draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-03.txt   draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-04.txt 
OPSAWG WG T. Reddy OPSAWG WG T. Reddy
Internet-Draft McAfee Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: May 5, 2021 Citrix Expires: July 19, 2021 Citrix
B. Anderson B. Anderson
Cisco Cisco
November 1, 2020 January 15, 2021
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices
draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-03 draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-04
Abstract Abstract
This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
specification to incorporate (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows specification to incorporate (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows
a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which
can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an
endpoint. endpoint.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 5, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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4.2. Encrypted DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Encrypted DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. (D)TLS Profile of a IoT device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. (D)TLS Profile of a IoT device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Tree Structure of the (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL 5.1. Tree Structure of the (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL
YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. The (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL YANG Model . . . 10 5.2. The (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL YANG Model . . . 10
5.3. IANA (D)TLS profile YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.3. IANA (D)TLS profile YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4. MUD (D)TLS Profile Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.4. MUD (D)TLS Profile Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Processing of the MUD (D)TLS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Processing of the MUD (D)TLS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. TLS Version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 10.2. ACL TLS Version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3. DTLS version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 10.3. ACL DTLS version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.4. (D)TLS Parameters registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10.4. ACL (D)TLS Parameters registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.5. MUD Extensions registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10.5. MUD Extensions registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Encryption is necessary to enhance the privacy of end users using IoT Encryption is necessary to enhance the privacy of end users using IoT
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remediate the compromised device. For example, if the cipher remediate the compromised device. For example, if the cipher
suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA in the ClientHello message is suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA in the ClientHello message is
not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher suite is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher suite is
recognized by the firewall, it can identify unexpected TLS usage. recognized by the firewall, it can identify unexpected TLS usage.
o If the (D)TLS parameter observed in a (D)TLS session is not o If the (D)TLS parameter observed in a (D)TLS session is not
specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the (D)TLS parameter is specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the (D)TLS parameter is
not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized
parameter and the correct behavior is not to block the (D)TLS parameter and the correct behavior is not to block the (D)TLS
session. The behaviour is functionally equivalent to the session. The behaviour is functionally equivalent to the
description in Section 9.3 of [RFC8446] to ignore all unrecognized compliant TLS middlebox description in Section 9.3 of [RFC8446] to
cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters. For example, if ignore all unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other
the cipher suite TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 in the ClientHello parameters. For example, if the cipher suite
message is not specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 in the ClientHello message is not
suite is not recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the cipher suite is not
unrecognized cipher suite. recognized by the firewall, it can ignore the unrecognized cipher
suite.
o Deployments update at different rates, so an updated MUD (D)TLS o Deployments update at different rates, so an updated MUD (D)TLS
profile may support newer parameters. If the firewall does not profile may support newer parameters. If the firewall does not
recognize the newer parameters, an alert should be triggered to recognize the newer parameters, an alert should be triggered to
the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or administrator. A the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or administrator. A
firewall must be readily updatable, so that when ossification firewall must be readily updatable, so that when new parameters in
problems are discovered, they can be addressed quickly. Most the MUD (D)TLS profile are discovered that are not recognized by
importantly, if the firewall is not readily updatable, its the firewall, it can be updated quickly. Most importantly, if the
efficacy to identify emerging malware will decrease with time. firewall is not readily updatable, its protection efficacy to
For example, if the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 in the identify emerging malware will decrease with time. For example,
ClientHello message is specified in the MUD (D)TLS profile and the if the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 specified in the MUD
cipher suite is not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be (D)TLS profile is not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be
triggered. Similarly, if the (D)TLS version in the MUD file is triggered. Similarly, if the (D)TLS version specified in the MUD
not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be triggered. file is not recognized by the firewall, an alert will be
triggered.
7. MUD File Example 7. MUD File Example
The example below contains (D)TLS profile parameters for a IoT device The example below contains (D)TLS profile parameters for a IoT device
used to reach servers listening on port 443 using TCP transport. used to reach servers listening on port 443 using TCP transport.
JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [RFC7951] is used to illustrate JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [RFC7951] is used to illustrate
the example. the example.
{ {
"ietf-mud:mud": { "ietf-mud:mud": {
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} }
}, },
"ietf-acl-tls:client-profile" : { "ietf-acl-tls:client-profile" : {
"tls-dtls-profiles" : [ "tls-dtls-profiles" : [
{ {
"supported-tls-versions" : ["tls-1.3"], "supported-tls-versions" : ["tls-1.3"],
"cipher-suites" : [ "cipher-suites" : [
{ {
"cipher": 19, "cipher": 19,
"hash": 1 "hash": 1
}, },
{ {
"cipher": 19, "cipher": 19,
"hash": 2 "hash": 2
} }
], ],
"extension-types" : [10,11,13,16,24], "extension-types" : [10,11,13,16,24],
"supported-groups" : [29] "supported-groups" : [29]
} }
] ]
}, },
"actions": { "actions": {
"forwarding": "accept" "forwarding": "accept"
} }
} }
} }
] ]
} }
} }
] ]
} }
} }
} }
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} }
The following illustrates the example scenarios for processing the The following illustrates the example scenarios for processing the
above profile: above profile:
o If the extension type "encrypt_then_mac" (code point 22) [RFC7366] o If the extension type "encrypt_then_mac" (code point 22) [RFC7366]
in the ClientHello message is recognized by the firewall, it can in the ClientHello message is recognized by the firewall, it can
identify unexpected TLS usage. identify unexpected TLS usage.
o If the extension type "token_binding" (code point 24) [RFC8472] in o If the extension type "token_binding" (code point 24) [RFC8472] in
the ClientHello message is not recognized by the firewall, it can the MUD (D)TLS profile is not recognized by the firewall, it can
ignore the unrecognized extension. Because the extension type ignore the unrecognized extension. Because the extension type
token_binding is specified in the profile, an alert will be "token_binding" is specified in the profile, an alert will be
triggered to the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or triggered to the firewall vendor and the IoT device owner or
administrator to notify the firewall is not up to date. administrator to notify the firewall is not up to date.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Security considerations in [RFC8520] need to be taken into Security considerations in [RFC8520] need to be taken into
consideration. Although it is challenging for a malware to mimic the consideration. The middlebox must adhere to the invariants discussed
TLS behavior of various IoT device types and IoT device models from in Section 9.3 of [RFC8446] to act as a compliant proxy.
several manufacturers, malicious agents have a very low probability
of using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agents on Although it is challenging for a malware to mimic the TLS behavior of
the IoT device to evade detection. Network security services should various IoT device types and IoT device models from several
also rely on contextual network data to detect false negatives. In manufacturers, malicious agents have a very low probability of using
order to detect such malicious flows, anomaly detection (deep the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agents on the IoT
learning techniques on network data) can be used to detect malicious device to evade detection. Network security services should also
agents using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agent rely on contextual network data to detect false negatives. In order
on the IoT device. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to to detect such malicious flows, anomaly detection (deep learning
maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an techniques on network data) can be used to detect malicious agents
"anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the using the same (D)TLS profile parameters as legitimate agent on the
knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal IoT device. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain
behavior. rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an
attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about
the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior.
9. Privacy Considerations 9. Privacy Considerations
Privacy considerations discussed in Section 16 of [RFC8520] to not Privacy considerations discussed in Section 16 of [RFC8520] to not
reveal the MUD URL to an attacker need to be taken into reveal the MUD URL to an attacker need to be taken into
consideration. The MUD URL can be stored in Trusted Execution consideration. The MUD URL can be stored in Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) for secure operation, enhanced data security, and Environment (TEE) for secure operation, enhanced data security, and
prevent exposure to unauthorized software. prevent exposure to unauthorized software.
The middlebox acting as a (D)TLS proxy must immediately delete the Full handshake inspection (Section 4.1) requires a TLS proxy device
decrypted data upon completing any necessary inspection functions. which needs to decrypt traffic between the IoT device and its
TLS proxy potentially has access to a user's PII (Personally server(s). There is a tradeoff between privacy of the data carried
identifiable information) and PHI (Protected Health Information). inside TLS (especially e.g., personally identifiable information and
The TLS proxy must not store, process or modify PII data. For protected health information) and efficacy of endpoint security. It
example, IT administrator can configure the middlebox to bypass is strongly RECOMMENDED to avoid a TLS proxy whenever possible. For
payload inspection for a connection destined to a specific service example, an enterprise firewall administrator can configure the
due to privacy compliance requirements. In addition, mechanisms middlebox to bypass TLS proxy functionality or payload inspection for
based on object security can be used by IoT devices to enable end-to- connections destined to specific well-known services. Alternatively,
end security and the middlebox will not have any access to the packet a IoT device could be configured to reject all sessions that involve
data. For example, Object Security for Constrained RESTful proxy servers to specific well-known services. In addition,
Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] is a proposal that protects CoAP mechanisms based on object security can be used by IoT devices to
messages by wrapping them in the COSE format [RFC8152]. enable end-to-end security and the middlebox will not have any access
to the packet data. For example, Object Security for Constrained
RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] is a proposal that protects
CoAP messages by wrapping them in the COSE format [RFC8152].
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules 10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules
This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the
"ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-tls-profile URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-tls-profile
Registrant Contact: The IESG. Registrant Contact: The IESG.
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prefix: ietf-mud-tls prefix: ietf-mud-tls
reference: RFC XXXX reference: RFC XXXX
IANA is requested to create an the initial version of the IANA- IANA is requested to create an the initial version of the IANA-
maintained YANG Module called "iana-tls-profile", based on the maintained YANG Module called "iana-tls-profile", based on the
contents of Section 5.3, which will allow for new (D)TLS parameters contents of Section 5.3, which will allow for new (D)TLS parameters
and (D)TLS versions to be added. IANA is requested to add this note: and (D)TLS versions to be added. IANA is requested to add this note:
o tls-version and dtls-version values must not be directly added to o tls-version and dtls-version values must not be directly added to
the iana-tls-profile YANG module. They must instead be the iana-tls-profile YANG module. They must instead be
respectively added to the "TLS Version Codes", and "DTLS Version respectively added to the "ACL TLS Version Codes", and "ACL DTLS
Codes" registries. Version Codes" registries.
o (D)TLS parameters must not be directly added to the iana-tls- o (D)TLS parameters must not be directly added to the iana-tls-
profile YANG module. They must instead be added to the "(D)TLS profile YANG module. They must instead be added to the "ACL
Parameters" registry. (D)TLS Parameters" registry.
When a 'tls-version' or 'dtls-version' value is respectively added to When a 'tls-version' or 'dtls-version' value is respectively added to
the "TLS Version Codes" or "DTLS Version Codes" registry, a new the "ACL TLS Version Codes" or "ACL DTLS Version Codes" registry, a
"enum" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG module. new "enum" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG
The following "enum" statement, and substatements thereof, should be module. The following "enum" statement, and substatements thereof,
defined: should be defined:
"enum": Replicates the label from the registry. "enum": Replicates the label from the registry.
"value": Contains the IANA-assigned value corresponding to the "value": Contains the IANA-assigned value corresponding to the
'tls-version' or 'dtls-version'. 'tls-version' or 'dtls-version'.
"description": Replicates the description from the registry. "description": Replicates the description from the registry.
"reference": Replicates the reference from the registry and adds "reference": Replicates the reference from the registry and adds
the title of the document. the title of the document.
When a (D)TLS parameter is added to "(D)TLS Parameters" registry, a When a (D)TLS parameter is added to "ACL (D)TLS Parameters" registry,
new "type" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG a new "type" statement must be added to the iana-tls-profile YANG
module. The following "type" statement, and substatements thereof, module. The following "type" statement, and substatements thereof,
should be defined: should be defined:
"derived type": Replicates the parameter name from the registry. "derived type": Replicates the parameter name from the registry.
"built-in type": Contains the built-in YANG type. "built-in type": Contains the built-in YANG type.
"description": Replicates the description from the registry. "description": Replicates the description from the registry.
When the iana-tls-profile YANG module is updated, a new "revision" When the iana-tls-profile YANG module is updated, a new "revision"
statement must be added in front of the existing revision statements. statement must be added in front of the existing revision statements.
IANA is requested to add this note to "TLS Version Codes", "DTLS IANA is requested to add this note to "ACL TLS Version Codes", "ACL
Version Codes", and "(D)TLS Parameters" registries: DTLS Version Codes", and "ACL (D)TLS Parameters" registries:
When this registry is modified, the YANG module iana-tls-profile When this registry is modified, the YANG module iana-tls-profile
must be updated as defined in [RFCXXXX]. must be updated as defined in [RFCXXXX].
The registration procedure for "ietf-acl-tls" YANG module will be The registration procedure for "ietf-acl-tls" YANG module will be
Specification Required, as defined by [RFC8126]. Specification Required, as defined by [RFC8126].
10.2. TLS Version registry 10.2. ACL TLS Version registry
IANA is requested to create a new subregistry titled "TLS Version IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL TLS Version
Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'tls- Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'tls-
version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through
Expert Review [RFC8126]. Expert Review [RFC8126].
+-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+ +-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+
| Value | Label | Description | Reference | | Value | Label | Description | Reference |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
+-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+ +-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+
| 1 | tls-1.2 | TLS Version 1.2 | [RFC5246] | | 1 | tls-1.2 | TLS Version 1.2 | [RFC5246] |
+-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+ +-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+
| 2 | tls-1.3 | TLS Version 1.3 | [RFC8446] | | 2 | tls-1.3 | TLS Version 1.3 | [RFC8446] |
+-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+ +-------+---------+-----------------+-----------+
10.3. DTLS version registry 10.3. ACL DTLS version registry
IANA is requested to create a new subregistry titled "DTLS Version IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL DTLS Version
Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'dtls- Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'dtls-
version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through version' parameter. Further assignments are to be made through
Expert Review [RFC8126]. Expert Review [RFC8126].
+-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+ +-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+
| Value | Label | Description | Reference | | Value | Label | Description | Reference |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
+-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+ +-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+
| 1 |dtls-1.2 |DTLS Version 1.2| [RFC6346] | | 1 |dtls-1.2 |DTLS Version 1.2| [RFC6346] |
+-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+ +-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+
| 2 |dtls-1.3 |DTLS Version 1.3|[draft-ietf-tls-dtls13]| | 2 |dtls-1.3 |DTLS Version 1.3|[draft-ietf-tls-dtls13]|
+-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+ +-------+---------+----------------+-----------------------+
10.4. (D)TLS Parameters registry 10.4. ACL (D)TLS Parameters registry
IANA is requested to create a new subregistry titled "(D)TLS IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "ACL (D)TLS
parameters". parameters".
The values for all the (D)TLS parameters in the registry are defined The values for all the (D)TLS parameters in the registry are defined
in the TLS and DTLS IANA registries in the TLS and DTLS IANA registries
(<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt> (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt>
and <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls- and <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-
extensiontype-values.txt>) excluding the tls-version, dtls-version, extensiontype-values.txt>) excluding the tls-version, dtls-version,
spki-pin-set and certificate-authority parameters. Further spki-pin-set and certificate-authority parameters. Further
assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126]. The assignments are to be made through Expert Review [RFC8126]. The
registry is initially populated with the following parameters: registry is initially populated with the following parameters:
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| Parameter Name | YANG | JSON | | | Parameter Name | YANG | JSON | |
| | Type | Type | Description | | | Type | Type | Description |
| | | | | | | | | |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| extension-type | uint16 | Number | Extension type | | extension-type | uint16 | Number | Extension type |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| supported-group | uint16 | Number | Supported group | | supported-group | uint16 | Number | Supported group |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| spki-pin-set | binary | String | Subject Public Key Info pin set | | spki-pin-set | binary | String | Subject public key info pin set |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| signature-algorithm | uint16 | Number | Signature algorithm | | signature-algorithm | uint16 | Number | Signature algorithm |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| psk-key-exchange-mode | uint8 | Number | pre-shared key exchange mode | | psk-key-exchange-mode | uint8 | Number | pre-shared key exchange mode |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| application-protocol | string | String | Application protocol | | application-protocol | string | String | Application protocol |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| cert-compression-algorithm | uint16 | Number | Certificate compression algorithm | | cert-compression-algorithm | uint16 | Number | Certificate compression algorithm |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| certificate-authority | string | String | Distinguished Name of Certificate authority | | certificate-authority | string | String | Distinguished name of Certificate Authority |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| cipher-algorithm | uint8 | Number | AEAD encryption algorithm | | cipher-algorithm | uint8 | Number | AEAD encryption algorithm |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| hash-algorithm | uint8 | Number | Hash algorithm | | hash-algorithm | uint8 | Number | Hash algorithm |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| tls-version | enumeration | String | TLS version | | tls-version | enumeration | String | TLS version |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
| dtls-version | enumeration | String | DTLS version | | dtls-version | enumeration | String | DTLS version |
+----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------+-------------+--------+---------------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 30, line 22 skipping to change at page 30, line 22
progress), August 2020. progress), August 2020.
[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression] [I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression]
Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-10 Compression", draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-10
(work in progress), January 2020. (work in progress), January 2020.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38 (work in progress), May 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39 (work in progress),
2020. November 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
skipping to change at page 31, line 35 skipping to change at page 31, line 35
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.04358.pdf>. <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.04358.pdf>.
[cryto-vulnerability] [cryto-vulnerability]
Perez, B., "Exploiting the Windows CryptoAPI Perez, B., "Exploiting the Windows CryptoAPI
Vulnerability", January 2020, Vulnerability", January 2020,
<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/14/2002234275/-1/-1/0/ <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/14/2002234275/-1/-1/0/
CSA-WINDOWS-10-CRYPT-LIB-20190114.PDF>. CSA-WINDOWS-10-CRYPT-LIB-20190114.PDF>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni] [I-D.ietf-tls-esni]
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, "TLS Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", draft-ietf-tls-esni-08 (work in Encrypted Client Hello", draft-ietf-tls-esni-09 (work in
progress), October 2020. progress), December 2020.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile] [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]
Tschofenig, H. and T. Fossati, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for Tschofenig, H. and T. Fossati, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for
the Internet of Things", draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot- the Internet of Things", draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-
profile-00 (work in progress), June 2020. profile-00 (work in progress), June 2020.
[I-D.reddy-add-enterprise] [I-D.reddy-add-enterprise]
Reddy.K, T. and D. Wing, "DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS Reddy.K, T. and D. Wing, "DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS
Server Deployment Considerations for Enterprise Networks", Server Deployment Considerations for Enterprise Networks",
draft-reddy-add-enterprise-00 (work in progress), June draft-reddy-add-enterprise-00 (work in progress), June
 End of changes. 31 change blocks. 
81 lines changed or deleted 87 lines changed or added

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