draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-23.txt   rfc7522.txt 
OAuth Working Group B. Campbell Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity Request for Comments: 7522 Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track C. Mortimore Category: Standards Track C. Mortimore
Expires: May 16, 2015 Salesforce ISSN: 2070-1721 Salesforce
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
November 12, 2014 May 2015
SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile
Grants for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-23
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the use of a Security Assertion Markup This specification defines the use of a Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) 2.0 Bearer Assertion as a means for requesting an Language (SAML) 2.0 Bearer Assertion as a means for requesting an
OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use as a means of client OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for client authentication.
authentication.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2015. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7522.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
skipping to change at page 2, line 24 skipping to change at page 2, line 21
2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants . . . . . . 4 2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants . . . . . . 4
2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication . . . . . 5 2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication . . . . . 5
3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . 6 3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Authorization Grant Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Authorization Grant Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Client Authentication Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Client Authentication Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Authorization Grant Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Authorization Grant Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth 8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of
:grant-type:saml2-bearer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer . . . . . . 12
8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth 8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of
:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer . . . . . . . . . . . 12 urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] is an XML-based framework that allows [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] is an XML-based framework that allows
identity and security information to be shared across security identity and security information to be shared across security
domains. The SAML specification, while primarily targeted at domains. The SAML specification, while primarily targeted at
providing cross domain Web browser single sign-on, was also designed providing cross domain Web browser single sign-on (SSO), was also
to be modular and extensible to facilitate use in other contexts. designed to be modular and extensible to facilitate use in other
contexts.
The Assertion, an XML security token, is a fundamental construct of The Assertion, an XML security token, is a fundamental construct of
SAML that is often adopted for use in other protocols and SAML that is often adopted for use in other protocols and
specifications. (Some examples include [OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile] specifications. (Some examples include [OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile]
and [OASIS.WS-Fed].) An Assertion is generally issued by an identity and [OASIS.WS-Fed].) An Assertion is generally issued by an Identity
provider and consumed by a service provider who relies on its content Provider and consumed by a Service Provider that relies on its
to identify the Assertion's subject for security related purposes. content to identify the Assertion's subject for security-related
purposes.
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] provides a method for The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] provides a method for
making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an access making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an access
token. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an token. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an
authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of
the resource owner. In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract the resource owner. In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract
term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the
resource owner authorization. An authorization grant is used by the resource owner authorization. An authorization grant is used by the
client to obtain an access token. Several authorization grant types client to obtain an access token. Several authorization grant types
are defined to support a wide range of client types and user are defined to support a wide range of client types and user
experiences. OAuth also allows for the definition of new extension experiences. OAuth also allows for the definition of new extension
grant types to support additional clients or to provide a bridge grant types to support additional clients or to provide a bridge
between OAuth and other trust frameworks. Finally, OAuth allows the between OAuth and other trust frameworks. Finally, OAuth allows the
definition of additional authentication mechanisms to be used by definition of additional authentication mechanisms to be used by
clients when interacting with the authorization server. clients when interacting with the authorization server.
The Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification is an Authorization Grants" [RFC7521] is an abstract extension to OAuth 2.0
abstract extension to OAuth 2.0 that provides a general framework for that provides a general framework for the use of assertions as client
the use of Assertions as client credentials and/or authorization credentials and/or authorization grants with OAuth 2.0. This
grants with OAuth 2.0. This specification profiles the Assertion specification profiles the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521] to
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization define an extension grant type that uses a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion
Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification to define an to request an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use as client
extension grant type that uses a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion to request credentials. The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion
an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use as client credentials. defined in this specification are intentionally similar, though not
The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion defined in identical, to those in the Web Browser SSO profile defined in the
this specification are intentionally similar, though not identical, SAML Profiles [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] specification. This
to those in the Web Browser SSO Profile defined in the SAML Profiles specification is reusing, to the extent reasonable, concepts and
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] specification. This specification is patterns from that well-established profile.
reusing, to the extent reasonable, concepts and patterns from that
well-established Profile.
This document defines how a SAML Assertion can be used to request an This document defines how a SAML Assertion can be used to request an
access token when a client wishes to utilize an existing trust access token when a client wishes to utilize an existing trust
relationship, expressed through the semantics of (and digital relationship, expressed through the semantics of the SAML Assertion,
signature or keyed message digest calculated over) the SAML without a direct user approval step at the authorization server. It
Assertion, without a direct user approval step at the authorization also defines how a SAML Assertion can be used as a client
server. It also defines how a SAML Assertion can be used as a client
authentication mechanism. The use of an Assertion for client authentication mechanism. The use of an Assertion for client
authentication is orthogonal to and separable from using an Assertion authentication is orthogonal to and separable from using an Assertion
as an authorization grant. They can be used either in combination or as an authorization grant. They can be used either in combination or
separately. Client assertion authentication is nothing more than an separately. Client assertion authentication is nothing more than an
alternative way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint alternative way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint,
and must be used in conjunction with some grant type to form a and it must be used in conjunction with some grant type to form a
complete and meaningful protocol request. Assertion authorization complete and meaningful protocol request. Assertion authorization
grants may be used with or without client authentication or grants may be used with or without client authentication or
identification. Whether or not client authentication is needed in identification. Whether or not client authentication is needed in
conjunction with an assertion authorization grant, as well as the conjunction with an assertion authorization grant, as well as the
supported types of client authentication, are policy decisions at the supported types of client authentication, are policy decisions at the
discretion of the authorization server. discretion of the authorization server.
The process by which the client obtains the SAML Assertion, prior to The process by which the client obtains the SAML Assertion, prior to
exchanging it with the authorization server or using it for client exchanging it with the authorization server or using it for client
authentication, is out of scope. authentication, is out of scope.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive. are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
All terms are as defined in The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework All terms are as defined in the following specifications: "The OAuth
[RFC6749], the Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], the OAuth Assertion Framework
Authentication and Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions], [RFC7521], and "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security
and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] specifications.
2. HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions 2. HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions
The Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and The OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521] defines generic HTTP
Authorization Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification parameters for transporting assertions during interactions with a
defines generic HTTP parameters for transporting Assertions during token endpoint. This section defines specific parameters and
interactions with a token endpoint. This section defines specific treatments of those parameters for use with SAML 2.0 Bearer
parameters and treatments of those parameters for use with SAML 2.0 Assertions.
Bearer Assertions.
2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants 2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants
To use a SAML Bearer Assertion as an authorization grant, the client To use a SAML Bearer Assertion as an authorization grant, the client
uses an access token request as defined in Section 4 of the Assertion uses an access token request as defined in Section 4 of the OAuth
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Assertion Framework [RFC7521] with the following specific parameter
Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification with the following values and encodings.
specific parameter values and encodings.
The value of the "grant_type" parameter is The value of the "grant_type" parameter is
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer". "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer".
The value of the "assertion" parameter contains a single SAML 2.0 The value of the "assertion" parameter contains a single SAML 2.0
Assertion. It MUST NOT contain more than one SAML 2.0 assertion. Assertion. It MUST NOT contain more than one SAML 2.0 Assertion.
The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where
the encoding adheres to the definition in Section 5 of RFC 4648 the encoding adheres to the definition in Section 5 of RFC 4648
[RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to zero. To avoid the [RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to zero. To avoid the
need for subsequent encoding steps (by "application/x-www-form- need for subsequent encoding steps (by "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for example), the base64url urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for example), the base64url-
encoded data MUST NOT be line wrapped and pad characters ("=") MUST encoded data MUST NOT be line wrapped and pad characters ("=") MUST
NOT be included. NOT be included.
The "scope" parameter may be used, as defined in the Assertion The "scope" parameter may be used, as defined in the OAuth Assertion
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Framework [RFC7521], to indicate the requested scope.
Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification, to indicate the
requested scope.
Authentication of the client is optional, as described in Authentication of the client is optional, as described in
Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and consequently, the Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and consequently, the
"client_id" is only needed when a form of client authentication that "client_id" is only needed when a form of client authentication that
relies on the parameter is used. relies on the parameter is used.
The following example demonstrates an Access Token Request with an The following example demonstrates an access token request with an
assertion as an authorization grant (with extra line breaks for Assertion as an authorization grant (with extra line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1 POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer& grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4 assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4
2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication 2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication
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The value of the "client_assertion_type" parameter is The value of the "client_assertion_type" parameter is
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer". "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer".
The value of the "client_assertion" parameter MUST contain a single The value of the "client_assertion" parameter MUST contain a single
SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded
using base64url, where the encoding adheres to the definition in using base64url, where the encoding adheres to the definition in
Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and where the padding bits are set to
zero. To avoid the need for subsequent encoding steps (by zero. To avoid the need for subsequent encoding steps (by
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224], for
example), the base64url encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped and example), the base64url-encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped and
pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included. pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included.
The following example demonstrates a client authenticating using an The following example demonstrates a client authenticating using an
assertion during the presentation of an authorization code grant in Assertion during the presentation of an authorization code grant in
an Access Token Request (with extra line breaks for display purposes an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes
only): only):
POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1 POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code& grant_type=authorization_code&
code=vAZEIHjQTHuGgaSvyW9hO0RpusLzkvTOww3trZBxZpo& code=n0esc3NRze7LTCu7iYzS6a5acc3f0ogp4&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth
%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer& %3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
client_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT client_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT
3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements 3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements
In order to issue an access token response as described in OAuth 2.0 In order to issue an access token response as described in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] or to rely on an Assertion for client authentication, the [RFC6749] or to rely on an Assertion for client authentication, the
authorization server MUST validate the Assertion according to the authorization server MUST validate the Assertion according to the
criteria below. Application of additional restrictions and policy criteria below. Application of additional restrictions and policy
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1. The Assertion's <Issuer> element MUST contain a unique 1. The Assertion's <Issuer> element MUST contain a unique
identifier for the entity that issued the Assertion. In the identifier for the entity that issued the Assertion. In the
absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, absence of an application profile specifying otherwise,
compliant applications MUST compare Issuer values using the compliant applications MUST compare Issuer values using the
Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC
3986 [RFC3986]. 3986 [RFC3986].
2. The Assertion MUST contain a <Conditions> element with an 2. The Assertion MUST contain a <Conditions> element with an
<AudienceRestriction> element with an <Audience> element that <AudienceRestriction> element with an <Audience> element that
identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. identifies the authorization server as an intended audience.
Section 2.5.1.4 of Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Section 2.5.1.4 of "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0"
defines the <AudienceRestriction> and <Audience> elements and, [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] defines the <AudienceRestriction> and
in addition to the URI references discussed there, the token <Audience> elements and, in addition to the URI references
endpoint URL of the authorization server MAY be used as a URI discussed there, the token endpoint URL of the authorization
that identifies the authorization server as an intended server MAY be used as a URI that identifies the authorization
audience. The Authorization Server MUST reject any assertion server as an intended audience. The authorization server MUST
that does not contain its own identity as the intended audience. reject any Assertion that does not contain its own identity as
In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, the intended audience. In the absence of an application profile
compliant applications MUST compare the audience values using specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare the
the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of Audience values using the Simple String Comparison method
RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. As noted in Section 5, the precise strings defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. As noted in
to be used as the audience for a given Authorization Server must Section 5, the precise strings to be used as the Audience for a
be configured out-of-band by the Authorization Server and the given authorization server must be configured out of band by the
Issuer of the assertion. authorization server and the issuer of the Assertion.
3. The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element identifying the 3. The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element identifying the
principal that is the subject of the Assertion. Additional principal that is the subject of the Assertion. Additional
information identifying the subject/principal MAY be included in information identifying the subject/principal MAY be included in
an <AttributeStatement>. an <AttributeStatement>.
A. For the authorization grant, the Subject typically A. For the authorization grant, the Subject typically
identifies an authorized accessor for which the access token identifies an authorized accessor for which the access token
is being requested (i.e., the resource owner or an is being requested (i.e., the resource owner or an
authorized delegate), but in some cases, may be a authorized delegate), but in some cases, it may be a
pseudonymous identifier or other value denoting an anonymous pseudonymous identifier or other value denoting an anonymous
user. user.
B. For client authentication, the Subject MUST be the B. For client authentication, the Subject MUST be the
"client_id" of the OAuth client. "client_id" of the OAuth client.
4. The Assertion MUST have an expiry that limits the time window 4. The Assertion MUST have an expiry that limits the time window
during which it can be used. The expiry can be expressed either during which it can be used. The expiry can be expressed either
as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of the <Conditions> element or as as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of the <Conditions> element or as
the NotOnOrAfter attribute of a suitable the NotOnOrAfter attribute of a suitable
<SubjectConfirmationData> element. <SubjectConfirmationData> element.
5. The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one 5. The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one
<SubjectConfirmation> element that has a Method attribute with a <SubjectConfirmation> element that has a Method attribute with a
value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer". If the value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer". If the
Assertion does not have a suitable NonOnOrAfter attribute on the Assertion does not have a suitable NotOnOrAfter attribute on the
<Conditions> element, the <SubjectConfirmation> element MUST <Conditions> element, the <SubjectConfirmation> element MUST
contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element. When present, the contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element. When present, the
<SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient
attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the
authorization server (or an acceptable alias). The authorization server (or an acceptable alias). The
authorization server MUST verify that the value of the Recipient authorization server MUST verify that the value of the Recipient
attribute matches the token endpoint URL (or an acceptable attribute matches the token endpoint URL (or an acceptable
alias) to which the Assertion was delivered. The alias) to which the Assertion was delivered. The
<SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter
attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can
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ensure that Bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining ensure that Bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining
the set of used ID values for the length of time for which the the set of used ID values for the length of time for which the
Assertion would be considered valid based on the applicable Assertion would be considered valid based on the applicable
NotOnOrAfter instant. NotOnOrAfter instant.
7. If the Assertion issuer directly authenticated the subject, the 7. If the Assertion issuer directly authenticated the subject, the
Assertion SHOULD contain a single <AuthnStatement> representing Assertion SHOULD contain a single <AuthnStatement> representing
that authentication event. If the Assertion was issued with the that authentication event. If the Assertion was issued with the
intention that the client act autonomously on behalf of the intention that the client act autonomously on behalf of the
subject, an <AuthnStatement> SHOULD NOT be included and the subject, an <AuthnStatement> SHOULD NOT be included and the
client presenting the assertion SHOULD be identified in the client presenting the Assertion SHOULD be identified in the
<NameID> or similar element in the <SubjectConfirmation> <NameID> or similar element in the <SubjectConfirmation>
element, or by other available means like SAML V2.0 Condition element, or by other available means like "SAML V2.0 Condition
for Delegation Restriction [OASIS.saml-deleg-cs]. for Delegation Restriction" [OASIS.saml-deleg-cs].
8. Other statements, in particular <AttributeStatement> elements, 8. Other statements, in particular <AttributeStatement> elements,
MAY be included in the Assertion. MAY be included in the Assertion.
9. The Assertion MUST be digitally signed or have a Message 9. The Assertion MUST be digitally signed or have a Message
Authentication Code applied by the issuer. The authorization Authentication Code (MAC) applied by the issuer. The
server MUST reject assertions with an invalid signature or authorization server MUST reject Assertions with an invalid
Message Authentication Code. signature or MAC.
10. Encrypted elements MAY appear in place of their plain text 10. Encrypted elements MAY appear in place of their plaintext
counterparts as defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. counterparts as defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
11. The authorization server MUST reject an Assertion that is not 11. The authorization server MUST reject an Assertion that is not
valid in all other respects per [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], such valid in all other respects per [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], such
as (but not limited to) all content within the Conditions as (but not limited to) all content within the Conditions
element including the NotOnOrAfter and NotBefore attributes, element including the NotOnOrAfter and NotBefore attributes,
unknown condition types, etc. unknown condition types, etc.
3.1. Authorization Grant Processing 3.1. Authorization Grant Processing
Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client
authentication or identification. Whether or not client authentication or identification. Whether or not client
authentication is needed in conjunction with an assertion authentication is needed in conjunction with an Assertion
authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client
authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the
authorization server. However, if client credentials are present in authorization server. However, if client credentials are present in
the request, the authorization server MUST validate them. the request, the authorization server MUST validate them.
If the Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation If the Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation
requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an
error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the
"error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_grant" error code. The "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_grant" error code. The
authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the
skipping to change at page 9, line 33 skipping to change at page 9, line 22
regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the
"error_description" or "error_uri" parameters. "error_description" or "error_uri" parameters.
4. Authorization Grant Example 4. Authorization Grant Example
The following examples illustrate what a conforming Assertion and an The following examples illustrate what a conforming Assertion and an
access token request would look like. access token request would look like.
The example shows an assertion issued and signed by the SAML Identity The example shows an assertion issued and signed by the SAML Identity
Provider identified as "https://saml-idp.example.com". The subject Provider identified as "https://saml-idp.example.com". The subject
of the assertion is identified by email address as of the Assertion is identified by email address as
"brian@example.com", who authenticated to the Identity Provider by "brian@example.com", who authenticated to the Identity Provider by
means of a digital signature where the key was validated as part of means of a digital signature where the key was validated as part of
an X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The intended audience of the an X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The intended audience of the
assertion is "https://saml-sp.example.net", which is an identifier Assertion is "https://saml-sp.example.net", which is an identifier
for a SAML Service Provider with which the authorization server for a SAML Service Provider with which the authorization server
identifies itself. The assertion is sent as part of an access token identifies itself. The Assertion is sent as part of an access token
request to the authorization server's token endpoint at request to the authorization server's token endpoint at
"https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2". "https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2".
Below is an example SAML 2.0 Assertion (whitespace formatting is for Below is an example SAML 2.0 Assertion (whitespace formatting is for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
<Assertion IssueInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.619Z" <Assertion IssueInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.619Z"
ID="ef1xsbZxPV2oqjd7HTLRLIBlBb7" ID="ef1xsbZxPV2oqjd7HTLRLIBlBb7"
Version="2.0" Version="2.0"
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
skipping to change at page 11, line 25 skipping to change at page 11, line 25
bearer&assertion=PEFzc2VydGlvbiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMTEtMDU bearer&assertion=PEFzc2VydGlvbiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMTEtMDU
[...omitted for brevity...]aG5TdGF0ZW1lbnQ-PC9Bc3NlcnRpb24- [...omitted for brevity...]aG5TdGF0ZW1lbnQ-PC9Bc3NlcnRpb24-
Figure 2: Example Request Figure 2: Example Request
5. Interoperability Considerations 5. Interoperability Considerations
Agreement between system entities regarding identifiers, keys, and Agreement between system entities regarding identifiers, keys, and
endpoints is required in order to achieve interoperable deployments endpoints is required in order to achieve interoperable deployments
of this profile. Specific items that require agreement are as of this profile. Specific items that require agreement are as
follows: values for the issuer and audience identifiers, the location follows: values for the Issuer and Audience identifiers, the location
of the token endpoint, the key used to apply and verify the digital of the token endpoint, the key used to apply and verify the digital
signature over the assertion, one-time use restrictions on signature over the Assertion, one-time use restrictions on
assertions, maximum assertion lifetime allowed, and the specific Assertions, maximum Assertion lifetime allowed, and the specific
subject and attribute requirements of the assertion. The exchange of Subject and attribute requirements of the Assertion. The exchange of
such information is explicitly out of scope for this specification such information is explicitly out of scope for this specification,
and typical deployment of it will be done alongside existing SAML Web and typical deployment of it will be done alongside existing SAML Web
SSO deployments that have already established a means of exchanging SSO deployments that have already established a means of exchanging
such information. Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup such information. "Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0 [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] is one common Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] specifies one
method of exchanging SAML related information about system entities. common method of exchanging SAML-related information about system
entities.
The RSA-SHA256 algorithm, from [RFC6931], is a mandatory to implement The RSA-SHA256 algorithm, from [RFC6931], is a mandatory-to-implement
XML signature algorithm for this profile. XML signature algorithm for this profile.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The security considerations described within the Assertion Framework The security considerations described within the following
for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants specifications are all applicable to this document: "Assertion
[I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions], The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization
[RFC6749], and the Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Grants" [RFC7521], "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749],
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 and "Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security
[OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os] specifications are all applicable to Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0"
this document. [OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os].
The specification does not mandate replay protection for the SAML The specification does not mandate replay protection for the SAML
assertion usage for either the authorization grant or for client Assertion usage for either the authorization grant or for client
authentication. It is an optional feature, which implementations may authentication. It is an optional feature, which implementations may
employ at their own discretion. employ at their own discretion.
7. Privacy Considerations 7. Privacy Considerations
A SAML Assertion may contain privacy-sensitive information and, to A SAML Assertion may contain privacy-sensitive information and, to
prevent disclosure of such information to unintended parties, should prevent disclosure of such information to unintended parties, should
only be transmitted over encrypted channels, such as TLS. In cases only be transmitted over encrypted channels, such as Transport Layer
where it is desirable to prevent disclosure of certain information to Security (TLS). In cases where it is desirable to prevent disclosure
the client, the Subject and/or individual attributes of a SAML of certain information to the client, the Subject and/or individual
Assertion should be encrypted to the authorization server. attributes of a SAML Assertion should be encrypted to the
authorization server.
Deployments should determine the minimum amount of information Deployments should determine the minimum amount of information
necessary to complete the exchange and include only that information necessary to complete the exchange and include only that information
in an Assertion (typically by limiting what information is included in an Assertion (typically by limiting what information is included
in an <AttributeStatement> or omitting it altogether). In some in an <AttributeStatement> or by omitting it altogether). In some
cases, the Subject can be a value representing an anonymous or cases, the Subject can be a value representing an anonymous or
pseudonymous user, as described in Section 6.3.1 of the Assertion pseudonymous user, as described in Section 6.3.1 of the OAuth
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Assertion Framework [RFC7521].
Grants [I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions].
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant- 8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of
type:saml2-bearer urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer
This is a request to IANA to please register the value "grant- This section registers the value "grant-type:saml2-bearer" in the
type:saml2-bearer" in the registry urn:ietf:params:oauth established IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
in An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth [RFC6755]. for OAuth" [RFC6755].
o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer
o Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for o Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for
OAuth 2.0 OAuth 2.0
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document: [[this document]] o Specification Document: RFC 7522
8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:client- 8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of
assertion-type:saml2-bearer urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer
This is a request to IANA to please register the value "client- This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer"
assertion-type:saml2-bearer" in the registry urn:ietf:params:oauth in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-
established in An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth [RFC6755]. Namespace for OAuth" [RFC6755].
o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer
o Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profile for OAuth 2.0 o Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profile for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication Client Authentication
o Change controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document: [[this document]] o Specification Document: RFC 7522
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions]
Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", draft-ietf-oauth-assertions
(work in progress), October 2014.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis- saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/
open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>. security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>.
[OASIS.saml-deleg-cs] [OASIS.saml-deleg-cs]
Cantor, S., Ed., "SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Cantor, S., Ed., "SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation
Restriction", Nov 2009. Restriction Version 1", Committee Specification 01,
November 2009, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/
security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-delegation-cs-01.html>.
[OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os]
Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and
Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Markup Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion
Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-sec-consider- Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis- saml-sec-consider-2.0-os, March 2005,
open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-sec-consider-2.0-os.pdf>. <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
saml-sec-consider-2.0-os.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
3986, January 2005. RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
6749, October 2012. RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6931] Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource [RFC6931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform
Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 6931, April 2013. Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 6931,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6931, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6931>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[OASIS.WS-Fed] [OASIS.WS-Fed]
Goodner, M. and T. Nadalin, "Web Services Federation Goodner, M. and A. Nadalin, "Web Services Federation
Language (WS-Federation) Version 1.2", May 2009, Language (WS-Federation) Version 1.2", OASIS Standard, May
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/federation/v1.2/os/ 2009, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/
ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.html>. federation/v1.2/os/ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.html>.
[OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile] [OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile]
Monzillo, R., Kaler, C., Nadalin, T., Hallam-Baker, P., Monzillo, R., Kaler, C., Nadalin, T., Hallam-Baker, P.,
and C. Milono, "Web Services Security SAML Token Profile and C. Milono, "Web Services Security SAML Token Profile
Version 1.1.1", May 2012, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss- Version 1.1.1", OASIS Standard, May 2012,
m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-SAMLTokenProfile-v1.1.1.html>. <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/
wss-SAMLTokenProfile-v1.1.1.html>.
[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Moreh, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, Cantor, S., Moreh, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Metadata for the Security Assertion Markup Language "Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-metadata-2.0-os, March (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-metadata-2.0-os, March
2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf>. saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf>.
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]
Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra, Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra,
P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005, Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005,
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>. saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>.
[RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace [RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
for OAuth", RFC 6755, October 2012. for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224] [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01 Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation
REC-html401-19991224, December 1999, REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The following people contributed wording and concepts to this The following people contributed wording and concepts to this
document: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motykowski, Eran document: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motykowski, Eran
Hammer, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten Hammer, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Susan Harper, Scott Tomilson, Scott Cantor, Hannes Lodderstedt, Susan Harper, Scott Tomilson, Scott Cantor, Hannes
Tschofenig, David Waite, Phil Hunt, and Mukesh Bhatnagar. Tschofenig, David Waite, Phil Hunt, and Mukesh Bhatnagar.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-23
o Fix typo per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/
msg13790.html
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-22
o Changes/suggestions from IESG reviews.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-21
o Added Privacy Considerations section per AD review discussion
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg13148.html
and http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/
msg13144.html
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-20
o Clarified some text around the treatment of subject based on the
rough rough consensus from the thread staring at
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12630.html
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-19
o Updated references.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-18
o Clean up language around subject per http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg12254.html.
o As suggested in http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg12253.html stated that "In the
absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant
applications MUST compare the audience/issuer values using the
Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC
3986."
o Clarify the potentially confusing language about the AS confirming
the assertion http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/
msg12255.html.
o Combine the two items about AuthnStatement and drop the word
presenter as discussed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg12257.html.
o Added one-time use, maximum lifetime, and specific subject and
attribute requirements to Interoperability Considerations based on
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg12252.html.
o Reword security considerations and mention that replay protection
is not mandated based on http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg12259.html.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-17
o Stated that issuer and audience values SHOULD be compared using
the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of
RFC 3986 unless otherwise specified by the application.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-16
o Changed title from "SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profiles for OAuth
2.0" to "SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants" to be more explicit about the scope of the
document per http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/
msg11063.html.
o Fixed typo in text identifying the presenter from "or similar
element, the" to "or similar element in the".
o Numbered the list of processing rules.
o Smallish editorial cleanups to try and improve readability and
comprehensibility.
o Cleaner split out of the processing rules in cases where they
differ for client authentication and authorization grants.
o Clarified the parameters that are used/available for authorization
grants.
o Added Interoperability Considerations section and info reference
to SAML Metadata.
o Added more explanatory context to the example in Section 4.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-15
o Reference RFC 6749 and RFC 6755.
o Update draft-ietf-oauth-assertions reference to -06.
o Remove extraneous word per http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg10055.html
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-14
o Add more text to intro explaining that an assertion grant type can
be used with or without client authentication/identification and
that client assertion authentication is nothing more than an
alternative way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint
o Add examples to Sections 2.1 and 2.2
o Update references
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-13
o Update references: oauth-assertions-04, oauth-urn-sub-ns-05, oauth
-28
o Changed "Description" to "Specification Document" in both
registration requests in IANA Considerations per changes to the
template in ietf-oauth-urn-sub-ns(-03)
o Added "(or an acceptable alias)" so that it's in both sentences
about Recipient and the token endpoint URL so there's no ambiguity
o Update area and workgroup (now Security and OAuth was Internet and
nothing)
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-12
o updated reference to draft-ietf-oauth-v2 from -25 to -26 and
draft-ietf-oauth-assertions from -02 to -03
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-11
o Removed text about limited lifetime access tokens and the SHOULD
NOT on issuing refresh tokens. The text was moved to draft-ietf-
oauth-assertions-02 and somewhat modified per http://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08298.html.
o Fixed typo/missing word per http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/oauth/current/msg08733.html.
o Added Terminology section.
o fix a spelling mistake
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-09
o Attempt to address an ambiguity around validation requirements
when the Conditions element contain a NotOnOrAfter and
SubjectConfirmation/SubjectConfirmationData does too. Basically
it needs to have at least one bearer SubjectConfirmation element
but that element can omit SubjectConfirmationData, if Conditions
has an expiry on it. Otherwise, a valid SubjectConfirmation must
have a SubjectConfirmationData with Recipient and NotOnOrAfter.
And any SubjectConfirmationData that has those elements needs to
have them checked.
o clarified that AudienceRestriction is under Conditions (even
though it's implied by schema)
o fix a typo
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-08
o fix some typos
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-07
o update reference from draft-campbell-oauth-urn-sub-ns to draft-
ietf-oauth-urn-sub-ns
o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-20
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-06
o Fix three typos NamseID->NameID and (2x) Namspace->Namespace
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-05
o Allow for subject confirmation data to be optional when Conditions
contain audience and NotOnOrAfter
o Rework most of the spec to profile draft-ietf-oauth-assertions for
both authn and authz including (but not limited to):
* remove requirement for issuer to be
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity
* change wording on Subject requirements
o using a MAY, explicitly say that the Audience can be token
endpoint URL of the authorization server
o Change title to be more generic (allowing for client authn too)
o added client authentication to the abstract
o register and use urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer for
grant type rather than http://oauth.net/grant_type/saml/2.0/bearer
o register urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer
o remove scope parameter as it is defined in
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-assertions
o remove assertion param registration because it [should] be in
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-assertions
o fix typo(s) and update/add references
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-04
o Changed the grant_type URI from
"http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer" to
"http://oauth.net/grant_type/saml/2.0/bearer" - dropping the word
assertion from the path. Recent versions of draft-ietf-oauth-v2
no longer refer to extension grants using the word assertion so
this URI is more reflective of that. It also more closely aligns
with the grant type URI in draft-jones-oauth-jwt-bearer-00 which
is "http://oauth.net/grant_type/jwt/1.0/bearer".
o Added "case sensitive" to scope definition to align with draft-
ietf-oauth-v2-15/16.
o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-16
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-03
o Cleanup of some editorial issues.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-02
o Added scope parameter with text copied from draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12
(the reorg of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 made it so scope wasn't
really inherited by this spec anymore)
o Change definition of the assertion parameter to be more generally
applicable per the suggestion near the end of http://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg05253.html
o Editorial changes based on feedback
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-01
o Update spec name when referencing draft-ietf-oauth-v2 (The OAuth
2.0 Protocol Framework -> The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol)
o Update wording in Introduction to talk about extension grant types
rather than the assertion grant type which is a term no longer
used in OAuth 2.0
o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and denote as work in
progress
o Update Parameter Registration Request to use similar terms as
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-12 and remove Related information part
o Add some text giving discretion to AS on rejecting assertions with
unreasonably long validity window.
draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-00
o Added Parameter Registration Request for "assertion" to IANA
Considerations.
o Changed document name to draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer in
anticipation of becoming an OAUTH WG item.
o Attempt to move the entire definition of the 'assertion' parameter
into this draft (it will no longer be defined in OAuth 2 Protocol
Framework).
draft-campbell-oauth-saml-01
o Updated to reference draft-ietf-oauth-v2-11 and reflect changes
from -10 to -11.
o Updated examples.
o Relaxed processing rules to allow for more than one
SubjectConfirmation element.
o Removed the 'MUST NOT contain a NotBefore attribute' on
SubjectConfirmationData.
o Relaxed wording that ties the subject of the Assertion to the
resource owner.
o Added some wording about identifying the client when the subject
hasn't directly authenticated including an informative reference
to SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Restriction.
o Added a few examples to the language about verifying that the
Assertion is valid in all other respects.
o Added some wording to the introduction about the similarities to
Web SSO in the format and processing rules
o Changed the grant_type (was assertion_type) URI from
http://oauth.net/assertion_type/saml/2.0/bearer to
http://oauth.net/grant_type/assertion/saml/2.0/bearer
o Changed title to include "Grant Type" in it.
o Editorial updates based on feedback from the WG and others
(including capitalization of Assertion when referring to SAML).
draft-campbell-oauth-saml-00
o Initial I-D
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Brian Campbell Brian Campbell
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com EMail: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com
Chuck Mortimore Chuck Mortimore
Salesforce.com Salesforce.com
Email: cmortimore@salesforce.com EMail: cmortimore@salesforce.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: http://self-issued.info/
 End of changes. 73 change blocks. 
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