draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-11.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-12.txt 
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: August 3, 2017 Ping Identity Expires: August 17, 2017 Ping Identity
January 30, 2017 February 13, 2017
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request
(JAR) (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-11 draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-12
Abstract Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not
integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b) integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward. forward.
This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be JWS JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
signed and/or JWE encrypted so that the integrity, source with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and/or encrypted with JSON Web
authentication and confidentiality property of the Authorization Encryption (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and
Request is attained. The request can be sent by value or by confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained.
reference. The request can be sent by value or by reference.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 3, line 5 skipping to change at page 3, line 5
10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 15 10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 15
10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.4. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.4. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization and typically sent through user agents such parameter serialization and is typically sent through user agents
as web browsers. such as web browsers.
For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state", For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state",
and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request: and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request:
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
While it is easy to implement, the encoding in the URI does not allow While it is easy to implement, the encoding in the URI does not allow
application layer security with confidentiality and integrity application layer security with confidentiality and integrity
protection to be used. While TLS is used to offer communication protection to be used. While TLS is used to offer communication
security between the Client and the user-agent and the user-agent and security between the Client and the user-agent as well as the user-
the Authorization Server, TLS sessions are terminated in the user- agent and the Authorization Server, TLS sessions are terminated in
agent. In addition, TLS sessions may be terminated prematurely at the user-agent. In addition, TLS sessions may be terminated
some middlebox (such as a load balancer). prematurely at some middlebox (such as a load balancer).
As the result, the Authorization Request of [RFC6749] has a property As the result, the Authorization Request of [RFC6749] has
that shortcomings in that:
(a) the communication through the user agents are not integrity (a) the communication through the user agents are not integrity
protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity
protection failure); protection failure)
(b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source (b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source
authentication failure); and authentication failure)
(c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored (c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored
(containment / confidentiality failure). (containment / confidentiality failure).
Because of these weaknesses, several attacks against the protocol, Due to these inherent weaknesses, several attacks against the
such as Redirection URI rewriting, has been discovered. protocol, such as Redirection URI rewriting, have been identified.
The use of application layer security mitigates these issues. The use of application layer security mitigates these issues.
In addition, it allows requests to be prepared by a third party so The use of application layer security allows requests to be prepared
that a client application cannot request more permissions than by a third party so that a client application cannot request more
previously agreed. This offers an additional degree of privacy permissions than previously agreed. This offers an additional degree
protection. of privacy protection.
Furthermore, the request by reference allows the reduction of over- Furthermore, the request by reference allows the reduction of over-
the- wire overhead. the-wire overhead.
The JWT [RFC7519] encoding has been chosen because of The JWT [RFC7519] encoding has been chosen because of
(1) its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's (1) its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's
response format; response format
(2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature; (2) its developer friendliness due to its textual nature
(3) its relative compactness compared to XML; (3) its relative compactness compared to XML
(4) its development status that it is an RFC and so is its (4) its development status that it is an RFC and so is its
associated signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and associated signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and
[RFC7516]; [RFC7516]
(5) the relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and (5) the relative ease of JWS and JWE compared to XML Signature and
Encryption. Encryption.
The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as
additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0 additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0 [RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0
authorization request parameters. This JWT is integrity protected authorization request parameters. This JWT is integrity protected
and source authenticated using JWS. and source authenticated using JWS.
The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to the authorization endpoint by
reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead reference, in which case the parameter "request_uri" is used instead
of the "request". of the "request".
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query
parameters has several advantages: parameters has several advantages:
(a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the (a) (integrity protection) The request can be signed so that the
integrity of the request can be checked; integrity of the request can be checked.
(b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the (b) (source authentication) The request can be signed so that the
signer can be authenticated; signer can be authenticated.
(c) (confidentiality protection) The request can be encrypted so (c) (confidentiality protection) The request can be encrypted so
that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS that end-to-end confidentiality can be provided even if the TLS
connection is terminated at one point or another; and connection is terminated at one point or another.
(d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a third (d) (collection minimization) The request can be signed by a third
party attesting that the authorization request is compliant with party attesting that the authorization request is compliant with
a certain policy. For example, a request can be pre-examined by a certain policy. For example, a request can be pre-examined by
a third party that all the personal data requested is strictly a third party that all the personal data requested is strictly
necessary to perform the process that the end-user asked for, necessary to perform the process that the end-user asked for,
and statically signed by that third party. The client would and statically signed by that third party. The client would
then send the request along with dynamic parameters such as then send the request along with dynamic parameters such as
"state". The authorization server then examines the signature "state". The authorization server then examines the signature
and shows the conformance status to the end-user, who would have and shows the conformance status to the end-user, who would have
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The use of application layer security increases the size of the The use of application layer security increases the size of the
request, particularly when public key cryptography is used. request, particularly when public key cryptography is used.
2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it in a place 2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it in a place
that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done
by a client utility or other process, so that the private key by a client utility or other process, so that the private key
does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming. does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming.
The downside of it is that the signed portion just become a The downside of it is that the signed portion just become a
token. token.
3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The 3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable. The
"request_uri" may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the "request_uri" may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the
resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the
server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so
it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as
well. This is explained in Section 5.2. well. This is explained in Section 5.2.
4. When the client does not want to do the crypto: The Authorization 4. When the client does not want to do the crypto. The
Server may provide an endpoint to accept the Authorization Authorization Server may provide an endpoint to accept the
Request through direct communication with the Client so that the Authorization Request through direct communication with the
Client is authenticated and the channel is TLS protected. Client so that the Client is authenticated and the channel is TLS
protected.
This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
skipping to change at page 6, line 51 skipping to change at page 6, line 51
A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization
request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It
contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters
including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as
the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included
as JSON strings. Since it is a JWT, JSON strings MUST be represented as JSON strings. Since it is a JWT, JSON strings MUST be represented
in UTF-8. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY in UTF-8. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers. It MAY
include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] constitutes include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159] constitutes
the JWT Claims Set defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The JWT Claims Set is the JWT Claims Set defined in JWT [RFC7519]. The JWT Claims Set is
then signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted. then signed or encrypted or both.
To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a
JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request
Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience) Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience)
as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT
[RFC7519] specification. [RFC7519] specification.
To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE
allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature SHOULD also allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature SHOULD also
be applied so that the source authentication can be done. When both be applied so that the source authentication can be done. When both
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a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and
the Request Object, the request is malformed. the Request Object, the request is malformed.
"request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in "request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in
Request Objects. Request Objects.
If the parameter exists in both the query string and the If the parameter exists in both the query string and the
Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take
precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request
object, it cannot include parameters such as "state" that are object, it cannot include parameters such as "state" that are
expected to differ in every request. It is fine to include them in expected to differ in every request. It is recommended to include
the request object if it is going to be prepared afresh every time. them in the request object if it is going to be prepared afresh every
time.
The following is a non-normative example of the Claims in a Request The following is an example of the Claims in a Request Object before
Object before base64url encoding and signing. Note that it includes base64url encoding and signing. Note that it includes extension
extension variables such as "nonce" and "max_age". variables such as "nonce" and "max_age".
{ {
"iss": "s6BhdRkqt3", "iss": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"aud": "https://server.example.com", "aud": "https://server.example.com",
"response_type": "code id_token", "response_type": "code id_token",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb", "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
"scope": "openid", "scope": "openid",
"state": "af0ifjsldkj", "state": "af0ifjsldkj",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
skipping to change at page 9, line 24 skipping to change at page 9, line 24
user-agent. user-agent.
For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request: following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1 GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity. The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MUST be either The authorization request object MUST be one of the following:
(a) JWS signed; or (a) JWS signed
(b) JWE encrypted (when symmetric keys are being used); or (b) JWE encrypted (when symmetric keys are being used)
(c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted. (c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted
When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter
values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also
be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request
Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward
compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed
(and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used
containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that can containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that can
vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce" of OpenID vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce" of OpenID
Connect, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. In such case, one needs Connect, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. In such case, one needs
to carefully assess the risk associated with it as unprotected to carefully assess the risk associated with it as unprotected
parameters would create additional attack surfaces. See Section 10.2 parameters would create additional attack surfaces. See Section 10.2
as well. as well.
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the
Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value. Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value.
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the
using the "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for display
display purposes only): purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA
iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmN iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmN
vbSIsDQogInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWV vbSIsDQogInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWV
udF9pZCI6ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8 udF9pZCI6ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8
vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiA vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiA
ic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaWZqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWo ic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaWZqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWo
iLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXN iLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXN
lcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWw lcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWw
skipping to change at page 12, line 5 skipping to change at page 12, line 5
would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is
not advisable from the user experience point of view. not advisable from the user experience point of view.
The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request
Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https", Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https",
unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is
verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST
be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by
the Client. the Client.
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a Request The following is an example of the contents of a Request Object
Object resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line wraps
wraps within values for display purposes only): within values for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3 eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3
F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogInJl F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogInJl
c3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNk c3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNk
JoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1w JoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1w
bGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiAic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaW bGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiAic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaW
Zqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjog Zqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjog
ODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXNlcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQ ODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXNlcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQ
ogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgIm5p ogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgIm5p
Y2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbCwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfS Y2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbCwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfS
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be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is
RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be
used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control
measures are taken. measures are taken.
Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate
authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request
Object MUST be JWS Signed. Object MUST be JWS Signed.
The following is a non-normative example of a Request Object URI The following is an example of a Request Object URI value (with line
value (with line wraps within values for display purposes only): wraps within values for display purposes only):
https://client.example.org/request.jwt# https://client.example.org/request.jwt#
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter 5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter
The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization
Endpoint. Endpoint.
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the
using the "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for display
display purposes only): purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM %23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
&state=af0ifjsldkj &state=af0ifjsldkj
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an
HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced
Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate
the Authorization Request parameters. the Authorization Request parameters.
Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request
containing distinct parameters values, or otherwise prevent the containing distinct parameters values, or otherwise prevent the
Authorization Server from caching the "request_uri". Authorization Server from caching the "request_uri".
The following is a non-normative example of this fetch process: The following is an example of this fetch process:
GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1 GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org Host: client.example.org
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
6.1. Encrypted Request Object 6.1. Encrypted Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the
JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a
signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as
defined in Section 6.2 as well. defined in Section 6.2 as well.
If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an
"invalid_request_object" error. "invalid_request_object" error.
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object
To perform JWS Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in To perform signature validation of a JSON Web Signature [RFC7515]
the JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. signed request object, the "alg" Header Parameter in its JOSE Header
The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. The signature
"client_id" and algorithm. MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that "client_id"
and algorithm.
If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return
an "invalid_request_object" error. an "invalid_request_object" error.
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization
Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or
"request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the "request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the
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developers from the server side and the client side can have a face developers from the server side and the client side can have a face
to face meeting to come to such an agreement. to face meeting to come to such an agreement.
10.3. Request Source Authentication 10.3. Request Source Authentication
The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified. The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified.
There are several ways to do it in this specification. There are several ways to do it in this specification.
(a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object. (a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object.
(b) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In (b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the
correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption.
(c) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In
this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that this case, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is the Client uses Request Object URI and only the Client is
covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a covered by the TLS certificate. In general, it is not a
reliable method. reliable method.
(c) Authorization Server is providing an endpoint that provides a (d) Authorization Server is providing an endpoint that provides a
Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. In this Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. In this
case, the Authorization Server MUST perform Client case, the Authorization Server MUST perform Client
Authentication to accept the Request Object and bind the Client Authentication to accept the Request Object and bind the Client
Identifier to the Request Object URI it is providing. Since Identifier to the Request Object URI it is providing. Since
Request Object URI can be replayed, the lifetime of the Request Request Object URI can be replayed, the lifetime of the Request
Object URI MUST be short and preferably one-time use. The Object URI MUST be short and preferably one-time use. The
entropy of the Request Object URI MUST be sufficiently large. entropy of the Request Object URI MUST be sufficiently large.
The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of the The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of the
Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the
value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for
the validity time would be less than a minute and the Request the validity time would be less than a minute and the Request
Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit
or more at the time of the writing of this specification. or more at the time of the writing of this specification.
(d) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an (e) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an
endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a
Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above apply. In Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above apply. In
addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator. the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator.
10.4. Explicit Endpoints 10.4. Explicit Endpoints
Although this specification does not require them, research such as Although this specification does not require them, research such as
[BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the [BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the
intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the
sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the
initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that come into question in initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that come into question in
this specification are this specification are :
(a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources"); (a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources")
(b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint")
(b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint"); (c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri")
(c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri"); and (d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint")
(d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint").
While Redirection URI is included, others are not included in the While Redirection URI is included, others are not included in the
Authorization Request Object. It is probably a good idea to include Authorization Request Object. It is probably a good idea to include
these in it to reduce the attack surface. An extension specification these in it to reduce the attack surface. An extension specification
should be created as a preventive measure to address potential should be created as a preventive measure to address potential
vulnerabilities that have not yet been identified. vulnerabilities that have not yet been identified.
11. Privacy Considerations 11. Privacy Considerations
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization
Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100 Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100
[ISO29100] is a freely accessible International Standard and its [ISO29100] is an International Standard and its Privacy Principles
Privacy Principles are good to follow. are good to follow.
While ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO29100] is a high-level document that gives While ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO29100] is a high-level document that gives
general guidance, RFC 6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet general guidance, RFC 6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet
Protocols [RFC6973] gives more specific guidances on the privacy Protocols [RFC6973] gives more specific guidance on the privacy
consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidances consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidance on
on the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provision
provision listed in it should be followed. listed in it should be followed.
Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer
Token Usage [RFC6750] and not specific to this specification. In Token Usage [RFC6750] and are not specific to this specification. In
what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are
noted. noted.
11.1. Collection limitation 11.1. Collection limitation
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of
personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law
and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s). and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s).
skipping to change at page 18, line 43 skipping to change at page 18, line 48
validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI
is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the
time of the writing of this specification. time of the writing of this specification.
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI 11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI
Even if the protected resource does not include a personally Even if the protected resource does not include a personally
identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the
user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request
Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser
history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. It history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. In
is in a way a data disclosure as well and should be avoided. a way, it is a data disclosure as well and should be avoided.
Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided. Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided.
12. Acknowledgements 12. Acknowledgements
The following people contributed to the creation of this document in The following people contributed to the creation of this document in
the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution are
used.) used.)
Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov
(Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt (Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt
(Deutsche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutsche Telecom), Hannes (Deutsche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutsche Telecom), Hannes
Tschofenig (ARM), Denis Pinkas, Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), and Steve Tschofenig (ARM), Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), and Steve Kent (as
Kent (as SECDIR). SECDIR).
The following people contributed to creating this document through The following people contributed to creating this document through
the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core]. the OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno (Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno
de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE). de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE).
In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous
versions through the OAuth Working Group. versions through the OAuth Working Group.
Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer
(Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke (Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook). Shepard (Facebook).
13. Revision History 13. Revision History
-12
o fixes #48 - OPSDIR Review : General - delete semicolors after list
items
o fixes #58 - DP Comments for the Last Call
o fixes #57 - GENART - Remove "non-normative ... " from examples.
o fixes #45 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - are attacks discovered
or already opened
o fixes #49 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - Inconsistent colons
after initial sentence of list items.
o fixes #53 - OPSDIR Review : 6.2 JWS Signed Request Object -
Clarify JOSE Header
o fixes #42 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - readability of 'and' is
confusing
o fixes #50 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - Clarify
'signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted'
o fixes #39 - OPSDIR Review : Abstract - Explain/Clarify JWS and JWE
o fixed #50 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - Clarify
'signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted'
o fixes #43 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'properties' sounds
awkward and are not exactly 'properties'
o fixes #56 - OPSDIR Review : 12 Acknowledgements - 'contribution
is' => 'contribution are'
o fixes #55 - OPSDIR Review : 11.2.2 Privacy Considerations - ' It
is in a way' => 'In a way, it is'
o fixes #54 - OPSDIR Review : 11 Privacy Considerations - 'and not
specific' => 'and are not specific'
o fixes #51 - OPSDIR Review : Section 4 Request Object - 'It is
fine' => 'It is recommended'
o fixes #47 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'over- the- wire' =>
'over-the-wire'
o fixes #46 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'It allows' => 'The use
of application security' for
o fixes #44 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - 'has' => 'have'
o fixes #41 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - missing 'is' before
'typically sent'
o fixes #38 - OPSDIR Review : Section 11 - Delete 'freely
accessible' regarding ISO 29100
-11 -11
o s/bing/being/ o s/bing/being/
o Added history for -10 o Added history for -10
-10 -10
o #20: KM1 -- some wording that is awkward in the TLS section. o #20: KM1 -- some wording that is awkward in the TLS section.
skipping to change at page 24, line 32 skipping to change at page 26, line 4
<https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/ <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/
papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>. papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID
Foundation Standards, February 2014, Foundation Standards, February 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg. Otemachi Financial City Grand Cube, 1-9-2 Otemachi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004
Japan Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111 Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM Talagante, RM
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