draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-12.txt 
OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed. OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: November 25, 2013 Ping Identity Expires: December 08, 2013 Ping Identity
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
M. Machulak M. Machulak
Newcastle University Newcastle University
May 24, 2013 June 06, 2013
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11 draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-12
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic
registration of OAuth 2.0 Clients at an Authorization Server and registration of OAuth 2.0 Clients at an Authorization Server and
methods for the dynamically registered client to manage its methods for the dynamically registered client to manage its
registration. registration.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 08, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Registration Tokens and Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Client Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . . . . 6
1.4.1. Open Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4.1. Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.2. Protected Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.3. Developer Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 10
2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 13 3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 15
4. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 18 4.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.1. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry . . 22
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry . . . 25 6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Appendix B. Client Lifecycle Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 B.1. Open Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 B.2. Protected Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 B.3. Developer Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth 2.0 clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth 2.0 OAuth 2.0 clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth 2.0
authorization server without requiring the two parties to interact authorization server without requiring the two parties to interact
beforehand. Nevertheless, for the authorization server to accurately beforehand. Nevertheless, for the authorization server to accurately
and securely represent to end-users which client is seeking and securely represent to end-users which client is seeking
authorization to access the end-user's resources, a method for authorization to access the end-user's resources, a method for
automatic and unique registration of clients is needed. The OAuth automatic and unique registration of clients is needed. The OAuth
2.0 authorization framework does not define how the relationship 2.0 authorization framework does not define how the relationship
between the Client and the Authorization Server is initialized, or between the Client and the Authorization Server is initialized, or
how a given client is assigned a unique Client Identifier. how a given client is assigned a unique Client Identifier.
Historically, this has happened out-of-band from the OAuth 2.0 Historically, this has happened out-of-band from the OAuth 2.0
protocol. This draft provides a mechanism for a client to register protocol. This draft provides a mechanism for a client to register
itself with the Authorization Server, which can be used to itself with the Authorization Server, which can be used to
dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and optionally a Client dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and optionally a Client
Secret. Secret. Additionally, the mechanisms in this draft may can be used
by a client developer to register the client with the authorization
server in a programmatic fashion.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to
the user during the authorization step. This draft also provides a the user during the authorization step. This draft also provides a
mechanism for the Client to read and update this information after mechanism for the Client to read and update this information after
the initial registration action. the initial registration action. This draft protects these actions
through the use of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Access Token that is issued to
the client during registration explicitly for this purpose.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive. are case sensitive.
skipping to change at page 4, line 14 skipping to change at page 4, line 9
Client Registration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which a Client Registration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which a
Client can be registered at an Authorization Server. The means by Client can be registered at an Authorization Server. The means by
which the URL for this endpoint are obtained are out of scope for which the URL for this endpoint are obtained are out of scope for
this specification. this specification.
Client Configuration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which Client Configuration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which
registration information for a registered Client can be managed. registration information for a registered Client can be managed.
This URL for this endpoint is returned by the Authorization Server This URL for this endpoint is returned by the Authorization Server
in the Client Information Response. in the Client Information Response.
Registration Access Token OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the Registration Access Token OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the
Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint that Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint that
is used to authenticate the caller when accessing the Client's is used to authenticate the caller when accessing the Client's
registration information at the Client Configuration Endpoint. registration information at the Client Configuration Endpoint.
This Access Token is associated with a particular registered This Access Token is associated with a particular registered
Client. Client.
Initial Access Token OAuth 2.0 Access Token optionally issued by an
Authorization Server and used to authorize calls to the Client
Registration Endpoint. The means by which the Authorization
Server issues this token as well as the means by which the
Registration Endpoint validates this token are out of scope for
this specification.
Initial Access Token An OAuth 2.0 Access Token optionally issued by 1.3. Protocol Flow
an Authorization Server granting access to its Client Registration
Endpoint.
1.3. Registration Tokens and Credentials (preamble)
+--------(A)- Initial Access Token
|
v
+-----------+ +---------------+
| |--(B)- Client Registration Request -->| Client |
| | | Registration |
| |<-(C)- Client Information Response ---| Endpoint |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| Client or |--(D)- Read or Update Request ------->| |
| Developer | | |
| |<-(E)- Client Information Response ---| Client |
| | | Configuration |
| | | Endpoint |
| | | |
| |--(F)- Delete Request --------------->| |
| | | |
| |<-(G)- Delete Confirmation -----------| |
+-----------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow
The abstract OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration flow illustrated
in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the Client or Developer
and the two Endpoints defined in this specification. This figure
does not demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the
following steps:
(A)
Optionally, the Client or Developer is issued an Initial Access
Token for use with the Client Registration Endpoint. The method
by which the Initial Access Token is issued to the Client or
Developer is out of scope for this specification.
(B)
The Client or Developer calls the Client Registration Endpoint
with its desired registration metadata, optionally including the
Initial Access Token from (A) if one is required by the
Authorization Server.
(C)
The Authorization Server registers the Client and returns the
client's registered metadata, a Client Identifier that is unique
at the server, a set of Client Credentials such as a Client Secret
if applicable for this Client, a URI pointing to the Client
Configuration Endpoint, and a Registration Access Token to be used
when calling the Client Configuration Endpoint.
(D)
The Client or Developer optionally calls the Client Configuration
Endpoint with a Read or Update request using the Registration
Access Token issued in (C). An Update request contains all of the
client's registered metadata.
(E)
The Authorization Server responds with the Client's current
configuration, potentially including a new Registration Access
Token and a new set of Client Credentials such as a Client Secret
if applicable for this Client. If a new Registration Access Token
is issued, it replaces the token issued in (C) for all subsequent
calls to the Client Configuration Endpoint.
(F)
The Client or Developer optionally calls the Client Configuration
Endpoint with a Delete request using the Registration Access Token
issued in (C).
(G)
The Authorization Server deprovisions the client and responds with
a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.
Further discussion of possible example lifecycles are found in the
Appendix to this specification, Client Lifecycle Examples
(Appendix B).
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials
Throughout the course of the Dynamic Registration protocol, there are Throughout the course of the Dynamic Registration protocol, there are
three different classes of credentials in play, each with different three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
properties and targets. properties and targets.
o The Initial Access Token is optionally used by the Client or o The Initial Access Token is optionally used by the Client or
Developer at the Registration Endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0 Developer at the Registration Endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token that is used to authorize the initial Client Token that is used to authorize the initial Client Registration
Registration Request. The content, structure, generation, and Request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of
validation of this token are out of scope for this specification. this token are out of scope for this specification. The
The Authorization Server can use this token to verify that the Authorization Server can use this token to verify that the
presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. The presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This
Authorization Server can also use this token to tie multiple token may be shared between multiple instances of a Client to
instances of registered clients (each with their own distinct allow them to each register separately, thereby letting the
Client Identifier) back to the party to whom the Initial Access Authorization Server use this token to tie multiple instances of
Token was issued, usually an application developer. This token registered clients (each with their own distinct Client
may be shared between multiple instances of a Client to allow them Identifier) back to the party to whom the Initial Access Token was
to each register separately. This token should be used only at issued, usually an application developer. This token should be
the Client Registration Endpoint. used only at the Client Registration Endpoint.
o The Registration Access Token is used by the Client or Developer o The Registration Access Token is used by the Client or Developer
at the Client Configuration Endpoint and represents the holder's at the Client Configuration Endpoint and represents the holder's
authorization to manage the registration of a Client. This is an authorization to manage the registration of a Client. This is an
OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token that is issued from the Client Registration OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token that is issued from the Client Registration
Endpoint in response to a Client Registration Request and is Endpoint in response to a Client Registration Request and is
returned in a Client Information Response. The Registration returned in a Client Information Response. The Registration
Access Token is uniquely bound to the Client Identifier and is Access Token is uniquely bound to the Client Identifier and is
required to be presented with all calls to the Client required to be presented with all calls to the Client
Configuration Endpoint. The Registration Access Token should be Configuration Endpoint. The Registration Access Token should be
protected and should not be shared between instances of a client protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
skipping to change at page 5, line 26 skipping to change at page 7, line 5
depending on the type of Client and are used to retrieve OAuth depending on the type of Client and are used to retrieve OAuth
tokens. Client Credentials are usually bound to particular tokens. Client Credentials are usually bound to particular
instances of a Client and should not be shared between instances. instances of a Client and should not be shared between instances.
Since not all types of Clients have Client Credentials, they Since not all types of Clients have Client Credentials, they
cannot be used to manage client registrations. The Client cannot be used to manage client registrations. The Client
Credentials can be rotated through the use of the client read and Credentials can be rotated through the use of the client read and
update methods on the Client Configuration Endpoint. The Client update methods on the Client Configuration Endpoint. The Client
Credentials should not be used for authentication at the Client Credentials should not be used for authentication at the Client
Registration Endpoint or at the Client Configuration endpoint. Registration Endpoint or at the Client Configuration endpoint.
1.4. Client Lifecycle 1.4.1. Credential Rotation
In the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749], a Client is identified by
its own unique Client Identifier ("client_id") at each Authorization
Server that it associates with. Dynamic Registration as defined in
this document is one way for a Client to get a Client Identifier and
associate a set of metadata with that identifier. Lack of such a
Client Identifier is the expected trigger for a client registration
operation.
In many cases, this Client Identifier is a unique, pairwise
association between a particular running instance of a piece of
Client software and a particular running instance of an Authorization
Server software. In particular:
o A single instance of Client software (such as a Web server)
talking to multiple Authorization Servers will need to register
with each Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct
Client Identifier with each Authorization Server. The Client can
not make any assumption of correlation on the part of the
Authorization Server without further specifications, profiles, and
extensions to this specification document.
o Multiple instances of Client software (such as a native
application installed on multiple devices simultaneously) talking
to the same Authorization Server will need to each register with
that Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct Client
Identifier for each copy of the application. The Authorization
Server cannot make any assumption of correlation between these
clients without further specifications, profiles, and extensions
to this specification document.
A Client Identifier (and its associated credentials) could also be
shared between multiple instances of a Client. Mechanisms for
sharing Client Identifiers between multiple instances of a piece of
software (either Client or Authorization Server) are outside the
scope of this specification, as it is expected that every successful
registration request (Section 3.1) results in the issuance of a new
Client Identifier.
There are several patterns of OAuth Client registration that this
protocol can enable. The following non-normative example lifecycle
descriptions are not intended to be an exhaustive list. It is
assumed that the Authorization Server supports the Dynamic
Registration protocol and that all necessary discovery steps (which
are out of scope for this specification) have already been performed.
1.4.1. Open Registration
Open Registration, with no authentication on the Registration
Endpoint, works as follows:
a. A Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
b. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server and includes its metadata.
c. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
d. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
e. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any valid OAuth 2.0
flow.
f. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any changed metadata values.
Its "client_id" will remain the same.
g. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
h. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
1.4.2. Protected Registration
An Authorization Server may require an Initial Access Token for
requests to its Registration Endpoint. While the method by which a
Client receives this Initial Access Token and the method by which the
Authorization Server validates this Initial Access Token are out of
scope for this specification, a common approach is for the Developer
to use a manual pre-registration portal at the Authorization Server
that issues an Initial Access Token to the Developer. This allows
the Developer to package the Initial Access Token with different
instances of the application. While each copy of the application
would get its own Client Identifier (and Registration Access Token),
all instances of the application would be tied back to the Developer
by their use of this initial registration token.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will dynamically register
at runtime, but that the Authorization Server requires
authorization the registration endpoint.
b. The Developer visits a manual pre-registration page at the
Authorization Server and is issued an Initial Access Token in the
form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750].
c. The Developer packages that token with all instances of the
Client application.
d. The Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
e. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server with its metadata, and the
Initial Access Token as its authorization.
f. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
g. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
h. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
i. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any metadata values
registered to that client, some of which may have changed. Its
"client_id" will remain the same.
j. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. The response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
k. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
1.4.3. Developer Automation
The Dynamic Registration protocol can also be used in place of a
manual registration portal, for instance as part of an automated
build and deployment process. An Authorization Server may require an
Initial Access Token for requests to its Registration Endpoint, as
described in Protected Registration (Section 1.4.2). However, in
this scenario, the Developer manages the Client's registration
instead of the Client itself. Therefore, the initial registration
token and Registration Access Token all remain with the Developer.
The Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client as part
of its build process.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will not dynamically
register at runtime.
b. If required for registrations at the Authorization Server, the
Developer visits a manual pre-registration page at the
Authorization Server and is issued an Initial Access Token in the
form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750].
c. The Developer configures his build environment to send an HTTP
POST request to the Client Registration Endpoint at the
Authorization Server with the Client's metadata, using the
Initial Access Token obtained the previous step as an OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token [RFC6750], if needed.
d. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Developer along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
e. The Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client and
stores the "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri" in the deployment system.
f. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
g. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Developer's deployment system sends an HTTP GET
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response
will contain the Client's refreshed "client_secret" along with
any changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the
same. These new values will then be packaged and shipped to or
retrieved by instances of the Client, if necessary.
h. If the Developer needs to update its configuration on the The Authorization Server MAY rotate the Client's Registration Access
Authorization Server, the deployment system sends an HTTP PUT Token and/or Client Credentials (such as a client_secret) throughout
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the the lifetime of the Client. The Client is informed of the changed
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response values changing by making calls either Read or Update requests to the
will contain the Client's changed metadata values. Its Client Configuration Endpoint, and the new values of the Registration
"client_id" will remain the same. These new values will then be Access Token and the Client Credentials will be included in the
packaged and shipped to or retrieved by instances of the Client, Client Information Response.
if necessary.
i. If the Client is deprovisioned, the Developer's deployment system The Registration Access Token SHOULD be rotated only in response to a
can send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" Read or Update request to the Client Configuration Endpoint, at which
with the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This point the new Registration Access Token is returned to the Client and
will effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization the old Registration Access Token SHOULD be discarded by both
Server and prevent any instances of the client from functioning. parties.
2. Client Metadata 2. Client Metadata
Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their
unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can
range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to
items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of
valid redirect URIs. valid redirect URIs.
The client metadata values serve two parallel purposes in the overall The client metadata values serve two parallel purposes in the overall
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range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to
items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of
valid redirect URIs. valid redirect URIs.
The client metadata values serve two parallel purposes in the overall The client metadata values serve two parallel purposes in the overall
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration protocol: OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration protocol:
o the Client requesting its desired values for each parameter to the o the Client requesting its desired values for each parameter to the
Authorization Server in a register (Section 3.1) or update Authorization Server in a register (Section 3.1) or update
(Section 4.3) request, and (Section 4.3) request, and
o the Authorization Server informing the Client of the current o the Authorization Server informing the Client of the current
values of each parameter that the Client has been registered to values of each parameter that the Client has been registered to
use through a client information response (Section 5.1). use through a client information response (Section 5.1).
An Authorization Server MAY override any value that a Client requests An Authorization Server MAY override any value that a Client requests
during the registration process (including any omitted values) and during the registration process (including any omitted values) and
replace the requested value with a default at the server's replace the requested value with a default at the server's
discretion. The Authorization Server SHOULD provide documentation discretion. The Authorization Server SHOULD provide documentation
for any fields that it requires to be filled in by the client or to for any fields that it requires to be filled in by the client or to
have particular values or formats. have particular values or formats. An Authorization Server MAY
ignore the values in any field in this list.
Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list, Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list,
but Authorization Servers MUST accept or ignore all parameters on and Authorization Servers MUST accept all fields in this list. The
this list. The Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by
parameters sent by the Client that it does not understand. the Client that it does not understand.
redirect_uris redirect_uris
Array of redirect URIs for use in redirect-based flows such as the Array of redirect URIs for use in redirect-based flows such as the
Authorization Code and Implicit grant types. It is RECOMMENDED Authorization Code and Implicit grant types. It is RECOMMENDED
that clients using these flows register this parameter, and an that clients using these flows register this parameter, and an
Authorization Server SHOULD require registration of valid redirect Authorization Server SHOULD require registration of valid redirect
URIs for all clients that use these grant types to protect against URIs for all clients that use these grant types to protect against
token and credential theft attacks. token and credential theft attacks.
client_name client_name
Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to the user. If Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to the user. If
omitted, the Authorization Server MAY display the raw "client_id" omitted, the Authorization Server MAY display the raw "client_id"
value to the user instead. It is RECOMMENDED that clients always value to the user instead. It is RECOMMENDED that clients always
send this field. The value of this field MAY be internationalized send this field. The value of this field MAY be internationalized
as described in Human Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2). as described in Human Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
client_uri client_uri
URL of the homepage of the Client. If present, the server SHOULD URL of the homepage of the Client. If present, the server SHOULD
display this URL to the end user in a clickable fashion. It is display this URL to the end user in a clickable fashion. It is
RECOMMENDED that clients always send this field. The value of RECOMMENDED that clients always send this field. The value of
this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this
field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable
Client Metadata (Section 2.2). Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
logo_uri logo_uri
URL that references a logo for the Client. If present, the server URL that references a logo for the Client. If present, the server
SHOULD display this image to the end user during approval. The SHOULD display this image to the end user during approval. The
value of this field MUST point to a valid image file. The value value of this field MUST point to a valid image file. The value
of this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human of this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human
Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2). Readable Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
contacts contacts
Array of email addresses for people responsible for this Client. Array of email addresses for people responsible for this Client.
The Authorization Server MAY make these addresses available to end The Authorization Server MAY make these addresses available to end
users for support requests for the Client. An Authorization users for support requests for the Client. An Authorization
Server MAY use these email addresses as identifiers for an Server MAY use these email addresses as identifiers for an
administrative page for this client. administrative page for this client.
tos_uri tos_uri
URL that points to a human-readable Terms of Service document for URL that points to a human-readable Terms of Service document for
the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to
the End-User if it is given. The Terms of Service usually the End-User if it is given. The Terms of Service usually
describe a contractual relationship between the End-User and the describe a contractual relationship between the End-User and the
Client that the End-User accepts when authorizing the Client. The Client that the End-User accepts when authorizing the Client. The
value of this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of value of this field MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of
this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable this field MAY be internationalized as described in Human Readable
Client Metadata (Section 2.2). Client Metadata (Section 2.2).
policy_uri policy_uri
URL that points to a human-readable Policy document for the URL that points to a human-readable Policy document for the
Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the
End-User if it is given. The Policy usually describes how an End- End-User if it is given. The Policy usually describes how an End-
User's data will be used by the Client. The value of this field User's data will be used by the Client. The value of this field
MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this field MAY be MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this field MAY be
internationalized as described in Human Readable Client Metadata internationalized as described in Human Readable Client Metadata
(Section 2.2). (Section 2.2).
token_endpoint_auth_method token_endpoint_auth_method
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MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this field MAY be MUST point to a valid Web page. The value of this field MAY be
internationalized as described in Human Readable Client Metadata internationalized as described in Human Readable Client Metadata
(Section 2.2). (Section 2.2).
token_endpoint_auth_method token_endpoint_auth_method
The requested authentication method for the Token Endpoint. The requested authentication method for the Token Endpoint.
Values defined by this specification are: Values defined by this specification are:
* "none": The client is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0 * "none": The client is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0
and does not have a client secret. and does not have a client secret.
* "client_secret_post": The client uses the HTTP POST parameters * "client_secret_post": The client uses the HTTP POST parameters
defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1. defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1.
* "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in * "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in
OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1 OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
Additional values can be defined via the IANA OAuth Token Endpoint Additional values can be defined via the IANA OAuth Token Endpoint
Authentication Methods registry Section 6.1. Absolute URIs can Authentication Methods registry Section 6.1. Absolute URIs can
also be used as values for this parameter. If unspecified or also be used as values for this parameter. If unspecified or
omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic", denoting HTTP Basic omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic", denoting HTTP Basic
Authentication Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0. Authentication Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
scope scope
Space separated list of scope values (as described in OAuth 2.0 Space separated list of scope values (as described in OAuth 2.0
Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client can use when requesting Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client can use when requesting
access tokens. The semantics of values in this list is service access tokens. The semantics of values in this list is service
specific. If omitted, an Authorization Server MAY register a specific. If omitted, an Authorization Server MAY register a
Client with a default set of scopes. Client with a default set of scopes.
grant_types grant_types
Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that the Client may use. These Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that the Client may use. These
grant types are defined as follows: grant types are defined as follows:
* "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in * "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.1 OAuth 2.0 Section 4.1
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth 2.0
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth 2.0 Section Section 4.2
4.2
* "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant * "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 4.3 described in OAuth 2.0 Section 4.3
* "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in * "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.4 OAuth 2.0 Section 4.4
* "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth 2.0 * "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth 2.0
Section 6. Section 6.
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer * "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer
grant type defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles grant type defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.JWT]. [OAuth.JWT].
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2 * "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2
Bearer grant type defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token Profiles Bearer grant type defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token Profiles
[OAuth.SAML2]. [OAuth.SAML2].
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
grant type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is grant type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5. If the Token Endpoint is used
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type" in the grant type, the value of this parameter MUST be the same as
parameter passed to the Token Endpoint defined in the extension. the value of the "grant_type" parameter passed to the Token
Endpoint defined in the extension.
response_types response_types
Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types that the Client may use. Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types that the Client may use.
These response types are defined as follows: These response types are defined as follows:
* "code": The Authorization Code response described in OAuth 2.0 * "code": The Authorization Code response described in OAuth 2.0
Section 4.1. Section 4.1.
* "token": The Implicit response described in OAuth 2.0
* "token": The Implicit response described in OAuth 2.0 Section Section 4.2.
4.2.
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
response type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is response type extensions to OAuth 2.0. The extension process is
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5, and the value of this
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "response_type" parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "response_type"
parameter passed to the Authorization Endpoint defined in the parameter passed to the Authorization Endpoint defined in the
extension. extension.
jwks_uri jwks_uri
URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] document representing URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] document representing
the client's public keys. The value of this field MUST point to a the client's public keys. The value of this field MUST point to a
valid JWK Set. These keys MAY also be used for higher level valid JWK Set. These keys MAY also be used for higher level
protocols that require signing or encryption. protocols that require signing or encryption.
2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types 2.1. Relationship Between Grant Types and Response Types
The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are
partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different
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"response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa. "response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa.
For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes
"authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes "authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes
code, as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0 code, as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Code Grant. As such, a server supporting these fields Authorization Code Grant. As such, a server supporting these fields
SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into
an inconsistent state. an inconsistent state.
The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below. The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below.
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
| grant_types value includes: | response_types | | grant_types value includes: | response_types |
| | value includes: | | | value includes: |
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
| authorization_code | code | | authorization_code | code |
| implicit | token | | implicit | token |
| password | (none) | | password | (none) |
| client_credentials | (none) | | client_credentials | (none) |
| refresh_token | (none) | | refresh_token | (none) |
| urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer | (none) | | urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer | (none) |
| urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer | (none) | | urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer | (none) |
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+-----------------+
Extensions and profiles of this document that introduce new values to Extensions and profiles of this document that introduce new values to
either the "grant_types" or "response_types" parameter MUST document either the "grant_types" or "response_types" parameter MUST document
all correspondences between these two parameter types. all correspondences between these two parameter types.
2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata 2.2. Human Readable Client Metadata
Human-readable Client Metadata values and Client Metadata values that Human-readable Client Metadata values and Client Metadata values that
reference human-readable values MAY be represented in multiple reference human-readable values MAY be represented in multiple
languages and scripts. For example, the values of fields such as languages and scripts. For example, the values of fields such as
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names, it is not a valid character for use in an object member name names, it is not a valid character for use in an object member name
in many programming environments. Therefore, implementations will in many programming environments. Therefore, implementations will
need to use alternative access forms for these claims. For instance, need to use alternative access forms for these claims. For instance,
in JavaScript, if one parses the JSON as follows, "var j = in JavaScript, if one parses the JSON as follows, "var j =
JSON.parse(json);", then the member "client_name#en-us" can be JSON.parse(json);", then the member "client_name#en-us" can be
accessed using the JavaScript syntax "j["client_name#en-us"]". accessed using the JavaScript syntax "j["client_name#en-us"]".
3. Client Registration Endpoint 3. Client Registration Endpoint
The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself this document that is designed to allow a Client to be registered
with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client
Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security
mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and
and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer /or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
The Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an Initial Access Token The Client Registration Endpoint MAY be an OAuth 2.0 Protected
in the form of an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token to limit Resource and accept an Initial Access Token in the form of an OAuth
registration to only previously authorized parties. The method by 2.0 [RFC6749] access token to limit registration to only previously
which the Initial Access Token is obtained by the registrant is authorized parties. The method by which the Initial Access Token is
generally out-of-band and is out of scope of this specification. obtained by the registrant is generally out-of-band and is out of
scope for this specification. The method by which the Initial Access
Token is verified and validated by the Client Registration Endpoint
is out of scope for this specification.
To support open registration and facilitate wider interoperability, To support open registration and facilitate wider interoperability,
the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow initial registration the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow initial registration
requests with no authentication. These requests MAY be rate-limited requests with no authorization (which is to say, with no OAuth 2.0
or otherwise limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the access token in the request). These requests MAY be rate-limited or
Client Registration Endpoint. otherwise limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the Client
Registration Endpoint.
To facilitate registered clients updating their information, the To allow registered clients to manage their information, the Client
Client Registration Endpoint issues a Request Access Token for Registration Endpoint issues a Request Access Token as an OAuth 2.0
clients to securely identify themselves in future connections to the Bearer Token [RFC6750] to securely authorize calls to the Client
Client Configuration Endpoint (Section 4). As such, the Client Configuration Endpoint (Section 4).
Configuration Endpoint MUST accept requests with OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Tokens [RFC6750] for these operations, whether or not the initial
registration call requires authentication of some form.
The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does
not understand. not understand.
3.1. Client Registration Request 3.1. Client Registration Request
This operation registers a new Client to the Authorization Server. This operation registers a new Client to the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client
Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata
(Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the (Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the
registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values
for any items omitted in the Client Metadata. for any items omitted in the Client Metadata.
The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP Entity Payload
is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top-level members of that JSON object. parameters as top-level members of that JSON object.
For example, a client could send the following open registration For example, if the server supports open registration (with no
request to the Client Registration Endpoint: Initial Access Token), the Client could send the following
registration request to the Client Registration Endpoint:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
{ {
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"https://client.example.org/callback2"] "https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"client_name":"My Example Client", "client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP": "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D", "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic",
"scope":"read write dolphin", "scope":"read write dolphin",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png", "logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks" "jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
} }
Alternatively, if the developer or the client has been provisioned Alternatively, if the server supports authorized registration, the
with an Initial Access Token, he or it sends the following developer or the client will be provisioned with an Initial Access
registration request to the Client Registration Endpoint. The method Token (the method by which the Initial Access Token is obtained is
by which the Initial Access Token is obtained is out of scope for out of scope for this specification). The developer or client sends
this specification. the following authorized registration request to the Client
Registration Endpoint, with the Initial Access Token sent in this
example as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750]:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Authorization: Bearer ey23f2.adfj230.af32-developer321 Authorization: Bearer ey23f2.adfj230.af32-developer321
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
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construct this URL from component pieces. construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the Client Configuration Depending on deployment characteristics, the Client Configuration
Endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that Endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the Client Registration Endpoint's URL and URL string which combines the Client Registration Endpoint's URL and
the issued "client_id" for this Client, with the latter as either a the issued "client_id" for this Client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a Client with the path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a Client with the
Client ID "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a Client Configuration Endpoint Client ID "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a Client Configuration Endpoint
URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3" (path URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3" (path
parameter) or of parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
"https://server.example.com/register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter). In both of these
parameter). In both of these cases, the client simply uses the URL cases, the client simply uses the URL as given.
as given.
These common patterns can help the Server to more easily determine These common patterns can help the Server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the Registration Access Token was issued. against the client to which the Registration Access Token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the Client Registration If desired, the server MAY simply return the Client Registration
Endpoint URL as the Client Configuration Endpoint URL and change Endpoint URL as the Client Configuration Endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
Registration Access Token. Registration Access Token.
4.2. Client Read Request 4.2. Client Read Request
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Secret, if the Client is a confidential Client. The response also Secret, if the Client is a confidential Client. The response also
contains the fully qualified URL to the Client Configuration Endpoint contains the fully qualified URL to the Client Configuration Endpoint
for this specific client that the client may use to obtain and update for this specific client that the client may use to obtain and update
information about itself. The response also contains a Registration information about itself. The response also contains a Registration
Access Token that is to be used by the client to perform subsequent Access Token that is to be used by the client to perform subsequent
operations at the Client Configuration Endpoint. operations at the Client Configuration Endpoint.
client_id client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be currently REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be currently
valid for any other registered Client. valid for any other registered Client.
client_secret client_secret
OPTIONAL. The Client secret. If issued, this MUST be unique for OPTIONAL. The Client secret. If issued, this MUST be unique for
each "client_id". This value is used by confidential clients to each "client_id". This value is used by confidential clients to
authenticate to the Token Endpoint as described in OAuth 2.0 authenticate to the Token Endpoint as described in OAuth 2.0
Section 2.3.1. Section 2.3.1.
client_id_issued_at client_id_issued_at
OPTIONAL. Time at which the Client Identifier was issued. The OPTIONAL. Time at which the Client Identifier was issued. The
time is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01- time is represented as the number of seconds from
01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time. 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
client_secret_expires_at client_secret_expires_at
REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. Time at which the REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. Time at which the
"client_secret" will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time "client_secret" will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time
is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as
measured in UTC until the date/time. measured in UTC until the date/time.
registration_access_token registration_access_token
REQUIRED. Access Token that is used at the Client Configuration REQUIRED. Access Token that is used at the Client Configuration
Endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon the Client Endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon the Client
registration. registration.
registration_client_uri registration_client_uri
REQUIRED. The fully qualified URL of the Client Configuration REQUIRED. The fully qualified URL of the Client Configuration
Endpoint for this client. The Client MUST use this URL as given Endpoint for this client. The Client MUST use this URL as given
when communicating with the Client Configuration Endpoint. when communicating with the Client Configuration Endpoint.
Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered
metadata (Section 2) about this client, including any fields metadata (Section 2) about this client, including any fields
provisioned by the Authorization Server itself. The Authorization provisioned by the Authorization Server itself. The Authorization
Server MAY reject or replace any of the client's requested metadata Server MAY reject or replace any of the client's requested metadata
values submitted during the registration or update requests and values submitted during the registration or update requests and
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Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
As this endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource, requests to the Since the Client Configuration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Registration Endpoint SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to Resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
prevent the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though repeated
repeated access attempts. access attempts.
For clients that use redirect-based grant types such as Authorization For clients that use redirect-based grant types such as Authorization
Code and Implicit, Authorization Servers SHOULD require clients to Code and Implicit, Authorization Servers SHOULD require clients to
register their "redirect_uris". Requiring Clients to do so can help register their "redirect_uris". Requiring Clients to do so can help
mitigate attacks where rogue actors inject and impersonate a validly mitigate attacks where rogue actors inject and impersonate a validly
registered client and intercept its authorization code or tokens registered client and intercept its authorization code or tokens
through an invalid redirect URI. through an invalid redirect URI.
The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self- The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self-
asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the
skipping to change at page 27, line 48 skipping to change at page 24, line 42
Server could warn if the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the Server could warn if the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the
domain/site of redirect URIs. An Authorization Server can also domain/site of redirect URIs. An Authorization Server can also
present warning messages to end users about untrusted Clients in all present warning messages to end users about untrusted Clients in all
cases, especially if such clients have been dynamically registered cases, especially if such clients have been dynamically registered
and have not been trusted by any users at the Authorization Server and have not been trusted by any users at the Authorization Server
before. before.
In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open
Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL
provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g. provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g.
"logo_uri" and "policy_uri"). A rogue Client could specify a "logo_uri", "tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri"). For
registration request with a reference to a drive-by download in the instance, a rogue Client could specify a registration request with a
"policy_uri". The Authorization Server SHOULD check to see if the reference to a drive-by download in the "policy_uri". The
"logo_uri" and "policy_uri" have the same host as the hosts defined Authorization Server SHOULD check to see if the "logo_uri",
in the array of "redirect_uris" and that all of these resolve to "tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri" have the same host and
valid Web pages. scheme as the those defined in the array of "redirect_uris" and that
all of these resolve to valid Web pages.
While the Client Secret can expire, the Registration Access Token While the Client Secret can expire, the Registration Access Token
should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If
this token were to expire, a developer or Client could be left in a this token were to expire, a developer or Client could be left in a
situation where they have no means of retrieving the Client's situation where they have no means of retrieving the Client's
registration information or updating it. Were that the case, a new registration information or updating it. Were that the case, a new
registration would be required, thereby getting a new Client registration would be required, thereby getting a new Client
Identifier. However, Registration Access Tokens MAY be rotated when Identifier. However, Registration Access Tokens MAY be rotated when
the developer or client does a read or update operation on its Client the developer or client does a read or update operation on its Client
Configuration Endpoint, and the developer or Client MUST use this new Configuration Endpoint, and the developer or Client MUST use this new
Registration Access Token. As the Registration Access Tokens are Registration Access Token. As the Registration Access Tokens are
long-term credentials, and since the Registration Access Token is a long-term credentials, and since the Registration Access Token is a
Bearer token and acts as the sole authentication for use at the Bearer token and acts as the sole authentication for use at the
Client Configuration Endpoint, it MUST be protected by the developer Client Configuration Endpoint, it MUST be protected by the developer
or Client as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer [RFC6750]. or Client as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer [RFC6750].
If a Client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding If a Client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
Registration Access Tokens for that client MUST be invalidated at the Registration Access Token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
a Client could make requests to the Client Configuration Endpoint a Client could make requests to the Client Configuration Endpoint
where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
because the Client is no longer valid. because the Client is no longer valid.
Public clients MAY register with an Authorization Server using this
protocol, if the Authorization Server's policy allows them, by using
a "none" value for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata field
and generally used with the "implicit" grant type. Often these
clients will be short-lived in-browser applications requesting access
to a user's resources and access is tied to a user's active session
at the Authorization Server. Since such clients often do not have
long-term storage, it's possible that such clients would need to re-
register every time the browser application is loaded. To avoid the
resulting proliferation of dead Client Identifiers, an Authorization
Server MAY decide to expire registrations for existing clients
meeting certain criteria after a period of time has elapsed.
8. Normative References 8. Normative References
[IANA.Language] [IANA.Language]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Language Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Language
Subtag Registry", 2005. Subtag Registry", 2005.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), May 2013. key (work in progress), May 2013.
[OAuth.JWT] [OAuth.JWT]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0", (JWT) Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer (work in progress), oauth-jwt-bearer (work in progress), March 2013.
March 2013.
[OAuth.SAML2] [OAuth.SAML2]
Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "SAML 2.0 Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "SAML 2.0
Bearer Assertion Profiles for OAuth 2.0", Bearer Assertion Profiles for OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer (work in progress), oauth-saml2-bearer (work in progress), March 2013.
March 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999. RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
skipping to change at page 29, line 34 skipping to change at page 26, line 37
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying [RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009. Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
RFC 6749, October 2012. 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012. Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray, to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Tim Bray,
Domenico Catalano, George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono,
Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Nov Matake, Nat Sakimura, and Phil Hunt, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake,
Christian Scholz. Nat Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Client Lifecycle Examples
In the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749], a Client is identified by
its own unique Client Identifier ("client_id") at each Authorization
Server that it associates with. Dynamic Registration as defined in
this document is one way for a Client to get a Client Identifier and
associate a set of metadata with that identifier. Lack of such a
Client Identifier is the expected trigger for a client registration
operation.
In many cases, this Client Identifier is a unique, pairwise
association between a particular running instance of a piece of
Client software and a particular running instance of an Authorization
Server software. In particular:
o A single instance of Client software (such as a Web server)
talking to multiple Authorization Servers will need to register
with each Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct
Client Identifier with each Authorization Server. The Client can
not make any assumption that the Authorization Server is
correlating separate instances of the client together without
further profiles and extensions to this specification document.
The means by which a Client discovers and differentiates between
multiple Authorization Servers is out of scope for this
specification.
o Multiple instances of Client software (such as a native
application installed on multiple devices simultaneously) talking
to the same Authorization Server will need to each register with
that Authorization Server separately, creating a distinct Client
Identifier for each copy of the application. The Authorization
Server cannot make any assumption of correlation between these
clients without further specifications, profiles, and extensions
to this specification.
A Client Identifier (and its associated credentials) could also be
shared between multiple instances of a Client. Mechanisms for
sharing Client Identifiers between multiple instances of a piece of
software (either Client or Authorization Server) are outside the
scope of this specification, as it is expected that every successful
registration request (Section 3.1) results in the issuance of a new
Client Identifier.
There are several patterns of OAuth Client registration that this
protocol can enable. The following non-normative example lifecycle
descriptions are not intended to be an exhaustive list. It is
assumed that the Authorization Server supports the Dynamic
Registration protocol and that all necessary discovery steps (which
are out of scope for this specification) have already been performed.
B.1. Open Registration
Open Registration, with no authentication on the Registration
Endpoint, works as follows:
a. A Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
b. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server and includes its metadata.
c. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
d. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
e. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any valid OAuth 2.0
flow.
f. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any changed metadata values.
Its "client_id" will remain the same.
g. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
h. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
B.2. Protected Registration
An Authorization Server may require an Initial Access Token for
requests to its Registration Endpoint. While the method by which a
Client receives this Initial Access Token and the method by which the
Authorization Server validates this Initial Access Token are out of
scope for this specification, a common approach is for the Developer
to use a manual pre-registration portal at the Authorization Server
that issues an Initial Access Token to the Developer. This allows
the Developer to package the Initial Access Token with different
instances of the application. While each copy of the application
would get its own Client Identifier (and Registration Access Token),
all instances of the application would be tied back to the Developer
by their use of this initial registration token.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will dynamically register
at runtime, but that the Authorization Server requires
authorization the registration endpoint.
b. The Developer visits a manual pre-registration page at the
Authorization Server and is issued an Initial Access Token in the
form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750].
c. The Developer packages that token with all instances of the
Client application.
d. The Client needs to get OAuth 2.0 tokens from an Authorization
Server, but the Client does not have a Client Identifier for that
Authorization Server.
e. The Client sends an HTTP POST request to the Client Registration
Endpoint at the Authorization Server with its metadata, and the
Initial Access Token as its authorization.
f. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Client along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
g. The Client stores the returned response from the Authorization
Server. At a minimum, it should know the values of "client_id",
"client_secret" (if present), "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri".
h. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
i. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Client sends an HTTP GET request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. This response will contain the Client's
refreshed "client_secret" along with any metadata values
registered to that client, some of which may have changed. Its
"client_id" will remain the same.
j. If the Client needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, it sends an HTTP PUT request to the
"registration_client_uri" with the "registration_access_token" as
its authorization. The response will contain the Client's
changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the same.
k. If the Client is uninstalled or otherwise deprovisioned, it can
send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri" with
the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This will
effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization Server.
B.3. Developer Automation
The Dynamic Registration protocol can also be used in place of a
manual registration portal, for instance as part of an automated
build and deployment process. An Authorization Server may require an
Initial Access Token for requests to its Registration Endpoint, as
described in Protected Registration (Appendix B.2). However, in this
scenario, the Developer manages the Client's registration instead of
the Client itself. Therefore, the initial registration token and
Registration Access Token all remain with the Developer. The
Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client as part of
the Client's build process.
a. A Developer is creating a Client to use an Authorization Server
and knows that instances of the Client will not dynamically
register at runtime.
b. If required for registrations at the Authorization Server, the
Developer performs an OAuth 2.0 authorization of his build
environment against the Authorization Server. The Authorization
Server and is issues an Initial Access Token to the Developer's
build environment in the form of an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
[RFC6750].
c. The Developer configures his build environment to send an HTTP
POST request to the Client Registration Endpoint at the
Authorization Server with the Client's metadata, using the
Initial Access Token obtained the previous step as an OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token [RFC6750], if needed.
d. The Authorization Server issues a Client Identifier and returns
it to the Developer along with a Registration Access Token and a
reference to the Client's Client Configuration Endpoint.
e. The Developer packages the Client Identifier with the Client and
stores the "registration_access_token", and
"registration_client_uri" in the deployment system.
f. The Client uses the its "client_id" and "client_secret" (if
provided) to request OAuth 2.0 tokens using any supported OAuth
2.0 flow.
g. If the Client's "client_secret" expires or otherwise stops
working, the Developer's deployment system sends an HTTP GET
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response
will contain the Client's refreshed "client_secret" along with
any changed metadata values. Its "client_id" will remain the
same. These new values will then be packaged and shipped to or
retrieved by instances of the Client, if necessary.
h. If the Developer needs to update its configuration on the
Authorization Server, the deployment system sends an HTTP PUT
request to the "registration_client_uri" with the
"registration_access_token" as its authorization. This response
will contain the Client's changed metadata values. Its
"client_id" will remain the same. These new values will then be
packaged and shipped to or retrieved by instances of the Client,
if necessary.
i. If the Client is deprovisioned, the Developer's deployment system
can send an HTTP DELETE request to the "registration_client_uri"
with the "registration_access_token" as its authorization. This
will effectively deprovision the client from the Authorization
Server and prevent any instances of the client from functioning.
Appendix C. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-12
o Improved definition of Initial Access Token
o Changed developer registration scenario to have the Initial Access
Token gotten through a normal OAuth 2.0 flow
o Moved non-normative client lifecycle examples to appendix
o Marked differentiating between auth servers as out of scope
o Added protocol flow diagram
o Added credential rotation discussion
o Called out Client Registration Endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Resource
o Cleaned up several pieces of text
-11 -11
o Added localized text to registration request and response o Added localized text to registration request and response
examples. examples.
o Removed "client_secret_jwt" and "private_key_jwt". o Removed "client_secret_jwt" and "private_key_jwt".
o Clarified "tos_uri" and "policy_uri" definitions. o Clarified "tos_uri" and "policy_uri" definitions.
o Added the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry for o Added the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry for
registering "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata values. registering "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata values.
o Removed uses of non-ASCII characters, per RFC formatting rules. o Removed uses of non-ASCII characters, per RFC formatting rules.
o Changed "expires_at" to "client_secret_expires_at" and "issued_at" o Changed "expires_at" to "client_secret_expires_at" and "issued_at"
to "client_id_issued_at" for greater clarity. to "client_id_issued_at" for greater clarity.
o Added explanatory text for different credentials (Initial Access o Added explanatory text for different credentials (Initial Access
Token, Registration Access Token, Client Credentials) and what Token, Registration Access Token, Client Credentials) and what
they're used for. they're used for.
o Added Client Lifecycle discussion and examples. o Added Client Lifecycle discussion and examples.
o Defined Initial Access Token in Terminology section. o Defined Initial Access Token in Terminology section.
-10 -10
o Added language to point out that scope values are service-specific o Added language to point out that scope values are service-specific
o Clarified normative language around client metadata o Clarified normative language around client metadata
o Added extensibility to token_endpoint_auth_method using absolute o Added extensibility to token_endpoint_auth_method using absolute
URIs URIs
o Added security consideration about registering redirect URIs o Added security consideration about registering redirect URIs
o Changed erroneous 403 responses to 401's with notes about token o Changed erroneous 403 responses to 401's with notes about token
handling handling
o Added example for initial registration credential o Added example for initial registration credential
-09 -09
o Added method of internationalization for Client Metadata values
o Added method of internationalization for Client Metadata values
o Fixed SAML reference o Fixed SAML reference
-08 -08
o Collapsed jwk_uri, jwk_encryption_uri, x509_uri, and o Collapsed jwk_uri, jwk_encryption_uri, x509_uri, and
x509_encryption_uri into a single jwks_uri parameter x509_encryption_uri into a single jwks_uri parameter
o Renamed grant_type to grant_types since it's a plural value o Renamed grant_type to grant_types since it's a plural value
o Formalized name of "OAuth 2.0" throughout document o Formalized name of "OAuth 2.0" throughout document
o Added JWT Bearer Assertion and SAML 2 Bearer Assertion to example o Added JWT Bearer Assertion and SAML 2 Bearer Assertion to example
grant types grant types
o Added response_types parameter and explanatory text on its use o Added response_types parameter and explanatory text on its use
with and relationship to grant_types with and relationship to grant_types
-07 -07
o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri
o Fixed missing text in 5.1 o Fixed missing text in 5.1
o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples
o Changed "no such client" error to 403 o Changed "no such client" error to 403
o Renamed Client Registration Access Endpoint to Client o Renamed Client Registration Access Endpoint to Client
Configuration Endpoint Configuration Endpoint
o Changed all the parameter names containing "_url" to instead use o Changed all the parameter names containing "_url" to instead use
"_uri" "_uri"
o Updated example text for forming Client Configuration Endpoint URL o Updated example text for forming Client Configuration Endpoint URL
-06 -06
o Removed secret_rotation as a client-initiated action, including o Removed secret_rotation as a client-initiated action, including
removing client secret rotation endpoint and parameters. removing client secret rotation endpoint and parameters.
o Changed _links structure to single value registration_access_url. o Changed _links structure to single value registration_access_url.
o Collapsed create/update/read responses into client info response. o Collapsed create/update/read responses into client info response.
o Changed return code of create action to 201. o Changed return code of create action to 201.
o Added section to describe suggested generation and composition of o Added section to describe suggested generation and composition of
Client Registration Access URL. Client Registration Access URL.
o Added clarifying text to PUT and POST requests to specify JSON in o Added clarifying text to PUT and POST requests to specify JSON in
the body. the body.
o Added Editor's Note to DELETE operation about its inclusion. o Added Editor's Note to DELETE operation about its inclusion.
o Added Editor's Note to registration_access_url about alternate o Added Editor's Note to registration_access_url about alternate
syntax proposals. syntax proposals.
-05 -05
o changed redirect_uri and contact to lists instead of space o changed redirect_uri and contact to lists instead of space
delimited strings delimited strings
o removed operation parameter o removed operation parameter
o added _links structure o added _links structure
o made client update management more RESTful o made client update management more RESTful
o split endpoint into three parts o split endpoint into three parts
o changed input to JSON from form-encoded o changed input to JSON from form-encoded
o added READ and DELETE operations o added READ and DELETE operations
o removed Requirements section o removed Requirements section
o changed token_endpoint_auth_type back to o changed token_endpoint_auth_type back to
token_endpoint_auth_method to match OIDC who changed to match us token_endpoint_auth_method to match OIDC who changed to match us
-04 -04
o removed default_acr, too undefined in the general OAuth2 case o removed default_acr, too undefined in the general OAuth2 case
o removed default_max_auth_age, since there's no mechanism for o removed default_max_auth_age, since there's no mechanism for
supplying a non-default max_auth_age in OAuth2 supplying a non-default max_auth_age in OAuth2
o clarified signing and encryption URLs o clarified signing and encryption URLs
o changed token_endpoint_auth_method to token_endpoint_auth_type to o changed token_endpoint_auth_method to token_endpoint_auth_type to
match OIDC match OIDC
-03 -03
o added scope and grant_type claims
o added scope and grant_type claims
o fixed various typos and changed wording for better clarity o fixed various typos and changed wording for better clarity
o endpoint now returns the full set of client information o endpoint now returns the full set of client information
o operations on client_update allow for three actions on metadata: o operations on client_update allow for three actions on metadata:
leave existing value, clear existing value, replace existing value leave existing value, clear existing value, replace existing value
with new value with new value
-02 -02
o Reorganized contributors and references o Reorganized contributors and references
o Moved OAuth references to RFC o Moved OAuth references to RFC
o Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity o Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity
o Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client o Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client
associate" associate"
o Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent requests o Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent requests
o Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists o Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists
-01 -01
o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document
o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration o Removed pull-based registration
-00 -00
o Imported original UMA draft specification o Imported original UMA draft specification
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor) Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation
skipping to change at page 34, line 10 skipping to change at page 34, line 23
-00 -00
o Imported original UMA draft specification o Imported original UMA draft specification
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor) Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation
Phone:
Fax:
Email: jricher@mitre.org Email: jricher@mitre.org
URI:
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
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