draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-19.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-20.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Intended status: Standards Track 10 July 2020 Intended status: Standards Track 20 August 2020
Expires: 11 January 2021 Expires: 21 February 2021
A YANG Data Model for a Keystore A YANG Data Model for a Keystore
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-19 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-20
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that
enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric
keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted. keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or
Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications hidden. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates.
are sent when certificates are about to expire. Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
* "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto- * "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types types
* "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft * "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
* "2020-07-10" --> the publication date of this draft * "2020-08-20" --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
* Appendix A. Change Log * Appendix A. Change Log
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Relation to other RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Relation to other RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. The "ietf-keystore" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Support for Built-in Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. Support for Built-in Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1. Data at Rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2. The "ietf-keystore" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.1. Data at Rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.2. The "ietf-keystore" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.1. The "IETF XML" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.1. The "IETF XML" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.14. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.15. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.16. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.14. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.17. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.15. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.18. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.16. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.19. 18 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.17. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.18. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.19. 18 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.20. 19 to 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf- This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-
keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric
and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be
encrypted. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. encrypted or hidden (see [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Asymmetric
Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire. keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications are sent
when certificates are about to expire.
The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements
intended for use by other modules that may import it. For instance, intended for use by other modules that may import it. For instance,
there are groupings that defined enabling a key to be either there are groupings that define enabling a key to be either
configured locally (within the defining data model) or be a reference configured locally (within the defining data model) or be a reference
to a key in the Keystore. to a key in the Keystore.
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Special consideration has been given for systems that have
cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM). cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the
secret key values. To support such hardware, symmetric keys may have secret key values. Additionally, such hardware is commonly
the value "hidden-key" and asymmetric keys may have the value initiailized when manufactured to protect a "built-in" asymmetric key
"hidden-private-key". While how such keys are created or destroyed for which the public half is conveyed in an identity certificate
is outside the scope of this document, the Keystore can contain (e.g., an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate). Please see
entries for such keys, enabling them to be referenced by other Section 3 to see how built-in keys are supported.
configuration elements.
It is not required that a system has an operating system level This document intends to support existing practices; it does not
keystore utility, with or without HSM backing, to implement this intend to define new behvior for systems to implement. To simplify
module. It is also possible that a system implementing the module to implementation, advanced key formats may be selectively implemented.
possess a multiplicity of operating system level keystore utilities
and/or a multiplicity of HSMs. Implementations may utilize zero or more operating system level
keystore utilities and/or hardware security modules (HSMs).
1.1. Relation to other RFCs 1.1. Relation to other RFCs
This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are
part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define
configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF
[RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols. [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.
The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their
use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at
the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in
time. time.
The relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is The normative dependency relationship between the various RFCs in the
presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent collection is presented in the below diagram. The labels in the
the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Links the each RFC are diagram represent the primary purpose provided by each RFC.
provided below the diagram. Hyperlinks to each RFC are provided below the diagram.
crypto-types crypto-types
^ ^ ^ ^
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
truststore keystore truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | | | +---------+ | |
| | | | | | | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
skipping to change at page 5, line 37 skipping to change at page 5, line 37
Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping
1.2. Specification Language 1.2. Specification Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.3. Adherence to the NMDA 1.3. Terminology
This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore The terms "client" and "server" are defined in [RFC6241] and are not
redefined here.
The term "keystore" is defined in this draft as a mechanism that
intends safeguard secrets placed into it for protection.
The nomenclature "<running>" and "<operational>" are defined in
[RFC8342].
The sentence fragments "augmented" and "augmented in" are used herein
as the past tense verbified form of the "augment" statement defined
in Section 7.17 of [RFC7950].
1.4. Adherence to the NMDA
This document is compliant with Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, keys and associated
certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID
[Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate) are expected to appear in certificate) are expected to appear in <operational> (see Section 3).
<operational> (see Section 3).
2. The "ietf-keystore" Module 2. The "ietf-keystore" Module
This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that defines a This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-
"keystore" and groupings supporting downstream modules to reference keystore". A high-level overview of the module is provided in
the keystore or have locally-defined definitions. Section 2.1. Examples illustatrating the module's use are provided
in Examples (Section 2.2). The YANG module itself is defined in
Section 2.3.
2.1. Data Model Overview 2.1. Data Model Overview
This section provides an overview of the "ietf-keystore" module in
terms of its features, typedefs, groupings, and protocol-accessible
nodes.
2.1.1. Features 2.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-keystore" module: the "ietf-keystore" module:
Features: Features:
+-- keystore-supported +-- keystore-supported
+-- local-definitions-supported +-- local-definitions-supported
| The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not
| defined in [RFC8340].
2.1.2. Typedefs 2.1.2. Typedefs
The following diagram lists the "typedef" statements defined in the The following diagram lists the "typedef" statements defined in the
"ietf-keystore" module: "ietf-keystore" module:
Typedefs: Typedefs:
leafref leafref
+-- symmetric-key-ref +-- symmetric-key-ref
+-- asymmetric-key-ref +-- asymmetric-key-ref
| The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not
| defined in [RFC8340].
Comments: Comments:
* All of the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend * All of the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend
the base "leafref" type defined in [RFC7950]. the base "leafref" type defined in [RFC7950].
* The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the * The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the
keystore. These typedefs are provided primarily as an aid to keystore. These typedefs are provided primarily as an aid to
downstream modules that import the "ietf-keystore" module. downstream modules that import the "ietf-keystore" module.
2.1.3. Groupings 2.1.3. Groupings
skipping to change at page 6, line 46 skipping to change at page 7, line 26
Groupings: Groupings:
+-- encrypted-by-choice-grouping +-- encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping +-- asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping +-- local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping +-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping +-- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping +-- local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
+-- keystore-grouping +-- keystore-grouping
| The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not
| defined in [RFC8340].
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections. Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
2.1.3.1. The "encrypted-by-choice-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.1. The "encrypted-by-choice-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-by- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-by-
choice-grouping" grouping: choice-grouping" grouping:
| The grouping's name is intended to be parsed "(encrypted-by)- | The grouping's name is intended to be parsed "(encrypted-
| (choice-grouping)", not as "(encrypted)-(by- | by)-(choice)-(grouping)", not as "(encrypted)-(by-
| choice)-(grouping)". | choice)-(grouping)".
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- (encrypted-by-choice) +-- (encrypted-by-choice)
+--:(symmetric-key-ref) +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| +-- symmetric-key-ref? | +-- symmetric-key-ref? ks:symmetric-key-ref
| -> /keystore/symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/name
+--:(asymmetric-key-ref) +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
+-- asymmetric-key-ref? +-- asymmetric-key-ref? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
-> /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/name
Comments: Comments:
* This grouping defines a "choice" statement with options to * This grouping defines a "choice" statement with options to
reference either a symmetric or an asymmetric key configured in reference either a symmetric or an asymmetric key configured in
the keystore. the keystore.
2.1.3.2. The "asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.2. The "asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "asymmetric-key- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "asymmetric-key-
skipping to change at page 8, line 9 skipping to change at page 8, line 38
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping | +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
Comments: Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is * The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to
offer an option as to if an symmetric key is defined locally or as offer an option for whether a symmetric key is defined locally or
a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore. as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location. reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the * For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance * For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in Section 2.1.2. of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.4. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.4. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 8, line 41 skipping to change at page 9, line 22
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
Comments: Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is * The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish to
offer an option as to if an asymmetric key is defined locally or offer an option for whether an asymmetric key is defined locally
as a reference to a asymmetric key in the keystore. or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a asymmetric key in an alternate location. reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the * For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.5 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance * For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2. of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.5. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" 2.1.3.5. The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"
Grouping Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping: keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 9, line 26 skipping to change at page 10, line 7
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
Comments: Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" * The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"
grouping is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules grouping is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules
that wish to offer an option as to if an asymmetric key is defined that wish to offer an option for whether an asymmetric key is
locally or as a reference to a asymmetric key in the keystore. defined locally or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a asymmetric key in an alternate location. reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the * For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.10 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.11 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance * For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" is an instance
of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2. of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.3.6. The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" 2.1.3.6. The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
Grouping Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "local-or-
keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping: keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 10, line 18 skipping to change at page 10, line 42
| +-- local-definition | +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference +-- keystore-reference
+---u asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping +---u asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
Comments: Comments:
* The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping * The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping
is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish is provided soley as convenience to downstream modules that wish
to offer an option as to if an symmetric key is defined locally or to offer an option for whether a symmetric key is defined locally
as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore. or as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.
* A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each * A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each
option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case"
statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to statements MAY be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to
reference a symmetric key in an alternate location. reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.
* For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the * For the "local-definition" option, the defintion uses the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.10 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.11 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" uses the * For the "keystore" option, the "keystore-reference" uses the
"asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" grouping discussed in "asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.2. Section 2.1.3.2.
2.1.3.7. The "keystore-grouping" Grouping 2.1.3.7. The "keystore-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "keystore- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "keystore-
grouping" grouping: grouping" grouping:
skipping to change at page 11, line 5 skipping to change at page 11, line 26
| +-- asymmetric-key* [name] | +-- asymmetric-key* [name]
| +-- name? string | +-- name? string
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+-- symmetric-keys +-- symmetric-keys
+-- symmetric-key* [name] +-- symmetric-key* [name]
+-- name? string +-- name? string
+---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
Comments: Comments:
* The "keystore-grouping" grouping is defines a keystore instance as * The "keystore-grouping" grouping defines a keystore instance as
being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The stucture for being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The stucture for
the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially the same, being a the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially the same, being a
"list" inside a "container". "list" inside a "container".
* For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric- * For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric-
key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed Section 2.1.3.10 key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in
of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Section 2.1.4.11 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
* For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key- * For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key-
grouping" grouping discussed Section 2.1.3.2 of grouping" grouping discussed in Section 2.1.4.3 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes 2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes
The following diagram lists all the protocol-accessible nodes defined The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol-
in the "ietf-keystore" module: accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, without
expanding the "grouping" statements:
module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore
+---u keystore-grouping
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- (encrypted-by-choice)
+--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| +-- symmetric-key-ref? ks:symmetric-key-ref
+--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
+-- asymmetric-key-ref? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+-- certificate? leafref
grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference
+---u asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
grouping keystore-grouping
+-- asymmetric-keys
| +-- asymmetric-key* [name]
| +-- name? string
| +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+-- symmetric-keys
+-- symmetric-key* [name]
+-- name? string
+---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] lists all the protocol-
accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, with all
"grouping" statements expanded, enabling the keystore's full
structure to be seen:
module: ietf-keystore module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore +--rw keystore
+--rw asymmetric-keys +--rw asymmetric-keys
| +--rw asymmetric-key* [name] | +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw public-key-format identityref | +--rw public-key-format identityref
| +--rw public-key binary | +--rw public-key binary
| +--rw private-key-format? identityref | +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type) | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key) | | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {private-key-encryption}?
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw (encrypted-by-choice) | | | +--rw (encrypted-by-choice)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref) | | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref | | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref?
| | | | ks:symmetric-key-ref
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) | | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref | | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref?
| | | ks:asymmetric-key-ref
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw certificates | +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name] | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name string | | +--rw name string
| | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms | | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration | | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}? | {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input | +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info | | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output | +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr | +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--rw symmetric-keys +--rw symmetric-keys
+--rw symmetric-key* [name] +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw key-format? identityref +--rw key-format? identityref
+--rw (key-type) +--rw (key-type)
+--:(cleartext-key) +--:(cleartext-key)
| +--rw cleartext-key? binary | +--rw cleartext-key? binary
+--:(hidden-key) +--:(hidden-key)
| +--rw hidden-key? empty | +--rw hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key) +--:(encrypted-key) {symmetric-key-encryption}?
+--rw encrypted-key +--rw encrypted-key
+--rw encrypted-by +--rw encrypted-by
| +--rw (encrypted-by-choice) | +--rw (encrypted-by-choice)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref) | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref?
| | ks:symmetric-key-ref
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref) | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref?
| ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw encrypted-value binary +--rw encrypted-value binary
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping
+-- (encrypted-by-choice)
+--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| +-- symmetric-key-ref? ks:symmetric-key-ref
+--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
+-- asymmetric-key-ref? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping
+-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+-- certificate? leafref
grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +-- key-format? identityref
| +-- (key-type)
| +--:(cleartext-key)
| | +-- cleartext-key? binary
| +--:(hidden-key)
| | +-- hidden-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-key) {symmetric-key-encryption}?
| +-- encrypted-key
| +-- encrypted-by
| +-- encrypted-value binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
| +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-private-key) {private-key-encryption}?
| +-- encrypted-private-key
| +-- encrypted-by
| +-- encrypted-value binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {private-key-encryption}?
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- encrypted-by
| | +-- encrypted-value binary
| +-- certificates
| | +-- certificate* [name]
| | +-- name? string
| | +-- cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| +-- local-definition
| +-- public-key-format identityref
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {private-key-encryption}?
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- encrypted-by
| | +-- encrypted-value binary
| +-- cert-data?
| | end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- keystore-reference
+-- asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+-- certificate? leafref
grouping keystore-grouping
+-- asymmetric-keys
| +-- asymmetric-key* [name]
| +-- name? string
| +-- public-key-format identityref
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key-format? identityref
| +-- (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +-- hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {private-key-encryption}?
| | +-- encrypted-private-key
| | +-- encrypted-by
| | +-- encrypted-value binary
| +-- certificates
| | +-- certificate* [name]
| | +-- name? string
| | +-- cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+-- symmetric-keys
+-- symmetric-key* [name]
+-- name? string
+-- key-format? identityref
+-- (key-type)
+--:(cleartext-key)
| +-- cleartext-key? binary
+--:(hidden-key)
| +-- hidden-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-key) {symmetric-key-encryption}?
+-- encrypted-key
+-- encrypted-by
+-- encrypted-value binary
Comments: Comments:
* Protocol-accessible nodes are those nodes that are accessible when * Protocol-accessible nodes are those nodes that are accessible when
the module is "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of the module is "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of
[RFC7950]. [RFC7950].
* For the "ietf-keystore" module, the protcol-accessible nodes are * The protcol-accessible nodes for the "ietf-keystore" module are an
an instance of the "keystore-grouping" discussed in instance of the "keystore-grouping" grouping discussed in
Section 2.1.3.7 grouping. Note that, in this diagram, all the Section 2.1.3.7.
used groupings have been expanded, enabling the keystore's full
structure to be seen.
* The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the * The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the
protocol-accessible nodes definition is so as to enable instances protocol-accessible nodes definition is so as to enable instances
of the keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be of the keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be
needed or desired by some modules. needed or desired by some modules.
2.2. Example Usage 2.2. Example Usage
The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be
the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodings MAY be the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodings MAY be
skipping to change at page 17, line 5 skipping to change at page 21, line 44
2.2.3. The "Local or Keystore" Groupings 2.2.3. The "Local or Keystore" Groupings
This section illustrates the various "local-or-keystore" groupings This section illustrates the various "local-or-keystore" groupings
defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "local-or- defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "local-or-
keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.3), "local-or- keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.3), "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.4), "local-or- keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.4), "local-or-
keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.5), and keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.3.5), and
"local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
(Section 2.1.3.6) groupings. (Section 2.1.3.6) groupings.
The following non-normative module is defined to illustrate these These examples assume the existence of an example module called "ex-
groupings: keystore-usage" having the namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-
keystore-usage".
module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix "eku";
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
organization
"Example Corporation";
contact
"Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description
"This module illustrates notable groupings defined in
the 'ietf-keystore' module.";
revision "2020-07-10" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
container keystore-usage {
description
"An illustration of the various keystore groupings.";
list symmetric-key { The ex-keystore-usage module is first presented using tree diagrams
key name; [RFC8340], followed by an instance example illustrating all the
leaf name { "local-or-keystore" groupings in use, followed by the YANG module
type string; itself.
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping;
description
"An symmetric key that may be configured locally or be a
reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.";
}
list asymmetric-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping;
description
"An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured
locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric
key, not any certificates that may also be associated
with the asymmetric key.";
}
list asymmetric-key-with-certs { The following tree diagram illustrates "ex-keystore-usage" without
key name; expanding the "grouping" statements:
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping;
description
"An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be
configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key
(and its associated certs) in the keystore.";
}
list end-entity-cert-with-key { module: ex-keystore-usage
key name; +--rw keystore-usage
leaf name { +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
type string; | +--rw name string
description | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
"An arbitrary name for this key."; +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
} | +--rw name string
uses ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping; | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
description +--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name]
"An end-entity certificate, and its associated private key, | +--rw name
that may be configured locally or be a reference to a | | string
specific certificate (and its associated private key) in | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
the keystore."; +--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name]
} +--rw name
} | string
+---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping
} The following tree diagram illustrates the "ex-keystore-usage"
The tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module follows: module, with all "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the
keystore's full structure to be seen:
module: ex-keystore-usage module: ex-keystore-usage
+--rw keystore-usage +--rw keystore-usage
+--rw symmetric-key* [name] +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore) | +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? | +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition | | +--rw local-definition
| | +--rw key-format? identityref | | +--rw key-format? identityref
| | +--rw (key-type) | | +--rw (key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-key) | | +--:(cleartext-key)
| | | +--rw cleartext-key? binary | | | +--rw cleartext-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-key) | | +--:(hidden-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-key? empty | | | +--rw hidden-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-key) | | +--:(encrypted-key) {symmetric-key-encryption}?
| | +--rw encrypted-key | | +--rw encrypted-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? | +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref | +--rw keystore-reference? ks:symmetric-key-ref
+--rw asymmetric-key* [name] +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore) | +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? | +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition | | +--rw local-definition
| | +--rw public-key-format identityref | | +--rw public-key-format identityref
| | +--rw public-key binary | | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | | +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key) | | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | {private-key-encryption}?
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? | +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref | +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name] +--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw (local-or-keystore) | +--rw (local-or-keystore)
| +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}? | +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
| | +--rw local-definition | | +--rw local-definition
skipping to change at page 20, line 12 skipping to change at page 23, line 35
| | | identityref | | | identityref
| | +--rw public-key binary | | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw private-key-format? | | +--rw private-key-format?
| | | identityref | | | identityref
| | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | | +--:(hidden-private-key) | | | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | | {private-key-encryption}?
| | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | | +--rw encrypted-by | | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| | +--rw certificates | | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate* [name] | | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string | | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw cert-data | | | +--rw cert-data
| | | | end-entity-cert-cms | | | | end-entity-cert-cms
| | | +---n certificate-expiration | | | +---n certificate-expiration
| | | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | {certificate-signing-request-generation}? | | {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| | +---w input | | +---w input
| | | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info | | | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| | +--ro output | | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr | | +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
| +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? | +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
| +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref | +--rw keystore-reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
+--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name] +--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name]
skipping to change at page 20, line 46 skipping to change at page 24, line 23
| | identityref | | identityref
| +--rw public-key binary | +--rw public-key binary
| +--rw private-key-format? | +--rw private-key-format?
| | identityref | | identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type) | +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key)
| | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key) | | +--:(hidden-private-key)
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | +--:(encrypted-private-key)
| | {private-key-encryption}?
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw cert-data? | +--rw cert-data?
| | end-entity-cert-cms | | end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| {certificate-signing-request-generation}? | {certificate-signing-request-generation}?
| +---w input | +---w input
| | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info | | +---w csr-info ct:csr-info
| +--ro output | +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr | +--ro certificate-signing-request ct:csr
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+--rw keystore-reference +--rw keystore-reference
+--rw asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref +--rw asymmetric-key? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
skipping to change at page 23, line 33 skipping to change at page 27, line 14
ct:rsa-private-key-format ct:rsa-private-key-format
</private-key-format> </private-key-format>
<cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-private\ <cleartext-private-key>base64encodedvalue==</cleartext-private\
-key> -key>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</end-entity-cert-with-key> </end-entity-cert-with-key>
</keystore-usage> </keystore-usage>
Following is the "ex-keystore-usage" module's YANG definition:
module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix "eku";
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
organization
"Example Corporation";
contact
"Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description
"This module illustrates notable groupings defined in
the 'ietf-keystore' module.";
revision "2020-08-20" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
}
container keystore-usage {
description
"An illustration of the various keystore groupings.";
list symmetric-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping;
description
"An symmetric key that may be configured locally or be a
reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.";
}
list asymmetric-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping;
description
"An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured
locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the
keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric
key, not any certificates that may also be associated
with the asymmetric key.";
}
list asymmetric-key-with-certs {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping;
description
"An asymmetric key and its associated certs, that may be
configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key
(and its associated certs) in the keystore.";
}
list end-entity-cert-with-key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
description
"An end-entity certificate and its associated asymmetric
key, that may be configured locally or be a reference
to another certificate (and its associated asymmetric
key) in the keystore.";
}
}
}
2.3. YANG Module 2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2020-07-10.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2020-08-20.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix ks; prefix ks;
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
skipping to change at page 24, line 42 skipping to change at page 30, line 23
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."; capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-07-10 { revision 2020-08-20 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
/****************/ /****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/****************/ /****************/
feature keystore-supported { feature keystore-supported {
description description
"The 'keystore-supported' feature indicates that the server "The 'keystore-supported' feature indicates that the server
supports the Keystore."; supports the Keystore.";
} }
feature local-definitions-supported { feature local-definitions-supported {
description description
"The 'local-definitions-supported' feature indicates that the "The 'local-definitions-supported' feature indicates that the
server supports locally-defined keys."; server supports locally-defined keys.";
skipping to change at page 25, line 46 skipping to change at page 31, line 27
"This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference "This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference
to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore."; to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Groupings */ /* Groupings */
/*****************/ /*****************/
grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping { grouping encrypted-by-choice-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that defines a choice enabling references "A grouping that defines a choice that can be augmented
to other keys."; into the 'encrypted-by' node presented by the
'symmetric-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping'
groupings defined in RFC AAAA.";
choice encrypted-by-choice { choice encrypted-by-choice {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys."; "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
case symmetric-key-ref { case symmetric-key-ref {
leaf symmetric-key-ref { leaf symmetric-key-ref {
type leafref { type ks:symmetric-key-ref;
path "/ks:keystore/ks:symmetric-keys/"
+ "ks:symmetric-key/ks:name";
}
description description
"Identifies the symmetric key used to encrypt this key."; "Identifies the symmetric key used to encrypt the
associated key.";
} }
} }
case asymmetric-key-ref { case asymmetric-key-ref {
leaf asymmetric-key-ref { leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref { type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/"
+ "ks:asymmetric-key/ks:name";
}
description description
"Identifies the asymmetric key used to encrypt this key."; "Identifies the asymmetric key whose public key
encrypted the associated key.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping { grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping {
description description
"This grouping defines a reference to a specific certificate "This grouping defines a reference to a specific certificate
associated with an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore."; associated with an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
leaf asymmetric-key { leaf asymmetric-key {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
skipping to change at page 27, line 4 skipping to change at page 32, line 32
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key[ks:" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key[ks:"
+ "name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/ks:certificates" + "name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/ks:certificates"
+ "/ks:certificate/ks:name"; + "/ks:certificate/ks:name";
} }
must '../asymmetric-key'; must '../asymmetric-key';
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate of the "A reference to a specific certificate of the
asymmetric key in the Keystore."; asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
// local-or-keystore-* groupings // local-or-keystore-* groupings
grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the symmetric key to be "A grouping that expands to allow the symmetric key to be
either stored locally, within the using data model, or be either stored locally, i.e., within the using data model,
a reference to a symmetric key stored in the Keystore."; or a reference to a symmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore."; that exists in the Keystore.";
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
skipping to change at page 27, line 40 skipping to change at page 33, line 22
"A reference to an symmetric key that exists in "A reference to an symmetric key that exists in
the Keystore."; the Keystore.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the asymmetric key to be "A grouping that expands to allow the asymmetric key to be
either stored locally, within the using data model, or be either stored locally, i.e., within the using data model,
a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore."; or a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in "A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in
the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the
asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates
that may be associated with it."; that may be associated with it.";
skipping to change at page 28, line 17 skipping to change at page 33, line 49
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in "A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in
the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the the Keystore. The intent is to reference just the
asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates
that may be associated with it."; that may be associated with it.";
} }
} }
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow an asymmetric key and its "A grouping that expands to allow an asymmetric key and
associated certificates to be either stored locally, within its associated certificates to be either stored locally,
the using data model, or be a reference to an asymmetric key i.e., within the using data model, or a reference to an
(and its associated certificates) stored in the Keystore."; asymmetric key (and its associated certificates) stored
in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf keystore-reference { leaf keystore-reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
description description
"A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its "A reference to an asymmetric-key (and all of its
associated certificates) in the Keystore."; associated certificates) in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow an end-entity certificate "A grouping that expands to allow an end-entity certificate
(and its associated private key) to be either stored locally, (and its associated asymmetric key pair) to be either stored
within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific locally, i.e., within the using data model, or a reference
certificate in the Keystore."; to a specific certificate in the Keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
case local { case local {
if-feature "local-definitions-supported"; if-feature "local-definitions-supported";
container local-definition { container local-definition {
description description
"Container to hold the local key definition."; "Container to hold the local key definition.";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping;
} }
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-supported"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
container keystore-reference { container keystore-reference {
uses asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping; uses asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping;
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate (and its "A reference to a specific certificate associated with
associated private key) in the Keystore."; an asymmetric key stored in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the Keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping keystore-grouping { grouping keystore-grouping {
description description
"Grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever "Grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever
done, implementations SHOULD augment new 'case' statements done, implementations SHOULD augment new 'case' statements
into local-or-keystore 'choice' statements to supply leafrefs into local-or-keystore 'choice' statements to supply leafrefs
to the new location."; to the new location.";
container asymmetric-keys { container asymmetric-keys {
skipping to change at page 31, line 21 skipping to change at page 37, line 8
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
3. Support for Built-in Keys 3. Support for Built-in Keys
In some implementations, a server may support built-in keys. Built- In some implementations, a server may support built-in keys. Built-
in built-in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or be in keys MAY be set during the manufacturing process or be dynamically
dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a generated the first time the server is booted or a particular service
particular service (e.g., SSH) is enabled. (e.g., SSH) is enabled.
The key characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are provided The primary characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are
by the system, as opposed to configuration. As such, they are provided by the system, as opposed to configuration. As such, they
present in <operational>. The example below illustrates what the are present in <operational>. The example below illustrates what the
keystore in <operational> might look like for a server in its factory keystore in <operational> might look like for a server in its factory
default state. default state.
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
or:origin="or:intended"> or:origin="or:intended">
<asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system">
<name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name>
skipping to change at page 32, line 4 skipping to change at page 37, line 39
<hidden-private-key/> <hidden-private-key/>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
In order for the built-in keys (and/or their associated built-in In order for the built-in keys (and/or their associated built-in
certificates) to be referenced by configuration, the referenced keys certificates) to be referenced by configuration, the referenced keys
MUST first be copied into <running>. The keys SHOULD be copied into MUST first be copied into <running>. The keys SHOULD be copied into
<running> using the same "key" values, so that the server can bind <running> using the same value for the list's "key" substatement, so
the references to the built-in entries. that the server can bind the references to the built-in entries.
Built-in "hidden" keys cannot be copied into other parts of the In addition to copying keys into the Keystore in <running>, cleartext
configuration because their private parts are hidden, and therefore and encrypted keys may be copied into other parts of configuration,
impossible to replicate. Built-in "encrypted" keys MAY be copied but they will lose their connection to having been a built-in value.
into other parts of the configuration so long as they maintain their Note that hidden keys cannot be copied into other parts of the
reference to the other built-in key that encrypted them. configuration because doing would lose the key's connection to the
built-in key, where the key's secret value is stored. Built-in
"encrypted" keys MAY be copied into other parts of the configuration
so long as the reference to the other built-in key that encrypted
them is maintained.
Only the referenced keys need to be copied; that is, the keys in Only the referenced keys need to be copied; that is, the keys in
<running> MAY be a subset of the built-in keys define in <running> MAY be a subset, including the whole of the set, of the
<operational>. No keys may be added or changed (with exception to built-in keys defined in <operational>.
associating additional certificates to a built-in key); that is, the
keys in <running> MUST be a subset (which includes the whole of the No new built-in keys may be added nor existing built-in changed, with
set) of the built-in keys define in <operational>. exception for associating additional certificates to an existing
built-in key.
A server MUST reject attempts to modify any aspect of built-in keys, A server MUST reject attempts to modify any aspect of built-in keys,
with exception to associating additional certificates to a built-in with exception for associating additional certificates to a built-in
key. That these keys are "configured" in <running> is an illusion, key. That these keys are "configured" in <running> is an illusion,
as they are strictly a read-only subset of that which must already as they are strictly a read-only subset of that which must already
exist in <operational>. exist in <operational>.
The following example illustrates how a single built-in key The following example illustrates how a single built-in key
definition from the previous example has been propagated to definition from the previous example has been propagated to
<running>: <running>:
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
skipping to change at page 34, line 33 skipping to change at page 40, line 33
<name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name> <name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration 4. Encrypting Keys in Configuration
This section describes an approach that enables all the private keys This section describes an approach that enables both the symmetric
on a server to be encrypted, such that traditional backup/restore and asymmetric keys on a server to be encrypted, such that
procedures can be used without concern for keys being compromised traditional backup/restore procedures can be used without concern for
when in transit. the keys being compromised when in transit.
4.1. Root Key 4.1. Key Encryption Key
The cornerstone to this solution is the existence of a "root" key The ability to encrypt configured keys is predicated on the existence
that can be used to encrypt all the other keys. The server MUST be of a "key encryption key" (KEK). There may be any number of KEKs in
able to use this key to decrypt the other keys in the configuration. a system. A KEK, by its namesake, is a key that is used to encrypt
other keys. A KEK MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric
key.
The root key SHOULD be a hidden key, i.e., one whose private data has If a KEK is a symmetric key, then the server MUST provide an API for
no presence in <running> or <operational> (see "hidden-key" and administrators to encrypt other keys without needing to know the
"hidden-private-key" in "ietf-crypto-types" symmetric key's value. If the KEK is an asymmetric key, then the
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). If the server implementation does server MAY provide an API enabling the encryption of other keys or,
not support hidden keys, then the private data part of key MUST be alternatively, let the administrators do so themselves using the
protected by access control with access granted only to an asymmetric key's public half.
administrator with special access control rights (e.g., an
organization's crypto officer). Given the long lifetime of built-in
keys (see Section 3), built-in keys MUST be hidden.
A hidden root key MAY be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. A server MUST possess (or be able to possess, in case the KEK has
If the hidden root key is symmetric, then the server MUST provide been encrypted by another KEK) a KEK's cleartext value so that it can
APIs enabling other keys (ideally generated by the server) to be decrypt the other keys in the configurion at runtime.
encrypted. If the hidden root key is asymmetric, then the server
SHOULD provide APIs enabling other keys to be both generated and
encrypted by it, but MAY alternatively enable administrators with
special access control rights to generate and encrypt the other keys
themselves, using the hidden key's public part. For practical
reasons, an unhidden root key SHOULD be asymmetric, so that its
public part can be accessed by other administrators without concern.
4.2. Configuring Encrypting Keys 4.2. Configuring Encrypted Keys
Each time a new key is to be configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by Each time a new key is configured, it SHOULD be encrypted by a KEK.
the root key.
In "ietf-crypto-types" [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], the format In "ietf-crypto-types" [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], the format
for an encrypted symmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one- for an encrypted symmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-
symmetric-key-format" identity, while the format for an encrypted symmetric-key-format" identity, while the format for an encrypted
asymmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-asymmetric-key- asymmetric key is described by the "encrypted-one-asymmetric-key-
format" identity format" identity
Ideally, the server implementation provides an API to generate a Implementations SHOULD provide an API that simultaneously generates
symmetric or asymmetric key, and encrypt the generated key using and encrypts a key (symmetric or asymmetric) using a KEK. Thusly
another key known to the system (e.g., the root key). Thusly newly generated key cleartext values are never known to the
administrators can safely call this API to configure new keys. administrators generating the keys.
In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then
the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the the generating and encrypting steps MAY be performed outside the
server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights. server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights
(e.g., an organization's crypto officer).
In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the Keystore In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the Keystore
using either the "encrypted-key" (for symmetric keys) or the using either the "encrypted-key" (for symmetric keys) or the
"encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two nodes "encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two nodes
contain both the encrypted value as well as a reference to the other contain both the encrypted value as well as a reference to the KEK
key in the Keystore that it was encrypted by. that encrypted the key.
4.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server 4.3. Migrating Configuration to Another Server
In the case a server's root key is used to encrypt other keys, When a KEK is used to encrypt other keys, migrating the configuration
migrating the configuration to another server may entail additional to another server is only possible if the second server has the same
effort, assuming the second server has a different root key than the KEK. How the second server comes to have the same KEK is discussed
first server, in order for the second server to decrypt the other in this section.
encrypted keys.
In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document
may be used to migrate the root key from one server to another. That may be used to migrate a KEK from one server to another. That said,
said, beware that the ability to do so typically entails having beware that the ability to do so typically entails having access to
access to the first server but, in many RMA scenarios, the first the first server but, in many RMA scenarios, the first server may no
server may no longer be operational. longer be operational.
Another option is to introduce a "shared root" key that acts as a In other deployments, an organization's crypto officer, possessing a
portable intermediate root key. This shared root key would only need KEK's cleartext value, configures the same KEK on the second server,
to be known to an organization's crypto officer. The shared root key presumably as a hidden key or a key protected by access-control
SHOULD be encrypted offline by the crypto officer using each server's (e.g., NACM's "default-deny-all), so that the cleartext value is not
public key, which may be, e.g., in the server's IDevID certificate. disclosed to regular administrators. However, this approach creates
The crypto officer can then safely handoff the encrypted shared key high-coupling to and dependency on the crypto officers that doesn't
to other administrators responsible for server installations, scale in production environments.
including migrations. In order to migrate configuration from a first
server, an administrator would need to make just a single
modification to the configuration before loading it onto a second
server, which is to replace the shared key's Keystore entry from the
first server (an encrypted key), with the shared key encrypted by the
second server's root key. The following diagram illustrates this
idea:
+-------------+ +---------------+ In order to decouple the crypto officers from the regular
| shared key | |shared root key| administrators, a special KEK, called the "master key" (MK), may be
|(unencrypted)|-------------------------------> | (encrypted) | used.
+-------------+ encrypts offline using +---------------+
^ each server's root key | A MK is commonly a globally-unique built-in (see Section 3)
asymmetric key. The private key, due to its long lifetime, is hidden
(i.e., "hidden-private-key" in Section 2.1.4.5. of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]). The public key is often contained
in an identity certificate (e.g., IDevID). How to configure a MK
during the manufacturing process is outside the scope of this
document.
It is highly RECOMMENDED that MKs are built-in and hidden but, if
this is not possible, MKs highly restricted access mechanisms SHOULD
be used to limit access to the MK's secret data to only highly
authorized clients (e.g., an organization's crypto officer). In this
case, it is RECOMMENDED that the MK is not built-in and hence is,
effectively, just like a KEK.
Assuming the server has a MK, the MK can be used to encrypt a "shared
KEK", which is then used to encrypt the keys configured by regular
administrators.
With this extra level of indirection, it is possible for a crypto
officer to encrypt the same KEK for a multiplicity of servers offline
using the public key contained in their identity certificates. The
crypto officer can then safely handoff the encrypted KEKs to the
regular administrators responsible for server installations,
including migrations.
In order to migrate the configuration from a first server, an
administrator would need to make just a single modification to the
configuration before loading it onto a second server, which is to
replace the encrypted KEK Keystore entry from the first server with
the encrypted KEK for the second server. Upon doing this, the
configuration (containing many encrypted keys) can be loaded into the
second server while enabling the second server to decrypt all the
encrypted keys in the configuration.
The following diagram illustrates this idea:
+-------------+ +-------------+
| shared KEK | | shared KEK |
|(unencrypted)|-------------------------------> | (encrypted) |
+-------------+ encrypts offline using +-------------+
^ each server's MK |
| | | |
| | | |
| possesses \o | | possesses \o |
+-------------- |\ | +-------------- |\ |
/ \ shares with | / \ shares with |
crypto +--------------------+ crypto +--------------------+
officer | officer |
| |
| |
+----------------------+ | +----------------------+ +----------------------+ | +----------------------+
| server-1 | | | server-2 | | server-1 | | | server-2 |
| configuration | | | configuration | | configuration | | | configuration |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| | root key-1 | | | | | root key-2 | | | | MK-1 | | | | | MK-2 | |
| | (hidden) | | | | | (hidden) | | | | (hidden) | | | | | (hidden) | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | | | ^ | | ^ | | | ^ |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | encrypted | | | | encrypted | | | encrypted | | | | encrypted |
| | by | | | | by | | | by | | | | by |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ |
| |shared root key | | | | |shared root key | | | | shared KEK | | | | | shared KEK | |
| | (encrypted) | | v | | (encrypted) | | | | (encrypted) | | v | | (encrypted) | |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | regular | ^ | | ^ | regular | ^ |
| | | admin | | | | | | admin | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | encrypted | \o | | encrypted | | | encrypted | \o | | encrypted |
| | by | |\ | | by | | | by | |\ | | by |
| | | / \ | | | | | | / \ | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| +----------------+ |----------------->| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |----------------->| +----------------+ |
skipping to change at page 38, line 38 skipping to change at page 44, line 38
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
"default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
defined in this module. defined in this module.
| Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private- | Please be aware that this module uses the "cleartext-key" and
| key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module | "cleartext-private-key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types"
| [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM | module [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have
| extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted | the NACM extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing
| read-access to the cleartext key values. | uncontrolled read-access to the cleartext key values.
All of the writable data nodes defined by this module, both in the All of the writable data nodes defined by this module, both in the
"grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore" "grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore"
instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments.. For instance, any modification to a key or reference environments.. For instance, any modification to a key or reference
to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For
this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for
all data nodes defined in this module. all data nodes defined in this module.
This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
skipping to change at page 39, line 23 skipping to change at page 45, line 23
XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the
following registration is requested: following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry 6.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following
following registration is requested: registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore name: ietf-keystore
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
prefix: ks prefix: ks
reference: RFC CCCC reference: RFC CCCC
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography", Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf- Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
crypto-types-15, 20 May 2020, ietf-netconf-crypto-types-17, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types-15>. types-17>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
skipping to change at page 40, line 19 skipping to change at page 46, line 19
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-http-client-server-03, 20 May 2020, netconf-http-client-server-04, 8 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-
client-server-03>. client-server-04>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-17, Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-19,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf- 10 July 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
netconf-keystore-17>. netconf-keystore-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020, client-server-20, 8 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19>. client-server-20>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020, client-server-20, 8 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19>. client-server-20>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and
SSH Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- SSH Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-19, 20 May 2020, ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-21, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-
client-server-19>. client-server-21>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-06, 16 June 2020, ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-07, 8 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-
client-server-06>. client-server-07>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and
TLS Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- TLS Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-19, 20 May 2020, ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-21, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls-
client-server-19>. client-server-21>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
anchors-10, 20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/ anchors-12, 10 July 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-10>. draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-12>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
skipping to change at page 46, line 33 skipping to change at page 52, line 33
* Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree * Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
diagrams]. diagrams].
* Updated the Security Considerations section. * Updated the Security Considerations section.
A.19. 18 to 19 A.19. 18 to 19
* Updated examples to reflect new "cleartext-" prefix in the crypto- * Updated examples to reflect new "cleartext-" prefix in the crypto-
types draft. types draft.
A.20. 19 to 20
* Addressed SecDir comments from Magnus Nystroem and Sandra Murphy.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Alan Luchuk, Andy
Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balazs Kovacs, David Lamparter, Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balazs Kovacs, David Lamparter,
Eric Voit, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Mahesh Eric Voit, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Martin Bjorklund, Mehmet Ersue, Phil Shafer, Radek Jethanandani, Magnus Nystroem, Martin Bjorklund, Mehmet Ersue, Phil
Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reshad Rahman, Sean Turner, and Tom Petch. Shafer, Radek Krejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reshad Rahman, Sandra
Murphy, Sean Turner, and Tom Petch.
Author's Address Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
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