draft-ietf-nfsv4-lfs-registry-00.txt   draft-ietf-nfsv4-lfs-registry-01.txt 
NFSv4 D. Quigley NFSv4 D. Quigley
Internet-Draft Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Lu Intended status: Standards Track J. Lu
Expires: November 2, 2014 Oracle Expires: March 20, 2015 Oracle
T. Haynes T. Haynes
Primary Data Primary Data
May 01, 2014 September 16, 2014
Registry Specification for Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Security Label Registry Specification for Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Security Label
Formats Formats
draft-ietf-nfsv4-lfs-registry-00.txt draft-ietf-nfsv4-lfs-registry-01.txt
Abstract Abstract
In the past Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems have used very In the past Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems have used very
rigid policies which were hardcoded into the particular protocol and rigid policies which were implemented in particular protocols and
platform. As MAC systems are more widely deployed additional platforms. As MAC systems became more widely deployed, additional
flexibility in mechanism and policy is required. Where traditional flexibility in mechanism and policy will be required. While
trusted systems implemented Multi-Level Security (MLS) and integrity traditional trusted systems implemented Multi-Level Security (MLS)
models, modern systems have expanded to include technologies such as and integrity models, modern systems have expanded to include
type enforcement. Due to the wide range of policies and mechanisms technologies such as type enforcement. Due to the wide range of
it has proven through past efforts to be virtually impossible to policies and mechanisms which need to be accommodated, it is unlikely
accomodate all parties in one security label format and model. that use of a single security label format and model will be viable.
To allow multiple MAC mechanisms and label formats in a network, this To allow multiple MAC mechanisms and label formats to co-exist in a
document proposes a registry of label format specifications. This network, this document proposes a registry of label format
registry contains several identifiers to accomodate both integer and specifications. This registry would contain label format identifiers
string preferences and associates those identifiers with an extensive and would provide for the association of each such identifier with a
document outlining the exact syntax and use of the particular label corresponding extensive document document outlining the exact syntax
format. and use of the particular label format.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 20, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 26 skipping to change at page 2, line 26
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Exisiting Label Format Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Exisiting Label Format Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. IP Security Option (IPSO), Basic Security Option (BSO) . 4
4.2. Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) 4 4.2. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3. Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.4. Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Initial Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Adding a New Entry to the Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Initial Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3. Obsoleting a Label Format Selector . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. Adding a New Entry to the Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.3. Obsoleting a Label Format Specifier . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
With the acceptance of security labels in several mainstream With the acceptance of security labels in several mainstream
operating systems the need to communicate labels between these operating systems the need to communicate labels between these
systems becomes more important. In a typical client and server systems becomes more important. In a typical client and server
scenario, the client request to the server acts as a subject trying scenario, the client request to the server acts as a subject trying
to access an object on the server [RFC7204]. Unfortunately these to access an object on the server [RFC7204]. Unfortunately these
systems are diverse enough that attempts at establishing one common systems are diverse enough that attempts at establishing one common
label format have been unsucessful. The reason for this is that label format have been unsucessful. The reason for this is that
systems implement different Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models, systems implement different Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models,
which typically do not share any common ground. which typically do not share any common ground.
One solution is to define a single label format which consists of the One solution might be to define a single label format which consists
union of the requirements of all MAC models/implementations. This is of the union of the requirements of all MAC models/implementations,
not ideal because it introduces an environment where many MAC models known at a given time. This approach is not desirable because it
would either have blank fields for many of the label's components or introduces an environment where many MAC models would either have
will ignore the values that are present all together. This blank fields for many of the label's components or where many
environment introduces waste and complexity where it is not needed. implementations would ignore many of values that are present
Additionally if a policy authority or identifier field is specified altogether. The resulting complexity would be likely to result in a
in the label format it would require a robust description that could confusing situation in which the interaction of fields that that
be implemented which would lock policy administration into the derive from different MAC models is never clearly specified and the
described model. addition of new models or extension of existing models is unduly
difficult.
An additional consideration is that if a policy authority or
identifier field is specified in the label format it would require a
robust description that encompassed multiple MAC models where
implementation would lock policy administration into the described
model.
Ideally a mechanism to address this problem should allow the most Ideally a mechanism to address this problem should allow the most
flexibility possible in terms of policy administration while flexibility possible in terms of policy administration while
providing a specification that is suffient to allow for providing a specification that is suffient to allow for
implementation of the label format and understanding of the semantics implementation of the label format and understanding of the semantics
of the label. This means that the label format specification would of the label. This means that the label format specification would
ideally contain a syntactic description of the label format and a ideally contain a syntactic description of the label format and a
description of the semantics for each component in the label. This description of the semantics for each component in the label. This
allows protocols to specify the type of label and label semantics allows protocols to specify the type of label and label semantics
that it requires while leaving policy and policy administration to that it requires while leaving policy and policy administration to
skipping to change at page 3, line 39 skipping to change at page 3, line 46
permission from external entities when crafting new policy or just permission from external entities when crafting new policy or just
making department specific modifications to existing policies. The making department specific modifications to existing policies. The
policy authority field would allow an label format specification to policy authority field would allow an label format specification to
specify a scheme for policy administration without forcing it on all specify a scheme for policy administration without forcing it on all
users of security labels. However by agreeing to implement a users of security labels. However by agreeing to implement a
particular label format specification, the protocol agrees to that particular label format specification, the protocol agrees to that
policy administration mechanism when processing labels of that type. policy administration mechanism when processing labels of that type.
2. Definitions 2. Definitions
Label Format Specification: an identifier used by the client to Label Format Specifier: an identifier used by the client to
establish the syntactic format of the security label and the establish the syntactic format of the security label and the
semantic meaning of its components. semantic meaning of its components.
Multi-Level Security (MLS): a traditional model where objects are Label Format Specification: is a reference to a stable, public
given a sensitivity level (Unclassified, Secret, Top Secret, etc.) document that specifies the label format.
and a category set [RH_MLS].
Object: a passive resource within the system that we wish to Multi-Level Security (MLS): a traditional model where subjects are
given a security level (Unclassified, Secret, Top Secret, etc.)
and objects are given security labels that mandate the access of
the subject to the object (see [BL73] and [RFC2401]).
object: a passive resource within the system that we wish to
protect. Objects can be entities such as files, directories, protect. Objects can be entities such as files, directories,
pipes, sockets, and many other system resources relevant to the pipes, sockets, and many other system resources relevant to the
protection of the system state. protection of the system state.
Subject: an active entity, usually a process, that is requesting subject: an active entity, usually a process, user, or client, that
access to an object. is requesting access to an object.
3. Requirements Language 3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
4. Exisiting Label Format Specifications 4. Exisiting Label Format Specifications
4.1. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) 4.1. IP Security Option (IPSO), Basic Security Option (BSO)
The Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) label format specification The "IP Security Option (IPSO)" label format is defined in [RFC1108].
is documented in [CIPSO]. While this draft has expired a long time IANA has assigned IPv4 Option 130 to the IPSO Basic Security Option
ago, it is the defacto standard for labeled networking. It is also (BSO). IPSO is the only IPv4 sensitivity label option implemented in
documented in [FIPS-188]. commercial IP routers. IPSO BSO continues to have widespread
implementation in hosts, and widespread deployment. For the purposes
of this document, only the BSO labels in Table 1 on Page 3 of
[RFC1108] are used.
4.2. Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) In some locales, the BSO value "(Reserved 2)" is used for marking
information that is considered "Restricted" by local policy, where
"Restricted" is less sensitive than "Confidential" but more sensitive
than "Unclassified".
The Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) [CIPSO] 4.2. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO)
is a successor to CIPSO.
4.3. Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) The "Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO)" label format is
documented in [CIPSO] and in [FIPS-188]. While the cited Internet-
Draft is long expired, it is widely supported in deployed MLS systems
that support IPv4. IANA has assigned IPv4 option number 134 to
CIPSO. CIPSO is defined ONLY as an IPv4 option. IANA has never
assigned any IPv6 option value to CIPSO.
The Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) is an impelementation of an 4.3. Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)
architecture to provide flexible support for security policies.
The "Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)" label
format is specified in [RFC5570] and is defined for IPv6. As noted
in Section 10 of [RFC5570] CALIPSO is a direct derivative of the
IPv4 "Simple IP Security Option (SIPSO)", therefore CALIPSO is NOT
derived from CIPSO in any way.
4.4. Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK)
The Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) [FLASK99] is an
impelementation of an architecture to provide flexible support for
security policies. Section 2.1 of [FLASK99b], summarizes the
architecture of FLASK to:
1. describe the interactions between a subsystem which enforces
security policy decisions and a subsystem which makes those
decisions
2. the requirements on the components within each subsystem.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document defines a mechanism to associate LFS identifier with a This document defines a mechanism to associate LFS identifier with a
document outlining the syntax and format of a label. There is no document outlining the syntax and format of a label. There is no
security consideration in such an association. The label security consideration in such an association. The label
specification documents referenced by each registration entry should specification documents referenced by each registration entry should
state security considerations for the label mechanism it specifies. state security considerations for the label mechanism it specifies.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding creation of a new registry in accordance Authority (IANA) regarding creation of a new registry in accordance
with [RFC5226]. with [RFC5226].
This submission requests the creation of a new registry called This submission requests the creation of a new registry called
"Security Label Format Selection Registry". The new registry has the "Security Label Format Selection Registry". The new registry has the
following fields: following fields:
Label Format Selector: An integer number that maps to a particular Label Format Specifier: An integer number that maps to a particular
label format, e.g., the CALIPSO label format defined by [RFC5570]. label format, e.g., the CALIPSO label format defined by [RFC5570].
The name space of this identifier has the range of 0..65,535. The name space of this identifier has the range of 0..65,535.
Label Description: A human readable ASCII text string that describes Label Description: A human readable ASCII text string that describes
the label format, e.g., "Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security the label format, e.g., "Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security
Option (CALIPSO)". The length of this field is limited to 128 Option (CALIPSO)". The length of this field is limited to 128
bytes. bytes.
Status: A short ASCII text string indicating the status of an entry Status: A short ASCII text string indicating the status of an entry
in the registry. The status field for most entries should have in the registry. The status field for most entries should have
the value "active". In the case that a label format selection the value "active". In the case that a label format selection
entry is obsolete, the status field of the obsoleted entry should entry is obsolete, the status field of the obsoleted entry should
be "obsoleted by entry NNN". be "obsoleted by entry NNN".
Label Format Specification: A reference to a stable, public document Label Format Specification: A reference to a stable, public document
that specify the label format, e.g., an URL to [RFC5570]. that specifies the label format, e.g., an URL to [RFC5570].
6.1. Initial Registry 6.1. Initial Registry
The initial assignments of the registry are as follows: The initial assignments of the registry are as follows:
+-----------------+------------------+--------+---------------------+ +---------------+---------------------+--------+--------------------+
| Label Format | Description | Status | Reference | | Label Format | Description | Status | Reference |
| Selector | | | | | Specifier | | | |
+-----------------+------------------+--------+---------------------+ +---------------+---------------------+--------+--------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | - | - | | 0 | Reserved | - | - |
| 1 - 127 | Private Use | - | - | | 1 - 127 | Private Use | - | - |
| 128 - 255 | Experimental Use | - | - | | 128 - 255 | Experimental Use | - | - |
| 256 | CIPSO (tag type | active | [[CIPSO] URL] | | 256 | CIPSO (tag type #1) | active | [[CIPSO] URL] |
| | #1) | | | | 257 | CALIPSO ([RFC5570]) | active | [[RFC5570] URL] |
| 257 | CALIPSO (RFC | active | [[RFC5570] URL] | | 258 | FLASK Security | active | [[FLASK99] URL] |
| | 5570) | | | | | Context | | |
| 258 | FLASK Security | active | [[FLASK] URL] | | 259 | IPSO | active | [[RFC1108] URL] |
| | Context | | | | 260 - 65535 | Unassigned | - | - |
| 258 - 65535 | Unassigned | - | - | +---------------+---------------------+--------+--------------------+
+-----------------+------------------+--------+---------------------+
Label Format Specifier Ranges Label Format Specifier Ranges
Table 1 Table 1
6.2. Adding a New Entry to the Registry 6.2. Adding a New Entry to the Registry
A label format specification document is required to add a new entry A label format specification document is required to add a new entry
to this registry. If the label format document is inside the RFC to this registry. If the label format document is inside the RFC
path, then The IANA Consideration section of the label format path, then The IANA Consideration section of the label format
document should clearly reference the Label Format Selection registry document should clearly reference the Label Format Selection registry
and request allocation of a new entry. The well-known IANA policy, and request allocation of a new entry. The well-known IANA policy,
Specification Required, as defined in section 4.1 of [RFC5226], will Specification Required, as defined in section 4.1 of [RFC5226], will
be used to handle such requests. Note that "Specification Required" be used to handle such requests. Note that "Specification Required"
policy implies this process requires a Designated Expert reviewer, policy implies this process requires a Designated Expert reviewer,
i.e., adding a new entry to this registry requires both a published i.e., adding a new entry to this registry requires both a published
label format specification and a Designated Expert review. label format specification and a Designated Expert review.
6.3. Obsoleting a Label Format Selector 6.3. Obsoleting a Label Format Specifier
In the case that a label format selector number is assigned to a In the case that a label format selector number is assigned to a
label format and the label format specification is changed later, a label format and the label format specification is changed later, a
new selector assignment should be requested. The same Specification new selector assignment should be requested. The same Specification
Required IANA policy applies to such requests. The IANA Required IANA policy applies to such requests. The IANA
Consideration section of the updated label format specification Consideration section of the updated label format specification
should be explicit in which old label selector assignment it should be explicit in which old label selector assignment it
obsoletes. Below is an example of obsoleted entry in the registry: obsoletes. Below is an example of obsoleted entry in the registry:
+---------------+-------------------+------------+------------------+ +--------------+--------------------+-----------+-------------------+
| Label Format | Description | Status | Reference | | Label Format | Description | Status | Reference |
| Selector | | | | | Specifier | | | |
+---------------+-------------------+------------+------------------+ +--------------+--------------------+-----------+-------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | - | - | | 0 | Reserved | - | - |
| 1 - 127 | Private Use | - | - | | 1 - 127 | Private Use | - | - |
| 128 - 255 | Experimental Use | - | - | | 128 - 255 | Experimental Use | - | - |
| 256 | CIPSO (tag type | active | [[CIPSO] URL] | | 256 | CIPSO (tag type | active | [[CIPSO] URL] |
| | #1) | | | | | #1) | | |
| 257 | CALIPSO (RFC | active | [[RFC5570] URL] | | 257 | CALIPSO | active | [[RFC5570] URL] |
| | 5570) | | | | | ([RFC5570]) | | |
| 258 | FLASK Security | obsoleted | [[FLASK] URL] | | 258 | FLASK Security | obsoleted | [[FLASK99] URL] |
| | Context | by 263 | | | | Context | by 263 | |
| ... | | | | | ... | | | |
| 263 | FLASK Security | active | [new spec URL] | | 263 | FLASK Security | active | [new spec URL] |
| | Context (v2) | | | | | Context (v2) | | |
| 264 - 65535 | Unassigned | - | - | | 264 - 65535 | Unassigned | - | - |
+---------------+-------------------+------------+------------------+ +--------------+--------------------+-----------+-------------------+
Example Label Format Specifier Updated Ranges Example Label Format Specifier Updated Ranges
Table 2 Table 2
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997. Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[BL73] Bell, D. and L. LaPadula, "Secure Computer Systems:
Mathematical Foundations and Model", Technical Report
M74-244, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, May 1973.
[CIPSO] IETF CIPSO Working Group, "Commercial IP Security Option [CIPSO] IETF CIPSO Working Group, "Commercial IP Security Option
(CIPSO 2.2)", draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecurity-01 (expired), (CIPSO 2.2)", draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecurity-01 (expired),
July 1992. July 1992.
[FIPS-188] [FIPS-188]
US National Institute of Standards and Technology, US National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Standard Security Labels for Information Transfer", "Standard Security Labels for Information Transfer",
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 188, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 188,
September 1994. September 1994.
[FLASK] Spencer, R., Smalley, S., Loscocco, P., Hibler, M., [FLASK99] Spencer, R., Smalley, S., Loscocco, P., Hibler, M.,
Andersen, D., and J. Lepreau, "The Flask Security Andersen, D., and J. Lepreau, "The Flask Security
Architecture: System Support for Diverse Security Architecture: System Support for Diverse Security
Policies", In Proceedings of the Eighth USENIX Security Policies", In Proceedings of the Eighth USENIX Security
Symposium, pages 123-139 , August 1999. Symposium, pages 123-139, August 1999.
[FLASK99b]
Secure Computing Corporation, "Assurance in the Fluke
Microkernel Formal Security Policy Model", Document
00-0930896A001 Rev B, 17 Feb 1999, Secure Computing
Corporation, Roseville, MN, USA, February 1999.
[RFC1108] Kent, S., "Security Options for the Internet Protocol",
RFC 1108, November 1991.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC5570] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common [RFC5570] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)", RFC Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)", RFC
5570, July 2009. 5570, July 2009.
[RFC7204] Haynes, T., "Requirements for Labeled NFS", RFC 7204, [RFC7204] Haynes, T., "Requirements for Labeled NFS", RFC 7204,
April 2014. April 2014.
[RH_MLS] "Multi-Level Security (MLS)", "Deployment, configuration
and administration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, Edition
10", Section 49.6, 2013, <http://docs.redhat.com/docs/
en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/5/html/Deployment_Guide/
sec-mls-ov.html>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
Ran Atkinson contributed the text for IPSO.
Dave Noveck helped detangle the terminology.
Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this [RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this
document as an RFC] document as an RFC]
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
David P. Quigley David P. Quigley
Email: dpquigl@davequigley.com Email: dpquigl@davequigley.com
 End of changes. 28 change blocks. 
104 lines changed or deleted 157 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/