draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-12.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt 
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: August 17, 2017 Ping Identity Expires: October 1, 2017 Ping Identity
February 13, 2017 March 30, 2017
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request
(JAR) (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-12 draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13
Abstract Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not
integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b) integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of
skipping to change at page 1, line 47 skipping to change at page 1, line 47
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 1, 2017.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 13 5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 12
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 13 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 12
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 14
7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object . 15 10.2. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.3. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.3. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.4. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server . . . . . . 17
11.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11. TLS security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 18 12.1. Collection limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.2. Disclosure Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.2.1. Request Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 12.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . 19
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query The Authorization Request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization and is typically sent through user agents parameter serialization and is typically sent through user agents
such as web browsers. such as web browsers.
For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state", For example, the parameters "response_type", "client_id", "state",
and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request: and "redirect_uri" are encoded in the URI of the request:
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protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted (integrity
protection failure) protection failure)
(b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source (b) the source of the communication is not authenticated (source
authentication failure) authentication failure)
(c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored (c) the communication through the user agents can be monitored
(containment / confidentiality failure). (containment / confidentiality failure).
Due to these inherent weaknesses, several attacks against the Due to these inherent weaknesses, several attacks against the
protocol, such as Redirection URI rewriting, have been identified. protocol, such as Redirection URI rewriting and Mix-up attack [FETT],
have been identified.
The use of application layer security mitigates these issues. The use of application layer security mitigates these issues.
The use of application layer security allows requests to be prepared The use of application layer security allows requests to be prepared
by a third party so that a client application cannot request more by a third party so that a client application cannot request more
permissions than previously agreed. This offers an additional degree permissions than previously agreed. This offers an additional degree
of privacy protection. of privacy protection.
Furthermore, the request by reference allows the reduction of over- Furthermore, the request by reference allows the reduction of over-
the-wire overhead. the-wire overhead.
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authorizing it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip authorizing it. In some cases, it may even be desirable to skip
the authorization dialogue under such circumstances. the authorization dialogue under such circumstances.
There are a few cases that request by reference is useful such as: There are a few cases that request by reference is useful such as:
1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request. 1. When it is desirable to reduce the size of transmitted request.
The use of application layer security increases the size of the The use of application layer security increases the size of the
request, particularly when public key cryptography is used. request, particularly when public key cryptography is used.
2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it in a place 2. The client can make a signed Request Object and put it in a place
that the Authorization Server can access. This may just be done that the Authorization Server can access. If thie location is
by a client utility or other process, so that the private key secure and only available to the Authorization server, the client
does not have to reside on the client, simplifying programming. may accheve confidentiality without encrypting the Request
The downside of it is that the signed portion just become a Object.
token.
3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable. The
"request_uri" may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the
resources referenced by the Request Object URI. With this, the
server knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so
it does not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as
well. This is explained in Section 5.2.
4. When the client does not want to do the crypto. The 3. When the client does not want to do the crypto. The
Authorization Server may provide an endpoint to accept the Authorization Server may provide an endpoint to accept the
Authorization Request through direct communication with the Authorization Request through direct communication with the
Client so that the Client is authenticated and the channel is TLS Client and return a prrivate "request_uri" to the client.
protected.
This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
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To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Unless the algorithm used in JWE
allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature SHOULD also allows for the source to be authenticated, JWS signature SHOULD also
be applied so that the source authentication can be done. When both be applied so that the source authentication can be done. When both
signature and encryption are being applied, the JWT MUST be signed signature and encryption are being applied, the JWT MUST be signed
then encrypted as advised in the section 11.2 of [RFC7519]. The then encrypted as advised in the section 11.2 of [RFC7519]. The
result is a Nested JWT, as defined in [RFC7519]. result is a Nested JWT, as defined in [RFC7519].
The Authorization Request Object MAY be sent by value as described in The Authorization Request Object MAY be sent by value as described in
Section 5.1 or by reference as described in Section 5.2. Section 5.1 or by reference as described in Section 5.2.
Required OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not
included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If
a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and
the Request Object, the request is malformed.
"request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in "request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in
Request Objects. Request Objects.
If the parameter exists in both the query string and the
Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take
precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request
object, it cannot include parameters such as "state" that are
expected to differ in every request. It is recommended to include
them in the request object if it is going to be prepared afresh every
time.
The following is an example of the Claims in a Request Object before The following is an example of the Claims in a Request Object before
base64url encoding and signing. Note that it includes extension base64url encoding and signing. Note that it includes extension
variables such as "nonce" and "max_age". variables such as "nonce" and "max_age".
{ {
"iss": "s6BhdRkqt3", "iss": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"aud": "https://server.example.com", "aud": "https://server.example.com",
"response_type": "code id_token", "response_type": "code id_token",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb", "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
skipping to change at page 9, line 8 skipping to change at page 9, line 8
5. Authorization Request 5. Authorization Request
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of
the following parameters but not both to the query component of the the following parameters but not both to the query component of the
authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form- authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" format: urlencoded" format:
request The Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds authorization request The Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds authorization
request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object request_uri The absolute URI as defined by RFC3986 [RFC3986] that
(Section 2.1) that holds authorization request parameters stated points to the Request Object (Section 2.1) that holds
in section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. authorization request parameters stated in section 4 of OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749].
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the
user-agent. user-agent.
For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the For example, the client directs the end user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request: following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1 GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
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The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity. The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MUST be one of the following: The authorization request object MUST be one of the following:
(a) JWS signed (a) JWS signed
(b) JWE encrypted (when symmetric keys are being used) (b) JWE encrypted (when symmetric keys are being used)
(c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted (c) JWS signed and JWE encrypted
When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter
values contained in the JWS Signed and/or JWE Encrypted JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also
be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request
Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward
compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed
(and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used
containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that can
vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce" of OpenID
Connect, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. In such case, one needs
to carefully assess the risk associated with it as unprotected
parameters would create additional attack surfaces. See Section 10.2
as well.
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value 5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the
Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value. Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value.
The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the The following is an example of an Authorization Request using the
"request" parameter (with line wraps within values for display "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize? https://server.example.com/authorize?
skipping to change at page 10, line 37 skipping to change at page 10, line 37
UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz
jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il
zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference 5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference
The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth
authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by
value. This parameter is used identically to the "request" value. This parameter is used identically to the "request"
parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from
the resource at the specified URL, rather than passed by value. the resource identified by the specified URI rather than passed by
value.
When the "request_uri" parameter is used, the OAuth 2.0 authorization
request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Parameters MAY also
be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request
Object is used in the cases such as (a) to achieve backward
compatibility with [RFC6749] or (b) to enable a cached, pre-signed
(and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used
containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that can
vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce" of OpenID
Connect, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. In such case, one needs
to carefully assess the risk associated with it as unprotected
parameters would create additional attack surfaces. See Section 10.2
as well.
Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by Request
Object URIs. If the contents of the referenced resource could ever
change, the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as
defined in RFC6234 [RFC6234] of the referenced resource contents as
the fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a
URI changes, it signals the server that any cached value for that URI
with the old fragment value is no longer valid.
The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There
are three reasons for this restriction. are three reasons for this restriction.
1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The 1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The
restriction is typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters. restriction is typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters.
2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet 2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet
Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters. Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters.
3. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL 3. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL
would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is would cause the slow response and therefore the use of such is
not advisable from the user experience point of view. not advisable from the user experience point of view.
The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request The contents of the resource referenced by the URI MUST be a Request
Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https", Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https",
unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is as defined in 2.7.2 of RFC7230 [RFC7230], unless the target Request
verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST Object is signed in a way that is verifiable by the Authorization
be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by Server. The "request_uri" value MUST be reachable by the
the Client. Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by the Client.
The following is an example of the contents of a Request Object The following is an example of the contents of a Request Object
resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line wraps resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line wraps
within values for display purposes only): within values for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3 eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3
F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogInJl F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogInJl
c3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNk c3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNk
JoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1w JoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1w
bGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiAic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaW bGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiAic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaW
skipping to change at page 12, line 32 skipping to change at page 11, line 39
luY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs luY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K 0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object 5.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object
The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or
remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. The URL MUST remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. Such facility
be HTTPS URL. This URL is the Request Object URI, "request_uri". may be provided by the client or the authorization server or a third
party. For example, the authorization server may provide a URL to
which the client POSTs the request object and obtains the Requiest
URI. The URL MUST be HTTPS URL. This URL is the Request Object URI,
"request_uri".
It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to
be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is
RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be RECOMMENDED that it be removed after a reasonable timeout unless
used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control access control measures are taken.
measures are taken.
Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate Unless the access to the "request_uri" over TLS provides adequate
authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request authentication of the source of the Request Object, the Request
Object MUST be JWS Signed. Object MUST be JWS Signed.
The following is an example of a Request Object URI value (with line The following is an example of a Request Object URI value (with line
wraps within values for display purposes only): wraps within values for display purposes only):
https://client.example.org/request.jwt# https://client.example.org/request.jwt#
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
skipping to change at page 13, line 25 skipping to change at page 12, line 35
response_type=code%20id_token response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM %23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
&state=af0ifjsldkj &state=af0ifjsldkj
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object 5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an
HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced
Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate Request Object, The Authorization Server may also use other
the Authorization Request parameters. equivelently secure mechinisims to retreve the refrenced Request
Object. A private mechinisim may use URN as the "request_uri" value.
Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request The Authorization server MUST parse the Request Object to vakidate
containing distinct parameters values, or otherwise prevent the and extract the Authorization Request parameters.
Authorization Server from caching the "request_uri".
The following is an example of this fetch process: The following is an example of this fetch process:
GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1 GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org Host: client.example.org
The following is an example of the fetch response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 23:52:39 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (client.example.org)
Content-Length: 1250
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Feb 2017 23:52:32 GMT
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3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.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests 6. Validating JWT-Based Requests
6.1. Encrypted Request Object 6.1. Encrypted Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the
JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a
signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as
defined in Section 6.2 as well. defined in Section 6.2 as well.
If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an If decryption fails, the Authorization Server MUST return an
skipping to change at page 14, line 18 skipping to change at page 14, line 10
signed request object, the "alg" Header Parameter in its JOSE Header signed request object, the "alg" Header Parameter in its JOSE Header
MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. The signature MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. The signature
MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that "client_id" MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that "client_id"
and algorithm. and algorithm.
If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return If signature validation fails, the Authorization Server MUST return
an "invalid_request_object" error. an "invalid_request_object" error.
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation 6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization The Authorization Server MUST extract the set of Authorization
Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the Request parameters from the Request Object value. The Authorization
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or Server then validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0
"request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the [RFC6749].
Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the
parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of
Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then
validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
7. Authorization Server Response 7. Authorization Server Response
Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in
Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] . Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] .
In addition, this document uses these additional error values: In addition, this document uses these additional error values:
invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request
returns an error or contains invalid data. returns an error or contains invalid data.
skipping to change at page 14, line 51 skipping to change at page 14, line 39
use of the "request" parameter. use of the "request" parameter.
request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support
the use of the "request_uri" parameter. the use of the "request_uri" parameter.
8. TLS Requirements 8. TLS Requirements
Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST Client implementations supporting the Request Object URI method MUST
support TLS following Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport support TLS following Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
[RFC7525]. [BCP195].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering, To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a cipher confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a cipher
suite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. suite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in HTTP clients MUST also verify the TLS server certificate, using
the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid
described in Section 6 of [RFC6125]. man-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in
[RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
o Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED. Certification
authorities which issue server certificates MUST support the DNS-
ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be present
in server certificates.
o DNS names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard
character "*".
o Clients MUST NOT use CN-ID identifiers; a CN field may be present
in the server certificate's subject name, but MUST NOT be used for
authentication within the rules described in [BCP195] .
o SRV-ID and URI-ID as described in Section 6.5 of [RFC6125] MUST
NOT be used for comparison.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This specification requests no actions by IANA. This specification requests no actions by IANA.
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth
2.0 [RFC6819], the security considerations in [RFC7515], [RFC7516], 2.0 [RFC6819], the security considerations in [RFC7515], [RFC7516],
and [RFC7518] needs to be considered. Also, there are several and [RFC7518] needs to be considered. Also, there are several
skipping to change at page 15, line 34 skipping to change at page 15, line 38
In consideration of the above, this document advises taking the In consideration of the above, this document advises taking the
following security considerations into account. following security considerations into account.
10.1. Choice of Algorithms 10.1. Choice of Algorithms
When sending the authorization request object through "request" When sending the authorization request object through "request"
parameter, it MUST either be signed using JWS [RFC7515] or encrypted parameter, it MUST either be signed using JWS [RFC7515] or encrypted
using JWE [RFC7516] with then considered appropriate algorithm. using JWE [RFC7516] with then considered appropriate algorithm.
10.2. Choice of Parameters to include in the Request Object 10.2. Request Source Authentication
Unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise, it is strongly
recommended to create a request object that covers all the parameters
so that the entire request is integrity protected.
This means that the request object is going to be prepared fresh each
time an authorization request is made and caching cannot be used. It
has a performance disadvantage, but where such disadvantage is
permissible, it should be considered.
Unless the server and the client have agreed prior to the
authorization request to use the non-protected parameters, the
authorization server SHOULD reject a request that is not fully
integrity protected and source authenticated. Note that such
agreement needs to be done in a secure fashion. For example, the
developers from the server side and the client side can have a face
to face meeting to come to such an agreement.
10.3. Request Source Authentication
The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified. The source of the Authorization Request MUST always be verified.
There are several ways to do it in this specification. There are several ways to do it in this specification.
(a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object. (a) Verifying the JWS Signature of the Request Object.
(b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the (b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the
correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption. correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption.
(c) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In (c) Verifying the TLS Server Identity of the Request Object URI. In
skipping to change at page 16, line 42 skipping to change at page 16, line 28
the validity time would be less than a minute and the Request the validity time would be less than a minute and the Request
Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit Object URI is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit
or more at the time of the writing of this specification. or more at the time of the writing of this specification.
(e) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an (e) A third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider, provides an
endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a
Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above apply. In Request Object. The same requirements as (b) above apply. In
addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that addition, the Authorization Server MUST know out-of-band that
the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator. the Client utilizes the Trust Framework Operator.
10.4. Explicit Endpoints 10.3. Explicit Endpoints
Although this specification does not require them, research such as Although this specification does not require them, research such as
[BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the [BASIN] points out that it is a good practice to explicitly state the
intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the intended interaction endpoints and the message position in the
sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the sequence in a tamper evident manner so that the intent of the
initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that come into question in initiator is unambiguous. The endpoints that come into question in
this specification are : this specification are :
(a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources") (a) Protected Resources ("protected_resources")
(b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint") (b) Authorization Endpoint ("authorization_endpoint")
(c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri") (c) Redirection URI ("redirect_uri")
(d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint") (d) Token Endpoint ("token_endpoint")
While Redirection URI is included, others are not included in the Further, if dynamic discovery is used, then the discovery related
Authorization Request Object. It is probably a good idea to include endpoints also come into question.
these in it to reduce the attack surface. An extension specification
should be created as a preventive measure to address potential
vulnerabilities that have not yet been identified.
11. Privacy Considerations In [RFC6749], while Redirection URI is included, others are not
included in the Authorization Request. As the result, the same
applies to Authorization Request Object.
The lack of the link among those endpoints are sited as the cause of
Cross-Phase Attacks introduced in [FETT]. An extension specification
should be created as a measure to address the risk.
10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri
The introdcution of "redirect_uri" introduces several attack
possibilities.
10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server
A set of malicious client can launch a DoS attack to the
authorization server by pointing the "request_uri" to a uri that
returns extremely large content or extremely slow to respond. Under
such an attack, the server may use up its resource and start failing.
To prevent such attack to succeed, the server should (a) check that
the value of "request_uri" parameter does not point to an unexpected
location, (b) check the content type of the response is "application/
json" (c) implement a time-out for obtaining the content of
"request_uri".
10.4.2. Request URI Rewrite
The value of "request_uri" is not signed thus it can be tampered by
Man-in-the-browser attacker. Several attack possibilities rise
because of this, e.g., (a) attacker may create another file that the
rewritten URI points to making it possible to request extra scope (b)
attacker launches a DoS attack to a victim site by setting the value
of "request_uri" to be that of the victim.
To prevent such attack to succeed, the server should (a) check that
the value of "request_uri" parameter does not point to an unexpected
location, (b) check the content type of the response is "application/
json" (c) implement a time-out for obtaining the content of
"request_uri".
11. TLS security considerations
Curent security considerations can be found in Recommendations for
Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195]. This supersedes the TLS version
recommendations in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
12. Privacy Considerations
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization containing personal data, both the Client and the Authorization
Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100 Server need to adhere to Privacy Principles. ISO/IEC 29100
[ISO29100] is an International Standard and its Privacy Principles [ISO29100] is an International Standard and its Privacy Principles
are good to follow. are good to follow.
While ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO29100] is a high-level document that gives While ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO29100] is a high-level document that gives
general guidance, RFC 6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet general guidance, RFC 6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet
Protocols [RFC6973] gives more specific guidance on the privacy Protocols [RFC6973] gives more specific guidance on the privacy
consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidance on consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidance on
the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provision the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provision
listed in it should be followed. listed in it should be followed.
skipping to change at page 17, line 37 skipping to change at page 18, line 21
consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidance on consideration for Internet Protocols. It gives excellent guidance on
the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provision the enhancement of protocol design and implementation. The provision
listed in it should be followed. listed in it should be followed.
Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Most of the provision would apply to The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Framework [RFC6749] and The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer
Token Usage [RFC6750] and are not specific to this specification. In Token Usage [RFC6750] and are not specific to this specification. In
what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are what follows, only the specific provisions to this specification are
noted. noted.
11.1. Collection limitation 12.1. Collection limitation
When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource When the Client is being granted access to a protected resource
containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of containing personal data, the Client SHOULD limit the collection of
personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law personal data to that which is within the bounds of applicable law
and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s). and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s).
It is often hard for the user to find out if the personal data asked It is often hard for the user to find out if the personal data asked
for is strictly necessary. A Trust Framework Provider can help the for is strictly necessary. A Trust Framework Provider can help the
user by examining the Client request and comparing to the proposed user by examining the Client request and comparing to the proposed
processing by the Client and certifying the request. After the processing by the Client and certifying the request. After the
skipping to change at page 18, line 19 skipping to change at page 19, line 5
the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the Authorization Server the Request Object URI. Upon connecting, the Authorization Server
MUST verify the server identity represented in the TLS certificate is MUST verify the server identity represented in the TLS certificate is
legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, the Authorization legitimate for the Request Object URI. Then, the Authorization
Server can obtain the Request Object, which includes the "client_id" Server can obtain the Request Object, which includes the "client_id"
representing the Client. representing the Client.
The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that The Consent screen MUST indicate the Client and SHOULD indicate that
the request has been vetted by the Trust Framework Operator for the the request has been vetted by the Trust Framework Operator for the
adherence to the Collection Limitation principle. adherence to the Collection Limitation principle.
11.2. Disclosure Limitation 12.2. Disclosure Limitation
11.2.1. Request Disclosure 12.2.1. Request Disclosure
This specification allows extension parameters. These may include This specification allows extension parameters. These may include
potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may potentially sensitive information. Since URI query parameter may
leak through various means but most notably through referrer and leak through various means but most notably through referrer and
browser history, if the authorization request contains a potentially browser history, if the authorization request contains a potentially
sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the sensitive parameter, the Client SHOULD JWE [RFC7516] encrypt the
request object. request object.
Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object Where Request Object URI method is being used, if the request object
contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the contains personally identifiable or sensitive information, the
"request_uri" SHOULD be used only once, have a short validity period, "request_uri" SHOULD be used only once, have a short validity period,
and MUST have large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable and MUST have large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable
security policy unless the Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516] security policy unless the Request Object itself is JWE [RFC7516]
Encrypted. The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of Encrypted. The adequate shortness of the validity and the entropy of
the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the the Request Object URI depends on the risk calculation based on the
value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for the value of the resource being protected. A general guidance for the
validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI validity time would be less than a minute and the Request Object URI
is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the is to include a cryptographic random value of 128bit or more at the
time of the writing of this specification. time of the writing of this specification.
11.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI 12.2.2. Tracking using Request Object URI
Even if the protected resource does not include a personally Even if the protected resource does not include a personally
identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the identifiable information, it is sometimes possible to identify the
user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request user through the Request Object URI if persistent per-user Request
Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser Object URI is used. A third party may observe it through browser
history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. In history etc. and start correlating the user's activity using it. In
a way, it is a data disclosure as well and should be avoided. a way, it is a data disclosure as well and should be avoided.
Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided. Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided.
12. Acknowledgements 13. Acknowledgements
The following people contributed to the creation of this document in The following people contributed to the creation of this document in
the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution are the OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution are
used.) used.)
Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Vladimir Dzhuvinov
(Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt (Connect2id), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Torsten Lodderstedt
(Deutsche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutsche Telecom), Hannes (Deutsche Telecom) Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(Deutsche Telecom), Hannes
Tschofenig (ARM), Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), and Steve Kent (as Tschofenig (ARM), Kathleen Moriarty (as AD), and Steve Kent (as
SECDIR). SECDIR).
skipping to change at page 19, line 31 skipping to change at page 20, line 16
(Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno (Mixi), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones (Microsoft), Breno
de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE). de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin Richer (MITRE).
In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous In addition, the following people contributed to this and previous
versions through the OAuth Working Group. versions through the OAuth Working Group.
Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer
(Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke (Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook). Shepard (Facebook).
13. Revision History 14. Revision History
-13
o add TLS Security Consideration section
o replace RFC7525 reference with BCP195
o moved front tag in FETT reference to fix XML structure
o changes reference from SoK to FETT
-12 -12
o fixes #62 - Alexey Melnikov Discuss
o fixes #48 - OPSDIR Review : General - delete semicolors after list o fixes #48 - OPSDIR Review : General - delete semicolors after list
items items
o fixes #58 - DP Comments for the Last Call o fixes #58 - DP Comments for the Last Call
o fixes #57 - GENART - Remove "non-normative ... " from examples. o fixes #57 - GENART - Remove "non-normative ... " from examples.
o fixes #45 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - are attacks discovered o fixes #45 - OPSDIR Review : Introduction - are attacks discovered
or already opened or already opened
skipping to change at page 23, line 48 skipping to change at page 24, line 41
precedence. precedence.
-02 -02
o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers. o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers.
-01 -01
o Copy Edits. o Copy Edits.
14. References 15. References
14.1. Normative References
15.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015.
[ISO29100] [ISO29100]
"ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology - Security "ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology - Security
techniques - Privacy framework", December 2011, techniques - Privacy framework", December 2011,
<http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/ <http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
c045123_ISO_IEC_29100_2011.zip>. c045123_ISO_IEC_29100_2011.zip>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
skipping to change at page 25, line 5 skipping to change at page 26, line 9
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 15.2. Informative References
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
14.2. Informative References
[BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing [BASIN] Basin, D., Cremers, C., and S. Meier, "Provably Repairing
the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication", the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard for Entity Authentication",
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust
Principles Volume 21 Issue 6, Pages 817-846, November Principles Volume 21 Issue 6, Pages 817-846, November
2013, 2013,
<https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/ <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/downloads/
papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>. papers/BCM2012-iso9798.pdf>.
[FETT] Fett, D., Kusters, R., and G. Schmitz, "A Comprehensive
Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0", CCS '16
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security Pages 1204-1215 , October
2016, <https://infsec.uni-
trier.de/people/publications/paper/FettKuestersSchmitz-
CCS-2016.pdf>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", OpenID
Foundation Standards, February 2014, Foundation Standards, February 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
Otemachi Financial City Grand Cube, 1-9-2 Otemachi Otemachi Financial City Grand Cube, 1-9-2 Otemachi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004
Japan Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111 Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
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Phone: +81-3-5533-2111 Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM Talagante, RM
Chile Chile
Phone: +44 20 8133 3718 Phone: +1.202.630.5272
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
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