--- 1/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02.txt 2017-07-28 12:13:13.214320358 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03.txt 2017-07-28 12:13:13.254321327 -0700 @@ -1,98 +1,107 @@ OAuth Working Group B. Campbell -Internet-Draft J. Bradley -Intended status: Standards Track Ping Identity -Expires: December 31, 2017 N. Sakimura +Internet-Draft Ping Identity +Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley +Expires: January 28, 2018 Yubico + N. Sakimura Nomura Research Institute T. Lodderstedt YES Europe AG - June 29, 2017 + July 27, 2017 Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0 - draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02 + draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03 Abstract This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual - authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth - client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender - constrained access to OAuth protected resources. + authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for OAuth + client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for + certificate bound sender constrained access tokens. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2017. + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint . 3 - 2.2. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.3. Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access . . . . . . . 5 + 2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint . 4 + 2.2. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.3. Dynamic Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access . . . . . . . 6 3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method - for JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection . . . . . . . 6 - 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 7 - 4.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration . . . . . 8 - 4.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.4. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 8 - 4.4.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 5.2. Client Identity Binding by the Authorization Server . . . 9 - 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Appendix B. Document(s) History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + for JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection . . . . . . . 8 + 4. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4.1. Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4.2. Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4.3. Sender Constrained Access Tokens Without Client + Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 4.4. Certificate Bound Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 11 + 5.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 11 + 5.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.4. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration . . . . . 11 + 5.4.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 12 + 5.5.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6.2. X.509 Certificate Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + Appendix B. Document(s) History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1. Introduction This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual - authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth + authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for OAuth client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender constrained access to OAuth protected resources. The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared secret method of client authentication but also allows for the definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms when interacting with the authorization server's token endpoint. This document describes an additional mechanism of client authentication utilizing mutual TLS [RFC5246] certificate-based authentication, which provides better security characteristics than @@ -152,59 +161,117 @@ For all access token requests to the token endpoint, regardless of the grant type used, the client MUST include the "client_id" parameter, described in OAuth 2.0, Section 2.2 [RFC6749]. The presence of the "client_id" parameter enables the authorization server to easily identify the client independently from the content of the certificate and allows for trust models to vary as appropriate for a given deployment. The authorization server can locate the client configuration by the client identifier and check the certificate presented in the TLS Handshake against the expected - credentials for that client. As described in Section 5.2, the - authorization server MUST enforce some method of binding a - certificate to a client. + credentials for that client. The authorization server MUST enforce + some method of binding a certificate to a client. The following two + binding methods are defined: + + PKI The PKI method uses a distinguished name (DN) to identify the + client. The TLS handshake is utilized to validate the client's + possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in + the certificate and to validate the corresponding certificate + chain. The client is successfully authenticated if the subject + information in the certificate matches the configured DN. The + client may prescribe the DN of the issuer of its certificates. + The authorization server will enforce this restriction after the + TLS handshake took place. Setting the issuer to a certain CA + securely scopes the DN of the client to this CA and shall prevent + an attacker from impersonating a client by using a certificate for + the client's DN obtained from a different CA. The PKI method + facilitates the way X.509 certificates are traditionally being + used for authentication. It also allows the client to rotate its + X.509 certificates without the need to modify its respective + authentication data at the authorization server. + + Public Key The Public Key method uses public keys to identify + clients. As pre-requisite, the client registers a X.509 + certificate or a trusted source for its X.509 certificates (jwks + uri as defined in [RFC7591]) with the authorization server. + During authentication, TLS is utilized to validate the client's + possession of the private key corresponding to the public key + presented in the respective TLS handshake. In contrast to the PKI + method, the certificate chain is not validated in this case. The + client is successfully authenticated, if the subject public key + info of the validated certificate matches the subject public key + info of one the certificates configured for that particular + client. The Public Key method allows to use mutual TLS to + authenticate clients without the need to maintain a PKI. When + used in conjunction with a trusted X.509 certificate source, it + also allows the client to rotate its X.509 certificates without + the need to change its respective authentication data at the + authorization server. 2.2. Authorization Server Metadata - "tls_client_auth" is used as a new value of the - "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" metadata parameter to - indicate server support for mutual TLS as a client authentication - method in authorization server metadata such as [OpenID.Discovery] - and [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. + In authorization server metadata, such as [OpenID.Discovery] and + [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery], the + "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" parameter indicates client + authentication methods to the token endpoint supported by the + authorization server. This document introduces the value + "tls_client_auth" for use in "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" + to indicate server support for mutual TLS client authentication + utilizing the PKI method. And for the support of mutual TLS client + authentication utilizing the Public Key method, the value + "pub_key_tls_client_auth" is used in + "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported". + + This document also introduces a new authorization server metadata + parameter: + + mutual_tls_sender_constrained_access_tokens + OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating server support for mutual TLS + sender constrained access tokens. If omitted, the default value + is "false". 2.3. Dynamic Client Registration - This draft adds the following values and metadata parameters to OAuth - 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591]. + This document adds the following values and metadata parameters to + OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591]. - The value "tls_client_auth" is used to indicate the client's - intention to use mutual TLS as an authentication method to the token - endpoint for the "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata field. + The client metadata parameter + "mutual_tls_sender_constrained_access_tokens" is a Boolean value used + to indicate the client's intention to use mutual TLS sender + constrained access tokens. If omitted, the default value is "false". - For authorization servers that associate certificates with clients - using subject information in the certificate, the following two new - metadata parameters can be used: + For the PKI method of binding a certificate to a client, the value + "tls_client_auth" is used to indicate the client's intention to use + mutual TLS as an authentication method to the token endpoint for the + "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata parameter. And the + following two metadata parameters are introduced in support of the + PKI method of binding a certificate to a client: tls_client_auth_subject_dn An [RFC4514] string representation of the expected subject distinguished name of the certificate the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication. tls_client_auth_root_dn - An [RFC4514] string representation of a distinguished name that - can optionally be used to constrain, for the given client, the - expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client - certificate. + OPTIONAL. An [RFC4514] string representation of a distinguished + name that can optionally be used to constrain, for the given + client, the expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the + client certificate. - For authorization servers that use the key or full certificate to - associate clients with certificates, the existing "jwks_uri" or - "jwks" metadata parameters from [RFC7591] should be used. + With the Public Key method of binding a certificate to a client, the + value "pub_key_tls_client_auth" is used for the + "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata parameter to indicate + the client's intention to use mutual TLS with a self-signed + certificate as an authentication method. For the Public Key method, + the existing "jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters from [RFC7591] + are used to convey client's public keys, where the X.509 certificates + are represented using the "x5c" parameter from [RFC7517]. 3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access When mutual TLS is used at the token endpoint, the authorization server is able to bind the issued access token to the client certificate. Such a binding is accomplished by associating the certificate with the token in a way that can be accessed by the protected resource, such as embedding the certificate hash in the issued access token directly, using the syntax described in Section 3.1, or through token introspection as described in @@ -214,22 +281,23 @@ specification. The client makes protected resource requests as described in [RFC6750], however, those requests MUST be made over a mutually authenticated TLS connection using the same certificate that was used for mutual TLS at the token endpoint. The protected resource MUST obtain the client certificate used for mutual TLS authentication and MUST verify that the certificate matches the certificate associated with the access token. If they do - not match, the resource access attempt MUST be rejected with an - error. + not match, the resource access attempt MUST be rejected with an error + per [RFC6750] using an HTTP 401 status code and the "invalid_token" + error code. 3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method for JWT When access tokens are represented as a JSON Web Tokens (JWT)[RFC7519], the certificate hash information SHOULD be represented using the "x5t#S256" confirmation method member defined herein. To represent the hash of a certificate in a JWT, this specification defines the new JWT Confirmation Method RFC 7800 [RFC7800] member @@ -247,20 +315,29 @@ "sub": "ty.webb@example.com", "exp": 1493726400, "nbf": 1493722800, "cnf":{ "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2" } } Figure 1: Example claims of a Certificate Thumbprint Constrained JWT + If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using + hash functions other than SHA-256, it is suggested that additional + related JWT confirmation methods members be defined for that purpose. + For example, a new "x5t#S512" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint using + SHA-512) confirmation method member could be defined by registering + it in the the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry + [IANA.JWT.Claims] for JWT "cnf" member values established by + [RFC7800]. + 3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] defines a method for a protected resource to query an authorization server about the active state of an access token as well as to determine meta-information about the token. For a mutual TLS sender constrained access token, the hash of the certificate to which the token is bound is conveyed to the protected resource as meta-information in a token introspection response. The @@ -302,109 +379,203 @@ "exp": 1493726400, "nbf": 1493722800, "cnf":{ "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2" } } Figure 2: Example Introspection Response for a Certificate Constrained Access Token -4. IANA Considerations +4. Implementation Considerations -4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration +4.1. Authorization Server + + The authorization server needs to setup its TLS configuration + appropriately for the binding methods it supports. + + If the authorization server wants to support mutual TLS client + authentication and other client authentication methods in parallel, + it should make mutual TLS optional on the token endpoint. + + If the authorization server supports the Public Key method, it should + configure the TLS stack in a way that it does not verify whether the + certificate presented by the client during the handshake is signed by + a trusted CA certificate. + + Please note: the Public Key method is intended to support client + authentication using self-signed certificates. + + The authorization server may also consider hosting the token endpoint + on a separate host name in order to prevent unintended impact on the + TLS behavior of its other endpoints, e.g. authorization or + registration. + +4.2. Resource Server + + From the perspective of the resource server, TLS client + authentication is used as a proof of possession method only. For the + purpose of client authentication, the resource server may completely + rely on the authorization server. So there is no need to validate + the trust chain of the client's certificate in any of the methods + defined in this document. The resource server should therefore + configure the TLS stack in a way that it does not verify whether the + certificate presented by the client during the handshake is signed by + a trusted CA certificate. + +4.3. Sender Constrained Access Tokens Without Client Authentication + + This document allows for the use of client authentication only or + client authentication in combination with sender constraint access + tokens. Use of mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens without + client authentication (e.g. to support binding access tokens to a TLS + client certificate for public clients) is also possible. The + authorization server would configure the TLS stack in the same manor + as for the Public Key method such that it does not verify that the + certificate presented by the client during the handshake is signed by + a trusted CA. Individual instances of a public client would then + create a self-signed certificate for mutual TLS with the + authorization server and resource server. The authorization server + would not authenticate the client at the OAuth layer but would bind + issued access tokens to the certificate, which the client has proven + possession of the corresponding private key. The access token is + then mutual TLS sender constrained and can only be used by the client + possessing the certificate and private key and utilizing them to + negotiate mutual TLS on connections to the resource server. + +4.4. Certificate Bound Access Tokens + + As described in Section 3, an access token is bound to a specific + client certificate, which means that the same certificate must be + used for mutual TLS on protected resource access. It also implies + that access tokens are invalidated when a client updates the + certificate, which can be handled similar to expired access tokens + where the client requests a new access token (typically with a + refresh token) and retries the protected resource request. + +5. IANA Considerations + +5.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] for JWT "cnf" member values established by [RFC7800]. -4.1.1. Registry Contents +5.1.1. Registry Contents o Confirmation Method Value: "x5t#S256" o Confirmation Method Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint + o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this specification ]] -4.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration +5.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration + + This specification requests registration of the following value in + the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry + [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. + +5.2.1. Registry Contents + + o Metadata Name: "mutual_tls_sender_constrained_access_tokens" + o Metadata Description: Indicates server support for mutual TLS + sender constraint access tokens. + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] + +5.3. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]. -4.2.1. Registry Contents +5.3.1. Registry Contents o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_auth" o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] -4.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration + o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: + "pub_key_tls_client_auth" + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] + +5.4. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7662]. -4.3.1. Registry Contents +5.4.1. Registry Contents o Claim Name: "cnf" o Claim Description: Confirmation o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this specification ]] -4.4. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration +5.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration This specification requests registration of the following client metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]: -4.4.1. Registry Contents +5.5.1. Registry Contents + + o Client Metadata Name: + "mutual_tls_sender_constrained_access_tokens" + o Client Metadata Description: Indicates the client's intention to + use mutual TLS sender constraint access tokens. + o Change Controller: IESG + o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_subject_dn" o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected subject distinguished name of the client certificate. o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] o Client Metadata Name: "tls_client_auth_root_dn" o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client certificate o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] -5. Security Considerations +6. Security Considerations -5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices +6.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] is cited in this document because, at the time of writing, it is latest version that is widely deployed. However, this document is applicable with other TLS versions supporting certificate-based client authentication. Implementation security considerations for TLS, including version recommendations, can be found in Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [BCP195]. -5.2. Client Identity Binding by the Authorization Server +6.2. X.509 Certificate Spoofing - No specific method of binding a certificate to a client identifier at - the token endpoint is prescribed by this document. However, some - method MUST be employed so that, in addition to proving possession of - the private key corresponding to the certificate, the client identity - is also bound to the certificate. One such binding would be to - configure for the client a value that the certificate must contain in - the subject field and possibly the expected trust anchor. An - alternative method would be to configure a public key for the client - directly that would have to match the subject public key info of the - certificate. + If the PKI method is used, an attacker could try to impersonate a + client using a certificate for the same DN issued by another CA, + which the authorization server trusts. -6. References + There are two ways to cope with that threat: the authorization server + may decide to only accept a limited number of CAs whose certificate + issuance policy meets its security requirements. Alternatively or in + addition, the client may want to explicitly prescribe the CA it will + use for obtaining its certificates. The latter is supported by this + document with the client registration parameter + "tls_client_auth_root_dn". -6.1. Normative References +7. References + +7.1. Normative References [BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, @@ -438,39 +609,43 @@ [RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of- Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016, . [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012, . -6.2. Informative References +7.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth- discovery-04 (work in progress), August 2016. [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", . [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] IANA, "OAuth Parameters", . [OpenID.Discovery] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0", February 2014. + [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, + . + [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . [RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, . [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", @@ -487,20 +662,39 @@ Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people for their input and contributions to the specification: Sergey Beryozkin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Samuel Erdtman, Phil Hunt, Sean Leonard, Kepeng Li, James Manger, Jim Manico, Nov Matake, Sascha Preibisch, Justin Richer, Dave Tonge, and Hannes Tschofenig. Appendix B. Document(s) History [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] + draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-03 + + o Introduced metadata and client registration parameter to publish + and request support for mutual TLS sender constrained access + tokens + o Added description of two methods of binding the cert and client, + PKI and Public Key. + o Indicated that the "tls_client_auth" authentication method is for + the PKI method and introduced "pub_key_tls_client_auth" for the + Public Key method + o Added implementation considerations, mainly regarding TLS stack + configuration and trust chain validation, as well as how to to do + binding of access tokens to a TLS client certificate for public + clients, and considerations around certificate bound access tokens + o Added new section to security considerations on cert spoofing + o Add text suggesting that a new cnf member be defined in the + future, if hash function(s) other than SHA-256 need to be used for + certificate thumbprints + draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02 o Fixed editorial issue https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/ U46UMEh8XIOQnvXY9pHFq1MKPns o Changed the title (hopefully "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0" is better than "Mutual TLS Profiles for OAuth Clients"). draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01 o Added more explicit details of using RFC 7662 token introspection @@ -514,20 +709,22 @@ o Changed the text in the Section 3 to not be specific about using a hash of the cert. o Changed the abbreviated title to 'OAuth Mutual TLS' (previously was the acronym MTLSPOC). draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00 o Created the initial working group version from draft-campbell- oauth-mtls + draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-01 + o Fix some typos. o Add to the acknowledgements list. draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-00 o Add a Mutual TLS sender constrained protected resource access method and a x5t#S256 cnf method for JWT access tokens (concepts taken in part from draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04). o Fixed "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" to "token_endpoint_auth_method" for client metadata. @@ -543,26 +740,26 @@ draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00 o Initial draft. Authors' Addresses Brian Campbell Ping Identity Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com - John Bradley - Ping Identity + Yubico Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ Nat Sakimura Nomura Research Institute Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp URI: https://nat.sakimura.org/ + Torsten Lodderstedt YES Europe AG Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net