draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-07.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-08.txt 
OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed. OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: August 25, 2013 Ping Identity Expires: September 19, 2013 Ping Identity
M. Jones M.B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
M. Machulak M. Machulak
Newcastle University Newcastle University
February 21, 2013 March 18, 2013
OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Protocol OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-07 draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-08
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic
registration of OAuth Clients at an Authorization Server. registration of OAuth 2.0 Clients at an Authorization Server and
methods for the dynamically registered client to manage its
registration.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 19, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 7
3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 9 4. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 10
4.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth authorization OAuth 2.0 clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth 2.0
server without requiring the two parties to interact beforehand. authorization server without requiring the two parties to interact
Nevertheless, in order for the authorization server to accurately and beforehand. Nevertheless, in order for the authorization server to
securely represent to end-users which client is seeking authorization accurately and securely represent to end-users which client is
to access the end-user's resources, a method for automatic and unique seeking authorization to access the end-user's resources, a method
registration of clients is needed. The OAuth2 authorization for automatic and unique registration of clients is needed. The
framework does not define how the relationship between the Client and OAuth 2.0 authorization framework does not define how the
the Authorization Server is initialized, or how a given client is relationship between the Client and the Authorization Server is
assigned a unique Client Identifier. Historically, this has happened initialized, or how a given client is assigned a unique Client
out-of-band from the OAuth protocol. This draft provides a mechanism Identifier. Historically, this has happened out-of-band from the
for a client to register itself with the Authorization Server, which OAuth 2.0 protocol. This draft provides a mechanism for a client to
can be used to dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and register itself with the Authorization Server, which can be used to
optionally a Client Secret. dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and optionally a Client
Secret.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to
the user during the authorization step. This draft also provides a the user during the authorization step. This draft also provides a
mechanism for the Client to read and update this information after mechanism for the Client to read and update this information after
the initial registration action. the initial registration action.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
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Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by
the Client that it does not understand. the Client that it does not understand.
[[ Editor's note: normative language in the table below is meant to [[ Editor's note: normative language in the table below is meant to
apply to the *client* when sending the request. The paragraph above apply to the *client* when sending the request. The paragraph above
is meant to say that the server must at least accept all parameters is meant to say that the server must at least accept all parameters
and not fail with an error at an unknown parameter, especially if and not fail with an error at an unknown parameter, especially if
it's in the list below. Also, extensions need to explicitly call out it's in the list below. Also, extensions need to explicitly call out
if they're not going to do something with one of these basic if they're not going to do something with one of these basic
parameters instead of just ignoring their existence. This is meant parameters instead of just ignoring their existence. This is meant
to be the *minimum set* of parameters for interoperability. ]] to be the *minimum set* of parameters for interoperability. ]]
redirect_uris redirect_uris
RECOMMENDED. Array of redirect URIs for use in the Authorization RECOMMENDED. Array of redirect URIs for use in the Authorization
Code and Implicit grant types. An Authorization Server SHOULD Code and Implicit grant types. An Authorization Server SHOULD
require registration of valid redirect URIs for all clients that require registration of valid redirect URIs for all clients that
use these grant types in order to protect against token and use these grant types in order to protect against token and
credential theft attacks. credential theft attacks.
client_name client_name
RECOMMENDED. Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to RECOMMENDED. Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to
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to the End-User if it is given. to the End-User if it is given.
token_endpoint_auth_method token_endpoint_auth_method
OPTIONAL. The requested authentication type for the Token OPTIONAL. The requested authentication type for the Token
Endpoint. Valid values are: Endpoint. Valid values are:
* "none": this is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0 and * "none": this is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0 and
does not have a client secret does not have a client secret
* "client_secret_post": the client uses the HTTP POST parameters * "client_secret_post": the client uses the HTTP POST parameters
defined in OAuth2.0 section 2.3.1 defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
* "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in * "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in
OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1 OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
* "client_secret_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile * "client_secret_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile
with a symmetric secret issued by the server with a symmetric secret issued by the server
* "private_key_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile * "private_key_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile
with its own private key with its own private key
Other authentication methods may be defined by extension. If Other authentication methods may be defined by extension. If
unspecified or omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic", unspecified or omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic",
denoting HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as specified in Section denoting HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as specified in
2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0. Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
scope scope
OPTIONAL. Space separated list of scope values (as described in OPTIONAL. Space separated list of scope values (as described in
OAuth 2.0 Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client is declaring that OAuth 2.0 Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client is declaring that
it may use when requesting access tokens. If omitted, an it may use when requesting access tokens. If omitted, an
Authorization Server MAY register a Client with a default set of Authorization Server MAY register a Client with a default set of
scopes. scopes.
grant_type grant_types
OPTIONAL. Array of grant types that a client may use. These OPTIONAL. Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that the Client may use.
grant types are defined as follows: These grant types are defined as follows:
* "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in * "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in
OAuth2 Section 4.1. OAuth 2.0 Section 4.1.
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth2 Section 4.2. * "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.2.
* "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant * "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
described in OAuth2 Section 4.3 described in OAuth 2.0 Section 4.3
* "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in * "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in
OAuth2 Section 4.4 OAuth 2.0 Section 4.4
* "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth2 * "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth 2.0
Section 6. Section 6.
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer
grant type defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.JWT].
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2
Bearer grant type defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.SAML2].
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
grant type extensions to OAuth2. The extension process is grant type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth2 Section 2.5, and the value of this parameter described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this
MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type" parameter parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type"
defined in the extension. parameter passed to the Token Endpoint defined in the extension.
response_types
OPTIONAL. Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types that the Client
may use. These response types are defined as follows:
* "code": The Authorization Code response described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.1.
* "token": The Implicit response described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.2
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
response type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "response_type"
parameter passed to the Authorization Endpoint defined in the
extension.
policy_uri policy_uri
OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Client provides to the End-User OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Client provides to the End-User
to read about the how the profile data will be used. The to read about the how the profile data will be used. The
Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it
is given. is given.
jwk_uri jwks_uri
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key [JWK] document that OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] document
is used for signing requests, such as requests to the Token that is used for signing requests, such as requests to the Token
Endpoint using the "private_key_jwt" assertion client credential. Endpoint using the "private_key_jwt" assertion client credential.
If the Client registers both "x509_uri" and "jwk_uri", the keys The keys MAY also be used for higher level protocols that require
contained in both formats MUST be the same. signing or encryption.
jwk_encryption_uri 2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key [JWK] that the server
can use to encrypt responses to the Client. If the Client
registers both "jwk_encryption_uri" and "x509_encryption_uri", the
keys contained in both formats MUST be the same.
x509_uri The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different
Certificate chain that is used for signing requests, such as endpoints in the OAuth protocol. However, they are related in that
requests to the Token Endpoint using the "private_key_jwt" the "grant_types" available to a client influence the
assertion client credential. If the Client registers both "response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa.
"x509_uri" and "jwk_uri", the keys contained in both formats MUST For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes
be the same. "authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes
code, as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Code Grant. As such, a server supporting these fields
SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into
an inconsistent state.
x509_encryption_uri The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below.
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or
Certificate chain that the server can use to encrypt responses to +-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
the Client. If the Client registers both "jwk_encryption_uri" and | grant_types value includes: | response_types |
"x509_encryption_uri", the keys contained in both formats MUST be | | value includes: |
the same. +-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| authorization_code | code |
| implicit | token |
| password | (none) |
| client_credentials | (none) |
| refresh_token | (none) |
| urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer | (none) |
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
Extensions and profiles of this specification that introduce new
values to either the "grant_types" or "response_types" parameter MUST
document all correspondences between the parameter types.
3. Client Registration Endpoint 3. Client Registration Endpoint
The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself
with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client
Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security
mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and
and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer /or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
The Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an initial authorization The Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an initial authorization
credential in the form of an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token in credential in the form of an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token in
order to limit registration to only previously authorized parties. order to limit registration to only previously authorized parties.
The method by which this access token is obtained by the registrant The method by which this access token is obtained by the registrant
is generally out-of-band and is out of scope of this specification. is generally out-of-band and is out of scope of this specification.
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Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata
(Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the (Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the
registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values
for any items omitted in the Client Metadata. for any items omitted in the Client Metadata.
The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload
is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top- level members of that JSON object. parameters as top-level members of that JSON object.
For example, a client could send the following registration request For example, a client could send the following registration request
to the Client Registration Endpoint: to the Client Registration Endpoint:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
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construct this URL from component pieces. construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the Client Configuration Depending on deployment characteristics, the Client Configuration
Endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that Endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the Client Registration Endpoint's URL and URL string which combines the Client Registration Endpoint's URL and
the issued client_id for this Client, with the latter as either a the issued client_id for this Client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a Client with the path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a Client with the
Client ID "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a Client Configuration Endpoint Client ID "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a Client Configuration Endpoint
URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3" (path URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3" (path
parameter) or of parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
"https://server.example.com/register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter). In both of these
parameter). In both of these cases, the client simply follows the cases, the client simply follows the URL as given.
URL as given.
These common patterns can help the Server to more easily determine These common patterns can help the Server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the Registration Access Token was issued. against the client to which the Registration Access Token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the Client Registration If desired, the server MAY simply return the Client Registration
Endpoint URL as the Client Configuration Endpoint URL and change Endpoint URL as the Client Configuration Endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
Registration Access Token. Registration Access Token.
4.2. Client Read Request 4.2. Client Read Request
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(Section 2) as returned to the Client from a previous register, read, (Section 2) as returned to the Client from a previous register, read,
or update operation. The Client MUST NOT include the or update operation. The Client MUST NOT include the
"registration_access_token", "registration_client_uri", "expires_at", "registration_access_token", "registration_client_uri", "expires_at",
or "issued_at" fields described in Client Information Response or "issued_at" fields described in Client Information Response
(Section 5.1). (Section 5.1).
Valid values of Client Metadata fields in this request MUST replace, Valid values of Client Metadata fields in this request MUST replace,
not augment, the values previously associated with this Client. not augment, the values previously associated with this Client.
Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the server. Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the server.
The Client MUST include its client_id field in the request, and it The Client MUST include its "client_id" field in the request, and it
MUST be the same as its currently-issued Client Identifier. If the MUST be the same as its currently-issued Client Identifier. If the
client includes its client_secret in the request, then it MUST match client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value
the currently-issued client_secret for that Client. The client MUST of this field MUST match the currently-issued Client Secret for that
NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing client_secret with its own Client. The Client MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
value. Client Secret with its own chosen value.
For all metadata fields, the Authorization Server MAY replace any For all metadata fields, the Authorization Server MAY replace any
invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any
such fields to the Client in the response. such fields to the Client in the response.
For example, a client could send the following request to the Client For example, a client could send the following request to the Client
Registration Endpoint to update the client registration in the above Registration Endpoint to update the client registration in the above
example: example with new information:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1 PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483 Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
{ {
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d", "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback", "redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"], "https://client.example.org/alt"],
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Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483 Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
{ {
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d", "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback", "redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"], "https://client.example.org/alt"],
"scope": "read write dolphin", "scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_type": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"] "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"jwk_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk" "jwk_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk"
"client_name":"My New Example", "client_name":"My New Example",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png" "logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png"
} }
Upon successful update, the Authorization Server responds with an Upon successful update, the Authorization Server responds with an
HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a
payload as described in Client Information Response (Section 5.1). payload as described in Client Information Response (Section 5.1).
The Authorization Server MAY include a new Client Secret and/or The Authorization Server MAY include a new Client Secret and/or
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If the Client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the If the Client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
Authorization Server does not set a default value, the Authorization Authorization Server does not set a default value, the Authorization
Server responds with an error as described in Client Registration Server responds with an error as described in Client Registration
Error Response (Section 5.2). Error Response (Section 5.2).
4.4. Client Delete Request 4.4. Client Delete Request
[[ Editor's note: The utility and nature of this function are still [[ Editor's note: The utility and nature of this function are still
under active discussion. This is a proposed set of functionality under active discussion. This is a proposed set of functionality
that a server MAY choose to implement, else give a 405 response to that a server MAY choose to implement, else give a 405 response to
any client that tries, if it can't support it. ]] any client that tries, if it can't support it. ]]
In order to deprovision itself on the Authorization Server, the In order to deprovision itself on the Authorization Server, the
Client makes an HTTP DELETE request to the Client Configuration Client makes an HTTP DELETE request to the Client Configuration
Endpoint. This request is authenticated by the Registration Access Endpoint. This request is authenticated by the Registration Access
Token issued to the client. Token issued to the client.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1 DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483 Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
A successful delete action will invalidate the client_id, A successful delete action will invalidate the client_id,
client_secret, and registration_access_token for this client, thereby client_secret, and registration_access_token for this client, thereby
preventing the client_id from being used at either the Authorization preventing the client_id from being used at either the Authorization
Endpoint or Token Endpoint of the Authorization Server. The Endpoint or Token Endpoint of the Authorization Server. The
Authorization Server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing Authorization Server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing
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{ {
"registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483", "registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
"registration_client_uri": "registration_client_uri":
"https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3", "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d", "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"expires_at":2893276800 "expires_at":2893276800
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback", "redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"] "https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"scope": "read write dolphin", "scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_type": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"] "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png", "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwk_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk" "jwk_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk"
} }
5.2. Client Registration Error Response 5.2. Client Registration Error Response
When an OAuth error condition occurs, such as the client presenting When an OAuth 2.0 error condition occurs, such as the client
an invalid Registration Access Token, the Authorization Server presenting an invalid Registration Access Token, the Authorization
returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the OAuth 2.0 Server returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the
specification. OAuth 2.0 specification.
When a registration error condition occurs, the Authorization Server When a registration error condition occurs, the Authorization Server
returns an HTTP 400 status code with content type "application/json" returns an HTTP 400 status code with content type "application/json"
consisting of a JSON object [RFC4627] describing the error in the consisting of a JSON object [RFC4627] describing the error in the
response body. response body.
The JSON object contains two members: The JSON object contains two members:
error error
The error code, a single ASCII string. The error code, a single ASCII string.
skipping to change at page 16, line 11 skipping to change at page 16, line 45
"error_description":"The redirect URI of http://sketchy.example.com "error_description":"The redirect URI of http://sketchy.example.com
is not allowed for this server." is not allowed for this server."
} }
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests of IANA. This document makes no requests of IANA.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
[[ Editor's note: Following are some security considerations taken
from the UMA and OpenID Connect source drafts. These need to be
massaged into a properly generic set of considerations. ]]
Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
As this endpoint is an OAuth2 Protected Resource, requests to the As this endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource, requests to the
Registration Endpoint SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to Registration Endpoint SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to
prevent the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though prevent the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though
repeated access attempts. repeated access attempts.
The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self- The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self-
asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the
legitimate Client, which it is trying to impersonate. An legitimate Client, which it is trying to impersonate. An
Authorization Server needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing Authorization Server needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing
risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking they're risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking they're
logging in to the legitimate Client. For instance, an Authorization logging in to the legitimate Client. For instance, an Authorization
skipping to change at page 17, line 24 skipping to change at page 18, line 7
If a Client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding If a Client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
Registration Access Tokens for that client MUST be invalidated at the Registration Access Tokens for that client MUST be invalidated at the
same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
a Client could make requests to the Client Configuration Endpoint a Client could make requests to the Client Configuration Endpoint
where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
because the Client is no longer valid. because the Client is no longer valid.
8. Normative References 8. Normative References
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", May 2012. [JWK] Jones, M.B., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", May 2012.
[OAuth.JWT]
Jones, M.B., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web
Token (JWT) Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-
ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer (work in progress), December 2012.
[OAuth.SAML2]
Campbell, B. and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT)
Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-oauth-
saml2-bearer (work in progress), December 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999. RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
skipping to change at page 17, line 51 skipping to change at page 18, line 44
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
RFC 6749, October 2012. 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012. Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray, to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray,
Domenico Catalano, George Fletcher, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Domenico Catalano, George Fletcher, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler,
Thomas Hardjono, Nat Sakimura, and Christian Scholz. Thomas Hardjono, Nat Sakimura, and Christian Scholz.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
skipping to change at page 18, line 23 skipping to change at page 19, line 16
their input to this document. In particular, the following their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray, to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray,
Domenico Catalano, George Fletcher, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Domenico Catalano, George Fletcher, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler,
Thomas Hardjono, Nat Sakimura, and Christian Scholz. Thomas Hardjono, Nat Sakimura, and Christian Scholz.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-08
o Collapsed jwk_uri, jwk_encryption_uri, x509_uri, and
x509_encryption_uri into a single jwks_uri parameter
o Renamed grant_type to grant_types since it's a plural value
o Formalized name of "OAuth 2.0" throughout document
o Added JWT Bearer Assertion and SAML 2 Bearer Assertion to example
grant types
o Added response_types parameter and explanatory text on its use
with and relationship to grant_types
-07 -07
o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri
o Fixed missing text in 5.1 o Fixed missing text in 5.1
o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples
o Changed "no such client" error to 403 o Changed "no such client" error to 403
skipping to change at page 21, line 6 skipping to change at page 22, line 4
o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration o Removed pull-based registration
-00 -00
o Imported original UMA draft specification o Imported original UMA draft specification
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor) Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation
Phone:
Fax:
Email: jricher@mitre.org Email: jricher@mitre.org
URI:
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
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