman
    half-keys but covers the other parts of the exchanged message as
    well.  Both mutual peer entity authentication and message integrity
    provide effective countermeasure against man-in-the-middle attacks.

    The initiator may deploy a local timer that fires when the awaited
    response message did not arrive timely.  This is to detect deletion
    of entire messages.

  * Replay protection of the messages is achieved using embedded
    timestamps.

  * Limited DoS protection:
    Rapid checking of the message digest allows verifying  In order to detect replayed messages it is essential
    that the
    authenticity clocks among initiator and integrity of a message before launching CPU
    intensive Diffie-Hellman operations or starting other sender be roughly synchronized.
    The reader is referred to [3] section 5.4 and [3] section 9.3 that
    provide further considerations and give guidance on clock
    synchronization and timestamp usage.  Should the clock
    synchronization be lost, then end systems cannot detect replayed
    messages anymore resulting that the end systems cannot securely
    establish keying material.  This may result in a denial-of-service,
    see [3] section 9.5.

  * Limited DoS protection:
    Rapid checking of the message digest allows verifying the
    authenticity and integrity of a message before launching CPU
    intensive Diffie-Hellman operations or starting other resource
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    consuming tasks.  This protects against some denial-of-service
    attacks: malicious modification of messages and spam attacks with
    (replayed or masqueraded) messages.  DHHMAC probably does not
    explicitly counter sophisticated distributed, large-scale denial-
    of-service attacks that compromise system availability for example.
    Some DoS protection is provided by inclusion of the initiator's
    identity payload in the I_message.  This allows the recipient to
    filter out those (replayed) I_messages that are not targeted for
    him and avoids the recipient from creating unnecessary MIKEY
    sessions.

  * Perfect-forward secrecy (PFS):
    Other than the MIKEY pre-shared and public-key based key
    distribution protocols, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
    features a security property called perfect forward secrecy.  That
    is, that even if the long-term pre-shared key would be compromised
    at some point in time, this would not render past or future session
    keys compromised.

    Neither the MIKEY pre-shared nor the MIKEY public-key protocol
    variants are able to provide the security property of perfect-

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
    forward secrecy.  Thus, none of the other MIKEY protocols is able
    to substitute the Diffie-Hellman PFS property.

    As such, DHHMAC but also digitally signed DH provides a far
    superior security level over the pre-shared or public-key based key
    distribution protocol in that respect.

  * Fair, mutual key contribution:
    The Diffie-Hellman key management protocol is not a strict key
    distribution protocol per se with the initiator distributing a key
    to its peers.  Actually, both parties involved in the protocol
    exchange are able to equally contribute to the common Diffie-
    Hellman TEK traffic generating key.  This reduces the risk of
    either party cheating or unintentionally generating a weak session
    key.  This makes the DHHMAC a fair key agreement protocol. One may
    view this property as an additional distributed security measure
    that is increasing security robustness over the case where all the
    security depends just on the proper implementation of a single
    entity.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    In order for Diffie-Hellman key agreement to be secure, each party
    SHALL generate its xi or xr values using a strong, unpredictable
    pseudo-random generator if a source of true randomness is not
    available.  Further, these values xi or xr SHALL be kept private.
    It is RECOMMENDED that these secret values be destroyed once the
    common Diffie-Hellman shared secret key has been established.

  * Efficiency and performance:
    Like the MIKEY-public key protocol, the MIKEY DHHMAC key agreement
    protocol securely establishes a TGK within just one roundtrip.
    Other existing key management techniques like IPSEC-IKE IPsec-IKE [14],
    IPSEC-IKEv2
    IPsec-IKEv2 [21] and TLS [13] and other schemes are not deemed
    adequate in addressing sufficiently those real-time and security
    requirements; they all use more than a single roundtrip.  All the
    MIKEY key management protocols are able to complete their task of
    security policy parameter negotiation including key-agreement or
    key distribution in one roundtrip.  However, the MIKEY pre-shared
    and the MIKEY public-key protocol both are able to complete their
    task even in a half-round trip when the confirmation messages are
    omitted.

    Using HMAC in conjunction with a strong one-way hash function such
    as SHA1 may be achieved more efficiently in software than expensive

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
    public-key operations.  This yields a particular performance
    benefit of DHHMAC over signed DH or the public-key encryption
    protocol.

    If a very high security level is desired for long-term secrecy of
    the negotiated Diffie-Hellman shared secret, longer hash values may
    be deployed such as SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512 provide, possibly in
    conjunction with stronger Diffie-Hellman groups.  This is left as
    for further study.

    For the sake of improved performance and reduced round trip delay
    either party may off-line pre-compute its public Diffie-Hellman
    half-key.

    On the other side and under reasonable conditions, DHHMAC consumes
    more CPU cycles than the MIKEY pre-shared key distribution
    protocol.  The same might hold true quite likely for the MIKEY
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

    public-key distribution protocol (depending on choice of the
    private and public key lengths).

    As such, it can be said that DHHMAC provides sound performance when
    compared with the other MIKEY protocol variants.

    The use of optional identity information (with the constraints
    stated in section 5.2) and optional Diffie-Hellman half-key fields
    provides a means to increase performance and shorten the consumed
    network bandwidth.

  * Security infrastructure:
    This document describes the HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
    agreement protocol that completely avoids digital signatures and
    the associated public-key infrastructure as would be necessary for
    the X.509 RSA public-key based key distribution protocol or the
    digitally signed Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol as described
    in MIKEY.  Public-key infrastructures may not always be available
    in certain environments nor may they be deemed adequate for real-
    time multimedia applications when taking additional steps for
    certificate validation and certificate revocation methods with
    additional round-trips into account.

    DHHMAC does not depend on PKI nor do implementations require PKI
    standards and thus is believed to be much simpler than the more
    complex PKI facilities.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

    DHHMAC is particularly attractive in those environments where
    provisioning of a pre-shared key has already been accomplished.

  * NAT-friendliness:
    DHHMAC is able to operate smoothly through firewall/NAT devices as
    long as the protected identity information of the end entity is not
    an IP /transport address.

  * Scalability:
    Like the MIKEY signed Diffie-Hellman protocol, DHHMAC does not
    scale to any larger configurations beyond peer-to-peer groups.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  5.4.   Assumptions

  This document states a couple of assumptions upon which the security
  of DHHMAC significantly depends.  It is assumed, that

  * the parameters xi, xr, s and auth_key are to be kept secret.

  * the pre-shared key s has sufficient entropy and cannot be
    effectively guessed.

  * the pseudo-random function (PRF) is secure, yields indeed the
    pseudo-random property and maintains the entropy.

  * a sufficiently large and secure Diffie-Hellman group is applied.

  * the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds saying basically that even with
    knowledge of the exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys and knowledge
    of the Diffie-Hellman group, it is infeasible to compute the TGK or
    to derive the secret parameters xi or xr.  The latter is also
    called the discrete logarithm assumption.  Please see [7], [11] or
    [12] for more background information regarding the Diffie-Hellman
    problem and its computational complexity assumptions.

  * the hash function (SHA1) is secure; i.e. that it is computationally
    infeasible to find a message which corresponds to a given message
    digest, or to find two different messages that produce the same
    message digest.

  * the HMAC algorithm is secure and does not leak the auth_key.  In

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
    particular, the security depends on the message authentication
    property of the compression function of the hash function H when
    applied to single blocks (see [6]).

  * a source capable of producing sufficiently many bits of (pseudo)
    randomness is available.

  * the system upon which DHHMAC runs is sufficiently secure.

  5.5.   Residual risk
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  Although these detailed assumptions are non-negligible, security
  experts generally believe that all these assumptions are reasonable
  and that the assumptions made can be fulfilled in practice with
  little or no expenses.

  The mathematical and cryptographic assumptions upon the properties of
  the PRF, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (discrete log-assumption), the
  HMAC and SHA1 algorithms have not been proved yet nor have they been
  disproved by the time of this writing.

  Thus, a certain residual risk remains, which might threaten the
  overall security at some unforeseeable time in the future.

  The DHHMAC would be compromised as soon as any of the listed
  assumptions do not hold anymore.

  The Diffie-Hellman mechanism is a generic security technique that is
  not only applicable to groups of prime order or of characteristic
  two.  This is because of the fundamental mathematical assumption that
  the discrete logarithm problem is also a very hard one in general
  groups.  This enables Diffie-Hellman to be deployed also for GF(p)*,
  for sub-groups of sufficient size and for groups upon elliptic
  curves.  RSA does not allow such generalization, as the core
  mathematical problem is a different one (large integer
  factorization).
  RSA asymmetric keys tend to become increasingly lengthy (1536 bits
  and more) and thus very computational intensive.  Neverthess,
  elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) allows to cut-down key lengths
  substantially (say 170 bits or more) while maintaining at least the

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
  security level and providing even significant performance benefits in
  practice.  Moreover, it is believed that elliptic curve techniques
  provide much better protection against side channel attacks due to
  the inherent redundancy in the projective coordinates.  For all these
  reasons, one may view elliptic-curve-based Diffie-Hellman as being
  more "future-proof" and robust against potential threats than RSA.
  Note, that an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman variant of MIKEY remains
  for further study.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  It is not recommended to deploy DHHMAC for any other usage than
  depicted in section 2.  Otherwise any such misapplication might lead
  to unknown, undefined properties.

  5.6.   Authorization and Trust Model

  Basically, similar remarks on authorization as stated in [3] section
  4.3.2. hold also for DHHMAC.  However, as noted before, this key
  management protocol does not serve full groups.

  One may view the pre-established shared secret to yield some pre-
  established trust relationship between the initiator and the
  responder.  This results in a much simpler trust model for DHHMAC
  than would be the case for some generic group key management protocol
  and potential group entities without any pre-defined trust
  relationship.  The common group controller in conjunction with the
  assumption of a shared key simplifies the communication setup of the
  entities.

  One may view the pre-established trust relationship through the pre-
  shared secret as some means for pre-granted, implied authorization.
  This document does not define any particular authorization means but
  leaves this subject to the application.

6. IANA considerations   Acknowledgments

   This document does not define its own new name spaces for DHHMAC,
   beyond incorporates kindly valuable review feedback from
   Steffen Fries, Hannes Tschofenig, Fredrick Lindholm and Russell
   Housely and general feedback by the IANA name spaces that have been assigned MSEC WG.

Conclusions

  Key management for MIKEY, see
   [3] section 10 environments and section 10.1. applications with real-time and
  performance constraints are becoming of interest.  Existing key
  management techniques like IPsec-IKE [14] and IPsec-IKEv2 [22], TLS
  [13] and other schemes are not deemed adequate in addressing
  sufficiently those real-time and security requirements.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   The name spaces for the following fields  January 2005

  MIKEY defines three key management security protocols addressing
  real-time constraints.  DHHMAC as described in this document defines
  a fourth MIKEY variant aiming at the Common header payload
   (from Section 4.1) are requested to be managed by IANA (in bracket is
   the reference to the table with the initially registered values):

   *  data type (Table 4.1.a); to be aligned with [3] table 6.1.a.

   {editor/authorĘs note:
   Open Issue: Depending on the resolution same target.

  While each of the discussion related
   with draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-11.txt section 8.3, on whether KMID
   becomes an authenticated MIKEY protocol KMID or remains as an
   overall four key management protocol ID representing all MIKEY protocols,
   it protocols has its own merits
  there are also certain limitations of each approach.  As such there
  is noted that in the former case, a new KMID needs to be
   allocated for MIKEY-DHMMAC.

   The appropriate KMID to be allocated no single ideal solution and to used in the context none of
   this document shall be
   "mikey-dhhmac"
   }

Intellectual Property Rights

     The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of
     any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed
     to  pertain variants is able to
  subsume the implementation or use of the technology
     described in this document or the extent to which any license
     under such rights might or might not be available; neither does
     it represent other remaining variants.

  It is concluded that it has made any effort to identify any such
     rights.  Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to
     rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation
     can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of claims of rights made
     available for publication DHHMAC features useful security and any assurances of licenses to
     be made available, or the result of an attempt made
     to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
     proprietary rights by implementors or users performance
  properties that none of this
     specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

     The IETF invites any interested party to bring other three MIKEY variants is able to
  provide.

7.   IANA considerations

   This document does not define its
     attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman own new name spaces for MIKEY  October 2004

     other proprietary rights which may cover technology DHHMAC,
   beyond the IANA name spaces that may be
     required have been assigned for MIKEY, see
   [3] section 10 and section 10.1.
   The name spaces for the following fields in the Common header payload
   (from Section 4.1) are requested to practice this standard.  Please address be managed by IANA (in bracket is
   the
     information reference to the IETF Executive Director.

7. table with the initially registered values):

   *  data type (Table 4.1.a); to be aligned with [3] table 6.1.a.

8.   References
  7.1.
   8.1    Normative References

   [1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3",
       BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3] J. Arkko, E. Carrara, F. Lindholm, M. Naslund, K. Norrman;
       "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830 IETF, August 2004.

   [4] NIST, FIBS-PUB 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", April 1995,
       http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.ps.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

   [5] J. Arkko, E. Carrara et al: "Key Management Extensions for SDP
       and RTSP", Internet Draft <draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-11.txt>,
       Work in Progress (MMUSIC WG), IETF, April 2004.

   [6] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti: "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
       Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.

  7.2.

   8.2    Informative References

   [7] A.J. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone: "Handbook of
       Applied Cryptography", CRC Press 1996.

   [8] E. Rescorla, B. Korver: " Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on
       Security Considerations", RFC 3552, IETF, July 2003.

   [9] D. Eastlake, S. Crocker: "Randomness Recommendations for
       Security", RFC 1750, IETF, December 1994.

   [10] S.M. Bellovin, C. Kaufman, J. I. Schiller: "Security
       Mechanisms for the Internet", RFC 3631, IETF, December 2003.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   [11] Ueli M. Maurer, S. Wolf: "The Diffie-Hellman Protocol",
       Designs, Codes, and Cryptography, Special Issue Public Key
       Cryptography, Kluwer Academic Publishers, vol. 19, pp. 147-171,
       2000. ftp://ftp.inf.ethz.ch/pub/crypto/publications/MauWol00c.ps

   [12] Discrete Logarithms and the Diffie-Hellman Protocol;
       http://www.crypto.ethz.ch/research/ntc/dldh/

   [13] T. Dierks, C. Allen: "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0.", RFC 2246,
       IETF, January 1999.

   [14] D. Harkins, D. Carrel: "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE).", RFC
       2409, IETF, November 1998.

   [15] Donald E. Eastlake, Jeffrey I. Schiller, Steve Crocker:
       "Randomness Requirements for Security"; <draft-eastlake-
       randomness2-08.txt>;
       randomness2-10.txt>; Work in Progress, IETF, August 2004. January 2005.

   [16] J. Schiller: "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

       Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", RFC 3365, IETF,
       2002.

   [17] C. Meadows: "Advice on Writing an Internet Draft Amenable to
       Security Analysis", Work in Progress, <draft-irtf-cfrg-advice-
       00.txt>, IRTF, October 2002.

   [18] T. Narten: "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations
       Section in RFCs", RFC 2434, IETF, October 1998.

   [19] J. Reynolds: "Instructions to Request for Comments (RFC)
       Authors", Work in Progress, <draft-rfc-editor-rfc2223bis-
       08.txt>, IETF, August 2004.

   [20] J. Rosenberg et all: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC
       3261, IETF, June 2002.

   [21] Ch. Kaufman: "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Work in
       Progress (IPSEC WG), <draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-15.txt>, <draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt>, Internet
       Draft, Work in Progress (IPSEC WG).

   [22] Draft ITU-T Recommendation H.235 Annex G: "Usage of the MIKEY
       Key Management Protocol for the Secure Real Time Transport
       Protocol (SRTP) within H.235"; 11/2004.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004 1/2005.

   [23] Schaad, J., Housley R.: "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
       Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, IETF, September 2002.

   [24] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., Harney, H.: "The Group
       Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, IETF, July 2003.

   [25] Harney, H., Colegrove, A., Harder, E., Meth, U., Fleischer, R.:
       "Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol", <draft-ietf-
       msec-gsakmp-sec-06.txt>,
       msec-gsakmp-sec-07.txt>, Internet Draft, Work in Progress (MSEC
       WG).

   [26] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and Lindholm, F.: "Group
       Key Management Architecture", <draft-ietf-msec-gkmarch-08.txt>,
       Internet Draft, Work in Progress (MSEC WG).

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

   [27] Baugher, McGrew, Oran, Blom, Carrara, Naslund: "The Secure Real-
        time Transport Protocol", RFC 3711, IETF, March 2004.

   [28] ITU-T Recommendation H.235V3Amd1, "Security and encryption for
        H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimedia terminals",
        (04/2004)

   [29] Bradner, S., "IETF Rights in Contributions", BCP 78, RFC 3667,
        February 2004.

   [30] Bradner, S., "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology",
        BCP 79, RFC 3668, February 2004.

8. Acknowledgments

   This document incorporates kindly review feedback by Steffen Fries
   and Fredrick Lindholm, general feedback by the MSEC WG and editorial
   assistance and review by Hannes Tschofenig to finalize the document.

Conclusions

  Key management for environments and applications with real-time and
  performance constraints are becoming of interest.  Existing key
  management techniques like IPSEC-IKE [14] and IPSEC-IKEv2 [22], TLS

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

  [13] and other schemes are not deemed adequate in addressing
  sufficiently those real-time and security requirements.

  MIKEY defines three key management security protocols addressing
  real-time constraints.  DHHMAC as described in this document defines
  a fourth MIKEY variant aiming at the same target.

  While each of the four key management protocols has its own merits
  there are also certain limitations of each approach.  As such there
  is no single ideal solution Recommendation H.235V3Amd1 Corr1, "Security and none of the variants is able to
  subsume the other remaining variants.

  It is concluded that DHHMAC features useful security encryption
        for H-series (H.323 and performance
  properties that none of the other three MIKEY variants is able to
  provide. H.245-based) multimedia
        terminals", (01/2005).

   [29] C. Adams et al: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
        Certificate Management Protocols"; draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2510bis-
        09.txt, Internet Draft, Work in Progress (PKIX WG).

   [30] M. Myers et al: "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
        Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, IETF, June 1999.

   [31] C. Adams et al: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data
        Validation and Certification Server Protocols", RFC 3029, IETF,
        February 2001.

   [32] M. Myers: "Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format",
        RFC 2511, IETF, March 1999.

   [33] M. Cooper et al: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
        Certification Path Building", <draft-ietf-pkix-certpathbuild-
        05.txt>, Internet Draft, Work in Progress (PKIX WG).

   [34] Bradner, S., "IETF Rights in Contributions", BCP 78, RFC 3667,
        February 2004.

   [35] Bradner, S., "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology",
        BCP 79, RFC 3668, February 2004.

Full Copyright Statement

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject
  to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
  except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

  This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
  "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
  OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

  ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
  INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
  INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
  WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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   in this document or the extent to which any license under such
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   Information on the ISOC's procedures with respect to rights in ISOC
   Documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
   of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
   at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Expiration Date

  This Internet Draft expires on 30 March July 2005.

Revision History

[Note to the RFC editor: Please remove this the entire following section
prior to publication.]
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

Revision History

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-07.txt:

   * Feedback addressed from AD review.
   * added considerations on the possible impact of PKIX protocols and
   operations to end systems with real-time constraints (section 1).
   * added note that DH group is transmitted explicitly but not the
   parameters g and p; see section 3.
   * added considerations on clock synchronization and timestamps in
   section 2 and in section 5.3 in the view of consequences on replay
   protection.
   * references updated.
   * editorial corrections and cleanup.

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-06.txt:

     * Abstract reworded.
     * used new RFC boilerplate: changed/moved IPR statement (now at the
     beginning), status of Memo, and Intellectual Property Rights
     section in accordance with RFC 3667, RFC 3668.
     * ID nits removal.
     * References updated.
     * Note added to section 4.1 explaining how to differentiate between
     MIKEY and DHHMAC.
     * New section 4.4 added that describes the use of the general
     extension payload to avoid bidding-down attacks.
     * Description of the bidding-down avoidance mechanism removed from
     the threat model in section 5.2.
     * IANA considerations section re-written and aligned with MIKEY.
     * Open issue on KMID pointed in IANA considerations section.
     * editorial clean-up.

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-05.txt:

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

     * HMAC-SHA1-96 option removed (see section 1.2, 4.2, 5.3,).  This
       option does not really provide much gain;  removal reduces number
       of options.
     * IDr added to I_message for DoS protection of the recipient; see
       section 3, 3.1, 5.3.
     * References updated.

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-04.txt:

     * Introduction section modified: PFS property of DH, requirement
     for 4th MIKEY key management variant motivated.
     * MIKEY-DHSIGN, MIKEY-PK and MIKEY-PS added to section 1.2
     Abbreviations.
     * Note on secure time synchronization added to section 2.0.
     * New section 2.2 "Relation to GMKARCH" added.
     * New section 2.1.1 "Usage in H.235" added: this section outlines a
     use case of DHHMAC in the context of H.235.
     * Trade-off between identity-protection and security & performance
     added to section 5.1.
     * New section 5.6 "Authorization and Trust Model" added.
     * Some further informative references added.

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-03.txt:

     * RFC 3552 available; some references updated.

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-02.txt:

     * text allows both random and pseudo-random values.
     * exponentiation ** changed to ^.
     * Notation aligned with MIKEY-07.
     * Clarified that the HMAC is calculated over the entire MIKEY
       message excluding the MAC field.
     * Section 4.2: The AES key wrap method SHALL not be applied.
     * Section 1: Relationship with other, existing work mentioned.
     *

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-01.txt:

     * bidding-down attacks addressed (see section 5.2).
     * optional [X], [X, Y] defined and clarified (see section 1.1,

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004
       5.3).
     * combination of options defined in key update procedure (see
       section 3.1).
     * ID payloads clarified (see section 3 and 5.2).
     * relationship with MIKEY explained (roundtrip, performance).

             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  January 2005

     * new section 2.1 on applicability of DHHMAC for SIP/SDP and
       H.323 added.
     * more text due to DH resolution incorporated in section 5.3
       regarding PFS, security robustness of DH, generalization
       capability of DH to general groups in particular EC and
       "future-proofness".
     * a few editorials and nits.
     * references adjusted and cleaned-up.

   Changes against draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-00.txt:

     * category set to proposed standard.
     * identity protection clarified.
     * aligned with MIKEY-05 DH protocol, notation and with payload
     * some editorials and nits.

   Changes against draft-euchner-mikey-dhhmac-00.txt:

     * made a MSEC WG draft
     * aligned with MIKEY-03 DH protocol, notation and with payload
       formats
     * clarified that truncated HMAC actually truncates the HMAC result
       rather than the SHA1 intermediate value.
     * improved security considerations section completely rewritten in
       the spirit of [8].
     * IANA consideration section added
     * a few editorial improvements and corrections
     * IPR clarified and IPR section changed.

Author's Addresses

   Martin Euchner
   Email: martin_euchner@hotmail.com
   Phone: +49 89 722 55790                       Hofmannstr. 51
   Fax:   +49 89 722 62366

   81359 Munich, Germany
             HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for MIKEY  October 2004

   81359 Munich, Germany  January 2005