draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-00.txt		draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01.txt
	OAuth P. Hunt, Ed.		OAuth P. Hunt, Ed.
	Internet-Draft Oracle Corporation		Internet-Draft Oracle Corporation
	Intended status: Informational J. Richer		Intended status: Informational J. Richer
	Expires: January 22, 2015 The MITRE Corporation		Expires: September 4, 2015
	W. Mills		W. Mills
	P. Mishra		P. Mishra
	Oracle Corporation		Oracle Corporation
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Limited		ARM Limited
	July 21, 2014		March 3, 2015
	OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security Architecture		OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security Architecture
	draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-00.txt		draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The OAuth 2.0 bearer token specification, as defined in RFC 6750,		The OAuth 2.0 bearer token specification, as defined in RFC 6750,
	allows any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") to get		allows any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") to get
	access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession		access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession
	of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens must to be		of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens must to be
	protected from disclosure in transit and at rest.		protected from disclosure in transit and at rest.
	Some scenarios demand additional security protection whereby a client		Some scenarios demand additional security protection whereby a client
	skipping to change at page 1, line 46		skipping to change at page 1, line 46
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 37		skipping to change at page 2, line 37
	3.3. Access to a Non-TLS Protected Resource . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3. Access to a Non-TLS Protected Resource . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.4. Offering Application Layer End-to-End Security . . . . . 5		3.4. Offering Application Layer End-to-End Security . . . . . 5
	4. Security and Privacy Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Security and Privacy Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5.1. Confidentiality Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.1. Confidentiality Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.2. Sender Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.2. Sender Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.3. Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5.3. Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5.4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	7. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	At the time of writing the OAuth 2.0 protocol family ([RFC6749],		At the time of writing the OAuth 2.0 protocol family ([RFC6749],
	skipping to change at page 5, line 21		skipping to change at page 5, line 21
	should work in such a scenario. Furthermore, it may not be necessary		should work in such a scenario. Furthermore, it may not be necessary
	to provide authentication of the resource server towards the client.		to provide authentication of the resource server towards the client.
	3.4. Offering Application Layer End-to-End Security		3.4. Offering Application Layer End-to-End Security
	In Web deployments resource servers are often placed behind load		In Web deployments resource servers are often placed behind load
	balancers, which are deployed by the same organization that operates		balancers, which are deployed by the same organization that operates
	the resource servers. These load balancers may terminate the TLS		the resource servers. These load balancers may terminate the TLS
	connection setup and HTTP traffic is transmitted in the clear from		connection setup and HTTP traffic is transmitted in the clear from
	the load balancer to the resource server. With application layer		the load balancer to the resource server. With application layer
	security independent of the underlying TLS security it is possible to		security in addition to the underlying TLS security it is possible to
	allow application servers to perform cryptographic verification on an		allow application servers to perform cryptographic verification on an
	end-to-end basis.		end-to-end basis.
	The key aspect in this use case is therefore to offer end-to-end		The key aspect in this use case is therefore to offer end-to-end
	security in the presence of load balancers via application layer		security in the presence of load balancers via application layer
	security.		security. Enterprise networks also deploy proxies that inspect
			traffic and thereby break TLS.
	4. Security and Privacy Threats		4. Security and Privacy Threats
	The following list presents several common threats against protocols		The following list presents several common threats against protocols
	utilizing some form of tokens. This list of threats is based on NIST		utilizing some form of tokens. This list of threats is based on NIST
	Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63]. We exclude a discussion of		Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63]. We exclude a discussion of
	threats related to any form of identity proofing and authentication		threats related to any form of identity proofing and authentication
	of the resource owner to the authorization server since these		of the resource owner to the authorization server since these
	procedures are not part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol specification		procedures are not part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol specification
	itself.		itself.
	skipping to change at page 10, line 27		skipping to change at page 10, line 27
	the possession of the secret to the resource server when accessing		the possession of the secret to the resource server when accessing
	the resource. The resource server, when receiving an access token,		the resource. The resource server, when receiving an access token,
	needs to verify that the key used by the client matches the one		needs to verify that the key used by the client matches the one
	included in the access token.		included in the access token.
	There are slight differences between the use of symmetric keys and		There are slight differences between the use of symmetric keys and
	asymmetric keys when they are bound to the access token and the		asymmetric keys when they are bound to the access token and the
	subsequent interaction between the client and the authorization		subsequent interaction between the client and the authorization
	server when demonstrating possession of these keys. Figure 1 shows		server when demonstrating possession of these keys. Figure 1 shows
	the symmetric key procedure and Figure 2 illustrates how asymmetric		the symmetric key procedure and Figure 2 illustrates how asymmetric
	keys are used.		keys are used. While symmetric cryptography provides better
			performance properties the use of asymmetric cryptography allows the
			client to keep the private key locally and never expose it to any
			other party.
	With the JSON Web Token (JWT) a standardized format for access tokens		With the JSON Web Token (JWT) [I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token] a
	is available. The necessary elements to bind symmetric or asymmetric		standardized format for access tokens is available. The necessary
	keys to the JWT are described in		elements to bind symmetric or asymmetric keys to a JWT are described
	[I-D.jones-oauth-proof-of-possession].		in [I-D.ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession].
			Note: The negotiation of cryptographic algorithms between the client
			and the authorization server is not shown in the examples below and
			assumed to be present in a protocol solution to meet the requirements
			for crypto-agility.
	+---------------+		+---------------+
	^| |		^| |
	// | Authorization |		// | Authorization |
	/ | Server |		/ | Server |
	// | |		// | |
	/ | |		/ | |
	(I) // /+---------------+		(I) // /+---------------+
	Access / //		Access / //
	Token / /		Token / /
	skipping to change at page 12, line 7		skipping to change at page 12, line 7
	key transport mechanism from the authorization server to the client		key transport mechanism from the authorization server to the client
	has been explained in the previous paragraph there are three ways for		has been explained in the previous paragraph there are three ways for
	communicating this session key from the authorization server to the		communicating this session key from the authorization server to the
	resource server, namely		resource server, namely
	Embedding the symmetric key inside the access token itself. This		Embedding the symmetric key inside the access token itself. This
	requires that the symmetric key is confidentiality protected.		requires that the symmetric key is confidentiality protected.
	The resource server queries the authorization server for the		The resource server queries the authorization server for the
	symmetric key. This is an approach envisioned by the token		symmetric key. This is an approach envisioned by the token
	introspection endpoint [I-D.richer-oauth-introspection].		introspection endpoint [I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection].
	The authorization server and the resource server both have access		The authorization server and the resource server both have access
	to the same back-end database. Smaller, tightly coupled systems		to the same back-end database. Smaller, tightly coupled systems
	might prefer such a deployment strategy.		might prefer such a deployment strategy.
	+---------------+		+---------------+
	^| |		^| |
	Access Token Req. // | Authorization |		Access Token Req. // | Authorization |
	+Parameters / | Server |		+Parameters / | Server |
	+[Fingerprint] // | |		+[Fingerprint] // | |
	skipping to change at page 12, line 48		skipping to change at page 12, line 48
	the server could be involved in the generation of the ephemeral key		the server could be involved in the generation of the ephemeral key
	pair. This exchange is shown in Figure 1. If the client generates		pair. This exchange is shown in Figure 1. If the client generates
	the key pair it either includes a fingerprint of the public key or		the key pair it either includes a fingerprint of the public key or
	the public key in the request to the authorization server. The		the public key in the request to the authorization server. The
	authorization server would include this fingerprint or public key in		authorization server would include this fingerprint or public key in
	the confirmation claim inside the access token and thereby bind the		the confirmation claim inside the access token and thereby bind the
	asymmetric key pair to the token. If the client did not provide a		asymmetric key pair to the token. If the client did not provide a
	fingerprint or a public key in the request then the authorization		fingerprint or a public key in the request then the authorization
	server is asked to create an ephemeral asymmetric key pair, binds the		server is asked to create an ephemeral asymmetric key pair, binds the
	fingerprint of the public key to the access token, and returns the		fingerprint of the public key to the access token, and returns the
	asymmetric key pair (public and private key) to the client.		asymmetric key pair (public and private key) to the client. Note
			that there is a strong preference for generating the private/public
			key pair locally at the client rather than at the server.
	The specification describing the interaction between the client and		The specification describing the interaction between the client and
	the authorization server, as shown in Figure 1 and in Figure 2, can		the authorization server, as shown in Figure 1 and in Figure 2, can
	be found in [I-D.bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution].		be found in [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution].
	Once the client has obtained the necessary access token and keying		Once the client has obtained the necessary access token and keying
	material it can start to interact with the resource server. To		material it can start to interact with the resource server. To
	demonstrate possession of the key bound to the access token it needs		demonstrate possession of the key bound to the access token it needs
	to apply this key to the request by computing a keyed message digest		to apply this key to the request by computing a keyed message digest
	(i.e., a symmetric key-based cryptographic primitive) or a digital		(i.e., a symmetric key-based cryptographic primitive) or a digital
	signature (i.e., an asymmetric cryptographic primitive). When the		signature (i.e., an asymmetric cryptographic computation). When the
	resource server receives the request it verifies it and decides		resource server receives the request it verifies it and decides
	whether access to the protected resource can be granted. This		whether access to the protected resource can be granted. This
	exchange is shown in Figure 3.		exchange is shown in Figure 3.
	+---------------+		+---------------+
	| |		| |
	| Authorization |		| Authorization |
	| Server |		| Server |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+---------------+		+---------------+
	Request		Request
	+-----------+ + Signature/MAC (a) +------------+		+-----------+ + Signature/MAC (a) +------------+
	| |---------------------->| |		| |---------------------->| |
	| | [+Access Token] | Resource |		| | [+Access Token] | Resource |
	| Client | | Server |		| Client | | Server |
	| | Response (b) | |		| | Response (b) | |
	| |<----------------------| |		| |<----------------------| |
	+-----------+ +------------+		+-----------+ [+ Signature/MAC] +------------+
	^ ^		^ ^
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	Symmetric Key Symmetric Key		Symmetric Key Symmetric Key
	or or		or or
	Asymmetric Key Pair Public Key (Client)		Asymmetric Key Pair Public Key (Client)
	+ +		+ +
	Parameters Parameters		Parameters Parameters
	Figure 3: Client demonstrates PoP.		Figure 3: Client demonstrates PoP.
	The specification describing the ability to sign the HTTP request		The specification describing the ability to sign the HTTP request
	from the client to the resource server can be found in		from the client to the resource server can be found in
	[I-D.richer-oauth-signed-http-request].		[I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request].
	So far the examples talked about access tokens that are passed by		So far the examples talked about access tokens that are passed by
	value and allow the resource server to make authorization decisions		value and allow the resource server to make authorization decisions
	immediately after verifying the request from the client. In some		immediately after verifying the request from the client. In some
	deployments a real-time interaction between the authorization server		deployments a real-time interaction between the authorization server
	and the resource server is envisioned that lowers the need to pass		and the resource server is envisioned that lowers the need to pass
	self-contained access tokens around. In that case the access token		self-contained access tokens around. In that case the access token
	merely serves as a handle or a reference to state stored at the		merely serves as a handle or a reference to state stored at the
	authorization server. As a consequence, the resource server cannot		authorization server. As a consequence, the resource server cannot
	autonomously make an authorization decision when receiving a request		autonomously make an authorization decision when receiving a request
	from a client but has to consult the authorization server. This can,		from a client but has to consult the authorization server. This can,
	for example, be done using the token introspection endpoint (see		for example, be done using the token introspection endpoint (see
	[I-D.richer-oauth-introspection]). Figure 4 shows the protocol		[I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection]). Figure 4 shows the protocol
	interaction graphically. Despite the additional token exchange		interaction graphically. Despite the additional token exchange
	previous descriptions about associating symmetric and asymmetric keys		previous descriptions about associating symmetric and asymmetric keys
	to the access token are still applicable to this scenario.		to the access token are still applicable to this scenario.
	+---------------+		+---------------+
	Access ^| |		Access ^| |
	Token Req. // | Authorization |\		Token Req. // | Authorization |^
	(I) / | Server | \ (IV) Token		(I) / | Server | \ (IV) Token
	// | | \ Introspection		// | | \ Introspection Req.
	/ | | \ +Access		/ | | \ +Access
	// /+---------------+ \ Token		// /+---------------+ \ Token
	/ // (II) \ \\		/ // (II) \ \\
	/ / Access \ \		/ / Access \ \
	// // Token \ (V) \		// // Token \ (V) \
	/ / \Resp.\		/ / \Resp.\
	// // \ \		// // \ \
	/ v \ \		/ v V \
	+-----------+ Request +Signature/MAC+------------+		+-----------+ Request +Signature/MAC+------------+
	| | (III) +Access Token | |		| | (III) +Access Token | |
	| |---------------------->| Resource |		| |---------------------->| Resource |
	| Client | (VI) Success or | Server |		| Client | (VI) Success or | Server |
	| | Failure | |		| | Failure | |
	| |<----------------------| |		| |<----------------------| |
	+-----------+ +------------+		+-----------+ +------------+
	Figure 4: Token Introspection and Access Token Handles.		Figure 4: Token Introspection and Access Token Handles.
	skipping to change at page 18, line 13		skipping to change at page 18, line 13
	pseudonymous identity of the resource owner, since the		pseudonymous identity of the resource owner, since the
	authorization server is the only entity involved in verifying the		authorization server is the only entity involved in verifying the
	resource owner's identity.		resource owner's identity.
	Collusion:		Collusion:
	Resource servers that collude can be prevented from using		Resource servers that collude can be prevented from using
	information related to the resource owner to track the individual.		information related to the resource owner to track the individual.
	That is, two different resource servers can be prevented from		That is, two different resource servers can be prevented from
	determining that the same resource owner has authenticated to both		determining that the same resource owner has authenticated to both
	of them. This requires that each authorization server obtains		of them. Authorization servers MUST bind different keying
	different keying material as well as different access tokens with		material to access tokens used for resource servers from different
	content that does not allow identification of the resource owner.		origins (or similar concepts in the app world).
	AS-to-RS Relationship Anonymity:		AS-to-RS Relationship Anonymity:
	This MAC Token security does not provide AS-to-RS relationship		For solutions using asymmetric key cryptography the client MAY
	anonymity since the client has to inform the resource server about		conceal information about the resource server it wants to interact
	the resource server it wants to talk to. The authorization server		with. The authorization server MAY reject such an attempt since
	needs to know how to encrypt the session key the client and the		it may not be able to enforce access control decisions.
	resource server will be using.
	As an additional requirement a solution MUST enable support for		Channel Binding:
	channel bindings. The concept of channel binding, as defined in
	[RFC5056], allows applications to establish that the two end-points		A solution MUST enable support for channel bindings. The concept
	of a secure channel at one network layer are the same as at a higher		of channel binding, as defined in [RFC5056], allows applications
	layer by binding authentication at the higher layer to the channel at		to establish that the two end-points of a secure channel at one
	the lower layer.		network layer are the same as at a higher layer by binding
			authentication at the higher layer to the channel at the lower
			layer.
	There are performance concerns with the use of asymmetric		There are performance concerns with the use of asymmetric
	cryptography. Although symmetric key cryptography offers better		cryptography. Although symmetric key cryptography offers better
	performance asymmetric cryptography offers additional security		performance asymmetric cryptography offers additional security
	properties. A solution MUST therefore offer the capability to		properties. A solution MUST therefore offer the capability to
	support both symmetric as well as asymmetric keys.		support both symmetric as well as asymmetric keys.
	There are threats that relate to the experience of the software		There are threats that relate to the experience of the software
	developer as well as operational practices. Verifying the servers		developer as well as operational practices. Verifying the servers
	identity in TLS is discussed at length in [RFC6125].		identity in TLS is discussed at length in [RFC6125].
	skipping to change at page 19, line 24		skipping to change at page 19, line 30
	chairs, Hannes Tschofenig, and Derek Atkins) provided their input		chairs, Hannes Tschofenig, and Derek Atkins) provided their input
	during these calls: Bill Mills, Justin Richer, Phil Hunt, Prateek		during these calls: Bill Mills, Justin Richer, Phil Hunt, Prateek
	Mishra, Mike Jones, George Fletcher, Leif Johansson, Lucy Lynch, John		Mishra, Mike Jones, George Fletcher, Leif Johansson, Lucy Lynch, John
	Bradley, Tony Nadalin, Klaas Wierenga, Thomas Hardjono, Brian		Bradley, Tony Nadalin, Klaas Wierenga, Thomas Hardjono, Brian
	Campbell		Campbell
	In the appendix of this document we re-use content from [RFC4962] and		In the appendix of this document we re-use content from [RFC4962] and
	the authors would like thank Russ Housely and Bernard Aboba for their		the authors would like thank Russ Housely and Bernard Aboba for their
	work on RFC 4962.		work on RFC 4962.
			We would like to thank Reddy Tirumaleswar for his review.
	11. References		11. References
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[I-D.bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
	Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
	"OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to
	Client Key Distribution", draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-
	distribution-01 (work in progress), June 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]		[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]
	Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol		Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
	(HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", draft-ietf-		(HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", draft-ietf-
	httpbis-p1-messaging-26 (work in progress), February 2014.		httpbis-p1-messaging-26 (work in progress), February 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]		[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]
	Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",		Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-31 (work in progress),		draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-40 (work in progress),
	July 2014.		January 2015.
			[I-D.ietf-oauth-introspection]
			ietf@justin.richer.org, i., "OAuth 2.0 Token
			Introspection", draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-05 (work in
			progress), February 2015.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
	Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25 (work in		(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-32 (work in
	progress), July 2014.		progress), December 2014.
	[I-D.jones-oauth-proof-of-possession]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
			Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
			"OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to
			Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-
			distribution-00 (work in progress), July 2014.
			[I-D.ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession]
	Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-Of-		Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-Of-
	Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", draft-		Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", draft-
	jones-oauth-proof-of-possession-02 (work in progress),		ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-01 (work in progress),
	July 2014.		January 2015.
	[I-D.richer-oauth-introspection]
	Richer, J., "OAuth Token Introspection", draft-richer-
	oauth-introspection-06 (work in progress), July 2014.
	[I-D.richer-oauth-signed-http-request]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-signed-http-request]
	Richer, J., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "A Method for		Richer, J., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "A Method for
	Signing an HTTP Requests for OAuth", draft-richer-oauth-		Signing an HTTP Requests for OAuth", draft-ietf-oauth-
	signed-http-request-01 (work in progress), April 2014.		signed-http-request-00 (work in progress), July 2014.
	[I-D.tschofenig-oauth-audience]
	Tschofenig, H., "OAuth 2.0: Audience Information", draft-
	tschofenig-oauth-audience-00 (work in progress), February
	2013.
	[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail		[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
	Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message		Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
	Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.		Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
	[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-		[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February		Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
	1997.		1997.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	skipping to change at page 22, line 35		skipping to change at page 22, line 39
	January 2013.		January 2013.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Phil Hunt (editor)		Phil Hunt (editor)
	Oracle Corporation		Oracle Corporation
	Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com		Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
	Justin Richer		Justin Richer
	The MITRE Corporation
	Email: jricher@mitre.org		Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
	William Mills		William Mills
	Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com		Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com
	Prateek Mishra		Prateek Mishra
	Oracle Corporation		Oracle Corporation
	Email: prateek.mishra@oracle.com		Email: prateek.mishra@oracle.com
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	ARM Limited		ARM Limited
			Hall in Tirol 6060
	Austria		Austria
	Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
End of changes. 34 change blocks.
	64 lines changed or deleted		74 lines changed or added
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