draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-07.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-08.txt 
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura, Ed. OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: July 22, 2016 Ping Identity Expires: February 3, 2017 Ping Identity
January 19, 2016 August 2, 2016
OAuth 2.0 JWT Authorization Request OAuth 2.0 JWT Authorization Request (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-07 draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-08
Abstract Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization, which means that parameters are encoded in parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
the URI of the request. This document introduces the ability to send parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
request parameters in form of a JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
allows the request to be signed and encrypted. using JWT means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not
serialization. The request is sent by value or by reference. integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
the source of the communication is not authentciated. Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward.
This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be JWS
signed and/or JWE encrypted so that the integrity, source
authentication and confidentiallity property of the Authorization
Request is attained. The request can be sent by value or by
reference.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 10 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 11 5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 12
5. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 12
5.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 12 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 14
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 17
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC 6749] defines the encoding of The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
requests and responses and in case of the authorization request query parameter serialization and typically sent through user agents such
parameter serialization has been chosen. For example, the parameters as web browsers.
'response_type', 'client_id', 'state', and 'redirect_uri' are encoded
in the URI of the request:
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 For example, the parameters 'response_type', 'client_id', 'state',
Host: server.example.com and 'redirect_uri' are encoded in the URI of the request:
The encoding in the URI does not allow application layer security GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
with confidentiality and integrity protection to be used. While TLS &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
is used to offer communication security between the client and the Host: server.example.com
resource server, TLS sessions are often terminated prematurely at
some middlebox (such as a load balancer). The use of application While it is easy to implement, the encoding in the URI does not allow
layer security additionally allows requests to be prepared by a third application layer security with confidentiality and integrity
party so that a client application cannot request more permissions protection to be used. While TLS is used to offer communication
than previously agreed. This offers an additional degree of privacy security between the Client and the user-agent and the user-agent and
the Authorization Server, TLS sessions are terminated in the user-
agent. In addition, TLS sessions are terminated prematurely at some
middlebox (such as a load balancer).
As the result, the Authorization Request of [RFC6749] has a property
that
(a) the communication through the user agents are not integrity
protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity
protection failure);
(b) the source of the communication is not authentciated (source
authentication failure); and
(c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored
(containment failure).
Because of these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol such as
Redirection URI rewrite has been put forward by now.
The use of application layer security mitigates these issues.
In addition, it allows requests to be prepared by a third party so
that a client application cannot request more permissions than
previously agreed. This offers an additional degree of privacy
protection. protection.
Further, the request by reference allows to reduce the over-the-wire Further, the request by reference allows the reduction of over-the-
overhead. wire overhead.
There are other potential formats that could be used for this purpose There are other potential formats that could be used for this purpose
instead of JWT. The JWT was chosen because of instead of JWT [RFC7519]. The JWT was chosen because of
1. its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's (1) its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's
response format; response format;
2. its developer friendliness due to its textaual nature; (2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature;
3. its relative compactness compared to XML; (3) its relative compactness compared to XML;
4. its development status that it is an RFC and so is its associated (4) its development status that it is an RFC and so is its
signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and [RFC7516]. associated signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and
[RFC7516];
(5) relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and
Encryption.
The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as
additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0 additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0 [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0
authorization request parameters. The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to authorization request parameters. This JWT is integrity protected
the authorization endpoint by reference, in which case the parameter and source authenticated using JWS.
"request_uri" is used instead of the "request".
The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by
reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead
of the "request".
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query
parameters has several advantages: parameters has several advantages:
1. The request can be signed so that an integrity check can be (a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the
implemented. If a suitable algorithm is used for the signing, integrity of the request can be checked ;
then it will provide verification of the client making the
request.
2. The request may be encrypted so that end-to-end confidentiality (b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the
may be obtained even if in the case TLS connection is terminated signer can be authenticated ;
at a gateway or a similar device.
3. The request may be signed by a third party attesting that the (c) (containment) The request can be encrypted so that end-to-end
authorization request is compliant to certain policy. For confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS connection is
example, a request can be pre-examined by a third party that all terminated at one point or another ; and
the personal data requested is strictly necessary to perform the
process that the end-user asked for, and statically signed by (d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a third
that third party. The client would then send the request along party attesting that the authorization request is compliant to
with dynamic parameters such as state. The authorization server certain policy. For example, a request can be pre-examined by a
then examines the signature and shows the conformance status to third party that all the personal data requested is strictly
the end-user, who would have some assurance as to the legitimacy necessary to perform the process that the end-user asked for,
of the request when authorizing it. In some cases, it may even and statically signed by that third party. The client would
be desirable to skip the authorization dialogue under such then send the request along with dynamic parameters such as
circumstances. state. The authorization server then examines the signature and
shows the conformance status to the end-user, who would have
some assurance as to the legitimacy of the request when
authorizing it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip
the authorization dialogue under such circumstances.
There are a few cases that request by reference are useful such as: There are a few cases that request by reference are useful such as:
1. When it is desirable to reduced the size of transmitted request. 1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request.
Since we are using application layer security, it may The use of application layer security increases the size of the
substantially increase the size of the request particulary in the request, particularly when public key cryptography is used.
case of using public key cryptography.
2. Static signature: The client can make a signed Request Object and 2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it at a place
put it at a place that the Authorization Server can access. This that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done
may just be done by a client utility or other process, so that by a client utility or other process, so that the private key
the private key does not have to reside on the client, does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming.
simplifying programming. Downside of it is that the signed Downside of it is that the signed portion just become a token.
portion just become a token.
3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The 3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The
request_uri may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the request_uri may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the
resources referenced by the Request URI. With this, the server resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the
knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so it does server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so
not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as well. it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as
This is explained in Section 4.2. well. This is explained in Section 5.2.
4. When the client does not want to do the crypto: The Authorization
Server may provide an endpoint to accept the Authorization
Request through direct communication with the Client so that the
Client is authentcicated and the channel is TLS protected.
This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
For the purposes of this specification, the following terms and For the purposes of this specification, the following terms and
definitions apply. definitions in addition to what is defined in OAuth 2.0 Framework
[RFC6749], JSON Web Signature [RFC7515], and JSON Web Encryption
[RFC7519] apply.
2.1. Request Object 2.1. Request Object
JWT [RFC7519] that holds an OAuth 2.0 authorization request as JWT JWT [RFC7519] that holds an OAuth 2.0 authorization request as JWT
Claims Set Claims Set
2.2. Request Object URI 2.2. Request Object URI
Absolute URI from which the Request Object (Section 2.1) can be Absolute URI from which the Request Object (Section 2.1) can be
obtained obtained
3. Request Object 3. Symbols and abbreviated terms
The following abbreviations are common to this specification.
JSON Javascript Object Notation
JWT JSON Web Token
JWS JSON Web Signature
JWE JSON Web Encryption
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
WAP Wireless Application Protocol
4. Request Object
A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization
request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It
contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters
including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as
the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included
as JSON strings. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. as JSON strings. Since it is a JWT, JSON strings MUST be represented
It MAY include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] in UTF-8. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY
constitutes the JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]. The JWS Claims Set is then include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] constitutes
signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted. the JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]. The JWS Claims Set is then signed,
encrypted, or signed and encrypted.
To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a
JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request
Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience) Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience)
as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT
[RFC7519] specification. [RFC7519] specification.
To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Note that JWE is always integrity To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE
protected, so if only integrity protection is desired, JWS signature allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature should also
is not needed. be applied. In this case, it MUST be signed then encrypted, with the
result being a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].
It can also be signed then encrypted. This is sometimes desired to
reduced the repudiation risk from the point of view of the receiver.
In this case, it MUST be signed then encrypted, with the result being
a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].
The Authorization Request Object may be sent by value as described in The Authorization Request Object may be sent by value as described in
Section 4.1 or by reference as described in Section 4.2. Section 5.1 or by reference as described in Section 5.2.
REQUIRED OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not Required OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not
included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If
a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and
the Request Object, the request is malformed. the Request Object, the request is malformed.
"request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in "request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in
Request Objects. Request Objects.
If the parameter exists in both the query string and the If the parameter exists in both the query string and the
Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take
precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request
skipping to change at page 7, line 22 skipping to change at page 8, line 45
"kid":"k2bdc", "kid":"k2bdc",
"n":"y9Lqv4fCp6Ei-u2-ZCKq83YvbFEk6JMs_pSj76eMkddWRuWX2aBKGHAtKlE5P "n":"y9Lqv4fCp6Ei-u2-ZCKq83YvbFEk6JMs_pSj76eMkddWRuWX2aBKGHAtKlE5P
7_vn__PCKZWePt3vGkB6ePgzAFu08NmKemwE5bQI0e6kIChtt_6KzT5OaaXDF 7_vn__PCKZWePt3vGkB6ePgzAFu08NmKemwE5bQI0e6kIChtt_6KzT5OaaXDF
I6qCLJmk51Cc4VYFaxgqevMncYrzaW_50mZ1yGSFIQzLYP8bijAHGVjdEFgZa I6qCLJmk51Cc4VYFaxgqevMncYrzaW_50mZ1yGSFIQzLYP8bijAHGVjdEFgZa
ZEN9lsn_GdWLaJpHrB3ROlS50E45wxrlg9xMncVb8qDPuXZarvghLL0HzOuYR ZEN9lsn_GdWLaJpHrB3ROlS50E45wxrlg9xMncVb8qDPuXZarvghLL0HzOuYR
adBJVoWZowDNTpKpk2RklZ7QaBO7XDv3uR7s_sf2g-bAjSYxYUGsqkNA9b3xV adBJVoWZowDNTpKpk2RklZ7QaBO7XDv3uR7s_sf2g-bAjSYxYUGsqkNA9b3xV
W53am_UZZ3tZbFTIh557JICWKHlWj5uzeJXaw", W53am_UZZ3tZbFTIh557JICWKHlWj5uzeJXaw",
"e":"AQAB" "e":"AQAB"
} }
4. Authorization Request 5. Authorization Request
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of
the following parameters but not both to the query component of the the following parameters but not both to the query component of the
authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form- authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" format: urlencoded" format:
request The Request Object (Section 3) that holds authorization request The Request Object (Section 4) that holds authorization
request parameters stated in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. request parameters stated in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object
(Section 3) that holds authorization request parameters stated in (Section 4) that holds authorization request parameters stated in
the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the
user-agent. user-agent.
For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request: following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1 GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity. The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MAY be signed AND/OR encrypted. The authorization request object MUST be either
(a) JWS signed; or
(b) JWE encrypted; or
(c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted.
When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter
values contained in the JWT supersede those passed using the OAuth values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede
2.0 request syntax. However, parameters MAY also be passed using the those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, parameters
OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request Object is used; this MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a
would typically be done to enable a cached, pre-signed (and possibly Request Object is used; this would typically be done to enable a
pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used containing the fixed cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value
request parameters, while parameters that can vary with each request, to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters
such as state and nonce, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. that can vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce" of
OpenID Connect, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
4.1. Passing a Request Object by Value 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the
Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value. Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value.
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request
using the "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for using the "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA
iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmN iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmN
vbSIsDQogInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWV vbSIsDQogInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWV
udF9pZCI6ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8 udF9pZCI6ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8
vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiA vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiA
ic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaWZqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWo ic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaWZqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWo
iLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXN iLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXN
lcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWw lcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWw
iOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgIm5pY2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbCwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsIjo iOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgIm5pY2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbCwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsIjo
geyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsX3ZlcmlmaWVkIjogeyJ geyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsX3ZlcmlmaWVkIjogeyJ
lc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgfSw lc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgfSw
NCiAgICJpZF90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgIHsNCiAgICAgImdlbmRlciI6IG51bGwsDQo NCiAgICJpZF90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgIHsNCiAgICAgImdlbmRlciI6IG51bGwsDQo
gICAgICJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiB7ImVzc2VudGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICAiYWN gICAgICJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiB7ImVzc2VudGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICAiYWN
yIjogeyJ2YWx1ZXMiOiBbInVybjptYWNlOmluY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0 yIjogeyJ2YWx1ZXMiOiBbInVybjptYWNlOmluY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0
NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-ZkbmnvsF6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4H NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-ZkbmnvsF6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4H
h-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyFKzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2 h-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyFKzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2
GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFC GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFC
UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz
jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il
zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
4.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference
The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth
authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by
value. This parameter is used identically to the "request" value. This parameter is used identically to the "request"
parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from
the resource at the specified URL, rather than passed by value. the resource at the specified URL, rather than passed by value.
When the "request_uri" parameter is used, the OAuth 2.0 authorization When the "request_uri" parameter is used, the OAuth 2.0 authorization
request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT supersede request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, parameters those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, parameters
MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a
"request_uri" is used; this would typically be done to enable a "request_uri" is used; this would typically be done to enable a
cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value
to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters
that can vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce", are that can vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce", are
passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by Request Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by Request
URIs. If the contents of the referenced resource could ever change, Object URIs. If the contents of the referenced resource could ever
the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as defined change, the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as
in FIPS180-2 [FIPS180-2] of the referenced resource contents as the defined in RFC6234 [RFC6234] of the referenced resource contents as
fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a URI the fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a
changes, that signals the server that any cached value for that URI URI changes, that signals the server that any cached value for that
with the old fragment value is no longer valid. URI with the old fragment value is no longer valid.
The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There
are three reasons for this restriction. are three reasons for this restriction.
1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The 1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The
restriction are typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters. restriction are typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters.
2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet 2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet
Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters. Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters.
skipping to change at page 10, line 29 skipping to change at page 12, line 5
ICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgfSwNCiAgICJpZF90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgIH ICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgfSwNCiAgICJpZF90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgIH
sNCiAgICAgImdlbmRlciI6IG51bGwsDQogICAgICJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiB7ImVzc2Vu sNCiAgICAgImdlbmRlciI6IG51bGwsDQogICAgICJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiB7ImVzc2Vu
dGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICAiYWNyIjogeyJ2YWx1ZXMiOiBbInVybjptYWNlOm dGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICAiYWNyIjogeyJ2YWx1ZXMiOiBbInVybjptYWNlOm
luY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs luY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K 0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
4.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object
The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or
remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. This URL is remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. The URL MUST
the Request URI, "request_uri". be HTTPS URL. This URL is the Request Object URI, "request_uri".
It is possible for the Request Object to include values that is to be It is possible for the Request Object to include values that is to be
revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is
RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be
used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control
measures are taken. measures are taken.
The following is a non-normative example of a Request URI value (with Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate
line wraps within values for display purposes only): authentciation of the source of the Request Object, the Request
Object MUST be JWS Signed.
The following is a non-normative example of a Request Object URI
value (with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
https://client.example.org/request.jwt# https://client.example.org/request.jwt#
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
4.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter 5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter
The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization
Endpoint. Endpoint.
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request
using the "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for using the "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM %23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
&state=af0ifjsldkj &state=af0ifjsldkj
4.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an
HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced
Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate
the Authorization Request parameters. the Authorization Request parameters.
Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request
utilizing distinct parameters, or otherwise prevent the Authorization containing distinct parameters values, or otherwise prevent the
Server from caching the "request_uri". Authorization Server from caching the "request_uri".
The following is a non-normative example of this fetch process: The following is a non-normative example of this fetch process:
GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1 GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org Host: client.example.org
5. Validating JWT-Based Requests 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
5.1. Encrypted Request Object 6.1. Encrypted Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the
JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a
signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as
defined in Section 5.2 as well. defined in Section 6.2 as well.
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if decryption fails. If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return
"invalid_request_object" error.
5.2. Signed Request Object 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object
To perform Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in the To perform JWS Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in
JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. the JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm.
The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that
"client_id" and algorithm. "client_id" and algorithm.
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if signature validation If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return
fails. "invalid_request_object" error.
5.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization
Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or
"request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the "request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the
Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the
parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of
Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then
validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
6. Authorization Server Response 7. Authorization Server Response
Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in
Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] . Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] .
In addition, this document uses these additional error values: In addition, this document uses these additional error values:
invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request
returns an error or contains invalid data. returns an error or contains invalid data.
invalid_request_object The request parameter contains an invalid invalid_request_object The request parameter contains an invalid
Request Object. Request Object.
request_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support the request_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support the
use of the "request" parameter. use of the "request" parameter.
request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support
use of the "request_uri" parameter. use of the "request_uri" parameter.
7. IANA Considerations 8. TLS Requirements
Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST
support TLS as recommended in Recommendations for Secure Use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) [RFC7525].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in
the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures
described in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
9. IANA Considerations
This specification requests no actions by IANA. This specification requests no actions by IANA.
8. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth
2.0 [RFC6819], the following security considerations SHOULD be taken 2.0 [RFC6819], the following security considerations should be taken
into account. into account.
10.1. Choice of Algorithms
When sending the authorization request object through "request" When sending the authorization request object through "request"
parameter, it SHOULD be signed with then considered appropriate parameter, it MUST either be JWS signed with then considered
algorithm using [RFC7515]. The "alg=none" SHOULD NOT be used in such appropriate algorithm or encrypted using [RFC7516].
a case.
If the request object contains personally identifiable or sensitive 10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object
information, the "request_uri" MUST be of one-time use and MUST have
large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable security
policy. For higher security requirement, using [RFC7516] is strongly
recommended.
9. Acknowledgements Unless there is a compelling reasons to do otherwise, it is strongly
recommended to create a request object that covers all the parameters
so that the entire request is integrity protected.
This means that the request object is going to be prepared fresh each
time an authorization request is made and cacheing cannot be used.
It has a performance disadvantage, but where such disadvantage is
permissible, it should be considered.
Unless the server and the client have agreed prior to the
authorization request to use the non-protected parameters, the
authorization server SHOULD reject a request that is not fully
integrity protected and source authenticated.
10.3. Request Source Authentication
The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified.
There are several ways to do it in this sepcification.
(a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object.
(b) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In
this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out of band that
the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is
covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a
reliable method.
(c) Authorization Server is providing an endpoint that provides a
Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. In this
case, the Authorization Server MUST peform Client Authentication
to accept the Request Object and bind the Client Identifier to
the Request Object URI it is providing. Since Request Object
URI can be replayed, the lifetime of the Request Object URI MUST
be short and preferably one-time use. The entropy of the
Request Object URI MUST be sufficiently large.
(d) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an
endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a
Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above applies. In
addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator.
11. Privacy Considerations
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization
Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100
[ISO29100] is a freely accessible International Standard and its
Privacy Principles are good to follow.
Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer
Token Usage [RFC6750] and not specific to this specification. In
what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are
noted.
11.1. Collection limitation
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of
personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law
and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s).
It is often hard for the user to find out if the personal data asked
for is strictly necessary. A Trust Framework Provider can help the
user by examining the Client request and comparing to the proposed
processing by the Client and certifying the request. After the
certification, the Client, when making an Authorization Request, can
submit Authorization Request to the Trust Framework Provider to
obtain the Request Object URI.
Upon receiving such Request Object URI in the Authorization Request,
the Authorization Server first verifies that the authority portion of
the Request Object URI is a legitimate one for the Trust Framework
Provider. Then, the Auhtorization Server issues HTTP GET request to
the Request Object URI. Uppon connecting, the Authorization Server
MUST verify the server identity represented in the TLS certificate is
legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, the Authorization
Server can obtain the Request Object, which includes the "client_id"
representing the Client.
The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that
the request has been vetted by the Trust Framework Operator for the
adherance to the Collection Limitation principle.
11.2. Disclosure Limitation
11.2.1. Request Disclosure
This specification allows extension parameters. These may include
potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may
leak through various means but most notably through referrer and
browser history, if the authorization request contains poteintially
sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the
request object.
Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object
contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the
"request_uri" SHOULD be of one-time use and MUST have large enough
entropy deemed necessary with applicable security policy unless the
Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516] Encrypted.
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI
Even if the protected resource does not include a personally
identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the
user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request
Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through borwser
history etc. and start corrilating the user's activity using it. It
is in a way a data disclosure as well and should be avoided.
Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided.
12. Acknowledgements
Follwoing people contributed to the creation of this document in Follwoing people contributed to the creation of this document in
OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is used.) OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is used.)
Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Michael B. Jones Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov
(Microsoft), Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(DT), (add yourself). (Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt
(Deutche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutche Telecom), Hannes
Tschofenig (ARM), (add yourself).
Following people contributed to creating this document through the Following people contributed to creating this document through the
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OpenID.Core]. OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Yahoo! Japan), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno
(Microsoft), Breno de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE), (add
Richer (MITRE), (add yourself). yourself).
In addition following people contributed to this and previous In addition following people contributed to this and previous
versions through The OAuth Working Group. versions through The OAuth Working Group.
Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer
(Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke (Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook), (add yourself). Shepard (Facebook).
10. Revision History 13. Revision History
-08
o Applied changes proposed by Hannes on 2016-06-29 on IETF OAUth
list recorded as https://bitbucket.org/Nat/oauth-jwsreq/
issues/12/.
o TLS requirements added.
o Security Consideration reinforced.
o Privacy Consideration added.
o Introduction improved.
-07 -07
o Changed the abbrev to OAuth JAR from oauth-jar. o Changed the abbrev to OAuth JAR from oauth-jar.
o Clarified sig and enc methods. o Clarified sig and enc methods.
o Better English. o Better English.
o Removed claims from one of the example. o Removed claims from one of the example.
skipping to change at page 15, line 9 skipping to change at page 19, line 35
precedence. precedence.
-02 -02
o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers. o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers.
-01 -01
o Copy Edits. o Copy Edits.
11. References 14. References
11.1. Normative References
[FIPS180-2]
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Institute of
Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Signature
Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
Defines Secure Hash Algorithm 256 (SHA256) 14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 [RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819, Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
11.2. Informative References [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
14.2. Informative References
[ISO29100]
"ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology - Security
techniques - Privacy framework", December 2011,
<http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
c045123_ISO_IEC_29100_2011.zip>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014. C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura (editor) Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg. 1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg.
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005
Japan Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111 Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley John Bradley
 End of changes. 72 change blocks. 
198 lines changed or deleted 430 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/