draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-01.txt   draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-02.txt 
Opsec Working Group W. Kumari Opsec Working Group W. Kumari
Internet Draft Google Internet Draft Google
<draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-01> D. McPherson <draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-02> D. McPherson
Category: Informational Arbor Networks Category: Informational Arbor Networks
Expires: September 5, 2009 Expires: September 7, 2009
March 5, 2009 March 7, 2009
Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering with uRPF Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering with uRPF
<draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-01.txt> <draft-ietf-opsec-blackhole-urpf-02.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
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http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2009.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
publication of this document. Please review these documents Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect and restrictions with respect to this document.
to this document.
Abstract Abstract
Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) filtering is a popular and Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) filtering is a popular and
effective technique for the mitigation of denial-of-service attacks. effective technique for the mitigation of denial-of-service attacks.
This document expands upon destination-based RTBH filtering by This document expands upon destination-based RTBH filtering by
outlining a method to enable filtering by source address as well. outlining a method to enable filtering by source address as well.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
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C. A brief history of RTBH.........................................12 C. A brief history of RTBH.........................................12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document expands upon the technique outlined in "Configuring BGP This document expands upon the technique outlined in "Configuring BGP
to Block Denial-of-Service Attacks" [RFC3882] to demonstrate a method to Block Denial-of-Service Attacks" [RFC3882] to demonstrate a method
that allows for filtering by source address(es). that allows for filtering by source address(es).
1.2 Terminology 1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. [RFC2119].
2. Background 2. Background
Network operators have developed a variety of techniques for Network operators have developed a variety of techniques for
mitigating denial of service attacks. While different techniques have mitigating denial of service attacks. While different techniques have
varying strengths and weaknesses, from an implementation perspective varying strengths and weaknesses, from an implementation perspective
the selection of which method to use for each type of attack involves the selection of which method to use for each type of attack involves
evaluating the tradeoffs associated with each method. evaluating the tradeoffs associated with each method.
A common DoS attack directed against a customer of a service provider A common DoS attack directed against a customer of a service provider
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[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996. BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3330] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September [RFC3330] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September
2002. 2002.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, February 2006.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004. Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
[RFC3882] Turk, D., "Configuring BGP to Block Denial-of-Service [RFC3882] Turk, D., "Configuring BGP to Block Denial-of-Service
Attacks", RFC 3882, September 2004. Attacks", RFC 3882, September 2004.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[2223BIS] Reynolds, J. and R. Braden, "Instructions to Request for
Comments (RFC) Authors", draft-rfc-editor-
rfc2223bis-08.txt, August 2004.
[Greene2001] Greene Barry Raveendran and Jarvis Neil "Unicast Reverse [Greene2001] Greene Barry Raveendran and Jarvis Neil "Unicast Reverse
Path Forwarding (uRPF) Enhancements for the ISP-ISP Edge", Path Forwarding (uRPF) Enhancements for the ISP-ISP Edge",
[ftp://ftp- [ftp://ftp-
eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/documents/uRPF_Enhancement.pdf], eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/documents/uRPF_Enhancement.pdf],
2001. 2001.
Appendix A: Cisco Router Configuration Sample Appendix A: Cisco Router Configuration Sample
This section provides a partial configuration for configuring RTBH on This section provides a partial configuration for configuring RTBH on
a Cisco router. This is not a complete configuration and should be a Cisco router. This is not a complete configuration and should be
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To clarify and restate, uRPF Loose Check was created as one part of a To clarify and restate, uRPF Loose Check was created as one part of a
rapid reaction tool to DDOS attacks that "drop packets based on rapid reaction tool to DDOS attacks that "drop packets based on
source IP address that can be pushed out to over 60 routers with in source IP address that can be pushed out to over 60 routers with in
60 seconds, be longer than a thousand lines, be modified on the fly, 60 seconds, be longer than a thousand lines, be modified on the fly,
and work in all your platforms filtering at line rate." The secondary and work in all your platforms filtering at line rate." The secondary
benefits of using uRPF Loose Check for other functions is a secondary benefits of using uRPF Loose Check for other functions is a secondary
benefit - not the primary goal for its creation. benefit - not the primary goal for its creation.
To facilitate the adoption to the industry, uRPF Loose Check was not To facilitate the adoption to the industry, uRPF Loose Check was not
patent. It was publicly published and disclosed in "Unicast Reverse patented. It was publicly published and disclosed in "Unicast Reverse
Path Forwarding (uRPF) Enhancements for the ISP-ISP Edge "Remote Path Forwarding (uRPF) Enhancements for the ISP-ISP Edge"
Triggering Black Hole Filtering," by Barry Raveendran Greene and Neil [Greene2001].
Jarvis [ftp://ftp-
eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/documents/uRPF_Enhancement.pdf].
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Warren Kumari Warren Kumari
Google Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043 Mountain View, CA 94043
Email: warren@kumari.net Email: warren@kumari.net
Danny McPherson Danny McPherson
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