draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-04.txt   draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-05.txt 
OSPF Working Group M. Bhatia OSPF Working Group M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent
Obsoletes: 6506 (if approved) V. Manral Obsoletes: 6506 (if approved) V. Manral
Intended status: Standards Track Hewlett Packard Intended status: Standards Track Hewlett Packard
Expires: June 11, 2014 A. Lindem Expires: June 16, 2014 A. Lindem
Ericsson Ericsson
December 8, 2013 December 13, 2013
Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3 Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3
draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-04.txt draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-05.txt
Abstract Abstract
Currently, OSPF for IPv6 (OSPFv3) uses IPsec as the only mechanism Currently, OSPF for IPv6 (OSPFv3) uses IPsec as the only mechanism
for authenticating protocol packets. This behavior is different from for authenticating protocol packets. This behavior is different from
authentication mechanisms present in other routing protocols (OSPFv2, authentication mechanisms present in other routing protocols (OSPFv2,
Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), RIP, and Routing Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), RIP, and Routing
Information Protocol Next Generation (RIPng)). In some environments, Information Protocol Next Generation (RIPng)). In some environments,
it has been found that IPsec is difficult to configure and maintain it has been found that IPsec is difficult to configure and maintain
and thus cannot be used. This document defines an alternative and thus cannot be used. This document defines an alternative
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Summary of Changes from RFC 6506 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Summary of Changes from RFC 6506 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. AT-Bit in Options Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. AT-Bit in Options Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Basic Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Basic Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. IPv6 Source Address Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. IPv6 Source Address Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. OSPFv3 Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. OSPFv3 Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Authentication Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Authentication Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1. Sequence Number Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1.1. Sequence Number Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. OSPFv3 Header Checksum and LLS Data Block Checksum . . . . 13 4.2. OSPFv3 Header Checksum and LLS Data Block Checksum . . . . 12
4.3. Cryptographic Authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Cryptographic Authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Cross-Protocol Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Cross-Protocol Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Cryptographic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Cryptographic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6. Message Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.6. Message Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Migration and Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5. Migration and Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Unlike Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2) [RFC2328], OSPF Unlike Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2) [RFC2328], OSPF
for IPv6 (OSPFv3) [RFC5340] does not include the AuType and for IPv6 (OSPFv3) [RFC5340] does not include the AuType and
Authentication fields in its headers for authenticating protocol Authentication fields in its headers for authenticating protocol
packets. Instead, OSPFv3 relies on the IPsec protocols packets. Instead, OSPFv3 relies on the IPsec protocols
Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and Encapsulating Security Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] to provide integrity, authentication, and/or Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] to provide integrity, authentication, and/or
confidentiality. confidentiality.
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attempts to solve the problems related to replay protection and attempts to solve the problems related to replay protection and
deterministically disambiguating different OSPFv3 packets as deterministically disambiguating different OSPFv3 packets as
described above. described above.
This document adds support for the Secure Hash Algorithms (SHAs) This document adds support for the Secure Hash Algorithms (SHAs)
defined in the US NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which is specified defined in the US NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which is specified
by NIST FIPS 180-3. [FIPS-180-3] includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, by NIST FIPS 180-3. [FIPS-180-3] includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512. The Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) SHA-384, and SHA-512. The Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
authentication mode defined in NIST FIPS 198-1 [FIPS-198-1] is used. authentication mode defined in NIST FIPS 198-1 [FIPS-198-1] is used.
It is believed that HMAC as defined in [RFC2104] is mathematically
identical to [FIPS-198-1]; it is also believed that algorithms in
[RFC6234] are mathematically identical to [FIPS-198-1].
1.1. Requirements 1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
1.2. Summary of Changes from RFC 6506 1.2. Summary of Changes from RFC 6506
This document includes the following changes from RFC 6506 [RFC6506]: This document includes the following changes from RFC 6506 [RFC6506]:
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ESP-NULL Packets", RFC 5879, May 2010. ESP-NULL Packets", RFC 5879, May 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010. RFC 5996, September 2010.
[RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues [RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues
with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing
Protocols", RFC 6039, October 2010. Protocols", RFC 6039, October 2010.
[RFC6234] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
First and foremost, thanks to the US National Institute of Standards First and foremost, thanks to the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology for their work on the SHA [FIPS-180-3] and HMAC and Technology for their work on the SHA [FIPS-180-3] and HMAC
[FIPS-198-1]. [FIPS-198-1].
Thanks also need to go to the authors of the HMAC-SHA authentication Thanks also need to go to the authors of the HMAC-SHA authentication
RFCs including [RFC4822], [RFC5310], and [RFC5709]. The basic HMAC- RFCs including [RFC4822], [RFC5310], and [RFC5709]. The basic HMAC-
SHA procedures were originally described by Ran Atkinson and Tony Li SHA procedures were originally described by Ran Atkinson and Tony Li
in [RFC4822]. in [RFC4822].
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