draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02.txt 
OAuth Working Group Y. Sheffer OAuth Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Best Current Practice D. Hardt Intended status: Best Current Practice D. Hardt
Expires: September 24, 2018 Amazon Expires: November 3, 2018 Amazon
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
March 23, 2018 May 02, 2018
JSON Web Token Best Current Practices JSON Web Token Best Current Practices
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02
Abstract Abstract
JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs [RFC7519], are URL-safe JSON- JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security
based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or
and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple
simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in
both in the area of digital identity, and in other application areas. the area of digital identity, and in other application areas. The
The goal of this Best Current Practices document is to provide goal of this Best Current Practices document is to provide actionable
actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.
of JWTs.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 24, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 3, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 27 skipping to change at page 2, line 26
2.1. Weak Signatures and Insufficient Signature Validation . . 4 2.1. Weak Signatures and Insufficient Signature Validation . . 4
2.2. Weak symmetric keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Weak symmetric keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature . . . . 5 2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature . . . . 5
2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption . . . . . . . . 5 2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. Substitution Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.6. Substitution Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Use Appropriate Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Use Appropriate Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy . . . . 7 3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy . . . . 7
3.6. Use UTF-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Validate Issuer and Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.7. Use UTF-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.8. Use and Validate Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Use Explicit Typing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9. Use and Validate Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.10. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different 3.10. Do Not Trust Received Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Kinds of JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.11. Use Explicit Typing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.12. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Kinds of JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.3. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.4. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.4. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.5. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs [RFC7519], are URL-safe JSON- JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs [RFC7519], are URL-safe JSON-
based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed
and/or encrypted. The JWT specification has seen rapid adoption and/or encrypted. The JWT specification has seen rapid adoption
because it encapsulates security-relevant information in one, easy to because it encapsulates security-relevant information in one, easy to
protect location, and because it is easy to implement using widely- protect location, and because it is easy to implement using widely-
available tools. One application area in which JWTs are commonly available tools. One application area in which JWTs are commonly
used is representing digital identity information, such as OpenID used is representing digital identity information, such as OpenID
skipping to change at page 5, line 7 skipping to change at page 5, line 7
In addition, some applications sign tokens using a weak symmetric key In addition, some applications sign tokens using a weak symmetric key
and a keyed MAC algorithm such as "HS256". In most cases, these keys and a keyed MAC algorithm such as "HS256". In most cases, these keys
are human memorable passwords that are vulnerable to dictionary are human memorable passwords that are vulnerable to dictionary
attacks [Langkemper]. attacks [Langkemper].
For mitigations, see Section 3.5. For mitigations, see Section 3.5.
2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings 2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings
Many practitioners are not aware that JSON [RFC7159] allows several Previous versions of the JSON format [RFC8259] allowed several
different character encodings: UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32. As a different character encodings: UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32. This is not
result, the JWT might be misinterpreted by its recipient. the case anymore, with the latest standard only allowing UTF-8.
However older implementations may result in the JWT being
misinterpreted by its recipient.
For mitigations, see Section 3.6. For mitigations, see Section 3.7.
2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature 2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature
Some libraries that decrypt a JWE-encrypted JWT to obtain a JWS- Some libraries that decrypt a JWE-encrypted JWT to obtain a JWS-
signed object do not always validate the internal signature. signed object do not always validate the internal signature.
For mitigations, see Section 3.3. For mitigations, see Section 3.3.
2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption 2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption
skipping to change at page 5, line 39 skipping to change at page 5, line 41
For mitigations, see Section 3.4. For mitigations, see Section 3.4.
2.6. Substitution Attacks 2.6. Substitution Attacks
There are attacks in which one recipient will have a JWT intended for There are attacks in which one recipient will have a JWT intended for
it and attempt to use it at a different recipient that it was not it and attempt to use it at a different recipient that it was not
intended for. If not caught, these attacks can result in the intended for. If not caught, these attacks can result in the
attacker gaining access to resources that it is not entitled to attacker gaining access to resources that it is not entitled to
access. access.
For mitigations, see Section 3.7 and Section 3.8. For mitigations, see Section 3.8 and Section 3.9.
2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion 2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion
As JWTs are being used by more different protocols in diverse As JWTs are being used by more different protocols in diverse
application areas, it becomes increasingly important to prevent cases application areas, it becomes increasingly important to prevent cases
of JWT tokens that have been issued for one purpose being subverted of JWT tokens that have been issued for one purpose being subverted
and used for another. Note that this is a specific type of and used for another. Note that this is a specific type of
substitution attack. If the JWT could be used in an application substitution attack. If the JWT could be used in an application
context in which it could be confused with other kinds of JWTs, then context in which it could be confused with other kinds of JWTs, then
mitigations MUST be employed to prevent these substitution attacks. mitigations MUST be employed to prevent these substitution attacks.
For mitigations, see Section 3.7, Section 3.8, Section 3.9, and For mitigations, see Section 3.8, Section 3.9, Section 3.11, and
Section 3.10. Section 3.12.
3. Best Practices 3. Best Practices
The best practices listed below should be applied by practitioners to The best practices listed below should be applied by practitioners to
mitigate the threats listed in the preceding section. mitigate the threats listed in the preceding section.
3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification 3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification
Libraries MUST enable the caller to specify a supported set of Libraries MUST enable the caller to specify a supported set of
algorithms and MUST NOT use any other algorithms when performing algorithms and MUST NOT use any other algorithms when performing
skipping to change at page 6, line 44 skipping to change at page 6, line 47
That said, if a JWT is cryptographically protected by a transport That said, if a JWT is cryptographically protected by a transport
layer, such as TLS using cryptographically current algorithms, there layer, such as TLS using cryptographically current algorithms, there
may be no need to apply another layer of cryptographic protections to may be no need to apply another layer of cryptographic protections to
the JWT. In such cases, the use of the "none" algorithm can be the JWT. In such cases, the use of the "none" algorithm can be
perfectly acceptable. JWTs using "none" are often used in perfectly acceptable. JWTs using "none" are often used in
application contexts in which the content is optionally signed; then application contexts in which the content is optionally signed; then
the URL-safe claims representation and processing can be the same in the URL-safe claims representation and processing can be the same in
both the signed and unsigned cases. both the signed and unsigned cases.
Applications SHOULD follow these algorithm-specific recommendations:
- Avoid all RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 encryption algorithms, preferring RSA-
OAEP.
- ECDSA signatures require a unique random value for every message
that is signed. If even just a few bits of the random value are
predictable across multiple messages then the security of the
signature scheme may be compromised. In the worst case, the
private key may be recoverable by an attacker. To counter these
attacks, JWT libraries SHOULD implement ECDSA using the
deterministic approach defined in [RFC6979]. This approach is
completely compatible with existing ECDSA verifiers and so can be
implemented without new algorithm identifiers being required.
3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations 3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations
All cryptographic operations used in the JWT MUST be validated and All cryptographic operations used in the JWT MUST be validated and
the entire JWT MUST be rejected if any of them fail to validate. the entire JWT MUST be rejected if any of them fail to validate.
This is true not only of JWTs with a single set of Header Parameters This is true not only of JWTs with a single set of Header Parameters
but also for Nested JWTs, in which both outer and inner operations but also for Nested JWTs, in which both outer and inner operations
MUST be validated using the keys and algorithms supplied by the MUST be validated using the keys and algorithms supplied by the
application. application.
3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs 3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs
Some cryptographic operations, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Some cryptographic operations, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
key agreement ("ECDH-ES") take inputs that may contain invalid key agreement ("ECDH-ES") take inputs that may contain invalid
values, such as points not on the specified elliptic curve or other values, such as points not on the specified elliptic curve or other
invalid points. Either the JWS/JWE library itself must validate invalid points (see e.g. [Valenta], Sec. 7.1). Either the JWS/JWE
these inputs before using them or it must use underlying library itself must validate these inputs before using them or it
cryptographic libraries that do so (or both!). must use underlying cryptographic libraries that do so (or both!).
ECDH-ES ephemeral public key (epk) inputs should be validated
according to the recipient's chosen elliptic curve. For the NIST
prime-order curves P-256, P-384 and P-521, validation MUST be
performed according to Section 5.6.2.3.4 "ECC Partial Public-Key
Validation Routine" of NIST Special Publication 800-56A revision 3
[nist-sp-800-56a-r3].
3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy 3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy
The Key Entropy and Random Values advice in Section 10.1 of [RFC7515] The Key Entropy and Random Values advice in Section 10.1 of [RFC7515]
and the Password Considerations in Section 8.8 of [RFC7518] MUST be and the Password Considerations in Section 8.8 of [RFC7518] MUST be
followed. In particular, human-memorizable passwords MUST NOT be followed. In particular, human-memorizable passwords MUST NOT be
directly used as the key to a keyed-MAC algorithm such as "HS256". directly used as the key to a keyed-MAC algorithm such as "HS256".
3.6. Use UTF-8 3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs
Many encryption algorithms leak information about the length of the
plaintext, with a varying amount of leakage depending on the
algorithm and mode of operation. Sensitive information, such as
passwords, SHOULD be padded before being encrypted. It is
RECOMMENDED to avoid any compression of data before encryption since
such compression often reveals information about the plaintext.
3.7. Use UTF-8
[RFC7515], [RFC7516], and [RFC7519] all specify that UTF-8 be used [RFC7515], [RFC7516], and [RFC7519] all specify that UTF-8 be used
for encoding and decoding JSON used in Header Parameters and JWT for encoding and decoding JSON used in Header Parameters and JWT
Claims Sets. Implementations and applications MUST do this, and not Claims Sets. This is also in line with the latest JSON specification
use other Unicode encodings for these purposes. [RFC8259]. Implementations and applications MUST do this, and not
use or admit the use of other Unicode encodings for these purposes.
3.7. Validate Issuer and Subject 3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject
When a JWT contains an "iss" (issuer) claim, the application MUST When a JWT contains an "iss" (issuer) claim, the application MUST
validate that the cryptographic keys used for the cryptographic validate that the cryptographic keys used for the cryptographic
operations in the JWT belong to the issuer. If they do not, the operations in the JWT belong to the issuer. If they do not, the
application MUST reject the JWT. application MUST reject the JWT.
The means of determining the keys owned by an issuer is application- The means of determining the keys owned by an issuer is application-
specific. As one example, OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core] issuer values specific. As one example, OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core] issuer values
are "https" URLs that reference a JSON metadata document that are "https" URLs that reference a JSON metadata document that
contains a "jwks_uri" value that is an "https" URL from which the contains a "jwks_uri" value that is an "https" URL from which the
skipping to change at page 8, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 37
mechanism is used by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. Other applications mechanism is used by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. Other applications
may use different means of binding keys to issuers. may use different means of binding keys to issuers.
Similarly, when the JWT contains a "sub" (subject) claim, the Similarly, when the JWT contains a "sub" (subject) claim, the
application MUST validate that the subject value corresponds to a application MUST validate that the subject value corresponds to a
valid subject and/or issuer/subject pair at the application. This valid subject and/or issuer/subject pair at the application. This
may include confirming that the issuer is trusted by the application. may include confirming that the issuer is trusted by the application.
If the issuer, subject, or the pair are invalid, the application MUST If the issuer, subject, or the pair are invalid, the application MUST
reject the JWT. reject the JWT.
3.8. Use and Validate Audience 3.9. Use and Validate Audience
If the same issuer can issue JWTs that are intended for use by more If the same issuer can issue JWTs that are intended for use by more
than one relying party or application, the JWT MUST contain an "aud" than one relying party or application, the JWT MUST contain an "aud"
(audience) claim that can be used to determine whether the JWT is (audience) claim that can be used to determine whether the JWT is
being used by an intended party or was substituted by an attacker at being used by an intended party or was substituted by an attacker at
an unintended party. Furthermore, the relying party or application an unintended party. Furthermore, the relying party or application
MUST validate the audience value and if the audience value is not MUST validate the audience value and if the audience value is not
associated with the recipient, it MUST reject the JWT. present or not associated with the recipient, it MUST reject the JWT.
3.9. Use Explicit Typing 3.10. Do Not Trust Received Claims
The "kid" (key ID) header is used by the relying application to
perform key lookup. Applications should ensure that this does not
create SQL or LDAP injection vulnerabilities.
Similarly, blindly following a "jku" (JWK set URL) header, which may
contain an arbitrary URL, could result in server-side request forgery
(SSRF) attacks.
3.11. Use Explicit Typing
Confusion of one kind of JWT for another can be prevented by having Confusion of one kind of JWT for another can be prevented by having
all the kinds of JWTs that could otherwise potentially be confused all the kinds of JWTs that could otherwise potentially be confused
include an explicit JWT type value and include checking the type include an explicit JWT type value and include checking the type
value in their validation rules. Explicit JWT typing is accomplished value in their validation rules. Explicit JWT typing is accomplished
by using the "typ" header parameter. For instance, the by using the "typ" header parameter. For instance, the
[I-D.ietf-secevent-token] specification uses the "application/ [I-D.ietf-secevent-token] specification uses the "application/
secevent+jwt" media type to perform explicit typing of Security Event secevent+jwt" media type to perform explicit typing of Security Event
Tokens (SETs). Tokens (SETs).
skipping to change at page 8, line 45 skipping to change at page 9, line 39
parameter containing the explicit type value MUST be present in the parameter containing the explicit type value MUST be present in the
inner JWT of the Nested JWT (the JWT whose payload is the JWT Claims inner JWT of the Nested JWT (the JWT whose payload is the JWT Claims
Set). The same "typ" header parameter value MAY be present in the Set). The same "typ" header parameter value MAY be present in the
outer JWT as well, to explicitly type the entire Nested JWT. outer JWT as well, to explicitly type the entire Nested JWT.
Note that the use of explicit typing may not achieve disambiguation Note that the use of explicit typing may not achieve disambiguation
from existing kinds of JWTs, as the validation rules for existing from existing kinds of JWTs, as the validation rules for existing
kinds JWTs often do not use the "typ" header parameter value. kinds JWTs often do not use the "typ" header parameter value.
Explicit typing is RECOMMENDED for new uses of JWTs. Explicit typing is RECOMMENDED for new uses of JWTs.
3.10. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different Kinds of 3.12. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different Kinds of
JWTs JWTs
Each application of JWTs defines a profile specifying the required Each application of JWTs defines a profile specifying the required
and optional JWT claims and the validation rules associated with and optional JWT claims and the validation rules associated with
them. If more than one kind of JWT can be issued by the same issuer, them. If more than one kind of JWT can be issued by the same issuer,
the validation rules for those JWTs MUST be written such that they the validation rules for those JWTs MUST be written such that they
are mutually exclusive, rejecting JWTs of the wrong kind. To prevent are mutually exclusive, rejecting JWTs of the wrong kind. To prevent
substitution of JWTs from one context into another, a number of substitution of JWTs from one context into another, a number of
strategies may be employed: strategies may be employed:
skipping to change at page 9, line 37 skipping to change at page 10, line 31
- Use different issuers for different kinds of JWTs. Then the - Use different issuers for different kinds of JWTs. Then the
distinct "iss" values can be used to segregate the different kinds distinct "iss" values can be used to segregate the different kinds
of JWTs. of JWTs.
Given the broad diversity of JWT usage and applications, the best Given the broad diversity of JWT usage and applications, the best
combination of types, required claims, values, header parameters, key combination of types, required claims, values, header parameters, key
usages, and issuers to differentiate among different kinds of JWTs usages, and issuers to differentiate among different kinds of JWTs
will, in general, be application specific. will, in general, be application specific.
4. IANA Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This entire document is about security considerations when
implementing and deploying JSON Web Tokens.
5. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions. This document requires no IANA actions.
5. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Antonio Sanso for bringing the "ECDH-ES" invalid point Thanks to Antonio Sanso for bringing the "ECDH-ES" invalid point
attack to the attention of JWE and JWT implementers. Thanks to Nat attack to the attention of JWE and JWT implementers. Thanks to Nat
Sakimura for advocating the use of explicit typing. Sakimura for advocating the use of explicit typing. Thanks to Neil
Madden for his numerous comments, and to Carsten Bormann for his
review.
6. References 7. References
6.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7518>. editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
6.2. Informative References [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery] [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth- Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-
discovery-10 (work in progress), March 2018. discovery-10 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-secevent-token] [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]
Hunt, P., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security Hunt, P., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security
Event Token (SET)", draft-ietf-secevent-token-07 (work in Event Token (SET)", draft-ietf-secevent-token-10 (work in
progress), March 2018. progress), May 2018.
[Langkemper] [Langkemper]
Langkemper, S., "Attacking JWT Authentication", September Langkemper, S., "Attacking JWT Authentication", September
2016, <https://www.sjoerdlangkemper.nl/2016/09/28/ 2016, <https://www.sjoerdlangkemper.nl/2016/09/28/
attacking-jwt-authentication/>. attacking-jwt-authentication/>.
[nist-sp-800-56a-r3]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Keller, S., Roginsky, A., Vassilev,
A., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography, Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56A
Revision 3", August 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/sp/800-56a/
rev-3/draft/documents/sp800-56ar3-draft.pdf>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B., and C. Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B., and C.
Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7517>. editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[Sanso] Sanso, A., "Critical Vulnerability Uncovered in JSON [Sanso] Sanso, A., "Critical Vulnerability Uncovered in JSON
Encryption", March 2017, Encryption", March 2017,
<https://blogs.adobe.com/security/2017/03/critical- <https://blogs.adobe.com/security/2017/03/critical-
vulnerability-uncovered-in-json-encryption.html>. vulnerability-uncovered-in-json-encryption.html>.
[Valenta] Valenta, L., Sullivan, N., Sanso, A., and N. Heninger, "In
search of CurveSwap: Measuring elliptic curve
implementations in the wild", March 2018,
<https://ia.cr/2018/298>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02
- Implemented WGLC feedback.
A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01
- Feedback from Brian Campbell. - Feedback from Brian Campbell.
A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00
- Initial WG draft. No change from the latest individual version. - Initial WG draft. No change from the latest individual version.
A.3. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 A.4. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01
- Added explicit typing. - Added explicit typing.
A.4. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 A.5. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00
- Initial version. - Initial version.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Intuit Intuit
EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
 End of changes. 33 change blocks. 
63 lines changed or deleted 141 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.46. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/