draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-02.txt 
B. Campbell, Ed. B. Campbell, Ed.
Internet-Draft Ping Identity Corp. Internet-Draft Ping Identity Corp.
Intended status: Standards Track C. Mortimore Intended status: Standards Track C. Mortimore
Expires: August 1, 2011 Salesforce.com Expires: August 7, 2011 Salesforce.com
January 28, 2011 February 3, 2011
SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for OAuth 2.0 SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for OAuth 2.0
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01 draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-02
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the use of a SAML 2.0 bearer Assertion as This specification defines the use of a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion as
means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token. means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 7, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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provider and consumed by a service provider who relies on its content provider and consumed by a service provider who relies on its content
to identify the Assertion's subject for security related purposes. to identify the Assertion's subject for security related purposes.
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol [I-D.ietf.oauth-v2] provides a The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol [I-D.ietf.oauth-v2] provides a
method for making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an method for making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an
access token. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an access token. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an
authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of
the resource owner. In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract the resource owner. In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract
term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the
resource owner authorization. An authorization grant is used by the resource owner authorization. An authorization grant is used by the
client to obtain an access token. Several authorization grant types client to obtain an access token.
are defined to support a wide range of client types and user
experiences. OAuth also allows for the definition of new extension Several authorization grant types are defined to support a wide range
grant types in companion specifications (such as this one) to support of client types and user experiences. OAuth also allows for the
additional clients or to provide a bridge between OAuth and other definition of new extension grant types to support additional clients
trust frameworks. or to provide a bridge between OAuth and other trust frameworks.
This specification defines an extension grant type that profiles the This specification defines an extension grant type that profiles the
use of a SAML 2.0 bearer Assertion in requesting an OAuth 2.0 access use of a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion in requesting an OAuth 2.0 access
token. The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion token. The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion
defined in this specification are intentionally similar, though not defined in this specification are intentionally similar, though not
identical, to those in the Web Browser SSO Profile defined in identical, to those in the Web Browser SSO Profile defined in
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] reusing, to the extent reasonable, [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] reusing, to the extent reasonable,
concepts and patterns from that well-established profile. concepts and patterns from that well-established profile.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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| |<--(B)---- Access Token ---------<| | | |<--(B)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | | | | | | |
+--------+ +---------------+ +--------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Assertion Access Token Request Figure 1: Assertion Access Token Request
The request/response flow illustrated in Figure 1 includes the The request/response flow illustrated in Figure 1 includes the
following steps: following steps:
(A) The client sends an access token request to the authorization (A) The client sends an access token request to the authorization
server with the appropriate OAuth grant_type and includes a SAML server with the
2.0 Assertion. http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer grant_type
and includes a SAML 2.0 Assertion.
(B) The authorization server validates the Assertion per the (B) The authorization server validates the Assertion per the
processing rules defined in this specification and issues an processing rules defined in this specification and issues an
access token. access token.
2.1. Client Requests Access Token 2.1. Client Requests Access Token
The client includes the Assertion in the access token request, the The client includes the Assertion in the access token request, the
core details of which are defined in OAuth [I-D.ietf.oauth-v2], by core details of which are defined in OAuth [I-D.ietf.oauth-v2], by
specifying "http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer" as specifying "http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer" as
the absolute URI value of the "grant_type" parameter and by adding the absolute URI value of the "grant_type" parameter and by adding
the following parameter: the following parameter:
assertion assertion
REQUIRED. The value of the assertion parameter MUST contain a REQUIRED. The value of the assertion parameter MUST contain a
single SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be single SAML 2.0 Assertion. When used with the
encoded using base64url, where the encoding adheres to the "http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer"; grant
definition in Section 5 of RFC4648 [RFC4648] and where the type, the assertion MUST be a SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML
padding bits are set to zero. To to avoid the need for Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where the
subsequent encoding steps (by "application/ encoding adheres to the definition in Section 5 of RFC4648
[RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to zero. To to
avoid the need for subsequent encoding steps (by "application/
x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for
example), the base64url encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped example), the base64url encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped
and pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included. and pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list
of space-delimited strings. The value is defined by the
authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-
delimited strings, their order does not matter, and each string
adds an additional access range to the requested scope.
Authorization servers SHOULD issue access tokens with a limited Authorization servers SHOULD issue access tokens with a limited
lifetime and require clients to refresh them by requesting a new lifetime and require clients to refresh them by requesting a new
access token using the same assertion, if it is still valid, or with access token using the same assertion, if it is still valid, or with
a new assertion. The authorization server SHOULD NOT issue a refresh a new assertion. The authorization server SHOULD NOT issue a refresh
token. token.
2.2. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements 2.2. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements
Prior to issuing an access token response as described in Prior to issuing an access token response as described in
[I-D.ietf.oauth-v2], the authorization server MUST validate the [I-D.ietf.oauth-v2], the authorization server MUST validate the
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for the entity that issued the Assertion; the Format attribute for the entity that issued the Assertion; the Format attribute
MUST be omitted or have a value of MUST be omitted or have a value of
"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity". "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity".
o The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element. The subject MAY o The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element. The subject MAY
identify the resource owner for whom the access token is being identify the resource owner for whom the access token is being
requested. requested.
o The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one o The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one
<SubjectConfirmation> element that allows the authorization server <SubjectConfirmation> element that allows the authorization server
to confirm it as a bearer Assertion. Conditions for bearer to confirm it as a Bearer Assertion. Conditions for bearer
subject confirmation are described below. subject confirmation are described below.
* The <SubjectConfirmation> MUST have a Method attribute with a * The <SubjectConfirmation> MUST have a Method attribute with a
value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer" and MUST value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer" and MUST
contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element. contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element.
* The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient * The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient
attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the
authorization server. The authorization server MUST verify authorization server. The authorization server MUST verify
that the value of the Recipient attribute matches the token that the value of the Recipient attribute matches the token
endpoint URL (or an acceptable alias) to which the Assertion endpoint URL (or an acceptable alias) to which the Assertion
was delivered. was delivered.
* The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter * The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter
attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can
be confirmed. The authorization server MUST verify that the be confirmed. The authorization server MUST verify that the
NotOnOrAfter instant has not passed, subject to allowable clock NotOnOrAfter instant has not passed, subject to allowable clock
skew between systems. The authorization server MAY ensure that skew between systems. The authorization server MAY ensure that
bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining the set of Bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining the set of
used ID values for the length of time for which the Assertion used ID values for the length of time for which the Assertion
would be considered valid based on the NotOnOrAfter attribute would be considered valid based on the NotOnOrAfter attribute
in the <SubjectConfirmationData>. The authorization server MAY in the <SubjectConfirmationData>. The authorization server MAY
reject assertions with a NotOnOrAfter instant that is reject assertions with a NotOnOrAfter instant that is
unreasonably far in the future. unreasonably far in the future.
* The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MAY also contain an * The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MAY also contain an
Address attribute limiting the client address from which the Address attribute limiting the client address from which the
Assertion can be delivered. Verification of the Address is at Assertion can be delivered. Verification of the Address is at
the discretion of the authorization server. the discretion of the authorization server.
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The following people contributed wording and concepts to this The following people contributed wording and concepts to this
document: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motyka, Eran Hammer- document: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motyka, Eran Hammer-
Lahav, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten Lahav, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Scott Cantor and David Waite Lodderstedt, Scott Cantor and David Waite
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-02
o Added scope parameter with text copied from draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12
(the reorg of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 made it so scope wasn't
really inherited by this spec anymore)
o Change definition of the assertion parameter to be more generally
applicable per the suggestion near the end of
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg05253.html
o Editorial changes based on feedback
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01 draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01
o Update spec name when referencing draft-ietf-oauth-v2 (The OAuth o Update spec name when referencing draft-ietf-oauth-v2 (The OAuth
2.0 Protocol Framework -> The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol) 2.0 Protocol Framework -> The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol)
o Update wording in Introduction to talk about extension grant types o Update wording in Introduction to talk about extension grant types
rather than the assertion grant type which is a term no longer rather than the assertion grant type which is a term no longer
used in OAuth 2.0 used in OAuth 2.0
o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and denote as work in o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and denote as work in
skipping to change at page 12, line 24 skipping to change at page 12, line 34
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005. Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os]
Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and
Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Markup Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-sec-consider- Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-sec-consider-
2.0-os, March 2005. 2.0-os, March 2005.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224] [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01 Hors, A., Jacobs, I., and D. Raggett, "HTML 4.01
Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999, Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Brian Campbell (editor) Brian Campbell (editor)
Ping Identity Corp. Ping Identity Corp.
Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com
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