draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-hybridmac-07.txt		draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-hybridmac-08.txt
	Network Working Group C. Shao		Network Working Group C. Shao
	Internet-Draft H. Deng		Internet-Draft H. Deng
	Intended status: Standards Track China Mobile		Intended status: Standards Track China Mobile
	Expires: June 6, 2015 R. Pazhyannur		Expires: June 21, 2015 R. Pazhyannur
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	F. Bari		F. Bari
	AT&T		AT&T
	R. Zhang		R. Zhang
	China Telecom		China Telecom
	S. Matsushima		S. Matsushima
	SoftBank Telecom		SoftBank Telecom
	December 3, 2014		December 18, 2014
	IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile for CAPWAP		IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile for CAPWAP
	draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-hybridmac-07		draft-ietf-opsawg-capwap-hybridmac-08
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)		The CAPWAP protocol binding for IEEE 802.11 defines two MAC (Medium
	protocol defines two entities: a Wireless Transmission Point (WTP)		Access Control) modes for IEEE 802.11 WTP (Wireless Transmission
	and an Access Controller (AC). The CAPWAP protocol binding for IEEE		Point): Split and Local MAC. In the Split MAC mode, the partitioning
	802.11 defines two MAC (Medium Access Control) modes for IEEE 802.11		of encryption/decryption functions are not clearly defined. In the
	WTP: Split and Local MAC, and describes the required functionality		Split MAC mode description, IEEE 802.11 encryption is specified as
	split between the WTP and AC for each mode. However, in the Split		located in either the AC (Access Controller) or the WTP, with no
	MAC mode, the partitioning of encryption/decryption functions are not		clear way for the AC to inform the WTP of where the encryption
	clearly defined. In the Split MAC mode description, IEEE 802.11		functionality should be located. This leads to interoperability
	encryption is specified as located in either at the AC or the WTP,		issues, especially when the AC and WTP come from different vendors.
	with no clear way for the AC to inform the WTP of where the		To prevent interoperability issues, this specification defines an
	encryption functionality should be located. This lack of		IEEE 802.11 MAC profile message element in which each profile
	specification leads to interoperability issues, especially when the		specifies an unambiguous division of encryption functionality between
	AC and WTP come from different vendors. To prevent interoperability		the WTP and AC.
	issues, this specification defines an IEEE 802.11 MAC profile message
	element in which each profile specifies an unambiguous division of
	encryption functionality between the WTP and AC. The IEEE 802.11 MAC
	profile is used as follows: the WTP informs the AC of the supported
	profiles during the discovery or join process and the AC configures
	the WTP with one of the supported profiles when configuring the WLAN.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
			This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2015.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 6, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. IEEE MAC Profile Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. IEEE MAC Profile Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. Split MAC with WTP encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. Split MAC with WTP encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. Split MAC with AC encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2. Split MAC with AC encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.3. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile Frame Exchange . . . . . . . . . 7		2.3. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile Frame Exchange . . . . . . . . . 6
	3. MAC Profile Message Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. MAC Profile Message Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.1. IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1. IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.2. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The CAPWAP protocol supports two MAC modes of operation: Split and		The CAPWAP protocol supports two MAC modes of operation: Split and
	Local MAC, as described in [RFC5415], [RFC5416]. However, there are		Local MAC, as described in [RFC5415], [RFC5416]. However, there are
	MAC functions that have not been clearly defined. For example IEEE		MAC functions that have not been clearly defined. For example IEEE
	802.11 encryption is specified as located in either in the AC or the		802.11 encryption is specified as located in either in the AC or the
	WTP with no clear way to negotiate where it should be located.		WTP with no clear way to negotiate where it should be located.
	Because different vendors have different definitions of the MAC mode,		Because different vendors have different definitions of the MAC mode,
	many MAC layer functions are mapped differently to either the WTP or		many MAC layer functions are mapped differently to either the WTP or
	skipping to change at page 3, line 16		skipping to change at page 3, line 12
	configurations based on implementation of the two modes by their		configurations based on implementation of the two modes by their
	vendor. If there is no clear specification, then operators will		vendor. If there is no clear specification, then operators will
	experience interoperability issues with WTPs and ACs from different		experience interoperability issues with WTPs and ACs from different
	vendors.		vendors.
	Figure 1 from [RFC5416], illustrates how some functions are processed		Figure 1 from [RFC5416], illustrates how some functions are processed
	in different places in the Local MAC and Split MAC mode.		in different places in the Local MAC and Split MAC mode.
	Specifically, note that in the Split MAC mode the IEEE 802.11		Specifically, note that in the Split MAC mode the IEEE 802.11
	encryption/decryption is specified as WTP/AC implying that it could		encryption/decryption is specified as WTP/AC implying that it could
	be at either location. This is not an issue with Local MAC because		be at either location. This is not an issue with Local MAC because
	encryption is always at the Access Controller.		encryption is always at the WTP.
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Functions | Local MAC | Split MAC |		| Functions | Local MAC | Split MAC |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Distribution Service | WTP/AC | AC |		| |Distribution Service | WTP/AC | AC |
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Integration Service | WTP | AC |		| |Integration Service | WTP | AC |
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Beacon Generation | WTP | WTP |		| |Beacon Generation | WTP | WTP |
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	skipping to change at page 4, line 30		skipping to change at page 3, line 39
	+ |/Defragmentation | | |		+ |/Defragmentation | | |
	| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Assoc/Disassoc/Reassoc | WTP/AC | AC |		| |Assoc/Disassoc/Reassoc | WTP/AC | AC |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Classifying | WTP | AC |		| |Classifying | WTP | AC |
	+ IEEE +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ IEEE +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| 802.11 QoS |Scheduling | WTP | WTP/AC |		| 802.11 QoS |Scheduling | WTP | WTP/AC |
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |Queuing | WTP | WTP |		| |Queuing | WTP | WTP |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |IEEE 802.1X/EAP | AC | AC |		| |IEEE 802.1X/EAP | AC | AC |
	+ IEEE +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ IEEE +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| 802.11 RSN |RSNA Key Management | AC | AC |		| 802.11 RSN |RSNA Key Management | AC | AC |
	+ (WPA2) +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ (WPA2) +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |IEEE 802.11 | WTP | WTP/AC |		| |IEEE 802.11 | WTP | WTP/AC |
	+ |Encryption/Decryption | | |		+ |Encryption/Decryption | | |
	|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 1: Functions in Local MAC and Split MAC		Figure 1: Functions in Local MAC and Split MAC
	To solve this problem, this specification introduces IEEE 802.11 MAC		To solve this problem, this specification introduces IEEE 802.11 MAC
	skipping to change at page 9, line 27		skipping to change at page 8, line 27
	o Type: TBD for IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile		o Type: TBD for IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile
	o Profile: The profile is identified by a value as given below		o Profile: The profile is identified by a value as given below
	* 0: This refers to the Split MAC Profile with WTP encryption		* 0: This refers to the Split MAC Profile with WTP encryption
	* 1: This refers to the Split MAC Profile with AC encryption		* 1: This refers to the Split MAC Profile with AC encryption
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	This document does not introduce any new security risks compared to		This document does not introduce any new security risks compared to
	[RFC5416]. The negotiation between the WTP and AC is encrypted and		[RFC5416]. The negotiation messages between the WTP and AC have
	as a result an attacker cannot interfere with it to force a less		origin authentication and data integrity. As a result an attacker
	secure mode choice. The security considerations described in		cannot interfere with the messages to force a less secure mode
	[RFC5416] apply here as well.		choice. The security considerations described in [RFC5416] apply
			here as well.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document requires the following IANA actions:		This document requires the following IANA actions:
	o This specification defines two new message elements, IEEE 802.11		o This specification defines two new message elements, IEEE 802.11
	Supported MAC Profiles (described in Section 3.1) and IEEE 802.11		Supported MAC Profiles (described in Section 3.1) and IEEE 802.11
	MAC Profile (described in Section 3.2). These elements needs to		MAC Profile (described in Section 3.2). These elements needs to
	be registered in the existing CAPWAP Message Element Type		be registered in the existing CAPWAP Message Element Type
	registry, defined in [RFC5415]. The values for these elements		registry, defined in [RFC5415]. The values for these elements
	skipping to change at page 10, line 7		skipping to change at page 9, line 8
	IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile TBD2		IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile TBD2
	o The IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles message element and IEEE		o The IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles message element and IEEE
	802.11 MAC Profile message element include a Profile Field (as		802.11 MAC Profile message element include a Profile Field (as
	defined in Section 3.2). The Profile field in the IEEE 802.11		defined in Section 3.2). The Profile field in the IEEE 802.11
	Supported MAC Profiles denotes the MAC profiles supported by the		Supported MAC Profiles denotes the MAC profiles supported by the
	WTP. The profile field in the IEEE MAC profile denotes MAC		WTP. The profile field in the IEEE MAC profile denotes MAC
	profile assigned to the WTP. The namespace for the field is 8		profile assigned to the WTP. The namespace for the field is 8
	bits (0-255). This specification defines two values, zero (0) and		bits (0-255). This specification defines two values, zero (0) and
	one (1) as described below. The remaining values (2-255) are		one (1) as described below. The remaining values (2-255) are
	controlled and maintained by IANA and require an Expert Review.		controlled and maintained by IANA and require an Expert Review.
	IANA needs to create a registry called CAPWAP IEEE 802.11 Split		IANA needs to create a new sub-registry called IEEE 802.11 Split
	MAC Profile. The registry format is given below.		MAC Profile and add the new sub-registry to the existing registry
			"Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)
			Parameters". The registry format is given below.
	Profile Type Value Reference		Profile Type Value Reference
	Split MAC with WTP encryption 0		Split MAC with WTP encryption 0
	Split MAC with AC encryption 1		Split MAC with AC encryption 1
	6. Contributors		6. Contributors
	Yifan Chen chenyifan@chinamobile.com		Yifan Chen chenyifan@chinamobile.com
	Naibao Zhou zhounaibao@chinamobile.com		Naibao Zhou zhounaibao@chinamobile.com
End of changes. 10 change blocks.
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