draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-30.txt   rfc7591.txt 
OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft Request for Comments: 7591
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones Category: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: November 29, 2015 Microsoft ISSN: 2070-1721 Microsoft
J. Bradley J. Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
M. Machulak M. Machulak
Newcastle University Newcastle University
P. Hunt P. Hunt
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
May 28, 2015 July 2015
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-30
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering
OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests
send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization
server. The resulting registration responses return a client server. The resulting registration responses return a client
identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata
values registered for the client. The client can then use this values registered for the client. The client can then use this
registration information to communicate with the authorization server registration information to communicate with the authorization server
using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set
of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during
registration. registration.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2015. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Relationship between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 11 2.1. Relationship between Grant Types and Response Types . . . 12
2.2. Human-Readable Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2. Human-Readable Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3. Software Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.3. Software Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1. Client Registration Request Using a Software 3.1.1. Client Registration Request Using a Software
Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2.2. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . 21
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry . . . 22 4.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry . . . 22
4.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry . . 26 4.2. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry . . 27
4.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Appendix A. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.1. Open versus Protected Dynamic Client Registration . . . . 33 A.1. Open versus Protected Dynamic Client Registration . . . . 34
A.1.1. Open Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.1.1. Open Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.1.2. Protected Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . 33 A.1.2. Protected Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . 34
A.2. Registration without or with Software Statements . . . . 34
A.2. Registration Without or With Software Statements . . . . 34 A.2.1. Registration without a Software Statement . . . . . . 34
A.2.1. Registration Without a Software Statement . . . . . . 34 A.2.2. Registration with a Software Statement . . . . . . . 34
A.2.2. Registration With a Software Statement . . . . . . . 34
A.3. Registration by the Client or Developer . . . . . . . . . 34 A.3. Registration by the Client or Developer . . . . . . . . . 34
A.3.1. Registration by the Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 A.3.1. Registration by the Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.3.2. Registration by the Developer . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 A.3.2. Registration by the Developer . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.4. Client ID per Client Instance or per Client Software . . 34 A.4. Client ID per Client Instance or per Client Software . . 35
A.4.1. Client ID per Client Software Instance . . . . . . . 34 A.4.1. Client ID per Client Software Instance . . . . . . . 35
A.4.2. Client ID Shared Among All Instances of Client A.4.2. Client ID Shared among All Instances of Client
Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.5. Stateful or Stateless Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A.5. Stateful or Stateless Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.5.1. Stateful Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A.5.1. Stateful Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.5.2. Stateless Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A.5.2. Stateless Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order for an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] client to utilize an OAuth 2.0 In order for an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] client to utilize an OAuth 2.0
authorization server, the client needs specific information to authorization server, the client needs specific information to
interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to
use at that server. This specification describes how an OAuth 2.0 use at that server. This specification describes how an OAuth 2.0
client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server to client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server to
obtain this information. obtain this information.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the authorization server with a a mechanism for the client to present the authorization server with a
set of metadata, such as a set of valid redirection URIs. This set of metadata, such as a set of valid redirection URIs. This
metadata can either be communicated in a self-asserted fashion or as metadata can either be communicated in a self-asserted fashion or as
a set of metadata called a software statement, which is digitally a set of metadata called a software statement, which is digitally
signed or MACed; in the case of a software statement, the issuer is signed or protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC); in the
vouching for the validity of the data about the client. case of a software statement, the issuer is vouching for the validity
of the data about the client.
Traditionally, registration of a client with an authorization server Traditionally, registration of a client with an authorization server
is performed manually. The mechanisms defined in this specification is performed manually. The mechanisms defined in this specification
can be used either for a client to dynamically register itself with can be used either for a client to dynamically register itself with
authorization servers or for a client developer to programmatically authorization servers or for a client developer to programmatically
register the client with authorization servers. Multiple register the client with authorization servers. Multiple
applications using OAuth 2.0 have previously developed mechanisms for applications using OAuth 2.0 have previously developed mechanisms for
accomplishing such registrations. This specification generalizes the accomplishing such registrations. This specification generalizes the
registration mechanisms defined by the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client registration mechanisms defined by "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration 1.0 [OpenID.Registration] specification and used by the Registration 1.0" [OpenID.Registration] and used by "User Managed
User Managed Access (UMA) Profile of OAuth 2.0 Access (UMA) Profile of OAuth 2.0" [UMA-Core] in a way that is
[I-D.hardjono-oauth-umacore] specification in a way that is
compatible with both, while being applicable to a wider set of OAuth compatible with both, while being applicable to a wider set of OAuth
2.0 use cases. 2.0 use cases.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
skipping to change at page 4, line 34 skipping to change at page 5, line 18
This specification defines the following terms: This specification defines the following terms:
Client Software Client Software
Software implementing an OAuth 2.0 client. Software implementing an OAuth 2.0 client.
Client Instance Client Instance
A deployed instance of a piece of client software. A deployed instance of a piece of client software.
Client Developer Client Developer
The person or organization that builds a client software package The person or organization that builds a client software package
and prepares it for distribution. At the time of building the and prepares it for distribution. At the time the client is
client, the developer is often not aware of who the deploying built, the developer is often not aware of who the deploying
service provider organizations will be. Client developers will service provider organizations will be. Client developers will
need to use dynamic registration when they are unable to predict need to use dynamic registration when they are unable to predict
aspects of the software, such as the deployment URLs, at compile aspects of the software, such as the deployment URLs, at compile
time. For instance, this can occur when the software API time. For instance, this can occur when the software API
publisher and the deploying organization are not the same. publisher and the deploying organization are not the same.
Client Registration Endpoint Client Registration Endpoint
OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which a client can be registered at an OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which a client can be registered at an
authorization server. The means by which the URL for this authorization server. The means by which the URL for this
endpoint is obtained are out of scope for this specification. endpoint is obtained are out of scope for this specification.
Initial Access Token Initial Access Token
OAuth 2.0 access token optionally issued by an authorization OAuth 2.0 access token optionally issued by an authorization
server to a developer or client and used to authorize calls to the server to a developer or client and used to authorize calls to the
client registration endpoint. The type and format of this token client registration endpoint. The type and format of this token
are likely service-specific and are out of scope for this are likely service specific and are out of scope for this
specification. The means by which the authorization server issues specification. The means by which the authorization server issues
this token as well as the means by which the registration endpoint this token as well as the means by which the registration endpoint
validates this token are out of scope for this specification. Use validates this token are out of scope for this specification. Use
of an initial access token is required when the authorization of an initial access token is required when the authorization
server limits the parties that can register a client. server limits the parties that can register a client.
Deployment Organization Deployment Organization
An administrative security domain under which a software API An administrative security domain under which a software API
(service) is deployed and protected by an OAuth 2.0 framework. In (service) is deployed and protected by an OAuth 2.0 framework. In
some OAuth scenarios, the deployment organization and the software some OAuth scenarios, the deployment organization and the software
skipping to change at page 5, line 32 skipping to change at page 6, line 18
Software API Deployment Software API Deployment
A deployed instance of a software API that is protected by OAuth A deployed instance of a software API that is protected by OAuth
2.0 (a protected resource) in a particular deployment organization 2.0 (a protected resource) in a particular deployment organization
domain. For any particular software API, there may be one or more domain. For any particular software API, there may be one or more
deployments. A software API deployment typically has an deployments. A software API deployment typically has an
associated OAuth 2.0 authorization server as well as a client associated OAuth 2.0 authorization server as well as a client
registration endpoint. The means by which endpoints are obtained registration endpoint. The means by which endpoints are obtained
are out of scope for this specification. are out of scope for this specification.
Software API Publisher Software API Publisher
The organization that defines a particular web accessible API that The organization that defines a particular web-accessible API that
may be deployed in one or more deployment environments. A may be deployed in one or more deployment environments. A
publisher may be any standards body, commercial, public, private, publisher may be any standards body, commercial, public, private,
or open source organization that is responsible for publishing and or open source organization that is responsible for publishing and
distributing software and API specifications that may be protected distributing software and API specifications that may be protected
via OAuth 2.0. In some cases, a software API publisher and a via OAuth 2.0. In some cases, a software API publisher and a
client developer may be the same organization. At the time of client developer may be the same organization. At the time of
publication of a web accessible API, the software publisher often publication of a web-accessible API, the software publisher often
does not have a prior relationship with the deploying does not have a prior relationship with the deploying
organizations. organizations.
Software Statement Software Statement
Digitally signed or MACed JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] that A digitally signed or MACed JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] that
asserts metadata values about the client software. In some cases, asserts metadata values about the client software. In some cases,
a software statement will be issued directly by the client a software statement will be issued directly by the client
developer. In other cases, a software statement will be issued by developer. In other cases, a software statement will be issued by
a third party organization for use by the client developer. In a third-party organization for use by the client developer. In
both cases, the trust relationship the authorization server has both cases, the trust relationship the authorization server has
with the issuer of the software statement is intended to be used with the issuer of the software statement is intended to be used
as an input to the evaluation of whether the registration request as an input to the evaluation of whether the registration request
is accepted. A software statement can be presented to an is accepted. A software statement can be presented to an
authorization server as part of a client registration request. authorization server as part of a client registration request.
1.3. Protocol Flow 1.3. Protocol Flow
+--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL) +--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL)
| |
skipping to change at page 6, line 29 skipping to change at page 7, line 27
+-----------+ +-----------+
Figure 1: Abstract Dynamic Client Registration Flow Figure 1: Abstract Dynamic Client Registration Flow
The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated
in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer
and the endpoint defined in this specification. This figure does not and the endpoint defined in this specification. This figure does not
demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the following demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the following
steps: steps:
(A) Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access (A) Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access
token giving access to the client registration endpoint. The token giving access to the client registration endpoint. The
method by which the initial access token is issued to the client method by which the initial access token is issued to the
or developer is out of scope for this specification. client or developer is out of scope for this specification.
(B) Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software (B) Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software
statement for use with the client registration endpoint. The statement for use with the client registration endpoint. The
method by which the software statement is issued to the client or method by which the software statement is issued to the client
developer is out of scope for this specification. or developer is out of scope for this specification.
(C) The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint (C) The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint
with the client's desired registration metadata, optionally with the client's desired registration metadata, optionally
including the initial access token from (A) if one is required by including the initial access token from (A) if one is required
the authorization server. by the authorization server.
(D) The authorization server registers the client and returns: (D) The authorization server registers the client and returns:
* the client's registered metadata, * the client's registered metadata,
* a client identifier that is unique at the server, and * a client identifier that is unique at the server, and
* a set of client credentials such as a client secret, if
applicable for this client. * a set of client credentials such as a client secret, if
applicable for this client.
Examples of different configurations and usages are included in Examples of different configurations and usages are included in
Appendix A. Appendix A.
2. Client Metadata 2. Client Metadata
Registered clients have a set of metadata values associated with Registered clients have a set of metadata values associated with
their client identifier at an authorization server, such as the list their client identifier at an authorization server, such as the list
of valid redirection URIs or a display name. of valid redirection URIs or a display name.
skipping to change at page 7, line 41 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
Section 2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], clients using flows with Section 2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], clients using flows with
redirection MUST register their redirection URI values. redirection MUST register their redirection URI values.
Authorization servers that support dynamic registration for Authorization servers that support dynamic registration for
redirect-based flows MUST implement support for this metadata redirect-based flows MUST implement support for this metadata
value. value.
token_endpoint_auth_method token_endpoint_auth_method
String indicator of the requested authentication method for the String indicator of the requested authentication method for the
token endpoint. Values defined by this specification are: token endpoint. Values defined by this specification are:
* "none": The client is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0 * "none": The client is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0,
and does not have a client secret. Section 2.1, and does not have a client secret.
* "client_secret_post": The client uses the HTTP POST parameters * "client_secret_post": The client uses the HTTP POST parameters
defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1. as defined in OAuth 2.0, Section 2.3.1.
* "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in
OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
Additional values can be defined via the IANA OAuth Token Endpoint * "client_secret_basic": The client uses HTTP Basic as defined in
Authentication Methods Registry established in Section 4.2. OAuth 2.0, Section 2.3.1.
Absolute URIs can also be used as values for this parameter Additional values can be defined via the IANA "OAuth Token
without being registered. If unspecified or omitted, the default Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry established in
is "client_secret_basic", denoting HTTP Basic Authentication Section 4.2. Absolute URIs can also be used as values for this
Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0. parameter without being registered. If unspecified or omitted,
the default is "client_secret_basic", denoting the HTTP Basic
authentication scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
grant_types grant_types
Array of OAuth 2.0 grant type strings that the client can use at Array of OAuth 2.0 grant type strings that the client can use at
the token endpoint. These grant types are defined as follows: the token endpoint. These grant types are defined as follows:
* "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in * "authorization_code": The authorization code grant type defined
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.1 in OAuth 2.0, Section 4.1.
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth 2.0 * "implicit": The implicit grant type defined in OAuth 2.0,
Section 4.2 Section 4.2.
* "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant * "password": The resource owner password credentials grant type
described in OAuth 2.0 Section 4.3 defined in OAuth 2.0, Section 4.3.
* "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in * "client_credentials": The client credentials grant type defined
OAuth 2.0 Section 4.4 in OAuth 2.0, Section 4.4.
* "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth 2.0 * "refresh_token": The refresh token grant type defined in OAuth
Section 6. 2.0, Section 6.
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer * "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer": The JWT Bearer
Grant defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles [RFC7523]. Token Grant Type defined in OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles
[RFC7523].
* "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2 * "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer": The SAML 2.0
Bearer Grant defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token Profiles Bearer Assertion Grant defined in OAuth SAML 2 Bearer Token
[RFC7522]. Profiles [RFC7522].
If the token endpoint is used in the grant type, the value of this If the token endpoint is used in the grant type, the value of this
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type" parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type"
parameter passed to the token endpoint defined in the grant type parameter passed to the token endpoint defined in the grant type
definition. Authorization servers MAY allow for other values as definition. Authorization servers MAY allow for other values as
defined in the grant type extension process described in OAuth 2.0 defined in the grant type extension process described in OAuth
Section 2.5. If omitted, the default behavior is that the client 2.0, Section 4.5. If omitted, the default behavior is that the
will use only the "authorization_code" Grant Type. client will use only the "authorization_code" Grant Type.
response_types response_types
Array of the OAuth 2.0 response type strings that the client can Array of the OAuth 2.0 response type strings that the client can
use at the authorization endpoint. These response types are use at the authorization endpoint. These response types are
defined as follows: defined as follows:
* "code": The authorization code response described in OAuth 2.0 * "code": The authorization code response type defined in OAuth
Section 4.1. 2.0, Section 4.1.
* "token": The implicit response described in OAuth 2.0 * "token": The implicit response type defined in OAuth 2.0,
Section 4.2. Section 4.2.
If the authorization endpoint is used by the grant type, the value If the authorization endpoint is used by the grant type, the value
of this parameter MUST be the same as the value of the of this parameter MUST be the same as the value of the
"response_type" parameter passed to the authorization endpoint "response_type" parameter passed to the authorization endpoint
defined in the grant type definition. Authorization servers MAY defined in the grant type definition. Authorization servers MAY
allow for other values as defined in the grant type extension allow for other values as defined in the grant type extension
process is described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.5. If omitted, the process is described in OAuth 2.0, Section 4.5. If omitted, the
default is that the client will use only the "code" response type. default is that the client will use only the "code" response type.
client_name client_name
Human-readable string name of the client to be presented to the Human-readable string name of the client to be presented to the
end-user during authorization. If omitted, the authorization end-user during authorization. If omitted, the authorization
server MAY display the raw "client_id" value to the end-user server MAY display the raw "client_id" value to the end-user
instead. It is RECOMMENDED that clients always send this field. instead. It is RECOMMENDED that clients always send this field.
The value of this field MAY be internationalized, as described in The value of this field MAY be internationalized, as described in
Section 2.2. Section 2.2.
skipping to change at page 9, line 40 skipping to change at page 10, line 37
described in Section 2.2. described in Section 2.2.
logo_uri logo_uri
URL string that references a logo for the client. If present, the URL string that references a logo for the client. If present, the
server SHOULD display this image to the end-user during approval. server SHOULD display this image to the end-user during approval.
The value of this field MUST point to a valid image file. The The value of this field MUST point to a valid image file. The
value of this field MAY be internationalized, as described in value of this field MAY be internationalized, as described in
Section 2.2. Section 2.2.
scope scope
String containing a space separated list of scope values (as String containing a space-separated list of scope values (as
described in Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]) that the client described in Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]) that the client
can use when requesting access tokens. The semantics of values in can use when requesting access tokens. The semantics of values in
this list is service specific. If omitted, an authorization this list are service specific. If omitted, an authorization
server MAY register a client with a default set of scopes. server MAY register a client with a default set of scopes.
contacts contacts
Array of strings representing ways to contact people responsible Array of strings representing ways to contact people responsible
for this client, typically email addresses. The authorization for this client, typically email addresses. The authorization
server MAY make these contact addresses available to end-users for server MAY make these contact addresses available to end-users for
support requests for the client. See Section 6 for information on support requests for the client. See Section 6 for information on
Privacy Considerations. Privacy Considerations.
tos_uri tos_uri
skipping to change at page 10, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 23
policy_uri policy_uri
URL string that points to a human-readable privacy policy document URL string that points to a human-readable privacy policy document
that describes how the deployment organization collects, uses, that describes how the deployment organization collects, uses,
retains, and discloses personal data. The authorization server retains, and discloses personal data. The authorization server
SHOULD display this URL to the end-user if it is provided. The SHOULD display this URL to the end-user if it is provided. The
value of this field MUST point to a valid web page. The value of value of this field MUST point to a valid web page. The value of
this field MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2. this field MAY be internationalized, as described in Section 2.2.
jwks_uri jwks_uri
URL string referencing the client's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] URL string referencing the client's JSON Web Key (JWK) Set
document, which contains the client's public keys. The value of [RFC7517] document, which contains the client's public keys. The
this field MUST point to a valid JWK Set document. These keys can value of this field MUST point to a valid JWK Set document. These
be used by higher level protocols that use signing or encryption. keys can be used by higher-level protocols that use signing or
For instance, these keys might be used by some applications for encryption. For instance, these keys might be used by some
validating signed requests made to the token endpoint when using applications for validating signed requests made to the token
JWTs for client authentication [RFC7523]. Use of this parameter endpoint when using JWTs for client authentication [RFC7523]. Use
is preferred over the "jwks" parameter, as it allows for easier of this parameter is preferred over the "jwks" parameter, as it
key rotation. The "jwks_uri" and "jwks" parameters MUST NOT both allows for easier key rotation. The "jwks_uri" and "jwks"
be present in the same request or response. parameters MUST NOT both be present in the same request or
response.
jwks jwks
Client's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document value, which contains Client's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document value, which contains
the client's public keys. The value of this field MUST be a JSON the client's public keys. The value of this field MUST be a JSON
object containing a valid JWK Set. These keys can be used by object containing a valid JWK Set. These keys can be used by
higher level protocols that use signing or encryption. This higher-level protocols that use signing or encryption. This
parameter is intended to be used by clients that cannot use the parameter is intended to be used by clients that cannot use the
"jwks_uri" parameter, such as native clients that cannot host "jwks_uri" parameter, such as native clients that cannot host
public URLs. The "jwks_uri" and "jwks" parameters MUST NOT both public URLs. The "jwks_uri" and "jwks" parameters MUST NOT both
be present in the same request or response. be present in the same request or response.
software_id software_id
A unique identifier string (e.g. a UUID) assigned by the client A unique identifier string (e.g., a Universally Unique Identifier
developer or software publisher used by registration endpoints to (UUID)) assigned by the client developer or software publisher
identify the client software to be dynamically registered. Unlike used by registration endpoints to identify the client software to
"client_id", which is issued by the authorization server and be dynamically registered. Unlike "client_id", which is issued by
SHOULD vary between instances, the "software_id" SHOULD remain the the authorization server and SHOULD vary between instances, the
same for all instances of the client software. The "software_id" "software_id" SHOULD remain the same for all instances of the
SHOULD remain the same across multiple updates or versions of the client software. The "software_id" SHOULD remain the same across
same piece of software. The value of this field is not intended multiple updates or versions of the same piece of software. The
to be human-readable and is usually opaque to the client and value of this field is not intended to be human readable and is
authorization server. usually opaque to the client and authorization server.
software_version software_version
A version identifier string for the client software identified by A version identifier string for the client software identified by
"software_id". The value of the "software_version" SHOULD change "software_id". The value of the "software_version" SHOULD change
on any update to the client software identified by the same on any update to the client software identified by the same
"software_id". The value of this field is intended to be compared "software_id". The value of this field is intended to be compared
using string equality matching and no other comparison semantics using string equality matching and no other comparison semantics
are defined by this specification. The value of this field is are defined by this specification. The value of this field is
outside the scope of this speicification, but it is not intended outside the scope of this specification, but it is not intended to
to be human readable and is usually opaque to the client and be human readable and is usually opaque to the client and
authorization server. The definition of what constitutes an authorization server. The definition of what constitutes an
update to client software that would trigger a change to this update to client software that would trigger a change to this
value is specific to the software itself and is outside the scope value is specific to the software itself and is outside the scope
of this specification. of this specification.
Extensions and profiles of this specification can expand this list Extensions and profiles of this specification can expand this list
with metadata names and descriptions registered in accordance with with metadata names and descriptions registered in accordance with
the IANA Considerations in Section 4 of this document. The the IANA Considerations in Section 4 of this document. The
authorization server MUST ignore any client metadata sent by the authorization server MUST ignore any client metadata sent by the
client that it does not understand (for instance, by silently client that it does not understand (for instance, by silently
removing unknown metadata from the client's registration record removing unknown metadata from the client's registration record
during processing). The authorization server MAY reject any during processing). The authorization server MAY reject any
requested client metadata values by replacing requested values with requested client metadata values by replacing requested values with
suitable defaults as described in Section 3.2.1 or by returning an suitable defaults as described in Section 3.2.1 or by returning an
error response as described in Section 3.2.2. error response as described in Section 3.2.2.
Client metadata values can either be communicated directly in the Client metadata values can be either communicated directly in the
body of a registration request, as described in Section 3.1, or body of a registration request, as described in Section 3.1, or
included as claims in a software statement, as described in included as claims in a software statement, as described in
Section 2.3, or a mixture of both. If the same client metadata name Section 2.3; a mixture of both is also possible. If the same client
is present in both locations and the software statement is trusted by metadata name is present in both locations and the software statement
the authorization server, the value of a claim in the software is trusted by the authorization server, the value of a claim in the
statement MUST take precedence. software statement MUST take precedence.
2.1. Relationship between Grant Types and Response Types 2.1. Relationship between Grant Types and Response Types
The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are The "grant_types" and "response_types" values described above are
partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different partially orthogonal, as they refer to arguments passed to different
endpoints in the OAuth protocol. However, they are related in that endpoints in the OAuth protocol. However, they are related in that
the "grant_types" available to a client influence the the "grant_types" available to a client influence the
"response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa. "response_types" that the client is allowed to use, and vice versa.
For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes For instance, a "grant_types" value that includes
"authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes "authorization_code" implies a "response_types" value that includes
"code", as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0 "code", as both values are defined as part of the OAuth 2.0
authorization code grant. As such, a server supporting these fields authorization code grant. As such, a server supporting these fields
SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into SHOULD take steps to ensure that a client cannot register itself into
an inconsistent state, for example by returning an an inconsistent state, for example, by returning an
"invalid_client_metadata" error response to an inconsistent "invalid_client_metadata" error response to an inconsistent
registration request. registration request.
The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below. The correlation between the two fields is listed in the table below.
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+ +-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| grant_types value includes: | response_types | | grant_types value includes: | response_types |
| | value includes: | | | value includes: |
+-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+ +-----------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| authorization_code | code | | authorization_code | code |
skipping to change at page 12, line 36 skipping to change at page 13, line 37
2.2. Human-Readable Client Metadata 2.2. Human-Readable Client Metadata
Human-readable client metadata values and client metadata values that Human-readable client metadata values and client metadata values that
reference human-readable values MAY be represented in multiple reference human-readable values MAY be represented in multiple
languages and scripts. For example, the values of fields such as languages and scripts. For example, the values of fields such as
"client_name", "tos_uri", "policy_uri", "logo_uri", and "client_uri" "client_name", "tos_uri", "policy_uri", "logo_uri", and "client_uri"
might have multiple locale-specific values in some client might have multiple locale-specific values in some client
registrations to facilitate use in different locations. registrations to facilitate use in different locations.
To specify the languages and scripts, BCP47 [RFC5646] language tags To specify the languages and scripts, BCP 47 [RFC5646] language tags
are added to client metadata member names, delimited by a # are added to client metadata member names, delimited by a "#"
character. Since JSON [RFC7159] member names are case sensitive, it character. Since JSON [RFC7159] member names are case sensitive, it
is RECOMMENDED that language tag values used in Claim Names be is RECOMMENDED that language tag values used in Claim Names be
spelled using the character case with which they are registered in spelled using the character case with which they are registered in
the IANA Language Subtag Registry [IANA.Language]. In particular, the "IANA Language Subtag" registry [IANA.Language]. In particular,
normally language names are spelled with lowercase characters, region normally language names are spelled with lowercase characters, region
names are spelled with uppercase characters, and languages are names are spelled with uppercase characters, and languages are
spelled with mixed case characters. However, since BCP47 language spelled with mixed-case characters. However, since BCP 47 language
tag values are case insensitive, implementations SHOULD interpret the tag values are case-insensitive, implementations SHOULD interpret the
language tag values supplied in a case insensitive manner. Per the language tag values supplied in a case insensitive manner. Per the
recommendations in BCP47, language tag values used in metadata member recommendations in BCP 47, language tag values used in metadata
names should only be as specific as necessary. For instance, using member names should only be as specific as necessary. For instance,
"fr" might be sufficient in many contexts, rather than "fr-CA" or using "fr" might be sufficient in many contexts, rather than "fr-CA"
"fr-FR". or "fr-FR".
For example, a client could represent its name in English as For example, a client could represent its name in English as
""client_name#en": "My Client"" and its name in Japanese as "client_name#en": "My Client" and its name in Japanese as
""client_name#ja-Jpan-JP": "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D"" within the same "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D" within the same
registration request. The authorization server MAY display any or registration request. The authorization server MAY display any or
all of these names to the resource owner during the authorization all of these names to the resource owner during the authorization
step, choosing which name to display based on system configuration, step, choosing which name to display based on system configuration,
user preferences or other factors. user preferences or other factors.
If any human-readable field is sent without a language tag, parties If any human-readable field is sent without a language tag, parties
using it MUST NOT make any assumptions about the language, character using it MUST NOT make any assumptions about the language, character
set, or script of the string value, and the string value MUST be used set, or script of the string value, and the string value MUST be used
as-is wherever it is presented in a user interface. To facilitate as is wherever it is presented in a user interface. To facilitate
interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED that clients and servers use a interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED that clients and servers use a
human-readable field without any language tags in addition to any human-readable field without any language tags in addition to any
language-specific fields, and it is RECOMMENDED that any human- language-specific fields, and it is RECOMMENDED that any human-
readable fields sent without language tags contain values suitable readable fields sent without language tags contain values suitable
for display on a wide variety of systems. for display on a wide variety of systems.
Implementer's Note: Many JSON libraries make it possible to reference Implementer's Note: Many JSON libraries make it possible to reference
members of a JSON object as members of an object construct in the members of a JSON object as members of an object construct in the
native programming environment of the library. However, while the native programming environment of the library. However, while the
"#" character is a valid character inside of a JSON object's member "#" character is a valid character inside of a JSON object's member
names, it is not a valid character for use in an object member name names, it is not a valid character for use in an object member name
in many programming environments. Therefore, implementations will in many programming environments. Therefore, implementations will
need to use alternative access forms for these claims. For instance, need to use alternative access forms for these claims. For instance,
in JavaScript, if one parses the JSON as follows, "var j = in JavaScript, if one parses the JSON as follows, "var j =
JSON.parse(json);", then as a workaround the member "client_name#en- JSON.parse(json);", then as a workaround the member
us" can be accessed using the JavaScript syntax "j["client_name#en- "client_name#en-us" can be accessed using the JavaScript syntax
us"]". "j["client_name#en-us"]".
2.3. Software Statement 2.3. Software Statement
A software statement is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] that asserts A software statement is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] that asserts
metadata values about the client software as a bundle. A set of metadata values about the client software as a bundle. A set of
claims that can be used in a software statement are defined in claims that can be used in a software statement are defined in
Section 2. When presented to the authorization server as part of a Section 2. When presented to the authorization server as part of a
client registration request, the software statement MUST be digitally client registration request, the software statement MUST be digitally
signed or MACed using JWS [RFC7515] and MUST contain an "iss" signed or MACed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and MUST
(issuer) claim denoting the party attesting to the claims in the contain an "iss" (issuer) claim denoting the party attesting to the
software statement. It is RECOMMENDED that software statements be claims in the software statement. It is RECOMMENDED that software
digitally signed using the "RS256" signature algorithm, although statements be digitally signed using the "RS256" signature algorithm,
particular applications MAY specify the use of different algorithms. although particular applications MAY specify the use of different
It is RECOMMENDED that software statements contain the "software_id" algorithms. It is RECOMMENDED that software statements contain the
claim to allow authorization servers to correlate different instances "software_id" claim to allow authorization servers to correlate
of software using the same software statement. different instances of software using the same software statement.
For example, a software statement could contain the following claims: For example, a software statement could contain the following claims:
{ {
"software_id": "4NRB1-0XZABZI9E6-5SM3R", "software_id": "4NRB1-0XZABZI9E6-5SM3R",
"client_name": "Example Statement-based Client", "client_name": "Example Statement-based Client",
"client_uri": "https://client.example.net/" "client_uri": "https://client.example.net/"
} }
The following non-normative example JWT includes these claims and has The following non-normative example JWT includes these claims and has
been asymmetrically signed using RS256: been asymmetrically signed using "RS256" (with line breaks for
display purposes only):
Line breaks are for display purposes only
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9. eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.
eyJzb2Z0d2FyZV9pZCI6IjROUkIxLTBYWkFCWkk5RTYtNVNNM1IiLCJjbGll eyJzb2Z0d2FyZV9pZCI6IjROUkIxLTBYWkFCWkk5RTYtNVNNM1IiLCJjbGll
bnRfbmFtZSI6IkV4YW1wbGUgU3RhdGVtZW50LWJhc2VkIENsaWVudCIsImNs bnRfbmFtZSI6IkV4YW1wbGUgU3RhdGVtZW50LWJhc2VkIENsaWVudCIsImNs
aWVudF91cmkiOiJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC8ifQ. aWVudF91cmkiOiJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC8ifQ.
GHfL4QNIrQwL18BSRdE595T9jbzqa06R9BT8w409x9oIcKaZo_mt15riEXHa GHfL4QNIrQwL18BSRdE595T9jbzqa06R9BT8w409x9oIcKaZo_mt15riEXHa
zdISUvDIZhtiyNrSHQ8K4TvqWxH6uJgcmoodZdPwmWRIEYbQDLqPNxREtYn0 zdISUvDIZhtiyNrSHQ8K4TvqWxH6uJgcmoodZdPwmWRIEYbQDLqPNxREtYn0
5X3AR7ia4FRjQ2ojZjk5fJqJdQ-JcfxyhK-P8BAWBd6I2LLA77IG32xtbhxY 5X3AR7ia4FRjQ2ojZjk5fJqJdQ-JcfxyhK-P8BAWBd6I2LLA77IG32xtbhxY
fHX7VhuU5ProJO8uvu3Ayv4XRhLZJY4yKfmyjiiKiPNe-Ia4SMy_d_QSWxsk fHX7VhuU5ProJO8uvu3Ayv4XRhLZJY4yKfmyjiiKiPNe-Ia4SMy_d_QSWxsk
U5XIQl5Sa2YRPMbDRXttm2TfnZM1xx70DoYi8g6czz-CPGRi4SW_S2RKHIJf U5XIQl5Sa2YRPMbDRXttm2TfnZM1xx70DoYi8g6czz-CPGRi4SW_S2RKHIJf
IjoI3zTJ0Y2oe0_EJAiXbL6OyF9S5tKxDXV8JIndSA IjoI3zTJ0Y2oe0_EJAiXbL6OyF9S5tKxDXV8JIndSA
The means by which a client or developer obtains a software statement The software statement is typically distributed with all instances of
are outside the scope of this specification. Some common methods a client application. The means by which a client or developer
could include a client developer generating a client-specific JWT by obtains a software statement are outside the scope of this
registering with a software API publisher to obtain a software specification. Some common methods could include a client developer
statement for a class of clients. The software statement is generating a client-specific JWT by registering with a software API
typically distributed with all instances of a client application. publisher to obtain a software statement for a class of clients.
The criteria by which authorization servers determine whether to The criteria by which authorization servers determine whether to
trust and utilize the information in a software statement are beyond trust and utilize the information in a software statement are outside
the scope of this specification. the scope of this specification.
In some cases, authorization servers MAY choose to accept a software In some cases, authorization servers MAY choose to accept a software
statement value directly as a client identifier in an authorization statement value directly as a client identifier in an authorization
request, without a prior dynamic client registration having been request, without a prior dynamic client registration having been
performed. The circumstances under which an authorization server performed. The circumstances under which an authorization server
would do so, and the specific software statement characteristics would do so, and the specific software statement characteristics
required in this case, are beyond the scope of this specification. required in this case, are outside the scope of this specification.
3. Client Registration Endpoint 3. Client Registration Endpoint
The client registration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 endpoint defined in The client registration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a client to be registered this document that is designed to allow a client to be registered
with the authorization server. The client registration endpoint MUST with the authorization server. The client registration endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/json" format. The client entity body using the "application/json" format. The client
registration endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security registration endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security
mechanism, as described in Section 5. mechanism, as described in Section 5.
The client registration endpoint MAY be an OAuth 2.0 protected The client registration endpoint MAY be an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
resource and accept an initial access token in the form of an OAuth protected resource and it MAY accept an initial access token in the
2.0 [RFC6749] access token to limit registration to only previously form of an OAuth 2.0 access token to limit registration to only
authorized parties. The method by which the initial access token is previously authorized parties. The method by which the initial
obtained by the client or developer is generally out-of-band and is access token is obtained by the client or developer is generally out
out of scope for this specification. The method by which the initial of band and is out of scope for this specification. The method by
access token is verified and validated by the client registration which the initial access token is verified and validated by the
endpoint is out of scope for this specification. client registration endpoint is out of scope for this specification.
To support open registration and facilitate wider interoperability, To support open registration and facilitate wider interoperability,
the client registration endpoint SHOULD allow registration requests the client registration endpoint SHOULD allow registration requests
with no authorization (which is to say, with no initial access token with no authorization (which is to say, with no initial access token
in the request). These requests MAY be rate-limited or otherwise in the request). These requests MAY be rate-limited or otherwise
limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the client limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the client
registration endpoint. registration endpoint.
3.1. Client Registration Request 3.1. Client Registration Request
skipping to change at page 15, line 42 skipping to change at page 16, line 43
metadata. metadata.
To register, the client or developer sends an HTTP POST to the client To register, the client or developer sends an HTTP POST to the client
registration endpoint with a content type of "application/json". The registration endpoint with a content type of "application/json". The
HTTP Entity Payload is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON HTTP Entity Payload is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON
object and all requested client metadata values as top-level members object and all requested client metadata values as top-level members
of that JSON object. of that JSON object.
For example, if the server supports open registration (with no For example, if the server supports open registration (with no
initial access token), the client could send the following initial access token), the client could send the following
registration request to the client registration endpoint: registration request to the client registration endpoint.
The following is a non-normative example request not using an initial The following is a non-normative example request not using an initial
access token (with line wraps within values for display purposes access token:
only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
{ {
"redirect_uris":[ "redirect_uris": [
"https://client.example.org/callback", "https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"], "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"client_name":"My Example Client", "client_name": "My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP": "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D", "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png", "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks", "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
"example_extension_parameter": "example_value" "example_extension_parameter": "example_value"
} }
Alternatively, if the server supports authorized registration, the Alternatively, if the server supports authorized registration, the
developer or the client will be provisioned with an initial access developer or the client will be provisioned with an initial access
token. (The method by which the initial access token is obtained is token. (The method by which the initial access token is obtained is
out of scope for this specification.) The developer or client sends out of scope for this specification.) The developer or client sends
the following authorized registration request to the client the following authorized registration request to the client
registration endpoint. Note that the initial access token sent in registration endpoint. Note that the initial access token sent in
this example as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750], but any OAuth this example as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token [RFC6750], but any OAuth
2.0 token type could be used by an authorization server. 2.0 token type could be used by an authorization server.
The following is a non-normative example request using an initial The following is a non-normative example request using an initial
access token and registering a JWK set by value (with line wraps access token and registering a JWK Set by value (with line breaks
within values for display purposes only): within values for display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Authorization: Bearer ey23f2.adfj230.af32-developer321 Authorization: Bearer ey23f2.adfj230.af32-developer321
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
{ {
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback", "redirect_uris": ["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"], "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"client_name":"My Example Client", "client_name": "My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP": "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D", "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"policy_uri":"https://client.example.org/policy.html", "policy_uri": "https://client.example.org/policy.html",
"jwks":{"keys":[{ "jwks": {"keys": [{
"e": "AQAB", "e": "AQAB",
"n": "nj3YJwsLUFl9BmpAbkOswCNVx17Eh9wMO-_AReZwBqfaWFcfG "n": "nj3YJwsLUFl9BmpAbkOswCNVx17Eh9wMO-_AReZwBqfaWFcfG
HrZXsIV2VMCNVNU8Tpb4obUaSXcRcQ-VMsfQPJm9IzgtRdAY8NN8Xb7PEcYyk HrZXsIV2VMCNVNU8Tpb4obUaSXcRcQ-VMsfQPJm9IzgtRdAY8NN8Xb7PEcYyk
lBjvTtuPbpzIaqyiUepzUXNDFuAOOkrIol3WmflPUUgMKULBN0EUd1fpOD70p lBjvTtuPbpzIaqyiUepzUXNDFuAOOkrIol3WmflPUUgMKULBN0EUd1fpOD70p
RM0rlp_gg_WNUKoW1V-3keYUJoXH9NztEDm_D2MQXj9eGOJJ8yPgGL8PAZMLe RM0rlp_gg_WNUKoW1V-3keYUJoXH9NztEDm_D2MQXj9eGOJJ8yPgGL8PAZMLe
2R7jb9TxOCPDED7tY_TU4nFPlxptw59A42mldEmViXsKQt60s1SLboazxFKve 2R7jb9TxOCPDED7tY_TU4nFPlxptw59A42mldEmViXsKQt60s1SLboazxFKve
qXC_jpLUt22OC6GUG63p-REw-ZOr3r845z50wMuzifQrMI9bQ", qXC_jpLUt22OC6GUG63p-REw-ZOr3r845z50wMuzifQrMI9bQ",
"kty": "RSA" "kty": "RSA"
}]}, }]},
"example_extension_parameter": "example_value" "example_extension_parameter": "example_value"
skipping to change at page 18, line 8 skipping to change at page 19, line 8
this OPTIONAL member: this OPTIONAL member:
software_statement software_statement
A software statement containing client metadata values about the A software statement containing client metadata values about the
client software as claims. This is a string value containing the client software as claims. This is a string value containing the
entire signed JWT. entire signed JWT.
In the following example, some registration parameters are conveyed In the following example, some registration parameters are conveyed
as claims in a software statement from the example in Section 2.3, as claims in a software statement from the example in Section 2.3,
while some values specific to the client instance are conveyed as while some values specific to the client instance are conveyed as
regular parameters (with line wraps within values for display regular parameters (with line breaks within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1 POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
{ {
"redirect_uris":[ "redirect_uris": [
"https://client.example.org/callback", "https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2" "https://client.example.org/callback2"
], ],
"software_statement":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9. "software_statement": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.
eyJzb2Z0d2FyZV9pZCI6IjROUkIxLTBYWkFCWkk5RTYtNVNNM1IiLCJjbGll eyJzb2Z0d2FyZV9pZCI6IjROUkIxLTBYWkFCWkk5RTYtNVNNM1IiLCJjbGll
bnRfbmFtZSI6IkV4YW1wbGUgU3RhdGVtZW50LWJhc2VkIENsaWVudCIsImNs bnRfbmFtZSI6IkV4YW1wbGUgU3RhdGVtZW50LWJhc2VkIENsaWVudCIsImNs
aWVudF91cmkiOiJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC8ifQ. aWVudF91cmkiOiJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC8ifQ.
GHfL4QNIrQwL18BSRdE595T9jbzqa06R9BT8w409x9oIcKaZo_mt15riEXHa GHfL4QNIrQwL18BSRdE595T9jbzqa06R9BT8w409x9oIcKaZo_mt15riEXHa
zdISUvDIZhtiyNrSHQ8K4TvqWxH6uJgcmoodZdPwmWRIEYbQDLqPNxREtYn0 zdISUvDIZhtiyNrSHQ8K4TvqWxH6uJgcmoodZdPwmWRIEYbQDLqPNxREtYn0
5X3AR7ia4FRjQ2ojZjk5fJqJdQ-JcfxyhK-P8BAWBd6I2LLA77IG32xtbhxY 5X3AR7ia4FRjQ2ojZjk5fJqJdQ-JcfxyhK-P8BAWBd6I2LLA77IG32xtbhxY
fHX7VhuU5ProJO8uvu3Ayv4XRhLZJY4yKfmyjiiKiPNe-Ia4SMy_d_QSWxsk fHX7VhuU5ProJO8uvu3Ayv4XRhLZJY4yKfmyjiiKiPNe-Ia4SMy_d_QSWxsk
U5XIQl5Sa2YRPMbDRXttm2TfnZM1xx70DoYi8g6czz-CPGRi4SW_S2RKHIJf U5XIQl5Sa2YRPMbDRXttm2TfnZM1xx70DoYi8g6czz-CPGRi4SW_S2RKHIJf
IjoI3zTJ0Y2oe0_EJAiXbL6OyF9S5tKxDXV8JIndSA", IjoI3zTJ0Y2oe0_EJAiXbL6OyF9S5tKxDXV8JIndSA",
"scope":"read write", "scope": "read write",
"example_extension_parameter":"example_value" "example_extension_parameter": "example_value"
} }
3.2. Responses 3.2. Responses
Upon a successful registration request, the authorization server Upon a successful registration request, the authorization server
returns a client identifier for the client. The server responds with returns a client identifier for the client. The server responds with
an HTTP 201 Created code and a body of type "application/json" with an HTTP 201 Created status code and a body of type "application/json"
content as described in Section 3.2.1. with content as described in Section 3.2.1.
Upon an unsuccessful registration request, the authorization server Upon an unsuccessful registration request, the authorization server
responds with an error, as described in Section 3.2.2. responds with an error, as described in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1. Client Information Response 3.2.1. Client Information Response
The response contains the client identifier as well as the client The response contains the client identifier as well as the client
secret, if the client is a confidential client. The response MAY secret, if the client is a confidential client. The response MAY
contain additional fields as specified by extensions to this contain additional fields as specified by extensions to this
specification. specification.
skipping to change at page 19, line 13 skipping to change at page 20, line 15
client_id client_id
REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 client identifier string. It SHOULD NOT be REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 client identifier string. It SHOULD NOT be
currently valid for any other registered client, though an currently valid for any other registered client, though an
authorization server MAY issue the same client identifier to authorization server MAY issue the same client identifier to
multiple instances of a registered client at its discretion. multiple instances of a registered client at its discretion.
client_secret client_secret
OPTIONAL. OAuth 2.0 client secret string. If issued, this MUST OPTIONAL. OAuth 2.0 client secret string. If issued, this MUST
be unique for each "client_id" and SHOULD be unique for multiple be unique for each "client_id" and SHOULD be unique for multiple
instances of a client using the same "client_id". This value is instances of a client using the same "client_id". This value is
used by confidential clients to authenticate to the token endpoint used by confidential clients to authenticate to the token
as described in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Section 2.3.1. endpoint, as described in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], Section 2.3.1.
client_id_issued_at client_id_issued_at
OPTIONAL. Time at which the client identifier was issued. The OPTIONAL. Time at which the client identifier was issued. The
time is represented as the number of seconds from time is represented as the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time of 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z as measured in UTC until the date/time of
issuance. issuance.
client_secret_expires_at client_secret_expires_at
REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. Time at which the client REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. Time at which the client
secret will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time is secret will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time is
represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z as
measured in UTC until the date/time of expiration. measured in UTC until the date/time of expiration.
Additionally, the authorization server MUST return all registered Additionally, the authorization server MUST return all registered
metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the
authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or
replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted
during the registration and substitute them with suitable values. during the registration and substitute them with suitable values.
The client or developer can check the values in the response to The client or developer can check the values in the response to
determine if the registration is sufficient for use (e.g., the determine if the registration is sufficient for use (e.g., the
registered "token_endpoint_auth_method" is supported by the client registered "token_endpoint_auth_method" is supported by the client
software) and determine a course of action appropriate for the client software) and determine a course of action appropriate for the client
software. The response to such a situation is out of scope for this software. The response to such a situation is out of scope for this
specification but could include filing a report with the application specification but could include filing a report with the application
developer or authorization server provider, attempted re-registration developer or authorization server provider, attempted re-registration
with different metadata values, or various other methods. For with different metadata values, or various other methods. For
instance, if the server also supports a registration management instance, if the server also supports a registration management
mechanism such as that defined in [OAuth.Registration.Management], mechanism such as that defined in [RFC7592], the client or developer
the client or developer could attempt to update the registration with could attempt to update the registration with different metadata
different metadata values. This process could also be aided by a values. This process could also be aided by a service discovery
service discovery protocol such as [OpenID.Discovery] which can list protocol, such as [OpenID.Discovery], which can list a server's
a server's capabilities, allowing a client to make a more informed capabilities, allowing a client to make a more informed registration
registration request. The use of any such management or discovery request. The use of any such management or discovery system is
system is optional and outside the scope of this specification. optional and outside the scope of this specification.
The successful registration response uses an HTTP 201 Created status The successful registration response uses an HTTP 201 Created status
code with a body of type "application/json" consisting of a single code with a body of type "application/json" consisting of a single
JSON object [RFC7159] with all parameters as top-level members of the JSON object [RFC7159] with all parameters as top-level members of the
object. object.
If a software statement was used as part of the registration, its If a software statement was used as part of the registration, its
value MUST be returned unmodified in the response along with other value MUST be returned unmodified in the response along with other
metadata using the "software_statement" member name. Client metadata metadata using the "software_statement" member name. Client metadata
elements used from the software statement MUST also be returned elements used from the software statement MUST also be returned
directly as top-level client metadata values in the registration directly as top-level client metadata values in the registration
response (possibly with different values, since the values requested response (possibly with different values, since the values requested
and the values used may differ). and the values used may differ).
Following is a non-normative example response of a successful The following is a non-normative example response of a successful
registration: registration:
HTTP/1.1 201 Created HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
{ {
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d", "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"client_id_issued_at":2893256800, "client_id_issued_at": 2893256800,
"client_secret_expires_at":2893276800, "client_secret_expires_at": 2893276800,
"redirect_uris":[ "redirect_uris": [
"https://client.example.org/callback", "https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"], "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"client_name":"My Example Client", "client_name": "My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP": "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D", "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/logo.png", "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri":"https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks", "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
"example_extension_parameter": "example_value" "example_extension_parameter": "example_value"
} }
3.2.2. Client Registration Error Response 3.2.2. Client Registration Error Response
When an OAuth 2.0 error condition occurs, such as the client When an OAuth 2.0 error condition occurs, such as the client
presenting an invalid initial access token, the authorization server presenting an invalid initial access token, the authorization server
returns an error response appropriate to the OAuth 2.0 token type. returns an error response appropriate to the OAuth 2.0 token type.
When a registration error condition occurs, the authorization server When a registration error condition occurs, the authorization server
skipping to change at page 21, line 14 skipping to change at page 22, line 19
Two members are defined for inclusion in the JSON object: Two members are defined for inclusion in the JSON object:
error error
REQUIRED. Single ASCII error code string. REQUIRED. Single ASCII error code string.
error_description error_description
OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII text description of the error used OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII text description of the error used
for debugging. for debugging.
Other members MAY also be included, and if not understood, MUST be Other members MAY also be included and, if they are not understood,
ignored. they MUST be ignored.
This specification defines the following error codes: This specification defines the following error codes:
invalid_redirect_uri invalid_redirect_uri
The value of one or more redirection URIs is invalid. The value of one or more redirection URIs is invalid.
invalid_client_metadata invalid_client_metadata
The value of one of the client metadata fields is invalid and the The value of one of the client metadata fields is invalid and the
server has rejected this request. Note that an authorization server has rejected this request. Note that an authorization
server MAY choose to substitute a valid value for any requested server MAY choose to substitute a valid value for any requested
parameter of a client's metadata. parameter of a client's metadata.
invalid_software_statement invalid_software_statement
The software statement presented is invalid. The software statement presented is invalid.
unapproved_software_statement unapproved_software_statement
The software statement presented is not approved for use by this The software statement presented is not approved for use by this
authorization server. authorization server.
Following is a non-normative example of an error response resulting The following is a non-normative example of an error response
from a redirection URI that has been blacklisted by the authorization resulting from a redirection URI that has been blacklisted by the
server (with line wraps within values for display purposes only): authorization server (with line breaks within values for display
purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
{ {
"error": "invalid_redirect_uri", "error": "invalid_redirect_uri",
"error_description": "The redirection URI "error_description": "The redirection URI
http://sketchy.example.com is not allowed by this server." http://sketchy.example.com is not allowed by this server."
} }
Following is a non-normative example of an error response resulting The following is a non-normative example of an error response
from an inconsistent combination of "response_types" and resulting from an inconsistent combination of "response_types" and
"grant_types" values (with line wraps within values for display "grant_types" values (with line breaks within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
{ {
"error": "invalid_client_metadata", "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
"error_description": "The grant type 'authorization_code' must be "error_description": "The grant type 'authorization_code' must be
registered along with the response type 'code' but found only registered along with the response type 'code' but found only
'implicit' instead." 'implicit' instead."
} }
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
4.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry 4.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry
This specification establishes the OAuth Dynamic Client Registration This specification establishes the "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Metadata registry. Metadata" registry.
OAuth registration client metadata names and descriptions are OAuth registration client metadata names and descriptions are
registered with a Specification Required ([RFC5226]) after a two-week registered with a Specification Required ([RFC5226]) after a two-week
review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the
advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of names prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) allocation of names prior to publication, the Designated Experts may
may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published, per [RFC7120]. specification will be published, per [RFC7120].
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register OAuth Dynamic an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register OAuth Dynamic
Client Registration Metadata name: example"). Client Registration Metadata name: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
4.1.1. Registration Template 4.1.1. Registration Template
Client Metadata Name: Client Metadata Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case-
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Client Metadata Description: Client Metadata Description:
Brief description of the metadata value (e.g., "Example Brief description of the metadata value (e.g., "Example
description"). description").
Change controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, list "IESG". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the token endpoint Reference to the document or documents that specify the client
authorization method, preferably including a URI that can be used metadata definition, preferably including a URI that can be used
to retrieve a copy of the document(s). An indication of the to retrieve a copy of the documents. An indication of the
relevant sections may also be included but is not required. relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
4.1.2. Initial Registry Contents 4.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
The initial contents of the OAuth Dynamic Client Registration The initial contents of the "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Metadata registry are: Metadata" registry are:
o Client Metadata Name: "redirect_uris" o Client Metadata Name: "redirect_uris"
o Client Metadata Description: Array of redirection URIs for use in o Client Metadata Description: Array of redirection URIs for use in
redirect-based flows redirect-based flows
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "token_endpoint_auth_method" o Client Metadata Name: "token_endpoint_auth_method"
o Client Metadata Description: Requested authentication method for o Client Metadata Description: Requested authentication method for
the token endpoint the token endpoint
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "grant_types" o Client Metadata Name: "grant_types"
o Client Metadata Description: Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that o Client Metadata Description: Array of OAuth 2.0 grant types that
the client may use the client may use
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "response_types" o Client Metadata Name: "response_types"
o Client Metadata Description: Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types o Client Metadata Description: Array of the OAuth 2.0 response types
that the client may use that the client may use
o Change Controller: IESG
o Change controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "client_name" o Client Metadata Name: "client_name"
o Client Metadata Description: Human-readable name of the client to o Client Metadata Description: Human-readable name of the client to
be presented to the user be presented to the user
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "client_uri" o Client Metadata Name: "client_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: URL of a Web page providing o Client Metadata Description: URL of a web page providing
information about the client information about the client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "logo_uri" o Client Metadata Name: "logo_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: URL that references a logo for the o Client Metadata Description: URL that references a logo for the
client client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "scope" o Client Metadata Name: "scope"
o Client Metadata Description: Space separated list of OAuth 2.0 o Client Metadata Description: Space-separated list of OAuth 2.0
scope values scope values
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "contacts" o Client Metadata Name: "contacts"
o Client Metadata Description: Array of strings representing ways to o Client Metadata Description: Array of strings representing ways to
contact people responsible for this client, typically email contact people responsible for this client, typically email
addresses addresses
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "tos_uri" o Client Metadata Name: "tos_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: URL that points to a human-readable o Client Metadata Description: URL that points to a human-readable
Terms of Service document for the client terms of service document for the client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "policy_uri" o Client Metadata Name: "policy_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: URL that points to a human-readable o Client Metadata Description: URL that points to a human-readable
Policy document for the client policy document for the client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "jwks_uri" o Client Metadata Name: "jwks_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: URL referencing the client's JSON Web o Client Metadata Description: URL referencing the client's JSON Web
Key Set [RFC7517] document representing the client's public keys Key Set [RFC7517] document representing the client's public keys
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "jwks" o Client Metadata Name: "jwks"
o Client Metadata Description: Client's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] o Client Metadata Description: Client's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517]
document representing the client's public keys document representing the client's public keys
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "software_id" o Client Metadata Name: "software_id"
o Client Metadata Description: Identifier for the software that o Client Metadata Description: Identifier for the software that
comprises a client comprises a client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "software_version" o Client Metadata Name: "software_version"
o Client Metadata Description: Version identifier for the software o Client Metadata Description: Version identifier for the software
that comprises a client that comprises a client
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "client_id" o Client Metadata Name: "client_id"
o Client Metadata Description: Client identifier o Client Metadata Description: Client identifier
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "client_secret" o Client Metadata Name: "client_secret"
o Client Metadata Description: Client secret o Client Metadata Description: Client secret
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "client_id_issued_at" o Client Metadata Name: "client_id_issued_at"
o Client Metadata Description: Time at which the client identifier o Client Metadata Description: Time at which the client identifier
was issued was issued
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Client Metadata Name: "client_secret_expires_at" o Client Metadata Name: "client_secret_expires_at"
o Client Metadata Description: Time at which the client secret will o Client Metadata Description: Time at which the client secret will
expire expire
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
4.2. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry 4.2. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registry
This specification establishes the OAuth Token Endpoint This specification establishes the "OAuth Token Endpoint
Authentication Methods registry. Authentication Methods" registry.
Additional values for use as "token_endpoint_auth_method" values are Additional values for use as "token_endpoint_auth_method" values are
registered with a Specification Required ([RFC5226]) after a two-week registered with a Specification Required ([RFC5226]) after a two-week
review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the
advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may
may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published, per [RFC7120]. specification will be published, per [RFC7120].
Registration requests must be sent to the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org Registration requests must be sent to the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject
(e.g., "Request to register token_endpoint_auth_method value: (e.g., "Request to register token_endpoint_auth_method value:
example"). example").
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
4.2.1. Registration Template 4.2.1. Registration Template
Token Endpoint Authorization Method Name: Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case-
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Change controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, list "IESG". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the token endpoint Reference to the document or documents that specify the token
authorization method, preferably including a URI that can be used endpoint authentication method, preferably including a URI that
to retrieve a copy of the document(s). An indication of the can be used to retrieve a copy of the document or documents. An
relevant sections may also be included but is not required. indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is
not required.
4.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 4.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
The initial contents of the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication The initial contents of the "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication
Methods registry are: Methods" registry are:
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method Name: "none" o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "none"
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method Name: "client_secret_post" o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "client_secret_post"
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
o Token Endpoint Authorization Method Name: "client_secret_basic" o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "client_secret_basic"
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): RFC 7591
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Since requests to the client registration endpoint result in the Since requests to the client registration endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the authorization server MUST require the use of a response), the authorization server MUST require the use of a
transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the
registration endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 registration endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and
[RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer mechanisms MAY support additional transport-layer security mechanisms meeting
meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST its security requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a
perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125].
Implementation security considerations can be found in Implementation security considerations can be found in
Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [RFC7525]. Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195].
For clients that use redirect-based grant types such as For clients that use redirect-based grant types such as
"authorization_code" and "implicit", authorization servers MUST "authorization_code" and "implicit", authorization servers MUST
require clients to register their redirection URI values. This can require clients to register their redirection URI values. This can
help mitigate attacks where rogue actors inject and impersonate a help mitigate attacks where rogue actors inject and impersonate a
validly registered client and intercept its authorization code or validly registered client and intercept its authorization code or
tokens through an invalid redirection URI or open redirector. tokens through an invalid redirection URI or open redirector.
Additionally, in order to prevent hijacking of the return values of Additionally, in order to prevent hijacking of the return values of
the redirection, registered redirection URI values MUST be one of: the redirection, registered redirection URI values MUST be one of:
o A remote web site protected by TLS (e.g., o A remote web site protected by TLS
https://client.example.com/oauth_redirect) (e.g., https://client.example.com/oauth_redirect)
o A web site hosted on the local machine using an HTTP URI (e.g., o A web site hosted on the local machine using an HTTP URI
http://localhost:8080/oauth_redirect) (e.g., http://localhost:8080/oauth_redirect)
o A non-HTTP application-specific URL that is available only to the o A non-HTTP application-specific URL that is available only to the
client application (e.g., exampleapp://oauth_redirect) client application
(e.g., exampleapp://oauth_redirect)
Public clients MAY register with an authorization server using this Public clients MAY register with an authorization server using this
protocol, if the authorization server's policy allows them. Public protocol, if the authorization server's policy allows them. Public
clients use a "none" value for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" clients use a "none" value for the "token_endpoint_auth_method"
metadata field and are generally used with the "implicit" grant type. metadata field and are generally used with the "implicit" grant type.
Often these clients will be short-lived in-browser applications Often these clients will be short-lived in-browser applications
requesting access to a user's resources and access is tied to a requesting access to a user's resources and access is tied to a
user's active session at the authorization server. Since such user's active session at the authorization server. Since such
clients often do not have long-term storage, it is possible that such clients often do not have long-term storage, it is possible that such
clients would need to re-register every time the browser application clients would need to re-register every time the browser application
is loaded. To avoid the resulting proliferation of dead client is loaded. To avoid the resulting proliferation of dead client
identifiers, an authorization server MAY decide to expire identifiers, an authorization server MAY decide to expire
registrations for existing clients meeting certain criteria after a registrations for existing clients meeting certain criteria after a
period of time has elapsed. Alternatively, such clients could be period of time has elapsed. Alternatively, such clients could be
registered on the server where the in-browser application's code is registered on the server where the in-browser application's code is
served from, and the client's configuration pushed to the browser served from, and the client's configuration could be pushed to the
along side the code. browser alongside the code.
Since different OAuth 2.0 grant types have different security and Since different OAuth 2.0 grant types have different security and
usage parameters, an authorization server MAY require separate usage properties, an authorization server MAY require separate
registrations for a piece of software to support multiple grant registrations for a piece of software to support multiple grant
types. For instance, an authorization server might require that all types. For instance, an authorization server might require that all
clients using the "authorization_code" grant type make use of a clients using the "authorization_code" grant type make use of a
client secret for the "token_endpoint_auth_method", but any clients client secret for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" but any clients
using the "implicit" grant type do not use any authentication at the using the "implicit" grant type not use any authentication at the
token endpoint. In such a situation, a server MAY disallow clients token endpoint. In such a situation, a server MAY disallow clients
from registering for both the "authorization_code" and "implicit" from registering for both the "authorization_code" and "implicit"
grant types simultaneously. Similarly, the "authorization_code" grant types simultaneously. Similarly, the "authorization_code"
grant type is used to represent access on behalf of an end-user, but grant type is used to represent access on behalf of an end-user, but
the "client_credentials" grant type represents access on behalf of the "client_credentials" grant type represents access on behalf of
the client itself. For security reasons, an authorization server the client itself. For security reasons, an authorization server
could require that different scopes be used for these different use could require that different scopes be used for these different use
cases, and as a consequence it MAY disallow these two grant types cases, and, as a consequence, it MAY disallow these two grant types
from being registered together by the same client. In all of these from being registered together by the same client. In all of these
cases, the authorization server would respond with an cases, the authorization server would respond with an
"invalid_client_metadata" error response. "invalid_client_metadata" error response.
Unless used as a claim in a software statement, the authorization Unless used as a claim in a software statement, the authorization
server MUST treat all client metadata as self-asserted. For server MUST treat all client metadata as self-asserted. For
instance, a rogue client might use the name and logo of a legitimate instance, a rogue client might use the name and logo of a legitimate
client that it is trying to impersonate. Additionally, a rogue client that it is trying to impersonate. Additionally, a rogue
client might try to use the software identifier or software version client might try to use the software identifier or software version
of a legitimate client to attempt to associate itself on the of a legitimate client to attempt to associate itself on the
skipping to change at page 29, line 11 skipping to change at page 30, line 30
the domain/site of redirection URIs. An authorization server could the domain/site of redirection URIs. An authorization server could
also refuse registration requests from a known software identifier also refuse registration requests from a known software identifier
that is requesting different redirection URIs or a different client that is requesting different redirection URIs or a different client
URI. An authorization server can also present warning messages to URI. An authorization server can also present warning messages to
end-users about dynamically registered clients in all cases, end-users about dynamically registered clients in all cases,
especially if such clients have been recently registered or have not especially if such clients have been recently registered or have not
been trusted by any users at the authorization server before. been trusted by any users at the authorization server before.
In a situation where the authorization server is supporting open In a situation where the authorization server is supporting open
client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL
provided by the client that will be displayed to the user (e.g. provided by the client that will be displayed to the user (e.g.,
"logo_uri", "tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri"). For "logo_uri", "tos_uri", "client_uri", and "policy_uri"). For
instance, a rogue client could specify a registration request with a instance, a rogue client could specify a registration request with a
reference to a drive-by download in the "policy_uri", enticing the reference to a drive-by download in the "policy_uri", enticing the
user to click on it during the authorization. The authorization user to click on it during the authorization. The authorization
server SHOULD check to see if the "logo_uri", "tos_uri", server SHOULD check to see if the "logo_uri", "tos_uri",
"client_uri", and "policy_uri" have the same host and scheme as the "client_uri", and "policy_uri" have the same host and scheme as the
those defined in the array of "redirect_uris" and that all of these those defined in the array of "redirect_uris" and that all of these
URIs resolve to valid web pages. Since these URI values that are URIs resolve to valid web pages. Since these URI values that are
intended to be displayed to the user at the authorization page, the intended to be displayed to the user at the authorization page, the
authorization server SHOULD protect the user from malicious content authorization server SHOULD protect the user from malicious content
skipping to change at page 30, line 43 skipping to change at page 32, line 14
using the same redirect-based flow and the same redirection URIs. An using the same redirect-based flow and the same redirection URIs. An
authorization server SHOULD NOT issue the same client secret to authorization server SHOULD NOT issue the same client secret to
multiple instances of a registered client, even if they are issued multiple instances of a registered client, even if they are issued
the same client identifier, or else the client secret could be the same client identifier, or else the client secret could be
leaked, allowing malicious impostors to impersonate a confidential leaked, allowing malicious impostors to impersonate a confidential
client. client.
6. Privacy Considerations 6. Privacy Considerations
As the protocol described in this specification deals almost As the protocol described in this specification deals almost
exclusively with information about software and not about people, exclusively with information about software and not people, there are
there are very few privacy concerns for its use. The notable very few privacy concerns for its use. The notable exception is the
exception is the "contacts" field as defined in Client Metadata "contacts" field as defined in Section 2, which contains contact
(Section 2), which contains contact information for the developers or information for the developers or other parties responsible for the
other parties responsible for the client software. These values are client software. These values are intended to be displayed to end-
intended to be displayed to end-users and will be available to the users and will be available to the administrators of the
administrators of the authorization server. As such, the developer authorization server. As such, the developer may wish to provide an
may wish to provide an email address or other contact information email address or other contact information expressly dedicated to the
expressly dedicated to the purpose of supporting the client instead purpose of supporting the client instead of using their personal or
of using their personal or professional addresses. Alternatively, professional addresses. Alternatively, the developer may wish to
the developer may wish to provide a collective email address for the provide a collective email address for the client to allow for
client to allow for continuing contact and support of the client continuing contact and support of the client software after the
software after the developer moves on and someone else takes over developer moves on and someone else takes over that responsibility.
that responsibility.
In general, the metadata for a client, such as the client name and In general, the metadata for a client, such as the client name and
software identifier, are common across all instances of a piece of software identifier, are common across all instances of a piece of
client software and therefore pose no privacy issues for end-users. client software and therefore pose no privacy issues for end-users.
Client identifiers, on the other hand, are often unique to a specific Client identifiers, on the other hand, are often unique to a specific
instance of a client. For clients such as web sites that are used by instance of a client. For clients such as web sites that are used by
many users, there may not be significant privacy concerns regarding many users, there may not be significant privacy concerns regarding
the client identifier, but for clients such as native applications the client identifier, but for clients such as native applications
that are installed on a single end-user's device, the client that are installed on a single end-user's device, the client
identifier could be uniquely tracked during OAuth 2.0 transactions identifier could be uniquely tracked during OAuth 2.0 transactions
skipping to change at page 31, line 41 skipping to change at page 33, line 12
this way, an application could marginally improve privacy by this way, an application could marginally improve privacy by
registering multiple times and appearing to be completely separate registering multiple times and appearing to be completely separate
applications. However, this technique does incur significant applications. However, this technique does incur significant
usability cost in the form of requiring multiple authorizations per usability cost in the form of requiring multiple authorizations per
resource owner and is therefore unlikely to be used in practice. resource owner and is therefore unlikely to be used in practice.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
[IANA.Language] [IANA.Language]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Language IANA, "Language Subtag Registry",
Subtag Registry", <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ <http://www.iana.org/assignments/
language-subtag-registry>. language-subtag-registry>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009. Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
6749, October 2012. RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012. Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code [RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, January 2014. Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015. Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015. [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015. (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7522] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "Security [RFC7522] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7522, Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7522,
May 2015. DOI 10.17487/RFC7522, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7522>.
[RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token [RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, May 2015. Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.hardjono-oauth-umacore]
Hardjono, T., Maler, E., Machulak, M., and D. Catalano,
"User-Managed Access (UMA) Profile of OAuth 2.0", draft-
hardjono-oauth-umacore-13 (work in progress), April 2015.
[OAuth.Registration.Management]
Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak,
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management
Protocol", draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management (work in
progress), May 2015.
[OpenID.Discovery] [OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", November 2014. Connect Discovery 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Registration] [OpenID.Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0", November 2014. Dynamic Client Registration 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC7592] Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak,
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management
Protocol", RFC 7592, DOI 10.17487/RFC7592, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7592>.
[UMA-Core]
Hardjono, T., Maler, E., Machulak, M., and D. Catalano,
"User-Managed Access (UMA) Profile of OAuth 2.0", Work in
Progress, draft-hardjono-oauth-umacore-13, April 2015.
Appendix A. Use Cases Appendix A. Use Cases
This appendix describes different ways that this specification can be This appendix describes different ways that this specification can be
utilized, including describing some of the choices that may need to utilized, including describing some of the choices that may need to
be made. Some of the choices are independent and can be used in be made. Some of the choices are independent and can be used in
combination, whereas some of the choices are interrelated. combination, whereas some of the choices are interrelated.
A.1. Open versus Protected Dynamic Client Registration A.1. Open versus Protected Dynamic Client Registration
skipping to change at page 33, line 49 skipping to change at page 36, line 28
all client software to register with the authorization server. all client software to register with the authorization server.
A.1.2. Protected Dynamic Client Registration A.1.2. Protected Dynamic Client Registration
Authorization servers that support protected registration require Authorization servers that support protected registration require
that an initial access token be used when making registration that an initial access token be used when making registration
requests. While the method by which a client or developer receives requests. While the method by which a client or developer receives
this initial access token and the method by which the authorization this initial access token and the method by which the authorization
server validates this initial access token are out of scope for this server validates this initial access token are out of scope for this
specification, a common approach is for the developer to use a manual specification, a common approach is for the developer to use a manual
pre-registration portal at the authorization server that issues an preregistration portal at the authorization server that issues an
initial access token to the developer. initial access token to the developer.
A.2. Registration Without or With Software Statements A.2. Registration without or with Software Statements
A.2.1. Registration Without a Software Statement A.2.1. Registration without a Software Statement
When a software statement is not used in the registration request, When a software statement is not used in the registration request,
the authorization server must be willing to use client metadata the authorization server must be willing to use client metadata
values without them being digitally signed or MACed (and thereby values without them being digitally signed or MACed (and thereby
attested to) by any authority. (Note that this choice is independent attested to) by any authority. (Note that this choice is independent
of the Open versus Protected choice, and that an initial access token of the Open versus Protected choice, and that an initial access token
is another possible form of attestation.) is another possible form of attestation.)
A.2.2. Registration With a Software Statement A.2.2. Registration with a Software Statement
A software statement can be used in a registration request to provide A software statement can be used in a registration request to provide
attestation by an authority for a set of client metadata values. attestation by an authority for a set of client metadata values.
This can be useful when the authorization server wants to restrict This can be useful when the authorization server wants to restrict
registration to client software attested to by a set of authorities registration to client software attested to by a set of authorities
or when it wants to know that multiple registration requests refer to or when it wants to know that multiple registration requests refer to
the same piece of client software. the same piece of client software.
A.3. Registration by the Client or Developer A.3. Registration by the Client or Developer
skipping to change at page 34, line 38 skipping to change at page 37, line 18
In some use cases, client software will dynamically register itself In some use cases, client software will dynamically register itself
with an authorization server to obtain a client identifier and other with an authorization server to obtain a client identifier and other
information needed to interact with the authorization server. In information needed to interact with the authorization server. In
this case, no client identifier for the authorization server is this case, no client identifier for the authorization server is
packaged with the client software. packaged with the client software.
A.3.2. Registration by the Developer A.3.2. Registration by the Developer
In some cases, the developer (or development software being used by In some cases, the developer (or development software being used by
the developer) will pre-register the client software with the the developer) will preregister the client software with the
authorization server or a set of authorization servers. In this authorization server or a set of authorization servers. In this
case, the client identifier value(s) for the authorization server(s) case, the client identifier value(s) for the authorization server(s)
can be packaged with the client software. can be packaged with the client software.
A.4. Client ID per Client Instance or per Client Software A.4. Client ID per Client Instance or per Client Software
A.4.1. Client ID per Client Software Instance A.4.1. Client ID per Client Software Instance
In some cases, each deployed instance of a piece of client software In some cases, each deployed instance of a piece of client software
will dynamically register and obtain distinct client identifier will dynamically register and obtain distinct client identifier
values. This can be advantageous, for instance, if the code flow is values. This can be advantageous, for instance, if the code flow is
being used, as it also enables each client instance to have its own being used, as it also enables each client instance to have its own
client secret. This can be useful for native clients, which cannot client secret. This can be useful for native clients, which cannot
maintain the secrecy of a client secret value packaged with the maintain the secrecy of a client secret value packaged with the
software, but which may be able to maintain the secrecy of a per- software, but which may be able to maintain the secrecy of a per-
instance client secret. instance client secret.
A.4.2. Client ID Shared Among All Instances of Client Software A.4.2. Client ID Shared among All Instances of Client Software
In some cases, each deployed instance of a piece of client software In some cases, each deployed instance of a piece of client software
will share a common client identifier value. For instance, this is will share a common client identifier value. For instance, this is
often the case for in-browser clients using the implicit flow, when often the case for in-browser clients using the implicit flow, when
no client secret is involved. Particular authorization servers might no client secret is involved. Particular authorization servers might
choose, for instance, to maintain a mapping between software choose, for instance, to maintain a mapping between software
statement values and client identifier values, and return the same statement values and client identifier values, and return the same
client identifier value for all registration requests for a client identifier value for all registration requests for a
particular piece of software. The circumstances under which an particular piece of software. The circumstances under which an
authorization server would do so, and the specific software statement authorization server would do so, and the specific software statement
skipping to change at page 35, line 32 skipping to change at page 38, line 16
A.5.1. Stateful Client Registration A.5.1. Stateful Client Registration
In some cases, authorization servers will maintain state about In some cases, authorization servers will maintain state about
registered clients, typically indexing this state using the client registered clients, typically indexing this state using the client
identifier value. This state would typically include the client identifier value. This state would typically include the client
metadata values associated with the client registration, and possibly metadata values associated with the client registration, and possibly
other state specific to the authorization server's implementation. other state specific to the authorization server's implementation.
When stateful registration is used, operations to support retrieving When stateful registration is used, operations to support retrieving
and/or updating this state may be supported. One possible set of and/or updating this state may be supported. One possible set of
operations upon stateful registrations is described in the operations upon stateful registrations is described in [RFC7592].
[OAuth.Registration.Management] specification.
A.5.2. Stateless Client Registration A.5.2. Stateless Client Registration
In some cases, authorization servers will be implemented in a manner In some cases, authorization servers will be implemented in a manner
the enables them to not maintain any local state about registered the enables them to not maintain any local state about registered
clients. One means of doing this is to encode all the registration clients. One means of doing this is to encode all the registration
state in the returned client identifier value, and possibly state in the returned client identifier value, and possibly
encrypting the state to the authorization server to maintain the encrypting the state to the authorization server to maintain the
confidentiality and integrity of the state. confidentiality and integrity of the state.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins, to various draft versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek
Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Atkins, Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir
George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten Dzhuvinov, George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, William Kim, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat
Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig. Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix C. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-30
o Updated JOSE, JWT, and OAuth Assertion draft references to final
RFC numbers.
-29
o Descrbed more possible client responses to the metadata fields
returned by the server being different than those requested.
o Added RFC 7120/BCP 100 references.
o Added RFC 7525/BCP 195 reference to replace draft reference.
-28
o Clarified all client metadata as JSON arrays, strings, or numbers.
o Expanded security considerations advice around external URLs.
o Added text to say what happens if the client doesn't get back the
registration it expected in the response.
o Added more explicit references to HTTP 201 response from
registration.
o Clarified client version definition.
o Removed spurious reference to "delete action".
o Fixed intended normative and non-normative language in several
sections.
o Stated what a server should do if a suspected duplicate client
tries to register.
-27
o Changed a registry name missed in -26.
-26
o Used consistent registry name.
-25
o Updated author information.
o Clarified registry contents.
o Added forward pointer to IANA from metadata section.
o Clarified how to silently ignore errors.
o Reformatted diagram text.
-24
o Clarified some party definitions.
o Clarified the opaqueness of software_id and software_statement.
o Created a forward pointer to the Security Considerations section
for TLS requirements on the registration endpoint.
o Added a forward pointer to the Privacy Considerations section for
the contacts field.
o Wrote privacy considerations about client_id tracking.
-23
o Updated author information.
-22
o Reorganized registration response sections.
o Addressed shepherd comments.
o Added concrete JWK set to example.
-21
o Applied minor editorial fixes.
o Added software statement examples.
o Moved software statement request details to sub-section.
o Clarified that a server MAY ignore the software statement (just as
it MAY ignore other metadata values).
o Removed TLS 1.0.
o Added privacy considerations around "contacts" field.
o Marked software_id as RECOMMENDED inside of a software statement.
-20
o Applied minor editorial fixes from working group comments.
-19
o Added informative references to the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration and UMA specifications in the introduction.
o Clarified the "jwks" and "jwks_uri" descriptions and included an
example situation in which they might be used.
o Removed "application_type".
o Added redirection URI usage restrictions to the Security
Considerations section, based on the client type.
o Expanded the "tos_uri" and "policy_uri" descriptions.
-18
o Corrected an example HTTP response status code to be 201 Created.
o Said more about who issues and uses initial access tokens and
software statements.
o Stated that the use of an initial access token is required when
the authorization server limits the parties that can register a
client.
o Stated that the implementation and use of all client metadata
fields is OPTIONAL, other than "redirect_uris", which MUST be used
for redirect-based flows and implemented to fulfill the
requirement in Section 2 of OAuth 2.0.
o Added the "application_type" metadata value, which had somehow
been omitted.
o Added missing default metadata values, which had somehow been
omitted.
o Clarified that the "software_id" is ultimately asserted by the
client developer.
o Clarified that the "error" member is required in error responses,
"error_description" member is optional, and other members may be
present.
o Added security consideration about registrations with duplicate
"software_id" and "software_version" values.
-17
o Merged draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata back into this document.
o Removed "Core" from the document title.
o Explicitly state that all metadata members are optional.
o Clarified language around software statements for use in
registration context.
o Clarified that software statements need to be digitally signed or
MACed.
o Added a "jwks" metadata parameter to parallel the "jwks_uri"
parameter.
o Removed normative language from terminology.
o Expanded abstract and introduction.
o Addressed review comments from several working group members.
-16
o Replaced references to draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata and
draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management with draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-
reg-metadata and draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management.
o Addressed review comments by Phil Hunt and Tony Nadalin.
-15
o Partitioned the Dynamic Client Registration specification into
core, metadata, and management specifications. This built on work
first published as draft-richer-oauth-dyn-reg-core-00 and draft-
richer-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00.
o Added the ability to use Software Statements. This built on work
first published as draft-hunt-oauth-software-statement-00 and
draft-hunt-oauth-client-association-00.
o Created the IANA OAuth Registration Client Metadata registry for
registering Client Metadata values.
o Defined Client Instance term and stated that multiple instances
can use the same client identifier value under certain
circumstances.
o Rewrote the introduction.
o Rewrote the Use Cases appendix.
-14
o Added software_id and software_version metadata fields
o Added direct references to RFC6750 errors in read/update/delete
methods
-13
o Fixed broken example text in registration request and in delete
request
o Added security discussion of separating clients of different grant
types
o Fixed error reference to point to RFC6750 instead of RFC6749
o Clarified that servers must respond to all requests to
configuration endpoint, even if it's just an error code
o Lowercased all Terms to conform to style used in RFC6750
-12
o Improved definition of Initial Access Token
o Changed developer registration scenario to have the Initial Access
Token gotten through a normal OAuth 2.0 flow
o Moved non-normative client lifecycle examples to appendix
o Marked differentiating between auth servers as out of scope
o Added protocol flow diagram
o Added credential rotation discussion
o Called out Client Registration Endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Protected
Resource
o Cleaned up several pieces of text
-11
o Added localized text to registration request and response
examples.
o Removed "client_secret_jwt" and "private_key_jwt".
o Clarified "tos_uri" and "policy_uri" definitions.
o Added the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry for
registering "token_endpoint_auth_method" metadata values.
o Removed uses of non-ASCII characters, per RFC formatting rules.
o Changed "expires_at" to "client_secret_expires_at" and "issued_at"
to "client_id_issued_at" for greater clarity.
o Added explanatory text for different credentials (Initial Access
Token, Registration Access Token, Client Credentials) and what
they're used for.
o Added Client Lifecycle discussion and examples.
o Defined Initial Access Token in Terminology section.
-10
o Added language to point out that scope values are service-specific
o Clarified normative language around client metadata
o Added extensibility to token_endpoint_auth_method using absolute
URIs
o Added security consideration about registering redirect URIs
o Changed erroneous 403 responses to 401's with notes about token
handling
o Added example for initial registration credential
-09
o Added method of internationalization for Client Metadata values
o Fixed SAML reference
-08
o Collapsed jwk_uri, jwk_encryption_uri, x509_uri, and
x509_encryption_uri into a single jwks_uri parameter
o Renamed grant_type to grant_types since it's a plural value
o Formalized name of "OAuth 2.0" throughout document
o Added JWT Bearer Assertion and SAML 2 Bearer Assertion to example
grant types
o Added response_types parameter and explanatory text on its use
with and relationship to grant_types
-07
o Changed registration_access_url to registration_client_uri
o Fixed missing text in 5.1
o Added Pragma: no-cache to examples
o Changed "no such client" error to 403
o Renamed Client Registration Access Endpoint to Client
Configuration Endpoint
o Changed all the parameter names containing "_url" to instead use
"_uri"
o Updated example text for forming Client Configuration Endpoint URL
-06
o Removed secret_rotation as a client-initiated action, including
removing client secret rotation endpoint and parameters.
o Changed _links structure to single value registration_access_url.
o Collapsed create/update/read responses into client info response.
o Changed return code of create action to 201.
o Added section to describe suggested generation and composition of
Client Registration Access URL.
o Added clarifying text to PUT and POST requests to specify JSON in
the body.
o Added Editor's Note to DELETE operation about its inclusion.
o Added Editor's Note to registration_access_url about alternate
syntax proposals.
-05
o changed redirect_uri and contact to lists instead of space
delimited strings
o removed operation parameter
o added _links structure
o made client update management more RESTful
o split endpoint into three parts
o changed input to JSON from form-encoded
o added READ and DELETE operations
o removed Requirements section
o changed token_endpoint_auth_type back to
token_endpoint_auth_method to match OIDC who changed to match us
-04
o removed default_acr, too undefined in the general OAuth2 case
o removed default_max_auth_age, since there's no mechanism for
supplying a non-default max_auth_age in OAuth2
o clarified signing and encryption URLs
o changed token_endpoint_auth_method to token_endpoint_auth_type to
match OIDC
-03
o added scope and grant_type claims
o fixed various typos and changed wording for better clarity
o endpoint now returns the full set of client information
o operations on client_update allow for three actions on metadata:
leave existing value, clear existing value, replace existing value
with new value
-02
o Reorganized contributors and references
o Moved OAuth references to RFC
o Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity
o Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client
associate"
o Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent requests
o Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists
-01
o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document
o Changed to form-parameter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration
-00
o Imported original UMA draft specification
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor) Justin Richer (editor)
Email: ietf@justin.richer.org Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
 End of changes. 174 change blocks. 
728 lines changed or deleted 431 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.42. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/