draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-17.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-18.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Intended status: Standards Track May 20, 2020 Intended status: Standards Track 8 July 2020
Expires: November 21, 2020 Expires: 9 January 2021
A YANG Data Model for a Keystore A YANG Data Model for a Keystore
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-17 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-18
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that
enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric
keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted. keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted.
Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications
are sent when certificates are about to expire. are sent when certificates are about to expire.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto- * "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types types
o "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft * "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
o "2020-05-20" --> the publication date of this draft * "2020-07-08" --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log * Appendix A. Change Log
Note to Reviewers (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This document presents a YANG module or modules that is/are part of a
collection of drafts that work together to produce the ultimate goal
of the NETCONF WG: to define configuration modules for NETCONF client
and servers, and RESTCONF client and servers.
The relationship between the various drafts in the collection is
presented in the below diagram.
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
trust-anchors keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
Full draft names and link to drafts:
o draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types (html [1])
o draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors (html [2])
o draft-ietf-netconf-keystore (html [3])
o draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server (html [4])
o draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server (html [5])
o draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server (html [6])
o draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server (html [7])
o draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server (html [8])
o draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server (html [9])
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 21, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Relation to other RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. A Keystore Instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Notable Keystore Groupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4. Support for Built-in Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3. Support for Built-in Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5. Encrypting Keys in Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1. Root Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2. Configuring Encrypting Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.1. Data at Rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server . . . . . . . . 32 5.2. The "ietf-keystore" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 A.14. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 A.15. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.14. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 A.16. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.15. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 A.17. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.16. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 A.18. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.17. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf- This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-
keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric
and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be
encrypted. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. encrypted. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates.
Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire. Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.
The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements
skipping to change at page 5, line 8 skipping to change at page 4, line 5
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Special consideration has been given for systems that have
cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM). cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM).
These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the
secret key values. To support such hardware, symmetric keys may have secret key values. To support such hardware, symmetric keys may have
the value "hidden-key" and asymmetric keys may have the value the value "hidden-key" and asymmetric keys may have the value
"hidden-private-key". While how such keys are created or destroyed "hidden-private-key". While how such keys are created or destroyed
is outside the scope of this document, the Keystore can contain is outside the scope of this document, the Keystore can contain
entries for such keys, enabling them to be referenced by other entries for such keys, enabling them to be referenced by other
configuration elements. configuration elements.
This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated
certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for a IDevID
[Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate), are expected to appear in
<operational> (see Section 4).
It is not required that a system has an operating system level It is not required that a system has an operating system level
Keystore utility to implement this module. keystore utility, with or without HSM backing, to implement this
module. It is also possible that a system implementing the module to
possess a multiplicity of operating system level keystore utilities
and/or a multiplicity of HSMs.
2. Requirements Language 1.1. Relation to other RFCs
This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are
part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define
configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF
[RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.
The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their
use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at
the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in
time.
The relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is
presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent
the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Links the each RFC are
provided below the diagram.
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
+=======================+===========================================+
| Label in Diagram | Originating RFC |
+=======================+===========================================+
| crypto-types | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| truststore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| keystore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| tcp-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| ssh-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| tls-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| http-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| netconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|restconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping
1.2. Specification Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. The Keystore Model 1.3. Adherence to the NMDA
3.1. Tree Diagram This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated
certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID
[Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate) are expected to appear in
<operational> (see Section 3).
This section provides a tree diagrams [RFC8340] for the "ietf- 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module
keystore" module that presents both the protocol-accessible
"keystore" as well the all the groupings intended for external usage.
module: ietf-keystore This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that defines a
+--rw keystore "keystore" and groupings supporting downstream modules to reference
+--rw asymmetric-keys the keystore or have locally-defined definitions.
| +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw public-key-format identityref
| +--rw public-key binary
| +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +--rw private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw (key-type)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | | {keystore-supported}?
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +--rw value? binary
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw cert end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w subject binary
| | +---w attributes? binary
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--rw symmetric-keys
+--rw symmetric-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw key-format? identityref
+--rw (key-type)
+--:(key)
| +--rw key? binary
+--:(hidden-key)
| +--rw hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key)
+--rw encrypted-key
+--rw (key-type)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| {keystore-supported}?
+--rw value? binary
grouping key-reference-type-grouping 2.1. Data Model Overview
+-- (key-type) 2.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-keystore" module:
Features:
+-- keystore-supported
+-- local-definitions-supported
2.1.2. Typedefs
The following diagram lists the "typedef" statements defined in the
"ietf-keystore" module:
Typedefs:
leafref
+-- symmetric-key-ref
+-- asymmetric-key-ref
Comments:
* All of the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend
the base "leafref" type defined in [RFC7950].
* The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the
keystore. These typedefs are provided primarily as an aid to
downstream modules that import the "ietf-keystore" module.
2.1.3. Groupings
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-keystore" module:
Groupings:
+-- encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
+-- keystore-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
2.1.3.1. The "encrypted-by-choice-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-by-
choice-grouping" grouping:
| The grouping's name is intended to be parsed "(encrypted-by)-
| (choice-grouping)", not as "(encrypted)-(by-
| choice)-(grouping)".
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- (encrypted-by-choice)
+--:(symmetric-key-ref) +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| +-- symmetric-key-ref? | +-- symmetric-key-ref?
| -> /keystore/symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/name | -> /keystore/symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/name
| {keystore-supported}?
+--:(asymmetric-key-ref) +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
+-- asymmetric-key-ref? +-- asymmetric-key-ref?
-> /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/name -> /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/name
{keystore-supported}?
grouping encrypted-value-grouping Comments:
+-- (key-type)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref) * This grouping defines a "choice" statement with options to
| | +-- symmetric-key-ref? reference either a symmetric or an asymmetric key configured in
| | -> /keystore/symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/name the keystore.
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) 2.1.3.2. The "asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" Grouping
| +-- asymmetric-key-ref?
| -> /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/name The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "asymmetric-key-
| {keystore-supported}? certificate-ref-grouping" grouping:
+-- value? binary
grouping symmetric-key-grouping
+-- key-format? identityref
+-- (key-type)
+--:(key)
| +-- key? binary
+--:(hidden-key)
| +-- hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key)
+-- encrypted-key
+-- (key-type)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| {keystore-supported}?
+-- value? binary
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+-- public-key-format identityref
+-- public-key binary
+-- private-key-format? identityref
+-- (private-key-type)
+--:(private-key)
| +-- private-key? binary
+--:(hidden-private-key)
| +-- hidden-private-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-private-key)
+-- encrypted-private-key
+-- (key-type)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| {keystore-supported}?
+-- value? binary
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
+-- public-key-format identityref
+-- public-key binary
+-- private-key-format? identityref
+-- (private-key-type)
| +--:(private-key)
| | +-- private-key? binary
| +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| +-- encrypted-private-key
| +-- (key-type)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +-- value? binary
+-- cert? end-entity-cert-cms
+---n certificate-expiration
| +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
+---x generate-certificate-signing-request
{certificate-signing-request-generation}?
+---w input
| +---w subject binary
| +---w attributes? binary
+--ro output
+--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+-- public-key-format identityref
+-- public-key binary
+-- private-key-format? identityref
+-- (private-key-type)
| +--:(private-key)
| | +-- private-key? binary
| +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| +-- encrypted-private-key
| +-- (key-type)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +-- value? binary
+-- certificates
| +-- certificate* [name]
| +-- name? string
| +-- cert end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration
| +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
+---x generate-certificate-signing-request
{certificate-signing-request-generation}?
+---w input
| +---w subject binary
| +---w attributes? binary
+--ro output
+--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+-- certificate? leafref +-- certificate? leafref
Comments:
* This grouping defines a reference to a certificate in two parts:
the first being the name of the asymmetric key the certificate is
associated with, and the second being the name of the certificate
itself.
2.1.3.3. The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping:
grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +-- key-format? identityref | +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
| +-- (key-type)
| +--:(key)
| | +-- key? binary
| +--:(hidden-key)
| | +-- hidden-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-key)
| +-- encrypted-key
| +-- (key-type)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +-- value? binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to
offer an option as to if an symmetric key is defined locally or as
a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.4. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping:
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| +--:(private-key)
| | +-- private-key? binary
| +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| +-- encrypted-private-key
| +-- (key-type)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +-- value? binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to
offer an option as to if an asymmetric key is defined locally or
as a reference to a asymmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.5. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"
Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping:
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +-- private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- (key-type)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | | {keystore-supported}?
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +-- value? binary
| +-- certificates
| | +-- certificate* [name]
| | +-- name? string
| | +-- cert end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w subject binary
| | +---w attributes? binary
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"
grouping is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules
that wish to offer an option as to if an asymmetric key is defined
locally or as a reference to a asymmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.10 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.6. The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping:
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +-- private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- (key-type)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | | {keystore-supported}?
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +-- value? binary
| +-- cert?
| | end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w subject binary
| | +---w attributes? binary
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference +-- keystore-reference
+-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +---u asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- certificate? leafref
Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping
is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish
to offer an option as to if an symmetric key is defined locally or
as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.10 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" uses the
"asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.2.
2.1.3.7. The "keystore-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "keystore-
grouping" grouping:
grouping keystore-grouping grouping keystore-grouping
+-- asymmetric-keys +-- asymmetric-keys
| +-- asymmetric-key* [name] | +-- asymmetric-key* [name]
| +-- name? string | +-- name? string
| +-- public-key-format identityref | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +-- private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- (key-type)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | | {keystore-supported}?
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | {keystore-supported}?
| | +-- value? binary
| +-- certificates
| | +-- certificate* [name]
| | +-- name? string
| | +-- cert end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w subject binary
| | +---w attributes? binary
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+-- symmetric-keys +-- symmetric-keys
+-- symmetric-key* [name] +-- symmetric-key* [name]
+-- name? string +-- name? string
+-- key-format? identityref +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
+-- (key-type)
+--:(key)
| +-- key? binary
+--:(hidden-key)
| +-- hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key)
+-- encrypted-key
+-- (key-type)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +-- symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | {keystore-supported}?
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +-- asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| {keystore-supported}?
+-- value? binary
3.2. Example Usage Comments:
3.2.1. A Keystore Instance * The "keystore-grouping" grouping is defines a keystore instance as
being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The stucture for
the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially the same, being a
"list" inside a "container".
The following example illustrates keys in <running>. Please see * For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric-
Section 4 for an example illustrating built-in values in key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed Section 2.1.3.10
<operational>. of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== * For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key-
grouping" grouping discussed Section 2.1.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" 2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<symmetric-keys>
<symmetric-key> The following diagram lists all the protocol-accessible nodes defined
<name>cleartext-symmetric-key</name> in the "ietf-keystore" module:
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<key>base64encodedvalue==</key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key> module: ietf-keystore
<name>hidden-symmetric-key</name> +--rw keystore
<hidden-key/> +--rw asymmetric-keys
</symmetric-key> | +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw public-key-format identityref
| +--rw public-key binary
| +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +--rw private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw (encrypted-by-choice)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--rw symmetric-keys
+--rw symmetric-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw key-format? identityref
+--rw (key-type)
+--:(key)
| +--rw key? binary
+--:(hidden-key)
| +--rw hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key)
+--rw encrypted-key
+--rw encrypted-by
| +--rw (encrypted-by-choice)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
+--rw encrypted-value binary
<symmetric-key> Comments:
<name>encrypted-symmetric-key</name> <!-- operator's key -->
<key-format>ct:encrypted-one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
<encrypted-key>
<asymmetric-key-ref>hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key-re\
f>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</encrypted-key>
</symmetric-key>
</symmetric-keys> * Protocol-accessible nodes are those nodes that are accessible when
<asymmetric-keys> the module is "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of
[RFC7950].
<asymmetric-key> * For the "ietf-keystore" module, the protcol-accessible nodes are
<name>ssh-rsa-key</name> an instance of the "keystore-grouping" discussed in
<public-key-format>ct:ssh-public-key-format</public-key-format> Section 2.1.3.7 grouping. Note that, in this diagram, all the
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> used groupings have been expanded, enabling the keystore's full
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ structure to be seen.
mat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> * The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the
<name>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</name> protocol-accessible nodes definition is so as to enable instances
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ of the keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be
ey-format> needed or desired by some modules.
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\
mat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert2</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> 2.2. Example Usage
<name>raw-private-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\
ey-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\
mat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be
<name>rsa-asymmetric-key</name> the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodings MAY be
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ used, such as JSON when using the RESTCONF protocol.
ey-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\
mat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> 2.2.1. A Keystore Instance
<name>ec-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\
ey-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:ec-private-key-format</private-key-form\
at>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-ec-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> The following example illustrates keys in <running>. Please see
<name>hidden-asymmetric-key</name> Section 3 for an example illustrating built-in values in
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <operational>.
ey-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/> <!-- e.g., TPM protected -->
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key> =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<name>encrypted-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\
ey-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:encrypted-one-asymmetric-key-format</pr\
ivate-key-format>
<encrypted-private-key>
<symmetric-key-ref>encrypted-symmetric-key</symmetric-key-re\
f>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</encrypted-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<symmetric-keys>
<symmetric-key>
<name>cleartext-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<key>base64encodedvalue==</key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>hidden-symmetric-key</name>
<hidden-key/>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>encrypted-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>
ct:encrypted-one-symmetric-key-format
</key-format>
<encrypted-key>
<encrypted-by>
<asymmetric-key-ref>hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-k\
ey-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value>base64encodedvalue==</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-key>
</symmetric-key>
</symmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ssh-rsa-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:ssh-public-key-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>raw-private-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>rsa-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ec-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:ec-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-ec-cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>encrypted-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>
ct:encrypted-one-asymmetric-key-format
</private-key-format>
<encrypted-private-key>
<encrypted-by>
<symmetric-key-ref>encrypted-symmetric-key</symmetric-k\
ey-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value>base64encodedvalue==</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
3.2.2. Notable Keystore Groupings 2.2.2. A Certificate Expiration Notification
The following non-normative module is used by subsequent examples to The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration"
illustrate groupings defined in the ietf-keystore module. notification for a certificate associated with a key configured in
the keystore.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<certificate-expiration>
<expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration\
-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore>
</notification>
2.2.3. The "Local or Keystore" Groupings
This section illustrates the various "local-or-keystore" groupings
defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "local-or-
keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.3), "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.4), "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.5), and
"local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
(Section 2.1.3.6) groupings.
The following non-normative module is defined to illustrate these
groupings:
module ex-keystore-usage { module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"; namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix "eku"; prefix "eku";
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
organization organization
"Example Corporation"; "Example Corporation";
contact contact
"Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>"; "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description description
"This module illustrates the grouping in the keystore draft called "This module illustrates notable groupings defined in
'local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping'."; the 'ietf-keystore' module.";
revision "YYYY-MM-DD" { revision "2020-07-08" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
container keystore-usage { container keystore-usage {
description description
"An illustration of the various keystore groupings."; "An illustration of the various keystore groupings.";
list just-a-key { list symmetric-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping;
description
"An symmetric key that may be configured locally or be a
reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.";
}
list asymmetric-key {
key name; key name;
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this key."; "An arbitrary name for this key.";
} }
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping; uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping;
description description
"An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured "An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured
locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric
key, not any certificates that may also be associated key, not any certificates that may also be associated
with the asymmetric key."; with the asymmetric key.";
} }
list key-with-certs { list asymmetric-key-with-certs {
key name; key name;
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this key."; "An arbitrary name for this key.";
} }
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping; uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping;
description description
"An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be "An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be
configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key
skipping to change at page 17, line 42 skipping to change at page 18, line 50
description description
"An end-entity certificate, and its associated private key, "An end-entity certificate, and its associated private key,
that may be configured locally or be a reference to a that may be configured locally or be a reference to a
specific certificate (and its associated private key) in specific certificate (and its associated private key) in
the keystore."; the keystore.";
} }
} }
} }
The following example illustrates what two configured keys, one local The tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module follows:
and the other remote, might look like. This example consistent with
other examples above (i.e., the referenced key is in an example
above).
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== module: ex-keystore-usage
+--rw keystore-usage
+--rw symmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition
| | +--rw key-format? identityref
| | +--rw (key-type)
| | +--:(key)
| | | +--rw key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-key)
| | +--rw encrypted-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
+--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition
| | +--rw public-key-format identityref
| | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +--rw private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition
| | +--rw public-key-format
| | | identityref
| | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw private-key-format?
| | | identityref
| | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | | +--:(private-key)
| | | | +--rw private-key? binary
| | | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw cert-data
| | | | end-entity-cert-cms
| | | +---n certificate-expiration
| | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| | +---w input
| | | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +--rw local-definition
| +--rw public-key-format
| | identityref
| +--rw public-key binary
| +--rw private-key-format?
| | identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(private-key)
| | | +--rw private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw cert-data?
| | end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+--rw keystore-reference
+--rw asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw certificate? leafref
<keystore-usage xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage" The following example provides two equivalent instances of each
grouping, the first being a reference to a keystore and the second
being locally-defined. The instance having a reference to a keystore
is consistent with the keystore defined in Section 2.2.1. The two
instances are equivalent, as the locally-defined instance example
contains the same values defined by the keystore instance referenced
by its sibling example.
<keystore-usage
xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping -->
<just-a-key> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<name>a locally-defined key</name> <!-- "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping: -->
<symmetric-key>
<name>example 1a</name>
<keystore-reference>cleartext-symmetric-key</keystore-reference>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>example 1b</name>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
ey-format> <key>base64encodedvalue==</key>
</local-definition>
</symmetric-key>
<!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the -->
<!-- "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: -->
<asymmetric-key>
<name>example 2a</name>
<keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</keystore-reference>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>example 2b</name>
<local-definition>
<public-key-format>
ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ <private-key-format>
mat> ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</just-a-key> </asymmetric-key>
<just-a-key> <!-- the following two equivalent examples illustrate -->
<name>a keystore-defined key (and its associated certs)</name> <!-- "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping": -->
<keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</keystore-reference>
</just-a-key>
<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-key-and-end-entity-cert-grouping --> <asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<name>example 3a</name>
<keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</keystore-reference>
</asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<key-with-certs> <asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<name>a locally-defined key with certs</name> <name>example 3b</name>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>
ey-format> ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ <private-key-format>
mat> ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>a locally-defined cert</name> <name>a locally-defined cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</key-with-certs> </asymmetric-key-with-certs>
<key-with-certs> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate -->
<name>a keystore-defined key (and its associated certs)</name> <!-- "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping": -->
<keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</keystore-reference>
</key-with-certs>
<!-- ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping --> <end-entity-cert-with-key>
<name>example 4a</name>
<keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference>
</end-entity-cert-with-key>
<end-entity-cert-with-key> <end-entity-cert-with-key>
<name>a locally-defined end-entity cert with key</name> <name>example 4b</name>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>
ey-format> ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ <private-key-format>
mat> ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</end-entity-cert-with-key> </end-entity-cert-with-key>
<end-entity-cert-with-key>
<name>a keystore-defined certificate (and its associated key)</n\
ame>
<keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference>
</end-entity-cert-with-key>
</keystore-usage> </keystore-usage>
3.3. YANG Module 2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], and an informative reference to [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
[RFC8342].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2020-05-20.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2020-07-08.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix ks; prefix ks;
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
} }
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct; prefix ct;
reference reference
"RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"; "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>"; Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";
skipping to change at page 20, line 36 skipping to change at page 24, line 36
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."; capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-05-20 { revision 2020-07-08 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
/****************/ /****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/****************/ /****************/
skipping to change at page 21, line 38 skipping to change at page 25, line 38
} }
description description
"This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference "This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference
to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore."; to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Groupings */ /* Groupings */
/*****************/ /*****************/
grouping key-reference-type-grouping { grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping {
description description
"A reusable grouping for a choice for the type of key "A grouping that defines a choice enabling references
referenced in the Keystore."; to other keys.";
choice key-type { choice encrypted-by-choice {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between a reference to a symmetric or asymmetric "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
key in the Keystore."; case symmetric-key-ref {
leaf symmetric-key-ref { leaf symmetric-key-ref {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; type leafref {
type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:symmetric-keys/"
path "/ks:keystore/ks:symmetric-keys/ks:symmetric-key/" + "ks:symmetric-key/ks:name";
+ "ks:name";
}
description
"Identifies a symmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
}
leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
if-feature "keystore-supported";
type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key/"
+ "ks:name";
}
description
"Identifies an asymmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
}
}
}
grouping encrypted-value-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by
a symmetric or asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
uses "key-reference-type-grouping";
leaf value {
type binary;
description
"The private key, encrypted using the specified symmetric
or asymmetric key.";
}
}
grouping symmetric-key-grouping {
description
"This grouping is identical to the one in ietf-crypto-types
except that it adds a case statement enabling the key
value to be encrypted by a symmetric or an asymmetric
key known to the Keystore.";
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "key-type" {
description
"Augments a new 'case' statement into the 'choice'
statement defined by the ietf-crypto-types module.";
container encrypted-key {
must "../key-format";
description
"A container for the encrypted symmetric key value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"This grouping is identical to the one in ietf-crypto-types
except that it adds a case statement enabling the key
value to be encrypted by a symmetric or an asymmetric
key known to the Keystore.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
augment "private-key-type" {
description
"Augments a new 'case' statement into the 'choice'
statement defined by the ietf-crypto-types module.";
container encrypted-private-key {
must "../private-key-format";
description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private
key value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping { }
description
"This grouping is identical to the one in ietf-crypto-types
except that it adds a case statement enabling the key
value to be encrypted by a symmetric or an asymmetric
key known to the Keystore.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
augment "private-key-type" {
description
"Augments a new 'case' statement into the 'choice'
statement defined by the ietf-crypto-types module.";
container encrypted-private-key {
must "../private-key-format";
description description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private "Identifies the symmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
key value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
} }
} }
} case asymmetric-key-ref {
} leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping { path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/"
description + "ks:asymmetric-key/ks:name";
"This grouping is identical to the one in ietf-crypto-types }
except that it adds a case statement enabling the key
value to be encrypted by a symmetric or an asymmetric
key known to the Keystore.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
augment "private-key-type" {
description
"Augments a new 'case' statement into the 'choice'
statement defined by the ietf-crypto-types module.";
container encrypted-private-key {
must "../private-key-format";
description description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private "Identifies the asymmetric key used to encrypt this key.";
key value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping { grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping {
description
"This grouping defines a reference to a specific certificate
associated with an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
leaf asymmetric-key { leaf asymmetric-key {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
must '../certificate'; must '../certificate';
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key in the Keystore."; "A reference to an asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
} }
leaf certificate { leaf certificate {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key[ks:" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key[ks:"
+ "name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/ks:certificates" + "name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/ks:certificates"
+ "/ks:certificate/ks:name"; + "/ks:certificate/ks:name";
} }
must '../asymmetric-key'; must '../asymmetric-key';
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate of the "A reference to a specific certificate of the
asymmetric key in the Keystore."; asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
} }
description
"This grouping defines a reference to a specific certificate
associated with an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
} }
// local-or-keystore-* groupings // local-or-keystore-* groupings
grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the symmetric key to be "A grouping that expands to allow the symmetric key to be
either stored locally, within the using data model, or be either stored locally, within the using data model, or be
a reference to a symmetric key stored in the Keystore."; a reference to a symmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses symmetric-key-grouping; uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:symmetric-key-ref; type ks:symmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an symmetric key that exists in "A reference to an symmetric key that exists in
the Keystore."; the Keystore.";
} }
} }
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the asymmetric key to be "A grouping that expands to allow the asymmetric key to be
either stored locally, within the using data model, or be either stored locally, within the using data model, or be
a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore."; a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in "A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in
the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the
asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates
skipping to change at page 26, line 24 skipping to change at page 28, line 25
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow an asymmetric key and its "A grouping that expands to allow an asymmetric key and its
associated certificates to be either stored locally, within associated certificates to be either stored locally, within
the using data model, or be a reference to an asymmetric key the using data model, or be a reference to an asymmetric key
(and its associated certificates) stored in the Keystore."; (and its associated certificates) stored in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its "A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its
associated certificates) in the Keystore."; associated certificates) in the Keystore.";
} }
skipping to change at page 27, line 7 skipping to change at page 29, line 9
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow an end-entity certificate "A grouping that expands to allow an end-entity certificate
(and its associated private key) to be either stored locally, (and its associated private key) to be either stored locally,
within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific
certificate in the Keystore."; certificate in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
container keystore-reference { container keystore-reference {
uses asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping; uses asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping;
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate (and its "A reference to a specific certificate (and its
associated private key) in the Keystore."; associated private key) in the Keystore.";
} }
skipping to change at page 27, line 38 skipping to change at page 29, line 41
} }
} }
grouping keystore-grouping { grouping keystore-grouping {
description description
"Grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever "Grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever
done, implementations SHOULD augment new 'case' statements done, implementations SHOULD augment new 'case' statements
into local-or-keystore 'choice' statements to supply leafrefs into local-or-keystore 'choice' statements to supply leafrefs
to the new location."; to the new location.";
container asymmetric-keys { container asymmetric-keys {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"A list of asymmetric keys."; "A list of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key { list asymmetric-key {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"An asymmetric key."; "An asymmetric key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key."; "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key.";
skipping to change at page 27, line 48 skipping to change at page 30, line 4
description description
"A list of asymmetric keys."; "A list of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key { list asymmetric-key {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"An asymmetric key."; "An asymmetric key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key."; "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key.";
} }
uses ks:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} }
} }
container symmetric-keys { container symmetric-keys {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"A list of symmetric keys."; "A list of symmetric keys.";
list symmetric-key { list symmetric-key {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"A symmetric key."; "A symmetric key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the symmetric key."; "An arbitrary name for the symmetric key.";
} }
uses ks:symmetric-key-grouping; uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping;
} }
} }
} // grouping keystore-grouping } // grouping keystore-grouping
/*********************************/ /*********************************/
/* Protocol accessible nodes */ /* Protocol accessible nodes */
/*********************************/ /*********************************/
container keystore { container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"The Keystore contains a list of symmetric keys and a list "The Keystore contains a list of symmetric keys and a list
of asymmetric keys."; of asymmetric keys.";
uses keystore-grouping; nacm:default-deny-write;
uses keystore-grouping {
augment "symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/key-type/encrypted-key/"
+ "encrypted-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting
key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the
keystore.";
uses encrypted-by-choice-grouping;
}
augment "asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key-type/"
+ "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-private-key/"
+ "encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting
key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the
keystore.";
uses encrypted-by-choice-grouping;
}
}
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
4. Support for Built-in Keys 3. Support for Built-in Keys
In some implementations, a server may support built-in keys. Built- In some implementations, a server may support built-in keys. Built-
in built-in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or be in built-in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or be
dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a
particular service (e.g., SSH) is enabled. particular service (e.g., SSH) is enabled.
The key characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are provided The key characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are provided
by the system, as opposed to configuration. As such, they are by the system, as opposed to configuration. As such, they are
present in <operational>. The example below illustrates what the present in <operational>. The example below illustrates what the
truststore in <operational> might look like for a server in its keystore in <operational> might look like for a server in its factory
factory default state. default state.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ===========
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
or:origin="or:intended"> or:origin="or:intended">
<asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system">
<name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>
ey-format> ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/> <!-- e.g., TPM protected --> <hidden-private-key/>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
In order for the built-in keys (and/or their associated built-in
certificates) to be referenced by configuration, the referenced keys
MUST first be copied into <running>. The keys SHOULD be copied into
<running> using the same "key" values, so that the server can bind
the references to the built-in entries.
In order for the built-in keys to be referenced by configuration, the Built-in "hidden" keys cannot be copied into other parts of the
referenced nodes MUST first be copied into <running>. They SHOULD be configuration because their private parts are hidden, and therefore
copied into <running> using the same "key" values, so that the system impossible to replicate. Built-in "encrypted" keys MAY be copied
can bind the references to the built-in entries. Only the referenced into other parts of the configuration so long as they maintain their
nodes need to be copied. When using the same key values as in reference to the other built-in key that encrypted them.
<operational> no new values can be added and no existing values can
be changed; that which is in <running> can only be a subset of that
which is in <operational>.
For instance, the following example illustrates how a single built-in Only the referenced keys need to be copied; that is, the keys in
key definition from the previous example has been propagated to <running> MAY be a subset of the built-in keys define in
<running>: <operational>. No keys may be added or changed (with exception to
associating additional certificates to a built-in key); that is, the
keys in <running> MUST be a subset (which includes the whole of the
set) of the built-in keys define in <operational>.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== A server MUST reject attempts to modify any aspect of built-in keys,
with exception to associating additional certificates to a built-in
key. That these keys are "configured" in <running> is an illusion,
as they are strictly a read-only subset of that which must already
exist in <operational>.
The following example illustrates how a single built-in key
definition from the previous example has been propagated to
<running>:
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>
<name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>
ey-format> ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/> <!-- e.g., TPM protected --> <hidden-private-key/>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name> <name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
After the above configuration is applied, <operational> should appear After the above configuration is applied, <operational> should appear
as follows: as follows:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ===========
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
or:origin="or:intended"> or:origin="or:intended">
<asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system">
<name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ <public-key-format>
ey-format> ct:subject-public-key-info-format
</public-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/> <!-- e.g., TPM protected --> <hidden-private-key/>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
<certificate or:origin="or:intended"> <certificate or:origin="or:intended">
<name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name> <name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
5. Encrypting Keys in Configuration 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration
This section describes an approach that enables all the private keys This section describes an approach that enables all the private keys
on a server to be encrypted, such that traditional backup/restore on a server to be encrypted, such that traditional backup/restore
procedures can be used without concern for keys being compromised procedures can be used without concern for keys being compromised
when in transit. when in transit.
5.1. Root Key 4.1. Root Key
The cornerstone to this solution is the existence of a "root" key The cornerstone to this solution is the existence of a "root" key
that can be used to encrypt all the other keys. The server MUST be that can be used to encrypt all the other keys. The server MUST be
able to use this key to decrypt the other keys in the configuration. able to use this key to decrypt the other keys in the configuration.
The root key SHOULD be a hidden key, i.e., one whose private data has The root key SHOULD be a hidden key, i.e., one whose private data has
no presence in <running> or <operational> (see "hidden-key" and no presence in <running> or <operational> (see "hidden-key" and
"hidden-private-key" in "ietf-crypto-types" "hidden-private-key" in "ietf-crypto-types"
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). If the server implementation does [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). If the server implementation does
not support hidden keys, then the private data part of key MUST be not support hidden keys, then the private data part of key MUST be
protected by access control with access granted only to an protected by access control with access granted only to an
administrator with special access control rights (e.g., an administrator with special access control rights (e.g., an
organization's crypto officer). Given the long lifetime of built-in organization's crypto officer). Given the long lifetime of built-in
keys (see Section 4), built-in keys MUST be hidden. keys (see Section 3), built-in keys MUST be hidden.
A hidden root key MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. A hidden root key MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.
If the hidden root key is symmetric, then the server MUST provide If the hidden root key is symmetric, then the server MUST provide
APIs enabling other keys (ideally generated by the server) to be APIs enabling other keys (ideally generated by the server) to be
encrypted. If the hidden root key is asymmetric, then the server encrypted. If the hidden root key is asymmetric, then the server
SHOULD provide APIs enabling other keys to be both generated and SHOULD provide APIs enabling other keys to be both generated and
encrypted by it, but MAY alternatively enable administrators with encrypted by it, but MAY alternatively enable administrators with
special access control rights to generate and encrypt the other keys special access control rights to generate and encrypt the other keys
themselves, using the hidden key's public part. For practical themselves, using the hidden key's public part. For practical
reasons, an unhidden root key SHOULD be asymmetric, so that its reasons, an unhidden root key SHOULD be asymmetric, so that its
public part can be accessed by other administrators without concern. public part can be accessed by other administrators without concern.
5.2. Configuring Encrypting Keys 4.2. Configuring Encrypting Keys
Each time a new key is to be configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by Each time a new key is to be configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by
the root key. the root key.
In "ietf-crypto-types" [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], the format In "ietf-crypto-types" [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], the format
for an encrypted symmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one- for an encrypted symmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-
symmetric-key-format" identity, while the format for an encrypted symmetric-key-format" identity, while the format for an encrypted
asymmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-asymmetric-key- asymmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-asymmetric-key-
format" identity format" identity
skipping to change at page 32, line 44 skipping to change at page 35, line 42
In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then
the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the
server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights. server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights.
In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the Keystore In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the Keystore
using either the "encrypted-key" (for symmetric keys) or the using either the "encrypted-key" (for symmetric keys) or the
"encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two nodes "encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two nodes
contain both the encrypted value as well as a reference to the other contain both the encrypted value as well as a reference to the other
key in the Keystore that it was encrypted by. key in the Keystore that it was encrypted by.
5.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server 4.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server
One concern that arose during discourse was how it could be possible In the case a server's root key is used to encrypt other keys,
migrate configuration from one server to another server, if both migrating the configuration to another server may entail additional
servers used different root keys (e.g., a TPM-protected built-in effort, assuming the second server has a different root key than the
key). It was noted that, in this case, the second server would be first server, in order for the second server to decrypt the other
unable to decrypt any of the keys encrypted by the first server. encrypted keys.
The solution to this issue is simply to ensure that the same key is In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document
known to both servers. How this is achieved may vary. If the first may be used to migrate the root key from one server to another. That
server is still accessible, it may be possible to ask it to encrypt said, beware that the ability to do so typically entails having
the key using the second server's root key. That said, a common access to the first server but, in many RMA scenarios, the first
scenario for needing to migrate configuration to another server is server may no longer be operational.
because the first server is no longer available. Thus it is more
likely the case that the shared root key is known to administrators
with special access control rights (an organization's crypto
officer), such that the shared key can be provided to the second
server to unlock all the other keys in the configuration.
For systems that have a built-in key protected by hardware, the Another option is to introduce a "shared root" key that acts as a
shared root key SHOULD be encrypted by the built-in key. In this portable intermediate root key. This shared root key would only need
way, at least from the system's perspective, it is more like an to be known to an organization's crypto officer. The shared root key
intermediate key than a root key. SHOULD be encrypted offline by the crypto officer using each server's
public key, which may be, e.g., in the server's IDevID certificate.
The crypto officer can then safely handoff the encrypted shared key
to other administrators responsible for server installations,
including migrations. In order to migrate configuration from a first
server, an administrator would need to make just a single
modification to the configuration before loading it onto a second
server, which is to replace the shared key's Keystore entry from the
first server (an encrypted key), with the shared key encrypted by the
second server's root key. The following diagram illustrates this
idea:
As a concrete example, assuming both servers have built-in asymmetric +-------------+ +---------------+
keys, the shared key could be a symmetric key that an organization's | shared key | |shared root key|
crypto officer encrypts offline knowing each server's public key, |(unencrypted)|-------------------------------> | (encrypted) |
which may be, e.g., in the server's IDevID certificate. The crypto +-------------+ encrypts offline using +---------------+
officer can then safely handoff the encrypted shared key to other ^ each server's root key |
administrators responsible for server installations, including | |
migrations. | |
| possesses \o |
+-------------- |\ |
/ \ shares with |
crypto +--------------------+
officer |
|
|
+----------------------+ | +----------------------+
| server-1 | | | server-2 |
| configuration | | | configuration |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| | root key-1 | | | | | root key-2 | |
| | (hidden) | | | | | (hidden) | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | | | ^ |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | encrypted | | | | encrypted |
| | by | | | | by |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| |shared root key | | | | |shared root key | |
| | (encrypted) | | v | | (encrypted) | |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | regular | ^ |
| | | admin | | |
| | | | | |
| | encrypted | \o | | encrypted |
| | by | |\ | | by |
| | | / \ | | |
| | | | | |
| +----------------+ |----------------->| +----------------+ |
| | all other keys | | migrate | | all other keys | |
| | (encrypted) | | configuration | | (encrypted) | |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| | | |
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
In order to migrate a configuration, the administrator would need to 5. Security Considerations
make just a single modification to the configuration before loading
it onto the second server, which is to replace the shared key's
Keystore entry from the first server (an encrypted key), with the
shared key encrypted by the second server's built-in key.
6. Security Considerations 5.1. Data at Rest
The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a
"keystore" that, by its name, suggests that it will protect its
contents from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
Security controls for the API (i.e., data in motion) are discussed in
Section 5.2, but controls for the data at rest cannot be specified by
the YANG module.
In order to satisfy the expectations of a "keystore", it is
RECOMMENDED that implementations ensure that the keystore contents
are encrypted when persisted to non-volatile memory.
5.2. The "ietf-keystore" YANG Module
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
authentication. authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) defined in this module.
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to
write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of
keys, certificates, etc., can dramatically alter the
implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM
extension "default-deny-write" has been set for the entire data
tree.
/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: When | Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-
writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the | key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module
strength of the key being configured is not greater than the | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM
strength of the underlying secure transport connection over | extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted
which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the | read-access to the cleartext key values.
write-request if ever the strength of the private key is
greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and
alert the client that the strength of the key may have been
compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node,
implementations SHOULD automatically (without explicit request)
zeroize these keys in the most secure manner available, so as
to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations
from being analyzed in any meaningful way.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered All of the writable data nodes defined by this module, both in the
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus "grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore"
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data environments.. For instance, any modification to a key or reference
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For
this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for
all data nodes defined in this module.
/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: This node This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.
normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The
best reason for returning this node is to support backup/
restore type workflows. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" has been set for this data node.
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
7.1. The IETF XML Registry 6.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF
XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the
following registration is requested: following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the
following registration is requested: following registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore name: ietf-keystore
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
prefix: ks prefix: ks
reference: RFC CCCC reference: RFC CCCC
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K. and H. Wang, "Common YANG Data Types for Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography",
Cryptography", draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-14 (work in Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-
progress), March 2020. crypto-types-15, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types-15>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-http-client-server-03, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-
client-server-03>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-17,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
netconf-keystore-17>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and
SSH Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-06, 16 June 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-
client-server-06>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and
TLS Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
anchors-10, 20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-10>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
skipping to change at page 36, line 33 skipping to change at page 42, line 5
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018, (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[Std-802.1AR-2009] [Std-802.1AR-2009]
Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
8.3. URIs
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
[4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server
[5] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server
[6] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server
[7] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server
[8] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-
server
[9] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-
server
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
A.1. 00 to 01 A.1. 00 to 01
o Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7 * Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7
structures. (Issue #1) structures. (Issue #1)
o Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the * Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the
'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2) 'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2)
o Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module. * Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
(Issues #4 and #5) (Issues #4 and #5)
A.2. 01 to 02 A.2. 01 to 02
o Added back 'generate-private-key' action. * Added back 'generate-private-key' action.
o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type. * Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.
o Fixed up a few description statements. * Fixed up a few description statements.
A.3. 02 to 03 A.3. 02 to 03
o Changed draft's title. * Changed draft's title.
o Added missing references. * Added missing references.
o Collapsed sections and levels. * Collapsed sections and levels.
o Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section. * Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
o Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'. * Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.
o Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true. * Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.
o Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC * Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC
4253. 4253.
A.4. 03 to 04 A.4. 03 to 04
o Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths * Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
o Removed Design Considerations section * Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
o Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings * Removed Design Considerations section
* Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings
A.5. 04 to 05 A.5. 04 to 05
o Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft) * Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft)
o Added back global keystore structure * Added back global keystore structure
o Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a * Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a
reference to the keystore. reference to the keystore.
A.6. 05 to 06 A.6. 05 to 06
o Added feature "local-keys-supported" * Added feature "local-keys-supported"
o Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write * Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write
o Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key * Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key
o Added an install-hidden-key action * Added an install-hidden-key action
o Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container * Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container
o Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types * Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types
A.7. 06 to 07 A.7. 06 to 07
o Removed a "require-instance false" * Removed a "require-instance false"
o Clarified some description statements * Clarified some description statements
o Improved the keystore-usage examples * Improved the keystore-usage examples
A.8. 07 to 08 A.8. 07 to 08
o Added "local-definition" containers to avoid posibility of the * Added "local-definition" containers to avoid posibility of the
action/notification statements being under a "case" statement. action/notification statements being under a "case" statement.
o Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding * Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding
algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module. algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module.
A.9. 08 to 09 A.9. 08 to 09
o Added a 'description' statement to the 'must' in the /keystore/ * Added a 'description' statement to the 'must' in the /keystore/
asymmetric-key node explaining that the descendent values may asymmetric-key node explaining that the descendent values may
exist in <operational> only, and that implementation MUST assert exist in <operational> only, and that implementation MUST assert
that the values are either configured or that they exist in that the values are either configured or that they exist in
<operational>. <operational>.
o Copied above 'must' statement (and description) into the local-or- * Copied above 'must' statement (and description) into the local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping, local-or-keystore-asymmetric- keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping, local-or-keystore-asymmetric-
key-with-certs-grouping, and local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert- key-with-certs-grouping, and local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-
with-key-grouping statements. with-key-grouping statements.
A.10. 09 to 10 A.10. 09 to 10
o Updated draft title to match new truststore draft title * Updated draft title to match new truststore draft title
o Moved everything under a top-level 'grouping' to enable use in * Moved everything under a top-level 'grouping' to enable use in
other contexts. other contexts.
o Renamed feature from 'local-keys-supported' to 'local-definitions- * Renamed feature from 'local-keys-supported' to 'local-definitions-
supported' (same name used in truststore) supported' (same name used in truststore)
o Removed the either-all-or-none 'must' expressions for the key's * Removed the either-all-or-none 'must' expressions for the key's
3-tuple values (since the values are now 'mandatory true' in 3-tuple values (since the values are now 'mandatory true' in
crypto-types) crypto-types)
o Example updated to reflect 'mandatory true' change in crypto-types * Example updated to reflect 'mandatory true' change in crypto-types
draft draft
A.11. 10 to 11 A.11. 10 to 11
o Replaced typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref with grouping * Replaced typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref with grouping
asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping. asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping.
o Added feature feature 'key-generation'. * Added feature feature 'key-generation'.
o Cloned groupings symmetric-key-grouping, asymmetric-key-pair- * Cloned groupings symmetric-key-grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-
grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping, and asymmetric- grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping, and asymmetric-
key-pair-with-certs-grouping from crypto-keys, augmenting into key-pair-with-certs-grouping from crypto-keys, augmenting into
each new case statements for values that have been encrypted by each new case statements for values that have been encrypted by
other keys in the keystore. Refactored keystore model to use other keys in the keystore. Refactored keystore model to use
these groupings. these groupings.
o Added new 'symmetric-keys' lists, as a sibling to the existing * Added new 'symmetric-keys' lists, as a sibling to the existing
'asymmetric-keys' list. 'asymmetric-keys' list.
o Added RPCs (not actions) 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate- * Added RPCs (not actions) 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-
asymmetric-key' to *return* a (potentially encrypted) key. asymmetric-key' to *return* a (potentially encrypted) key.
A.12. 11 to 12 A.12. 11 to 12
o Updated to reflect crypto-type's draft using enumerations over * Updated to reflect crypto-type's draft using enumerations over
identities. identities.
o Added examples for the 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate- * Added examples for the 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-
asymmetric-key' RPCs. asymmetric-key' RPCs.
o Updated the Introduction section. * Updated the Introduction section.
A.13. 12 to 13 A.13. 12 to 13
o Updated examples to incorporate new "key-format" identities. * Updated examples to incorporate new "key-format" identities.
o Made the two "generate-*-key" RPCs be "action" statements instead. * Made the two "generate-*-key" RPCs be "action" statements instead.
A.14. 13 to 14 A.14. 13 to 14
o Updated YANG module and examples to incorporate the new * Updated YANG module and examples to incorporate the new
iana-*-algorithm modules in the crypto-types draft.. iana-*-algorithm modules in the crypto-types draft..
A.15. 14 to 15 A.15. 14 to 15
o Added new "Support for Built-in Trust Anchors" section. * Added new "Support for Built-in Keys" section.
o Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf * Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf
whenever an encrypted key is specified. whenever an encrypted key is specified.
o Added local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping for PSK support. * Added local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping for PSK support.
A.16. 15 to 16 A.16. 15 to 16
o Moved the generate key actions to ietf-crypt-types as RPCs, which * Moved the generate key actions to ietf-crypt-types as RPCs, which
are augmented by ietf-keystore to support encrypted keys. are augmented by ietf-keystore to support encrypted keys.
Examples updated accordingly. Examples updated accordingly.
o Added a SSH certificate-based key (RFC 6187) and a raw private key * Added a SSH certificate-based key (RFC 6187) and a raw private key
to the example instance document (partly so they could be to the example instance document (partly so they could be
referenced by examples in the SSH and TLS client/server drafts. referenced by examples in the SSH and TLS client/server drafts.
A.17. 16 to 17 A.17. 16 to 17
o Removed augments to the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate- * Removed augments to the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-
asymmetric-key" groupings. asymmetric-key" groupings.
o Removed "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key" * Removed "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key"
examples. examples.
o Removed the "algorithm" nodes from remaining examples. * Removed the "algorithm" nodes from remaining examples.
o Renamed/updated the "Support for Built-in Keys" section. * Updated the "Support for Built-in Keys" section.
o Added new section "Encrypting Keys in Configuration". * Added new section "Encrypting Keys in Configuration".
o Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page. * Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.
A.18. 17 to 18
* Removed dangling/unnecessary ref to RFC 8342.
* r/MUST/SHOULD/ wrt strength of keys being configured over
transports.
* Added an example for the "certificate-expiration" notification.
* Clarified that OS MAY have a multiplicity of underlying keystores
and/or HSMs.
* Clarified expected behavior for "built-in" keys in <operational>
* Clarified the "Migrating Configuration to Another Server" section.
* Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
diagrams].
* Updated the Security Considerations section.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy
Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balazs Kovacs, David Lamparter, Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balazs Kovacs, David Lamparter,
Eric Voit, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Mahesh Eric Voit, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Martin Bjorklund, Mehmet Ersue, Phil Shafer, Radek Jethanandani, Martin Bjorklund, Mehmet Ersue, Phil Shafer, Radek
Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reshad Rahman, Sean Turner, and Tom Petch. Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reshad Rahman, Sean Turner, and Tom Petch.
Author's Address Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
EMail: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
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