draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-03.txt 
OAuth Working Group M. Jones OAuth Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: September 10, 2015 Ping Identity Expires: January 7, 2016 Ping Identity
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited ARM Limited
March 9, 2015 July 6, 2015
Proof-Of-Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02 draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-03
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of- and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also
sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Representation for an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession
3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key . . . . . . . . . . 5 Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Representation for an Encrypted Symmetric
Proof-of-Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession
Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is
also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
Envision the following two use cases. The first use case describes Envision the following two use cases. The first use case describes
the use of a symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use the use of a symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use
case uses an asymmetric proof-of-possession key. case uses an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
An OAuth 2.0 authorization server generates a JWT and places an An issuer generates a JWT and places an encrypted symmetric key
encrypted symmetric key inside the newly introduced confirmation inside the newly introduced confirmation claim. This symmetric key
claim. This symmetric key is encrypted with a key known only to the is encrypted with a key known only to the issuer and the recipient.
authorization server and the recipient. The entire JWT is then The entire JWT is then integrity protected by the issuer. The JWT is
integrity protected by the issuer (the authorization server). The then sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to obtain
JWT is then sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to the encrypted symmetric key from the JWT itself, the issuer conveys
obtain the encrypted symmetric key from the JWT itself, the that symmetric key separately to the presenter. Now, the presenter
authorization server conveys that symmetric key separately to the is in possession of the symmetric key as well as the JWT (which
presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric key includes the confirmation claim member). When the presenter needs to
as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim member). present the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to demonstrate
When the presenter needs to present the JWT to the recipient, it also possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, for example, uses the
needs to demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol with the recipient.
for example, uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol The recipient is then able to verify that it is interacting with the
with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is genuine presenter by decrypting the JWK contained inside the
interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the JWK confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the recipient obtains
contained inside the confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify cryptographically
the recipient obtains the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify protected messages exchanged with the presenter. This symmetric key
cryptographically protected messages exchanged with the presenter. mechanism described above is conceptually similar to the use of
This symmetric key mechanism described above is conceptually similar Kerberos tickets.
to the use of Kerberos tickets.
In the second case, consider a presenter that generates a public/ In the second case, consider a presenter that generates a public/
private key pair. It then sends the public key to an OAuth 2.0 private key pair. It then sends the public key to an issuer, which
authorization server (the issuer), which creates a JWT and places a creates a JWT and places a public key (or an identifier for it)
public key (or an identifier for it) inside the newly introduced inside the newly introduced confirmation claim. The entire JWT is
confirmation claim. The entire JWT is integrity protected using a integrity protected using a digital signature to protect it against
digital signature to protect it against modifications. The JWT is modifications. The JWT is then sent to the presenter. When the
then sent to the presenter. When the presenter needs to present the presenter needs to present the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to
JWT to the recipient, it also needs to demonstrate possession of the demonstrate possession of the private key. The presenter, for
private key. The presenter, for example, uses the private key in a example, uses the private key in a TLS exchange with the recipient or
TLS exchange with the recipient. The recipient is able to verify signs a nonce with the private key. The recipient is able to verify
that it is interacting with the genuine presenter by extracting the that it is interacting with the genuine presenter by extracting the
public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT (after verifying public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT (after verifying
the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it with the private the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it with the private
key in the TLS exchange. The asymmetric key mechanism described key in the TLS exchange or checking the nonce signature.
above is conceptually similar to a certificate.
In both cases the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the In both cases the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the
application. application.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119]. 2119 [RFC2119].
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These terms are defined by this specification: These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer Issuer
Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key
to it. to it.
Presenter Presenter
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
recipient. The presenter may be the issuer or a party different recipient. The presenter may be the issuer or a party distinct
from the issuer. from the issuer.
Recipient Recipient
Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key
information from the presenter. information from the presenter.
3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
The presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a particular key The issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses a
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of- particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf" proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with (confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with a
the JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) or "kid" (key ID) JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) member, a "jwe" (JSON
member identifying the key. Web Encryption) member, or a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
key.
The presenter can be identified in one of two ways by the JWT, The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the JWT,
depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a
"sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the subject identified by the "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is normally the subject
JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier will be relative identified by the JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier
to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim.) If the JWT will be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer)
contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the issuer claim.) If the JWT contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter
identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer) claim. The case in is normally the issuer identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer)
which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is analogous to SAML claim. The case in which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is
2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one analogous to SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation
of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in the JWT, and in some usage. At least one of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in
use cases, both MUST be present. the JWT. Some use cases may require that both be present.
3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key Another means used by some applications to identify the presenter is
an explicit claim, such as the "azp" (authorized party) claim defined
by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. Ultimately, the means of
identifying the presenter is application-specific, as is the means of
confirming possession of the key that is communicated.
3.1. Representation for an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
value of the "jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing "jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing the
the corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT: demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org", "aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": "1361398824", "exp": "1361398824",
"nbf": "1360189224", "nbf": "1360189224",
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"jwk":{ "jwk":{
"kty": "EC", "kty": "EC",
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"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM", "x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA" "y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
} }
} }
} }
The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key
type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID) type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID)
member. member.
3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key 3.2. Representation for an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the value of When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the "jwe"
the "jwk" member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted to a key
to a key known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization containing
containing the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are found in
found in Section 6 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification. Section 7 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification.
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwk" member: subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwe" member:
{ {
"kty": "oct", "kty": "oct",
"alg": "HS256", "alg": "HS256",
"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE" "k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"
} }
The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE
Plaintext when encrypting the key. Plaintext when encrypting the key.
The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when
encrypting this key: encrypting this key:
{ {
"alg": "RSA1_5", "alg": "RSA1_5",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256", "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
"cty": "jwk+json"
} }
The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of
an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwk" claim value: an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwe" member value:
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320", "sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970, "exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970, "iat": 1311280970,
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"jwk": "jwe":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
andrK2pzb24ifQ. ... (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)" (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
} }
} }
Note that the case in which the "jwk" claim contains an unencoded JWK 3.3. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
value and the case in which it contains an encrypted JWK value can be
distinguished by the type of the member value. In the first case,
the value is a JSON object containing the JWK and in the second case,
the value is a string containing the JWE JSON Serialization of the
encrypted JWK representation.
3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
this case, the presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a this case, the issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf" proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with (confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with
the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
key. key.
The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT
Claims Set of a JWT: Claims Set of a JWT:
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
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"exp": "1361398824", "exp": "1361398824",
"nbf": "1360189224", "nbf": "1360189224",
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad" "kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"
} }
} }
3.4. Confirmation 3.4. Confirmation
The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the
"jwk" or "kid" member because a proof-of-possession key may not be "jwk", "jwe", or "kid" member because a proof-of-possession key may
the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is not be the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token.
analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] This is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject
confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession
key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a
member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member. member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.
This specification defines a registry for these members in This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk" and "kid" members within the registry for these members in Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk",
registry. "jwe", and "kid" members within the registry. Other specifications
can register other members used for confirmation, including members
for conveying other proof-of-possession keys, possibly using
different key representations.
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
"challenge". "challenge".
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification, as different are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
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legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification, legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification,
since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the
"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details, "cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,
please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]. please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification. established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
three-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the after a three-week review period on the oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org
advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
specification will be published. satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to the
RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in
consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name:
oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWT Confirmation
for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name Method: example").
of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the
IESG and IANA. Suggested name: oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense. and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Expert(s). Experts.
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web
Token Claims registry defined in [JWT]. Token Claims registry defined in [JWT].
5.1.1. Registry Contents 5.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf" o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation o Claim Description: Confirmation
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this document o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this document
5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry 5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JWT Confirmation Methods This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
defines it. defines it.
5.2.1. Registration Template 5.2.1. Registration Template
Confirmation Method Value: Confirmation Method Value:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this The name requested (e.g., "kid"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
particular case.
Confirmation Method Description: Confirmation Method Description:
Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Example Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key
description"). Identifier").
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
email address, home page URI) may also be included. address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
be included but is not required. included but is not required.
5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk" o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk"
o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key or Encrypted JSON o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key Representing Public
Web Key Key
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "jwe"
o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted JSON Web Key
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Value: "kid" o Confirmation Method Value: "kid"
o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), RFC 7516, May 2015,
January 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015,
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
January 2015.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in (JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015,
progress), December 2014. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
Hunt, P., ietf@justin.richer.org, i., Mills, W., Mishra, Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
P., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
(PoP) Security Architecture", Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01 (work
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01 (work in progress), in progress), March 2015.
March 2015.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005. 2.0-os, March 2005.
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank James Manger for his review of the The authors wish to thank Brian Campbell, James Manger, Justin
specification. Richer, and Nat Sakimura for their reviews of the specification.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-03
o Separated the "jwk" and "jwe" confirmation members; the former
represents a public key as a JWK and the latter represents a
symmetric key as a JWE encrypted JWK.
o Changed the title to indicate that a proof-of-possession key is
being communicated.
o Updated language that formerly assumed that the issuer was an
OAuth 2.0 authorization server.
o Described ways that applications can choose to identify the
presenter, including use of the "iss", "sub", and "azp" claims.
o Harmonized the registry language with that used in JWT [RFC 7519].
o Addressed other issues identified during working group last call.
o Referenced the JWT and JOSE RFCs.
-02 -02
o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated
their usage within the document. their usage within the document.
o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of- o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of-
possession key to the introduction. possession key to the introduction.
o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method. o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method.
 End of changes. 48 change blocks. 
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