draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-01.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.txt 
OAuth Working Group M. Jones OAuth Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: August 1, 2015 Ping Identity Expires: September 10, 2015 Ping Identity
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited ARM Limited
January 28, 2015 March 9, 2015
Proof-Of-Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) Proof-Of-Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-01 draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of- and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also
sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is
also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
[[ Editorial Note: This paragraph needs to be updated to provide more Envision the following two use cases. The first use case describes
context and possibly also to describe the use of asymmetric keys the use of a symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use
instead. It's not clear that the symmetric case is as useful or case uses an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
valuable, and it is certainly more complicated.]] Envision the
following use case: An OAuth 2.0 authorization server generates a JWT An OAuth 2.0 authorization server generates a JWT and places an
and places an encrypted symmetric key inside the newly introduced encrypted symmetric key inside the newly introduced confirmation
confirmation claim. This symmetric key is encrypted with a key known claim. This symmetric key is encrypted with a key known only to the
only to the authorization server and the recipient. The JWT is then authorization server and the recipient. The entire JWT is then
sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to obtain the integrity protected by the issuer (the authorization server). The
encrypted symmetric key, the authorization server conveys that JWT is then sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to
symmetric key separately to the presenter. Now, the presenter is in obtain the encrypted symmetric key from the JWT itself, the
possession of the symmetric key as well as the JWT (which includes authorization server conveys that symmetric key separately to the
the confirmation claim member). When the presenter needs to utilize presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric key
the JWT to at recipient, it also needs to demonstrate possession of as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim member).
the symmetric key; the presenter, for example, uses the symmetric key When the presenter needs to present the JWT to the recipient, it also
in a challenge/response protocol with the recipient. The recipient needs to demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter,
is able to verify that it is interacting with the genuine presenter for example, uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol
by decrypting the JWK contained inside the confirmation claim of the with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is
JWT. By doing this the recipient obtains the symmetric key, which it interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the JWK
then uses to verify cryptographically protected messages exchanged contained inside the confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this,
with the presenter. the recipient obtains the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify
cryptographically protected messages exchanged with the presenter.
This symmetric key mechanism described above is conceptually similar
to the use of Kerberos tickets.
In the second case, consider a presenter that generates a public/
private key pair. It then sends the public key to an OAuth 2.0
authorization server (the issuer), which creates a JWT and places a
public key (or an identifier for it) inside the newly introduced
confirmation claim. The entire JWT is integrity protected using a
digital signature to protect it against modifications. The JWT is
then sent to the presenter. When the presenter needs to present the
JWT to the recipient, it also needs to demonstrate possession of the
private key. The presenter, for example, uses the private key in a
TLS exchange with the recipient. The recipient is able to verify
that it is interacting with the genuine presenter by extracting the
public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT (after verifying
the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it with the private
key in the TLS exchange. The asymmetric key mechanism described
above is conceptually similar to a certificate.
In both cases the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the
application.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive. are case sensitive.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
This specification uses terms defined in the JSON Web Token (JWT) This specification uses terms defined in the JSON Web Token (JWT)
[JWT], JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK], and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] [JWT], JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK], and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]
specifications. specifications.
These terms are defined by this specification: These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer
Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key
to it.
Presenter Presenter
Party that possesses the key identified by the JWT. Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
recipient. The presenter may be the issuer or a party different
from the issuer.
Recipient
Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key
information from the presenter.
3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation 3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation
The presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a particular key The presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a particular key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of- and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
possession of the key by the issuer by including a "cnf" possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with (confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with
the JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) member identifying the JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) or "kid" (key ID)
the key. member identifying the key.
The presenter can be identified in one of two ways by the JWT, The presenter can be identified in one of two ways by the JWT,
depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a
"sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the subject identified by the "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the subject identified by the
JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier will be relative JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier will be relative
to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim.) If the JWT to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim.) If the JWT
contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the issuer contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the issuer
identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer) claim. The case in identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer) claim. The case in
which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is analogous to SAML which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is analogous to SAML
2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one
of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in the JWT, and in some of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in the JWT, and in some
use cases, both MUST be present. use cases, both MUST be present.
3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key 3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key
When the key held by the issuer is an asymmetric private key, the When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
value of the "jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing value of the "jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing
the corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example the corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT: demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
{ {
"iss":"xas.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud":"http://auth.example.com", "aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp":"1361398824", "exp": "1361398824",
"nbf":"1360189224", "nbf": "1360189224",
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"jwk":{ "jwk":{
"kty":"EC", "kty": "EC",
"use":"sig", "use": "sig",
"crv":"P-256", "crv": "P-256",
"x":"18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM", "x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
"y":"-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA" "y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
} }
} }
} }
The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key
type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID) type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID)
member. member.
3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key 3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key
When the key held by the issuer is a symmetric key, the value of the When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the value of
"jwk" member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted to a the "jwk" member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted
key known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization to a key known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization
containing the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are containing the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are
found in Section 6 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification. found in Section 6 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification.
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwk" member: subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwk" member:
{ {
"kty":"oct", "kty": "oct",
"alg":"HS256", "alg": "HS256",
"k":"ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE" "k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"
} }
The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE
Plaintext when encrypting the key. Plaintext when encrypting the key.
The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when
encrypting this key: encrypting this key:
{ {
"alg":"RSA1_5", "alg": "RSA1_5",
"enc":"A128CBC-HS256", "enc": "A128CBC-HS256",
"cty":"jwk+json" "cty": "jwk+json"
} }
The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of
an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwk" claim value: an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwk" claim value:
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320", "sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
skipping to change at page 6, line 4 skipping to change at page 6, line 38
"sub": "24400320", "sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970, "exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970, "iat": 1311280970,
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"jwk": "jwk":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi
andrK2pzb24ifQ. ... (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)" andrK2pzb24ifQ. ... (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
} }
} }
Note that the case in which the "jwk" claim contains an unencoded JWK Note that the case in which the "jwk" claim contains an unencoded JWK
value and the case in which it contains an encrypted JWK value can be value and the case in which it contains an encrypted JWK value can be
distinguished by the type of the member value. In the first case, distinguished by the type of the member value. In the first case,
the value is a JSON object containing the JWK and in the second case, the value is a JSON object containing the JWK and in the second case,
the value is a string containing the JWE JSON Serialization of the the value is a string containing the JWE JSON Serialization of the
encrypted JWK representation. encrypted JWK representation.
3.3. Confirmation 3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
this case, the presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with
the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
key.
The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT
Claims Set of a JWT:
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": "1361398824",
"nbf": "1360189224",
"cnf":{
"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"
}
}
3.4. Confirmation
The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the
"jwk" member because a proof-of-possession key may not be the only "jwk" or "kid" member because a proof-of-possession key may not be
means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is analogous the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is
to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation element, analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
in which a number of different subject confirmation methods can be SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject
included, including proof-of-possession key information. When a confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession
recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a member that it does not key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a
understand, it MUST ignore that member. member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.
This specification defines a registry for these members in This specification defines a registry for these members in
Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk" member within the registry. Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk" and "kid" members within the
registry.
3.4. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the issuer Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the issuer. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
"challenge". "challenge".
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification, as different are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
protocols will communicate this information in different ways. protocols will communicate this information in different ways.
Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not
specified, as this is also protocol-specific. specified, as this is also protocol-specific.
Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a
symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of
skipping to change at page 7, line 40 skipping to change at page 9, line 4
since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the
"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details, "cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,
please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]. please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification. established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a
two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the three-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the
advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s)
may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published. specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list
for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request
for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name
of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the
IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jwt-reg-review. ]] IESG and IANA. Suggested name: oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request
successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period
longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@iesg.org mailing list) for resolution. iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense. and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s)
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
skipping to change at page 8, line 40 skipping to change at page 10, line 6
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web
Token Claims registry defined in [JWT]. Token Claims registry defined in [JWT].
5.1.1. Registry Contents 5.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf" o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation o Claim Description: Confirmation
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of this document o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this document
5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry 5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JWT Confirmation Methods This specification establishes the IANA JWT Confirmation Methods
registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
defines it. defines it.
5.2.1. Registration Template 5.2.1. Registration Template
skipping to change at page 9, line 38 skipping to change at page 10, line 48
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also
be included but is not required. be included but is not required.
5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk" o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk"
o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key or Encrypted JSON o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key or Encrypted JSON
Web Key Web Key
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "kid"
o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress),
January 2015. January 2015.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
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[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H. Hunt, P., ietf@justin.richer.org, i., Mills, W., Mishra,
Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security P., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession
Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-00 (work (PoP) Security Architecture",
in progress), July 2014. draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01 (work in progress),
March 2015.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005. 2.0-os, March 2005.
Appendix A. Open Issues Appendix A. Acknowledgements
In some conversations, we have said that it is the issuer of the JWT
that possesses the key, and in some conversations, we have said that
it is the presenter of the JWT that possesses the key. Which
description should we use?
Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank James Manger for his review of the The authors wish to thank James Manger for his review of the
specification. specification.
Appendix C. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-02
o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated
their usage within the document.
o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of-
possession key to the introduction.
o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method.
o These changes address the open issues identified in the previous
draft.
-01 -01
o Updated references. o Updated references.
-00 -00
o Created the initial working group draft from o Created the initial working group draft from
draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession-02. draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
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