draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-02.txt   draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-03.txt 
Network File System Version 4 C. Lever Network File System Version 4 C. Lever
Internet-Draft Oracle Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track October 8, 2018 Intended status: Standards Track November 7, 2018
Expires: April 11, 2019 Expires: May 11, 2019
File Content Provenance for Network File System version 4 File Content Provenance for Network File System version 4
draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-02 draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-03
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor
version 2 that enables file provenance information to be conveyed version 2 that enables file provenance information to be conveyed
between NFS version 4.2 servers and clients. File provenance between NFS version 4.2 servers and clients. File provenance
information authenticates the creator of a file's content and helps information authenticates the creator of a file's content and helps
guarantee the content's integrity from creation to use. guarantee the content's integrity from creation to use.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 11, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Architecture and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Extension Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Protocol Extension Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. XDR Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Managing File Provenance Information on NFS Files . . . . . . 5 4. Managing File Provenance Information on NFS Files . . . . . . 5
5. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. XDR Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Storing File Provenance Information . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Retrieving File Provenance Information . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Instantiating File Provenance Information . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Authorizing Updates to File Provenance Information . 9
5.3. Interaction With Non-Participating Implementations . . . 9
5.4. Performance Cost of Provenance Assessment . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The security of software distribution systems is complex and The security of software distribution systems is complex and
challenging, especially as software distribution has become challenging, especially as software distribution has become
increasingly decentralized. An end administrator needs to trust that increasingly decentralized. An end administrator needs to trust that
she is running executables just as they are supplied by a software she is running executables just as they are supplied by a software
vendor; in other words, that they have not been modified by malicious vendor; in other words, that they have not been modified by malicious
actors, contracted system administration services, or broken hardware actors, contracted system administration services, or broken hardware
or software. Software vendors want a guarantee that customer- or software. Software vendors want a guarantee that customer-
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A more extensive mechanism is needed to guarantee that no A more extensive mechanism is needed to guarantee that no
modification of a particular file has occurred since it was created, modification of a particular file has occurred since it was created,
perhaps even after several generations of copies have been made of perhaps even after several generations of copies have been made of
the file's content. the file's content.
This guarantee can be accomplished by separately preserving a keyed This guarantee can be accomplished by separately preserving a keyed
hash, such as an HMAC [RFC2104], of a file's content. The checksum hash, such as an HMAC [RFC2104], of a file's content. The checksum
and its signature are verified as the file's content is read into and its signature are verified as the file's content is read into
memory immediately before it is used. If verification fails, access memory immediately before it is used. If verification fails, access
to the file's content is prevented. The hash is updated and re- to the file's content is prevented. The hash is updated and re-
signed only when the file is legitimately modified. signed only when the file's content is legitimately modified.
1.1. Architecture Summary Unlike traditional integrity management schemes, the hash is not
replaced every time a file is copied. Instead, the signed checksum
is copied along with file content and presented whenever the content
is about to be used.
1.1. Architecture and Terminology
A keyed hash authenticates the identity of the last modifier of a A keyed hash authenticates the identity of the last modifier of a
file's content and serves as a strong check of the content's file's content and serves as a strong check of the content's
integrity. For the purposes of this document, we refer to this integrity. For the purposes of this document, we refer to this
metadata using the generic term "file provenance information". metadata using the generic term "file provenance information".
File provenance information is generated and signed by a "provenance File provenance information is generated and signed by a "provenance
authority", and then placed in the file system using special tools. authority", and then associated with each file using special tools.
A security module separate from the file system stack specifies the A security module separate from the file system stack specifies the
format of the file provenance information and enforces a policy for format of the file provenance information and enforces a policy for
utilizing it to determine when a protected file's content is safe to utilizing it to determine when a protected file's content is safe to
use on the local system. For the purposes of this document, we refer use on the local system. For the purposes of this document, we refer
to this module as a "provenance assessor", and the policy it uses as to this module as a "provenance assessor", and the policy it uses as
the "provenance assessment policy". the "provenance assessment policy".
NFS acts as a conduit by which file provenance information and file Provenance assessment is typically performed at the point of content
content move between storage on an NFS server and the provenance use. The file and storage system play no part in provenance
assessor where that content is to be accessed. NFS peers accessing a assessment decisions. NFS acts only as a conduit by which file
set of shared files must all agree on the at-rest file provenance provenance information and file content move between storage on an
information format. The format is specified by the provenance NFS server and the provenance assessor where that content is to be
assessor and is therefore not described in this document. accessed. NFS peers accessing a set of shared files must all agree
on the at-rest file provenance information format. The format is
specified by the provenance assessor and is therefore not described
in this document.
The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) is an example of a
mechanism that provides a full provenance assessment service
[IMA-WP]. The protocol extension in this document enables the
storage and use of file provenance information so that provenance
assessment can occur at point-of-use on NFS clients. The extension
does not provide a full assessment mechanism.
A Trusted Platform Module [TPM-SUM] can seal the key material used to A Trusted Platform Module [TPM-SUM] can seal the key material used to
sign and verify file content. Distributing and protecting such key sign and verify file content. Distributing and protecting such key
material is outside the scope of the OPTIONAL extension specified in material is outside the scope of the OPTIONAL extension specified in
this document. this document.
The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) is an example of a
mechanism that provides a full provenance assessment service
[IMA-WP]. The protocol extension in this document enables the
storage and use of file provenance information to protect files
stored on an NFS server.
2. Requirements Language 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
here.
3. Protocol Extension Considerations 3. Protocol Extension Considerations
This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor
version 2 [RFC7862], hereafter referred to as NFS version 4.2. NFS version 2 [RFC7862], hereafter referred to as NFS version 4.2. NFS
version 4.2 servers and clients implemented without knowledge of this version 4.2 servers and clients implemented without knowledge of this
extension will continue to interoperate with NFS version 4.2 clients extension will continue to interoperate with NFS version 4.2 clients
and servers that are aware of the extension, whether or not they and servers that are aware of the extension, whether or not they
support it. support it.
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<CODE BEGINS> <CODE BEGINS>
/// /* /// /*
/// * Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the person identified /// * Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the person identified
/// * as author of the code. All rights reserved. /// * as author of the code. All rights reserved.
/// * /// *
/// * The author of the code is: C. Lever /// * The author of the code is: C. Lever
/// */ /// */
/// ///
/// const FILEPROV4_MAXSIZE = 4096; /// struct file_prov4 {
/// typedef opaque file_prov4<FILEPROV4_MAXSIZE>; /// uint32_t fpv_type;
/// opaque fpv_data<>;
/// };
/// ///
/// %/* /// %/*
/// % * New For File Provenance Information /// % * New For File Provenance Information
/// % */ /// % */
/// const FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE = XXX; /* to be assigned */ /// typedef file_prov4 fattr4_file_provenance;
/// ///
/// typedef file_prov4 fattr4_file_provenance; /// const FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE = XXX; /* to be assigned */
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
4.2. Storing File Provenance Information 4.2. Storing File Provenance Information
An NFS version 4.2 client stores file provenance information by An NFS version 4.2 client stores file provenance information by
sending a SETATTR operation that specifies the FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE sending a SETATTR operation that specifies the FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE
attribute, targeting the file object associated with the file attribute and an fpv_type, targeting the file object associated with
provenance information to be stored. This attribute completely the file provenance information to be stored. This attribute
replaces any previous one. completely replaces any previous one with the same fpv_type field.
To remove this attribute from a file, the client sends a To remove a file provenance attribute from a file, the client sends a
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute whose length is zero. [ cel: Does FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute whose length is zero. Modifying the
writing to a file have any effect on IMA metadata? ] file in any other way MUST NOT alter or remove FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE
attributes.
When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server with a When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server with a
credential that is not authorized to replace the credential that is not authorized to replace a FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute, the server MUST respond with attribute, the server MUST respond with NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server with a When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server with a
fattr4_file_provenance field whose length is larger than fattr4_file_provenance field whose length is larger than the maximum
FILEPROV4_MAXSIZE, the server MUST respond with NFS4ERR_INVAL. size specified in Table 1 for that fpv_type, the server MUST respond
with NFS4ERR_INVAL.
When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server and the When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server and the
target object resides in a file system which supports target object resides in a file system which supports
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE but the object does not support this FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE but the object does not support
attribute, the server MUST respond with NFS4ERR_WRONGTYPE. FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attributes, the server MUST respond with
NFS4ERR_WRONGTYPE.
When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server but the When a SETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server but the
target object resides in a file system which does not support target object resides in a file system which does not support
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE, the server MUST respond with FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE or does not support the format associated with
the specified fpv_type, the server MUST respond with
NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP. NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP.
A detailed description of the SETATTR operation can be found in A detailed description of the SETATTR operation can be found in
Section 18.30 of [RFC5661]. Section 18.30 of [RFC5661].
4.3. Retrieving File Provenance Information 4.3. Retrieving File Provenance Information
An NFS version 4.2 client retrieves file provenance information by An NFS version 4.2 client retrieves file provenance information by
retrieving the FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute via a GETATTR retrieving the FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute via a GETATTR
operation, specifying the file handle of the file object associated operation, specifying an fpv_type and the file handle of the file
with the information to be retrieved. This information may have been object associated with the information to be retrieved. This
computed and signed previously on this client or by some other agent. information may have been computed and signed previously on this
client or by some other agent.
When a GETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server and the When a GETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server and the
target object resides in a file system which supports target object resides in a file system which supports
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE but the object does not support this FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE but the object does not support
attribute, the server MUST respond with NFS4ERR_WRONGTYPE. FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attributes, the server MUST respond with
NFS4ERR_WRONGTYPE.
When a GETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server but the When a GETATTR is presented to an NFS version 4.2 server but the
target object resides in a file system which does not support target object resides in a file system which does not support
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE, this does not result in an error and the FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE or does not support the format associated with
the specified fpv_type, this does not result in an error and the
FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute bit is clear in the server's FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute bit is clear in the server's
response. response.
Otherwise, if the target object supports FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE and Otherwise, if the target object supports FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE and
there is no file provenance information is available for the target there is no file provenance information is available for the target
object, the server returns a FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute whose object, the server returns a FATTR4_FILE_PROVENANCE attribute whose
length is zero. length is zero.
Provenance assessors operate after file content has been delivered Provenance assessors operate after file content has been delivered
but immediately before that content is to be used. To enable but immediately before that content is to be used. To enable
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has write permissions. This is because changing the content without has write permissions. This is because changing the content without
updating the associated file provenance information will make the updating the associated file provenance information will make the
content inaccessible, depending on the provenance assessment policy content inaccessible, depending on the provenance assessment policy
in effect. Thus updating the file content usually requires in effect. Thus updating the file content usually requires
generating fresh file provenance information. generating fresh file provenance information.
5.2.1. Authorizing Updates to File Provenance Information 5.2.1. Authorizing Updates to File Provenance Information
A participating server should ensure that modifications to file A participating server should ensure that modifications to file
provenance information are done only by appropriately authorized provenance information are done only by appropriately authorized
agents. agents. Such agents usually include only the owner of a file and
agents with super-user privileges.
[ cel: TBD. Regular users are probably not able to modify a local
security.ima xattr. What kind of authority should be required to
modify FPI remotely? ]
5.3. Interaction With Non-Participating Implementations 5.3. Interaction With Non-Participating Implementations
Because the protocol extension described herein is OPTIONAL, clients Because the protocol extension described herein is OPTIONAL, clients
and servers that support it must necessarily interact with clients and servers that support it must necessarily interact with clients
and servers that do not support it. To set the stage for a and servers that do not support it. To set the stage for a
discussion of interactions that might occur, consider the following discussion of interactions that might occur, consider the following
possible simple provenance assessment policies that might be adopted possible simple provenance assessment policies that might be adopted
by a provenance assessor (actual polices are left to provenance by a provenance assessor (actual polices are left to provenance
assessors): assessors):
Strict Strict: Access is prevented to a file's content if the file has no
Access is prevented to a file's content if the file has no
provenance information or if the provenance information fails to provenance information or if the provenance information fails to
verify the file content. Otherwise access to the file's content verify the file content. Otherwise access to the file's content
is not prevented. is not prevented.
Audit Audit: Access to a file's content is never prevented. Warnings are
Access to a file's content is never prevented. Warnings are
reported when a file has no provenance information or when reported when a file has no provenance information or when
existing provenance information fails to verify the file's existing provenance information fails to verify the file's
content. content.
Disabled Disabled: Access to file content is never prevented and provenance
Access to file content is never prevented and provenance
information is ignored. information is ignored.
Given the above example policies and the definitions we provided Given the above example policies and the definitions we provided
earlier for participating and non-participating implementations, the earlier for participating and non-participating implementations, the
following statements are true: following statements are true:
o A participating client that uses the Disabled policy is equivalent o A participating client that uses the Disabled policy is equivalent
to a non-participating client. to a non-participating client.
o A non-participating client never prevents access to file content o A non-participating client never prevents access to file content
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to files stored on a non-participating server. to files stored on a non-participating server.
A provenance assessor on an NFS version 4.2 peer needs to be prepared A provenance assessor on an NFS version 4.2 peer needs to be prepared
to deal with file provenance information it does not recognize or to deal with file provenance information it does not recognize or
cannot parse. Typically its policy treats this case as a provenance cannot parse. Typically its policy treats this case as a provenance
verification failure. verification failure.
Note that an NFS version 4.2 server may use a provenance assessor to Note that an NFS version 4.2 server may use a provenance assessor to
prevent access by local users to protected files. To enable NFS prevent access by local users to protected files. To enable NFS
version 4.2 clients to do their own assessment, an NFS version 4.2 version 4.2 clients to do their own assessment, an NFS version 4.2
server should never prevent remote access to clients if local server should not prevent remote access to participating clients if
provenance assessment fails. local provenance assessment fails.
5.4. Performance Cost of Using File Provenance Information 5.4. Performance Cost of Provenance Assessment
A provenance assessor typically checksums the entirety of a file's A provenance assessor typically checksums the entirety of a file's
content. When a file's content is first accessed, after it changes, content. When a file's content is first accessed, after it changes,
or if any portion of a file is evicted from an NFS version 4.2 or if any portion of a file is evicted from an NFS version 4.2
client's cache, the client must retrieve any missing content before client's cache, the client must retrieve any missing content before
its local provenance assessor can compute a fresh checksum to verify its local provenance assessor can compute a fresh checksum to verify
the file's content. the file's content.
Thus provenance assessment can incur a significant performance impact Thus provenance assessment can incur a significant performance impact
for large files, files that change frequently, or files where only a for large files, files that change frequently, or files where only a
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specified here to reduce this impact. specified here to reduce this impact.
For example, instead of signing a hash of the file's byte stream, a For example, instead of signing a hash of the file's byte stream, a
Merkle tree can be constructed that allows assessors to verify the Merkle tree can be constructed that allows assessors to verify the
integrity of smaller portions of a large file [MERKLE]. The root integrity of smaller portions of a large file [MERKLE]. The root
hash of that tree, being of sufficiently limited size, can be signed hash of that tree, being of sufficiently limited size, can be signed
and stored as file provenance information. The Merkle tree, which is and stored as file provenance information. The Merkle tree, which is
stored elsewhere, can be used to verify portions of the file's stored elsewhere, can be used to verify portions of the file's
content without the need to read the whole file. content without the need to read the whole file.
NFS can provide an offload mechanism to mitigate some of the network
and CPU utilization costs of provenance assessment on clients. If
there is a strong trust relationship between clients and server, and
the network transport is of very high integrity, the NFS server can
perform provenance assessment in lieu of exposing file provenance
information to clients.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The design of the OPTIONAL extension described in this document The design of the OPTIONAL extension described in this document
assumes that all file provenance information is keyed or otherwise assumes that all file provenance information is keyed or otherwise
cryptographically signed by a provenance authority to prevent cryptographically signed by a provenance authority to prevent
unwanted alteration at rest or in transit. unwanted alteration at rest or in transit.
When file provenance information for a file exists, the content of a When file provenance information for a file exists, the content of a
file is protected from creation to use. Receivers can reliably file is protected from creation to use. Receivers can reliably
detect unintentional or malicious alteration of file content by detect unintentional or malicious alteration of file content by
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failures on NFS version 4.2 clients. failures on NFS version 4.2 clients.
To prevent a malicious denial-of-service attempt by altering file To prevent a malicious denial-of-service attempt by altering file
provenance information at rest, an NFS version 4.2 server should provenance information at rest, an NFS version 4.2 server should
enforce a suitable level of privilege before authorizing a local or enforce a suitable level of privilege before authorizing a local or
remote agent to alter this information. See Section 5.2.1 for more remote agent to alter this information. See Section 5.2.1 for more
detail. detail.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any actions by IANA. In accordance with [RFC8126], the author requests that the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) create a new registry in the
"Network File System version 4" Protocol Category Group. The new
registry is to be called the "File Provenance Information Format
Registry".
The new registry has the following fields:
Code Point: An integer that maps to a particular File Provenance
Information format. The namespace of this identifier has the
range 0..4204067295. Or, a range of values to be used for the
same purpose.
Description: A human-readable ASCII text string that concisely
describes the File Provenance Information format. The length of
this field is limited to 128 bytes.
Max Size: An integer that expresses the largest possible size, in
octets, required to store a single item of File Provenance
Information. Typical values are 4096 or 9000. A hyphen is stored
here when the Code Point column contains a range.
Reference: A reference to a stable public document that requested
this entry. The document should describe the File Provenance
Information format and any specialized storage requirements, or
should reference other public documents as appropriate.
The initial assignments of the registry appear in Table 1.
+--------------+----------------------------+----------+------------+
| Code Point | Description | Max Size | Reference |
+--------------+----------------------------+----------+------------+
| 0 | Linux IMA | 4096 | [RFC-TBD] |
| 1 - 2^31-1 | Available for IANA | - | [RFC-TBD] |
| | Assignment | | |
| 2^31 - | Private and Experimental | - | [RFC-TBD] |
| 2^32-1 | Use | | |
+--------------+----------------------------+----------+------------+
Table 1: File Provenance Information Format Registry
A format specification document is recommended to add a new entry to
the "File Provenance Information Registry". If the format document
is inside the RFC track, then the IANA Considerations section of the
format document should reference the "File Provenance Information
Registry" and request allocation of a new entry. The well-known IANA
policy Expert Review, as defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC8126] is to be
used to handle requests to add new entries to the "File Provenance
Information Registry".
When reviewing published file provenance specifications, the
Designated Expert should consider whether or not the specified file
provenance format allows a correct and complete implementation of the
protocol to process this information as a policy administration
mechanism. To reduce interoperability issues, the reviewer must
determine if the file provenance information format specification has
clearly defined syntax and semantics.
For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be
consulted, the responsible IESG area director should appoint the
Designated Expert. Allocation of ranges of code points (more than
one for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. Code point
allocations SHOULD NOT be made for purposes unrelated to managing
file provenance information.
A request to modify either the Description or the published file
provenance information format specification requires the Expert
Review IANA policy to be applied. If the format document is inside
the RFC track, the IANA Considerations section of the updated
specification should be explicit regarding which old label selector
assignment it modifies.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
skipping to change at page 11, line 36 skipping to change at page 13, line 42
[RFC7862] Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor [RFC7862] Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor
Version 2 Protocol", RFC 7862, DOI 10.17487/RFC7862, Version 2 Protocol", RFC 7862, DOI 10.17487/RFC7862,
November 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7862>. November 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7862>.
[RFC7863] Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor [RFC7863] Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor
Version 2 External Data Representation Standard (XDR) Version 2 External Data Representation Standard (XDR)
Description", RFC 7863, DOI 10.17487/RFC7863, November Description", RFC 7863, DOI 10.17487/RFC7863, November
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7863>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7863>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8178] Noveck, D., "Rules for NFSv4 Extensions and Minor [RFC8178] Noveck, D., "Rules for NFSv4 Extensions and Minor
Versions", RFC 8178, DOI 10.17487/RFC8178, July 2017, Versions", RFC 8178, DOI 10.17487/RFC8178, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8178>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8178>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
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Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Mimi Zohar and James Morris for their The author wishes to thank Mimi Zohar and James Morris for their
early review of the concepts in this document, Wim Coekaerts for his early review of the concepts in this document, Wim Coekaerts for his
encouragement of this work, and Dave Noveck for his work on NFS encouragement of this work, and Dave Noveck for his work on NFS
version 4 extensibility. version 4 extensibility.
The author wishes to acknowledge review comments from Dave Noveck, The author wishes to acknowledge review comments from Dave Noveck,
Craig Everhart, and Bruce Fields which helped to make this a better Craig Everhart, and Bruce Fields which helped to make this a better
document. document. Benjamin Kaduk proposed the File Provenance Information
Registry.
The XDR extraction conventions were first described by the authors of The XDR extraction conventions were first described by the authors of
the NFS version 4.1 XDR specification [RFC5662]. Herbert van den the NFS version 4.1 XDR specification [RFC5662]. Herbert van den
Bergh suggested the replacement sed script used in this document. Bergh suggested the replacement sed script used in this document.
Special thanks go to Transport Area Director Spencer Dawkins, NFSV4 Special thanks go to Transport Area Director Spencer Dawkins, NFSV4
Working Group Chairs Spencer Shepler and Brian Pawlowski, and NFSV4 Working Group Chairs Spencer Shepler and Brian Pawlowski, and NFSV4
Working Group Secretary Thomas Haynes for their support. Working Group Secretary Thomas Haynes for their support.
Author's Address Author's Address
skipping to change at page 13, line 4 skipping to change at page 15, line 14
The XDR extraction conventions were first described by the authors of The XDR extraction conventions were first described by the authors of
the NFS version 4.1 XDR specification [RFC5662]. Herbert van den the NFS version 4.1 XDR specification [RFC5662]. Herbert van den
Bergh suggested the replacement sed script used in this document. Bergh suggested the replacement sed script used in this document.
Special thanks go to Transport Area Director Spencer Dawkins, NFSV4 Special thanks go to Transport Area Director Spencer Dawkins, NFSV4
Working Group Chairs Spencer Shepler and Brian Pawlowski, and NFSV4 Working Group Chairs Spencer Shepler and Brian Pawlowski, and NFSV4
Working Group Secretary Thomas Haynes for their support. Working Group Secretary Thomas Haynes for their support.
Author's Address Author's Address
Charles Lever Charles Lever
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
1015 Granger Avenue 1015 Granger Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48104 Ann Arbor, MI 48104
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 248 816 6463
Email: chuck.lever@oracle.com Email: chuck.lever@oracle.com
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