draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-10.txt 
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: April 1, 2017 Ping Identity Expires: August 3, 2017 Ping Identity
September 28, 2016 January 30, 2017
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request
(JAR) (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09 draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-10
Abstract Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not
integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b) integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward. forward.
This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be JWS JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be JWS
signed and/or JWE encrypted so that the integrity, source signed and/or JWE encrypted so that the integrity, source
authentication and confidentiallity property of the Authorization authentication and confidentiality property of the Authorization
Request is attained. The request can be sent by value or by Request is attained. The request can be sent by value or by
reference. reference.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 13 5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 13
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 13 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 13
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 14
7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 15 10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 15
10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.4. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.4. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization and typically sent through user agents such parameter serialization and typically sent through user agents such
as web browsers. as web browsers.
For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state", For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state",
and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request: and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request:
skipping to change at page 4, line 23 skipping to change at page 4, line 23
response format; response format;
(2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature; (2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature;
(3) its relative compactness compared to XML; (3) its relative compactness compared to XML;
(4) its development status that it is an RFC and so is its (4) its development status that it is an RFC and so is its
associated signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and associated signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and
[RFC7516]; [RFC7516];
(5) relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and (5) the relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and
Encryption. Encryption.
The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as
additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0 additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0 [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0
authorization request parameters. This JWT is integrity protected authorization request parameters. This JWT is integrity protected
and source authenticated using JWS. and source authenticated using JWS.
The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by
reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead
of the "request". of the "request".
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query
parameters has several advantages: parameters has several advantages:
(a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the (a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the
integrity of the request can be checked ; integrity of the request can be checked;
(b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the (b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the
signer can be authenticated ; signer can be authenticated;
(c) (confidentiality protection) The request can be encrypted so (c) (confidentiality protection) The request can be encrypted so
that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS
connection is terminated at one point or another ; and connection is terminated at one point or another; and
(d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a third (d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a third
party attesting that the authorization request is compliant to party attesting that the authorization request is compliant with
certain policy. For example, a request can be pre-examined by a a certain policy. For example, a request can be pre-examined by
third party that all the personal data requested is strictly a third party that all the personal data requested is strictly
necessary to perform the process that the end-user asked for, necessary to perform the process that the end-user asked for,
and statically signed by that third party. The client would and statically signed by that third party. The client would
then send the request along with dynamic parameters such as then send the request along with dynamic parameters such as
state. The authorization server then examines the signature and "state". The authorization server then examines the signature
shows the conformance status to the end-user, who would have and shows the conformance status to the end-user, who would have
some assurance as to the legitimacy of the request when some assurance as to the legitimacy of the request when
authorizing it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip authorizing it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip
the authorization dialogue under such circumstances. the authorization dialogue under such circumstances.
There are a few cases that request by reference are useful such as: There are a few cases that request by reference is useful such as:
1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request. 1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request.
The use of application layer security increases the size of the The use of application layer security increases the size of the
request, particularly when public key cryptography is used. request, particularly when public key cryptography is used.
2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it at a place 2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it in a place
that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done
by a client utility or other process, so that the private key by a client utility or other process, so that the private key
does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming. does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming.
Downside of it is that the signed portion just become a token. The downside of it is that the signed portion just become a
token.
3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The 3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The
"request_uri" may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the "request_uri" may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the
resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the
server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so
it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as
well. This is explained in Section 5.2. well. This is explained in Section 5.2.
4. When the client does not want to do the crypto: The Authorization 4. When the client does not want to do the crypto: The Authorization
Server may provide an endpoint to accept the Authorization Server may provide an endpoint to accept the Authorization
skipping to change at page 6, line 46 skipping to change at page 6, line 50
4. Request Object 4. Request Object
A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization
request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It
contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters
including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as
the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included
as JSON strings. Since it is a JWT, JSON strings MUST be represented as JSON strings. Since it is a JWT, JSON strings MUST be represented
in UTF-8. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY in UTF-8. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY
include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] constitutes include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] constitutes
the JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]. The JWS Claims Set is then signed, the JWT Claims Set defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The JWT Claims Set is
encrypted, or signed and encrypted. then signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted.
To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a
JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request
Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience) Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience)
as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT
[RFC7519] specification. [RFC7519] specification.
To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE
allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature should also allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature SHOULD also
be applied. In this case, it MUST be signed then encrypted, with the be applied so that the source authentication can be done. When both
result being a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519]. signature and encryption are being applied, the JWT MUST be signed
then encrypted as advised in the section 11.2 of [RFC7519]. The
result is a Nested JWT, as defined in [RFC7519].
The Authorization Request Object may be sent by value as described in The Authorization Request Object MAY be sent by value as described in
Section 5.1 or by reference as described in Section 5.2. Section 5.1 or by reference as described in Section 5.2.
Required OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not Required OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not
included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If
a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and
the Request Object, the request is malformed. the Request Object, the request is malformed.
"request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in "request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in
Request Objects. Request Objects.
skipping to change at page 9, line 6 skipping to change at page 9, line 6
} }
5. Authorization Request 5. Authorization Request
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of
the following parameters but not both to the query component of the the following parameters but not both to the query component of the
authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form- authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" format: urlencoded" format:
request The Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds authorization request The Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds authorization
request parameters stated in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object
(Section 2.1) that holds authorization request parameters stated (Section 2.1) that holds authorization request parameters stated
in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the
user-agent. user-agent.
For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request: following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1 GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity. The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MUST be either The authorization request object MUST be either
(a) JWS signed; or (a) JWS signed; or
(b) JWE encrypted; or (b) JWE encrypted (when symmetric keys are bing used); or
(c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted. (c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted.
When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter
values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also
be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request
Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward
compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed
(and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used
skipping to change at page 11, line 17 skipping to change at page 11, line 17
change, the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as change, the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as
defined in RFC6234 [RFC6234] of the referenced resource contents as defined in RFC6234 [RFC6234] of the referenced resource contents as
the fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a the fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a
URI changes, it signals the server that any cached value for that URI URI changes, it signals the server that any cached value for that URI
with the old fragment value is no longer valid. with the old fragment value is no longer valid.
The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There
are three reasons for this restriction. are three reasons for this restriction.
1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The 1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The
restriction are typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters. restriction is typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters.
2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet 2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet
Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters. Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters.
3. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL 3. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL
would cause the slow response and using such is not advisable would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is
from the user experience point of view. not advisable from the user experience point of view.
The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request
Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https", Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https",
unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is
verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST
be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by
the Client. the Client.
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a Request The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a Request
Object resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line Object resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line
skipping to change at page 12, line 35 skipping to change at page 12, line 35
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K 0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object
The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or
remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. The URL MUST remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. The URL MUST
be HTTPS URL. This URL is the Request Object URI, "request_uri". be HTTPS URL. This URL is the Request Object URI, "request_uri".
It is possible for the Request Object to include values that is to be It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to
revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is
RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be
used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control
measures are taken. measures are taken.
Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate
authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request
Object MUST be JWS Signed. Object MUST be JWS Signed.
The following is a non-normative example of a Request Object URI The following is a non-normative example of a Request Object URI
skipping to change at page 13, line 46 skipping to change at page 13, line 46
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
6.1. Encrypted Request Object 6.1. Encrypted Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the
JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a
signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as
defined in Section 6.2 as well. defined in Section 6.2 as well.
If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an
"invalid_request_object" error. "invalid_request_object" error.
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object
To perform JWS Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in To perform JWS Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in
the JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. the JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm.
The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that
"client_id" and algorithm. "client_id" and algorithm.
If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return
"invalid_request_object" error. an "invalid_request_object" error.
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization
Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or
"request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the "request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the
Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the
parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of
Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then
skipping to change at page 14, line 43 skipping to change at page 14, line 43
invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request
returns an error or contains invalid data. returns an error or contains invalid data.
invalid_request_object The request parameter contains an invalid invalid_request_object The request parameter contains an invalid
Request Object. Request Object.
request_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support the request_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support the
use of the "request" parameter. use of the "request" parameter.
request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support
use of the "request_uri" parameter. the use of the "request_uri" parameter.
8. TLS Requirements 8. TLS Requirements
Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST
support TLS as recommended in Recommendations for Secure Use of support TLS following Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
(DTLS) [RFC7525]. [RFC7525].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering, To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a cipher
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. suite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in
the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures
described in Section 6 of [RFC6125]. described in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This specification requests no actions by IANA. This specification requests no actions by IANA.
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth
2.0 [RFC6819], the following security considerations should be taken 2.0 [RFC6819], the security considerations in [RFC7515], [RFC7516],
into account. and [RFC7518] needs to be considered. Also, there are several
academic papers such as [BASIN] that provide useful insight into the
security properties of protocols like OAuth.
In consideration of the above, this document advises taking the
following security considerations into account.
10.1. Choice of Algorithms 10.1. Choice of Algorithms
When sending the authorization request object through "request" When sending the authorization request object through "request"
parameter, it MUST either be JWS signed with then considered parameter, it MUST either be signed using JWS [RFC7515] or encrypted
appropriate algorithm or encrypted using [RFC7516]. using JWE [RFC7516] with then considered appropriate algorithm.
10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object 10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object
Unless there is a compelling reasons to do otherwise, it is strongly Unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise, it is strongly
recommended to create a request object that covers all the parameters recommended to create a request object that covers all the parameters
so that the entire request is integrity protected. so that the entire request is integrity protected.
This means that the request object is going to be prepared fresh each This means that the request object is going to be prepared fresh each
time an authorization request is made and caching cannot be used. It time an authorization request is made and caching cannot be used. It
has a performance disadvantage, but where such disadvantage is has a performance disadvantage, but where such disadvantage is
permissible, it should be considered. permissible, it should be considered.
Unless the server and the client have agreed prior to the Unless the server and the client have agreed prior to the
authorization request to use the non-protected parameters, the authorization request to use the non-protected parameters, the
authorization server SHOULD reject a request that is not fully authorization server SHOULD reject a request that is not fully
integrity protected and source authenticated. integrity protected and source authenticated. Note that the such
agreement needs to be done in a secure fashion. For example, the
developers from the server side and the client side can have a face
to face meeting to come to such an agreement.
10.3. Request Source Authentication 10.3. Request Source Authentication
The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified. The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified.
There are several ways to do it in this specification. There are several ways to do it in this specification.
(a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object. (a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object.
(b) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In (b) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In
this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out of band that this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is
covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a
reliable method. reliable method.
(c) Authorization Server is providing an endpoint that provides a (c) Authorization Server is providing an endpoint that provides a
Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. In this Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. In this
case, the Authorization Server MUST perform Client case, the Authorization Server MUST perform Client
Authentication to accept the Request Object and bind the Client Authentication to accept the Request Object and bind the Client
Identifier to the Request Object URI it is providing. Since Identifier to the Request Object URI it is providing. Since
Request Object URI can be replayed, the lifetime of the Request Request Object URI can be replayed, the lifetime of the Request
Object URI MUST be short and preferably one-time use. The Object URI MUST be short and preferably one-time use. The
entropy of the Request Object URI MUST be sufficiently large. entropy of the Request Object URI MUST be sufficiently large.
The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of the
Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the
value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for
the validity time would be less than a minute and the Request
Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit
or more at the time of the writing of this specification.
(d) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an (d) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an
endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a
Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above applies. In Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above apply. In
addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator. the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator.
10.4. Explicit Endpoints 10.4. Explicit Endpoints
Although this specification does not require them, researchs such as Although this specification does not require them, research such as
[BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the [BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the
intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the
sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the
initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that comes into question in initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that come into question in
this specification are this specification are
(a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources"); (a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources");
(b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint"); (b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint");
(c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri"); and (c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri"); and
(d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint"). (d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint").
While Redirection URI is included, others are not included in the While Redirection URI is included, others are not included in the
Authorization Request Object. It is probably a good idea to include Authorization Request Object. It is probably a good idea to include
these in it to reduce the attack surface. An extension specification these in it to reduce the attack surface. An extension specification
should be created. should be created as a preventive measure to address potential
vulnerabilities that has not yet been identified.
11. Privacy Considerations 11. Privacy Considerations
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization
Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100 Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100
[ISO29100] is a freely accessible International Standard and its [ISO29100] is a freely accessible International Standard and its
Privacy Principles are good to follow. Privacy Principles are good to follow.
While ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO29100] is a high-level document that gives
general guidance, RFC 6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet
Protocols [RFC6973] gives more specific guidances on the privacy
consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidances
on the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The
provision listed in it should be followed.
Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer
Token Usage [RFC6750] and not specific to this specification. In Token Usage [RFC6750] and not specific to this specification. In
what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are
noted. noted.
11.1. Collection limitation 11.1. Collection limitation
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of
skipping to change at page 17, line 32 skipping to change at page 17, line 51
for is strictly necessary. A Trust Framework Provider can help the for is strictly necessary. A Trust Framework Provider can help the
user by examining the Client request and comparing to the proposed user by examining the Client request and comparing to the proposed
processing by the Client and certifying the request. After the processing by the Client and certifying the request. After the
certification, the Client, when making an Authorization Request, can certification, the Client, when making an Authorization Request, can
submit Authorization Request to the Trust Framework Provider to submit Authorization Request to the Trust Framework Provider to
obtain the Request Object URI. obtain the Request Object URI.
Upon receiving such Request Object URI in the Authorization Request, Upon receiving such Request Object URI in the Authorization Request,
the Authorization Server first verifies that the authority portion of the Authorization Server first verifies that the authority portion of
the Request Object URI is a legitimate one for the Trust Framework the Request Object URI is a legitimate one for the Trust Framework
Provider. Then, the Auhtorization Server issues HTTP GET request to Provider. Then, the Authorization Server issues HTTP GET request to
the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the Authorization Server the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the Authorization Server
MUST verify the server identity represented in the TLS certificate is MUST verify the server identity represented in the TLS certificate is
legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, the Authorization legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, the Authorization
Server can obtain the Request Object, which includes the "client_id" Server can obtain the Request Object, which includes the "client_id"
representing the Client. representing the Client.
The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that
the request has been vetted by the Trust Framework Operator for the the request has been vetted by the Trust Framework Operator for the
adherence to the Collection Limitation principle. adherence to the Collection Limitation principle.
11.2. Disclosure Limitation 11.2. Disclosure Limitation
11.2.1. Request Disclosure 11.2.1. Request Disclosure
This specification allows extension parameters. These may include This specification allows extension parameters. These may include
potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may
leak through various means but most notably through referrer and leak through various means but most notably through referrer and
browser history, if the authorization request contains potentially browser history, if the authorization request contains a potentially
sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the
request object. request object.
Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object
contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the
"request_uri" SHOULD be of one-time use and MUST have large enough "request_uri" SHOULD be used only once, have short validity period,
entropy deemed necessary with applicable security policy unless the and MUST have large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable
Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516] Encrypted. security policy unless the Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516]
Encrypted. The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of
the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the
value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for the
validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI
is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the
time of the writing of this specification.
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI 11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI
Even if the protected resource does not include a personally Even if the protected resource does not include a personally
identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the
user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request
Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser
history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. It history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. It
is in a way a data disclosure as well and should be avoided. is in a way a data disclosure as well and should be avoided.
Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided. Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided.
12. Acknowledgements 12. Acknowledgements
The following people contributed to the creation of this document in The following people contributed to the creation of this document in
the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is
used.) used.)
Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov
(Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt (Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt
(Deutche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutche Telecom), Hannes (Deutsche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutsche Telecom), Hannes
Tschofenig (ARM). Tschofenig (ARM), Denis Pinkas, Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), and Steve
Kent (as SECDIR).
The following people contributed to creating this document through The following people contributed to creating this document through
the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core]. the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno (Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno
de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE). de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE).
In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous
versions through the OAuth Working Group. versions through the OAuth Working Group.
Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer
(Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke (Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook). Shepard (Facebook).
13. Revision History 13. Revision History
-10
o Minor Editorial Nits.
o Section 10.4 added.
-09 -09
o Minor Editorial Nits. o Minor Editorial Nits.
o Section 10.4 added. o Section 10.4 added.
o Explicit reference to Security consideration (10.2) added in o Explicit reference to Security consideration (10.2) added in
section 5 and section 5.2. section 5 and section 5.2.
o , (add yourself) removed from the acknowledgement. o , (add yourself) removed from the acknowledgement.
skipping to change at page 21, line 9 skipping to change at page 21, line 45
o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers. o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers.
-01 -01
o Copy Edits. o Copy Edits.
14. References 14. References
14.1. Normative References 14.1. Normative References
[ISO29100]
"ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology - Security
techniques - Privacy framework", December 2011,
<http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
c045123_ISO_IEC_29100_2011.zip>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
skipping to change at page 21, line 40 skipping to change at page 22, line 36
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 [RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819, Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
14.2. Informative References 14.2. Informative References
[BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing [BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing
the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication", the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication",
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust
Principles Volume 21 Issue 6, Pages 817-846, November Principles Volume 21 Issue 6, Pages 817-846, November
2013, 2013,
<https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/ <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/
papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>. papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>.
[ISO29100]
"ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology - Security
techniques - Privacy framework", December 2011,
<http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
c045123_ISO_IEC_29100_2011.zip>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID
Foundation Standards, February 2014, Foundation Standards, February 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
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