draft-ietf-pana-pana-08.txt   draft-ietf-pana-pana-09.txt 
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: November 11, 2005 Y. Ohba (Ed.) Expires: January 12, 2006 Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
May 10, 2005 July 11, 2005
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-08 draft-ietf-pana-pana-09
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. PANA can carry any between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification
authentication method that can be specified as an EAP method, and it covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall
can be used on any link that can carry IP. PANA protocol secure network access framework, which additionally includes other
specification covers the client-to-network access authentication part protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as
of an overall secure network access framework, which additionally a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
includes other protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning,
access control as a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1 Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2 Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3 Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4 Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.4 Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5 Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.5 Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.6 Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.6 Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.7 Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22 4.8 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 23 4.8.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21
4.7.3 AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.8.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22
5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . 25 4.8.3 AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.1 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.1 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.3 PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.4 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5 Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.5 Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.6 Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.6 PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.7 Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.8 Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.8 PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.9 Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.9 Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.10 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5.10 Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. PANA Headers and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 5.11 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 6.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs . . . . . . . 42 6.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1 PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . 49 7.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.3 AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.1 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.1 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.3 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.3 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.4 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.4 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.5 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.5 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.6 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.6 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.7 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.7 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.8 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.8 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.9 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.9 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.10 Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.10 Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . 53
7.3.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . 55 8.12 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3.12 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.15 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3.15 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.15.1 Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.3.16 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 8.15.2 Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.3.17 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 8.16 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.3.18 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 8.17 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 8.18 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 63 9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 60
9.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.5 AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.5 AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 67 10.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . 64
9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 10.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 10.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.1 General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.2 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 11.1 General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.3 EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 11.2 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 71 11.3 EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.5 Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 11.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.6 Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 11.5 Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 11.6 Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10.8 Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 11.8 Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.10 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 11.9 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 11.10 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
12.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
12.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 79 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 82 A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 76
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 78
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network. client and the access network.
Currently there is no standard network-layer solution for Currently there is no standard network-layer solution for
authenticating clients for network access. Appendix A of [I-D.ietf- authenticating clients for network access. Appendix A of [RFC4058]
pana-requirements] describes the problem statement that led to the describes the problem statement that led to the development of PANA.
development of PANA.
Scope of this work is identified as designing a link-layer agnostic Scope of this work is identified as designing a link-layer agnostic
transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication
methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various
authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP
above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748]. lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-pana-requirements]. Potential security Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network-
threats for network-layer access authentication protocol are layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016].
discussed in [RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] on
requirements [I-D.ietf-pana-requirements] on the PANA protocol. Note the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed
that some of these requirements are imposed by the chosen payload, by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
EAP [RFC3748].
There are components that are part of a complete secure network There are components that are part of a complete secure network
solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including IP address configuration, authentication method choice, including IP address configuration, authentication method choice,
filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP
protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are
recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana- recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana-
framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document. framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document.
1.1 Specification of Requirements 1.1 Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
skipping to change at page 6, line 38 skipping to change at page 6, line 38
A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client
(PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a (PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a
result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message
delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values, delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values,
session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message. session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message.
A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A
session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces. Only session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces. Only
one device identifier of the PaC is allowed to be bound to a PANA one device identifier of the PaC is allowed to be bound to a PANA
session for simplicity. session for simplicity.
Session Lifetime:
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an
established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the
lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The
session lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires.
Session Identifier: Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it
cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA
messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This
bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the
handshake and freed when the session terminates. handshake and freed when the session terminates.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA): PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
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authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this
phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back- phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back-
to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP. to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP.
o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization
the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP
data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase, data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase,
the PaC and PAA may optionally ping each other to test liveness of the PaC and PAA may optionally ping each other to test liveness of
the PANA session on each end. the PANA session on each end.
o Re-authentication phase: Following the access phase, the PAA must o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must
initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime
expires. Again EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This
This phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA
without any respect to the session lifetime. The session moves to without any respect to the session lifetime. The session moves to
this phase from the access phase, and returns back there upon this phase from the access phase, and returns back there upon
successful re-authentication. successful re-authentication.
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would do the job. liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
PaC PAA Message PaC PAA Message
----------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase // Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover -----> PANA-PAA-Discover
<----- PANA-Start-Request <----- PANA-Start-Request
-----> PANA-Start-Answer -----> PANA-Start-Answer
// Authentication and authorization phase // Authentication and authorization phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */ <----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */
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integrity protection and authentication. integrity protection and authentication.
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response. incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
4. Protocol Details 4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session. session.
4.1 Payload Encoding 4.1 Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover
are always unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast
when the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA.
4.2 Payload Encoding
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these (Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document. the document.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
and used for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource and used for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource
consumption DoS attacks. consumption DoS attacks.
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o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication. used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in
cryptographic key computations. cryptographic key computations.
o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message. o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase 4.3 Discovery and Handshake Phase
When a PaC attaches to a network, and it does not already know the IP When a PaC attaches to a network, and it does not already know the IP
address of the PAA, it MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such address of the PAA, it MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such
as a multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery. as a multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery.
The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where the The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where the
PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known
administratively scoped multicast address (TBD) and UDP port (TBD). administratively scoped multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA)
and UDP port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such
that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s). In that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s). In
case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the administratively case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the administratively
scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded by the routers. scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded by the routers.
Details of scope configuration are discussed in [RFC2365]. Details of scope configuration are discussed in [RFC2365].
The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a
unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC. unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC.
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Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP-based) Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP-based)
but they are outside the scope of this specification. but they are outside the scope of this specification.
If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast
PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange. PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange.
When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase. authentication and authorization phase.
There can be multiple PAAs on the link and the PaC may receive There can be multiple PAAs in the access network and the PaC may
multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The receive multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The
authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA
is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that
sent the first response. sent the first PANA-Start-Request message.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a
random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to
as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA
can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the
same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that, same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that,
the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require
any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the
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information on the EAP state machine and the allocation of state information on the EAP state machine and the allocation of state
information in the respective protocol steps. information in the respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration
(PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to
indicate required and available capabilities for the network access. indicate required and available capabilities for the network access.
These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match
even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are
provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are
certain security risks involved in using the provided information. certain security risks involved in using the provided information.
See Section 10 for further discussion on this. See Section 11 for further discussion on this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start- If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-
Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA- Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA-
Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the
authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre- authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre-
configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover
message is unicast. message is unicast.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the PANA-Start-Request and PANA- A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-
Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a fresh Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase
PANA_MAC_KEY (see Section 5.3) which is a transient session key in when stateless PAA discovery is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and
the EAP key hierarchy [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and is used only in the PANA-Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise.
PANA protocol. A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the PANA-Start-
Request and PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to
establish a PANA SA.
A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead, retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead,
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it
receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start- receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start-
Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The
PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by
the presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request message MUST be the presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request message MUST be
retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer message when stateless retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer message when stateless
PAA discovery is not used. PAA discovery is not used.
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message), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message. message), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3 phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery. traffic-driven PAA discovery.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie] <----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie] -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when
PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC
PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger) ---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism ------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie] <------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie] ------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery traffic-driven PAA discovery
4.3 Authentication and Authorization Phase 4.4 Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA- Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-
Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the
requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include
the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it
takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g., takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g.,
intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth- intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth-
Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid
unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another
optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/ optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/
Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in
Section 4.2. Section 4.3.
When stateless PAA discovery was performed in the discovery and
handshake phase, a Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-
Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages.
PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one
with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional
feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When
performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is
signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the
next. See Section 4.7 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and next. See Section 4.8 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and
ISP authentication. ISP authentication.
The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the final message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the final
EAP authentication result (whether it is the second EAP EAP authentication result (whether it is the second EAP
authentication result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the authentication result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the
sole EAP authentication result) and the result of PANA sole EAP authentication result) and the result of PANA
authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged
with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example
sequence in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate sequence in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate
authentication). authentication).
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from the discovery and handshake phase) (continued from the discovery and handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, Nonce, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id] [Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id] [Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
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phase phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message) and any subsequent message MUST contain a MAC AVP. message) and any subsequent message MUST contain a MAC AVP.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s)to the also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s)to the
PANA SA. To achieve this, the PANA-Bind-Request message MUST contain PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
the device identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP if a Protection- in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device
Capability AVP is included in the message. Otherwise, the message identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a
SHOULD contain the device identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request
when a link-layer or IP address is used as the device identifier of message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a
the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST contain the PaC's device Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as
identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is already presented with that the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST
of EP(s) in the request with using the same type of device identifier contain the PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is
as contained in the request. If the PANA-Bind-Answer message sent already presented with that of EP(s) in the request with using the
from the PaC does not contain a Device-Id AVP with the same device same type of device identifier as contained in the request. If the
identifier type contained in the request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error- PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a
Request message with a PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the
PANA-Error-Answer message to terminate the session. The PANA-Bind- request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a
Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST also contain a PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer
Protection-Capability AVP if link-layer or network-layer ciphering is message to terminate the session. The PANA-Bind-Request message with
enabled after the authentication and authorization phase. The PANA- a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST also contain a Protection-Capability
Bind-Request message MAY also contain a Protection-Capability AVP to AVP if link-layer or network-layer ciphering is enabled after the
indicate if link-layer or network-layer ciphering should be enabled authentication and authorization phase. The PANA-Bind-Request
after the authentication and authorization phase. No link-layer or message MAY also contain a Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if
network-layer specific information is included in the Protection- link-layer or network-layer ciphering should be enabled after the
Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware of the security authentication and authorization phase. No link-layer or network-
layer specific information is included in the Protection-Capability
AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware of the security
capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol does not capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol does not
specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP will be specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP will be
used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic. used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic. When the PaC
does not support the protection capability indicated in the
Protection-Capability AVP, the PaC MUST send a PANA-Error-Request
message with a PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED result code and
terminate the PANA session.
Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS
result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC)
AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP
address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In
this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer
message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a
match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods
available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a
PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session. result code and terminate the PANA session.
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be retransmitted
based on the retransmission rule described in Section 5.2.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When sending an EAP Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When
this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the
PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not
change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or
lower-layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a lower-layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a
timeout on the PaC. timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
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rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA- rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA-
Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a
AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA with a MAC AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA
session MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message session MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message
exchange. exchange.
4.4 Access Phase 4.5 Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re- Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re-
authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to
the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the
availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return
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Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.5 Re-authentication Phase 4.6 Re-authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA- When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA-
Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the
PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC
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enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re- enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re-
authentication before the current session lifetime expires. authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers. existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA- For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA-
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by
adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication
MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during
the discovery and handshake phase. An example sequence for re- the discovery and handshake phase. The value of the S-flag of the
authentication phase initiated by the PaC is shown in Figure 7. PANA messages exchanged in the re-authentication phase MUST be
inherited from the previous authentication and authorization phase or
re-authentication phase.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q) -----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q) <----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, Key-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success},
Device-Id, Key-Id,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC by PaC
4.6 Termination Phase 4.7 Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures. indication and session revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
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message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately. the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and
ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network
access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the
ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional
authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the
NAP. NAP.
Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the
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of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try
another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
authentication when an EAP authentication method fails. authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication
and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent. and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent.
Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a
network access authorization decision based on the success or failure network access authorization decision based on the success or failure
of each authentication is a network policy issue. of each authentication is a network policy issue.
4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.2 Section 4.3
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana- availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana-
framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA- framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA-
Start-Request message. Start-Request message.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is
not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message sent back to the PAA. message sent back to the PAA.
If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one
authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.2. described in Section 4.3.
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request
message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the
PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC
cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication
or ISP authentication.) or ISP authentication.)
4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.3 in Section 4.4
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set. be set.
o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End- o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request (PFER) message as well as a PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) Request (PFER) message as well as a PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message MUST be used at message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message MUST be used at
the end of the first EAP authentication and the PANA-Bind-Request the end of the first EAP authentication and the PANA-Bind-Request
MUST be used for the second EAP authentication. The PANA- MUST be used for the second EAP authentication. The PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be acknowledged with a PANA- FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-
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the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA- EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the
PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second
EAP authentication MUST be performed. EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header. currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set. NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower- phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key). separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key).
4.7.3 AAA-Key Calculation 4.8.3 AAA-Key Calculation
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower- phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this
case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA- case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well
as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP
authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA- authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA-
Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
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MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to
derive the AAA-Key. derive the AAA-Key.
5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules 5. Processing Rules
5.1 Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is TBD. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover are always
unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast when the PaC
knows the IP address of the PAA.
5.1.1 Fragmentation 5.1 Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission 5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages. of messages.
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When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time. outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The initial discovery and handshake phase requires special handling.
The PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message if a subsequent
PANA-Start-Request message is not received in time. Even though a
PANA-Start-Request message is received, the PANA-PAA-Discover message
may still have to be retransmitted. This is because stateless PAA
discovery requires one time transmission of a solicited PANA-Start-
Request message. The PAA MUST NOT start a timer and retransmit the
request in order to avoid state creation. If the received PANA-
Start-Request message included a Cookie AVP (an indication of
stateless PAA discovery), the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-
Discover message until the first PANA-Auth-Request message is
received. Otherwise, the PaC can rely on the PAA to retransmit the
PANA-Start-Request message as soon as the PaC receives the first one
(i.e., the PaC can stop sending the PANA-PAA-Discover message).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 8 for default [RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default
timer and maximum retransmission count parameters. timer and maximum retransmission count parameters.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. The last The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. The last
transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer. retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
skipping to change at page 27, line 14 skipping to change at page 25, line 40
message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same
AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA- AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-
Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry a MAC AVP whose value is messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry a MAC AVP whose value is
computed by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key computed by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key
(or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from
two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a
particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple
method is to use monotonically increasing numbers. method is to use monotonically increasing numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the lifetime granted by the The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime
authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime). The lifetime granted by the authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime).
of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_MAC_KEY) is the same as the lifetime The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_MAC_KEY) is the same as
of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when the the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted
corresponding PANA session is deleted. when the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id * Session-Id
* Device-Id of PaC * Device-Id of PaC
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+ AAA-Key + AAA-Key
+ AAA-Key Identifier + AAA-Key Identifier
+ PANA_MAC_KEY + PANA_MAC_KEY
The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is
used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA- used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA-
Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one
failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see
Section 4.7), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single Section 4.8), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single
key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
following way ('|' indicates concatenation): following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2 AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way: The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of
HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID) HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in
use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of the AAA-Key MUST be N use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of the AAA-Key MUST be N
bits or longer. See Section Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of bits or longer. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the
the PANA_MAC_KEY. PANA_MAC_KEY.
5.4 Message Authentication Code 5.4 Message Authentication Code
A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP
for cryptographically protecting the message. for cryptographically protecting the message.
When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the
MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way: MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way:
MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU) MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU)
skipping to change at page 31, line 24 skipping to change at page 29, line 9
o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device
identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed
by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check
performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the
device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA
and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA
to the PaC. to the PaC.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.10 for details. be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details.
5.6 Device ID Choice 5.6 PaC-EP-Master-Key
As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering
mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in
the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization
phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the AAA-Key
for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for
bootstrapping link-layer or IPsec ciphering betweeen the PaC and EP.
The PaC-EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows.
PaC-EP-Master-Key = HMAC-SHA-1 (AAA-Key, "PaC-EP master key" |
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id)
EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the
corresponding EP.
5.7 Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that is not carried in data address, a MAC address, or an identifier that is not carried in data
packets but has local significance in identifying a connected device packets but has local significance in identifying a connected device
(e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of identifiers (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of identifiers
are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not
available and lower-layers are already physically or available and lower-layers are already physically or
cryptographically secured. cryptographically secured.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
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In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when
they are available. they are available.
If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not
available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id) available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id)
MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not
exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers
to provide them along with received PANA messages. to provide them along with received PANA messages.
5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address 5.8 PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example, A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA
address (POPA). In order to establish reachability, the PAA needs to address (POPA). In order to establish reachability, the PAA needs to
be notified about the change of PaC address. be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a PANA-Update- After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a PANA-Update-
Request message to the PAA. The PAA MUST update the PANA session Request message to the PAA. The PAA MUST update the PANA session
with the new PaC address (source IP address) and return a PANA- with the new PaC address (source IP address) and return a PANA-
Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both
PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP. with a MAC AVP.
5.8 Session Lifetime 5.9 Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The
Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind- Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind-
Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the
PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages. messages.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
any actions when the lifetime expires, other than optionally purging any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local
local state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase
phase before the current session lifetime expires. before the current session lifetime expires.
The PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to The PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to
expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and
reliability of such indications depend on the specific access reliability of such indications depend on the specific access
technologies. A PANA peer can use the PANA-Ping exchange to verify technologies. A PANA peer can use the PANA-Ping exchange to verify
the disconnection before taking an action. the disconnection before taking an action.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
require coordination between the peers. require coordination between the peers.
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller
authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA
Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication
will be performed in the re-authentication phase. will be performed in the re-authentication phase.
5.9 Network Selection 5.10 Network Selection
The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn
identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the
NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the
selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is
assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are
served by the NAP. served by the NAP.
A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
skipping to change at page 34, line 5 skipping to change at page 31, line 50
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA. outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [I-D.adrangi- An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [I-D.adrangi-
eap-network-discovery] which suggests advertising ISP information in- eap-network-discovery] which suggests advertising ISP information in-
band with the ongoing EAP method execution. Deployments using the band with the ongoing EAP method execution. Deployments using the
PANA's built-in ISP discovery mechanism need not use the other PANA's built-in ISP discovery mechanism need not use the other
mechanism. mechanism.
5.10 Error Handling 5.11 Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error- errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error-
Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a request Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a request
message (e.g., PANA-PAA-Discover or *-Request), then the request MAY message, then the request MAY be retransmitted immediately without
be retransmitted immediately without waiting for its retransmission waiting for its retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the
timer to go off. If the cause of the error was a response message, error was a response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request
the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request message SHOULD NOT resend the message SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the
same response until it receives the next request. next request.
Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adversaries to launch DoS Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adversaries to launch DoS
attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the
generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by
having to respond to bogus messages. Limiting the number of error having to respond to bogus messages. Limiting the number of error
notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of
time may be useful. time may be useful.
When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the
lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an
informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST
NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session
is not making any progress. is not making any progress.
6. PANA Headers and Formats 6. Header Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol. This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1 IP and UDP Headers 6.1 IP and UDP Headers
When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address
of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped
multicast address (TBD). A PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA). A PANA-PAA-Discover
in some cases as specified in Section 4.2. Any other PANA message is message MAY be unicast in some cases as specified in Section 4.3.
unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The source and destination Any other PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The
addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on the interfaces from which source and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on
the message will be sent and received, respectively. the interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
respectively.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message, from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively. respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (TBD) otherwise. exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message, from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively. respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (TBD) otherwise. exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise.
The maximum PANA message size is limited by the maximum UDP payload. The maximum PANA message size is limited by the maximum UDP payload.
6.2 PANA Header 6.2 PANA Header
A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted in network byte order. transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
skipping to change at page 36, line 28 skipping to change at page 34, line 28
This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1. This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1.
Reserved Reserved
This 8-bit field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set to This 8-bit field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Length Message Length
The Message Length field is three octets and indicates the length The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
of the PANA message including the header fields. the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned: The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S N r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |R S N r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to
authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a
PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and
PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate
NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the
authentication and authorization phase. For other cases, authentication and authorization phase. For other cases,
S-flag MUST NOT be set. S-flag MUST NOT be set.
N(AP authentication) N(AP authentication)
When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request message, it When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request, a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message, it
indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP
authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth- authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth-
Request message, it indicates that the current EAP Request, a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
authentication is for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy message, it indicates that the current EAP authentication is
the value of the flag in its requests from the last received for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy the value of the
request of the PAA. The value of the flag on an answer MUST be flag in its answer from the last received request of the PAA.
copied from the request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when The value of the flag on an answer MUST be copied from the
S-flag is not set. request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
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These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have
the following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST the following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST
be set. The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set. be set. The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set.
AVP Length AVP Length
The AVP Length field is four octets, and indicates the number of The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of
octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags, octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags,
and the AVP data. and the AVP data.
Reserved Reserved
This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set
to zero, and ignored by the receiver. to zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Vendor-Id Vendor-Id
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Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space, Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space,
guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's
vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications. vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications.
Data Data
The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields. field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
7. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs 7. PANA Messages
7.1 PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a message ID, and the Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and
sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit in the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit
the Message Flags field of the PANA header. in the Message Flags field of the PANA header.
Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's
Message-Id field, which is used to determine the action that is to be Message-Id field, which is used to determine the action that is to be
taken for a particular message. Figure 9 lists all PANA messages taken for a particular message. Figure 9 lists all PANA messages
defined in this document: defined in this document:
Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref. Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref.
----------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
PANA-PAA-Discover PDI 1 --------> 7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover PDI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2
PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.6
PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.7
PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8
PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9
PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10
PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.16
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.17
PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.18
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.19
----------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------
Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages
7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification
Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST [RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST
or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition: or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:
message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message
message-name = PANA-name message-name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional] PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional]
[ *fixed] [ *fixed]
header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Id header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Id
[r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">" [r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">"
Message-Id = 1*DIGIT Message-Id = 1*DIGIT
; The message code assigned to the message ; The message code assigned to the message
r-bit = ", REQ" r-bit = ", REQ"
; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message ; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer. ; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
skipping to change at page 44, line 40 skipping to change at page 41, line 34
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the ; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in ; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition. ; the message definition.
Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ > Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) 7.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address
of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero
(0). (0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 > PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) 7.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The
PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value. PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [, SEP] > PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [, SEP] >
{ Nonce } [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ] [ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ] * [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability] [ Protection-Capability]
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) 7.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
handshake to start PANA authentication. handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [, SEP] > PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [, SEP] >
{ Nonce } [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ] [ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) 7.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP. PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload > < EAP-Payload >
[ Nonce ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) 7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP- PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP-
Payload AVP. Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [, SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [, SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Nonce ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) 7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)
The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
to re-initiate EAP authentication. to re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ > PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) 7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)
The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC
in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message. in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 > PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) 7.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
deliver the result of PANA authentication. deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
{ PPAC } [ PPAC ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ] [ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ] [ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
* [ Device-Id ] * [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) 7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Bind-Request message. response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ] [ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) 7.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the
PAA for performing liveness test. PAA for performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ > PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) 7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA-
Ping-Request. Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 > PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) 7.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA to terminate a PANA session. or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ > PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause > < Termination-Cause >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) 7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request. or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 > PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) 7.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER)
The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the
PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message. PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ > PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Result-Code > < Result-Code >
* [ Failed-AVP ] * [ Failed-AVP ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) 7.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA-
Error-Request. Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 > PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) 7.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to
the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method
when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed. when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) 7.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to
the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [, SEP] [, NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) 7.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope
of this specification only the PaC IP address can be updated via this of this specification only the PaC IP address can be updated via this
mechanism. mechanism.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ > PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) 7.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC in The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the
response to a PANA-Update-Request. PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 > PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.3 AVPs in PANA 8. AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other
documents such as [RFC3588]. documents such as [RFC3588].
The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present. specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.
The table uses the following symbols: The table uses the following symbols:
skipping to change at page 51, line 13 skipping to change at page 49, line 10
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. 1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message. message.
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA| Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|
--------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
MAC | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| MAC | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2) Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+---------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA| Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA|
--------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 |
MAC |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1| MAC |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1| Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2) Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
7.3.1 Cookie AVP 8.1 Cookie AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for carrying a random value The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. The generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. The
random value is referred to as a cookie and used for making PAA random value is referred to as a cookie and used for making PAA
discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. The discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. The
exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate a cookie does exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate a cookie does
not affect interoperability and not specified in this document. An not affect interoperability and not specified in this document. An
example cookie generation algorithm is shown in Section 4.2. example cookie generation algorithm is shown in Section 4.3.
7.3.2 Device-Id AVP 8.2 Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in [RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit [RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link- specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link-
layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that
are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this
AVP. AVP.
7.3.3 EAP-Payload AVP 8.3 EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString. authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
7.3.4 Failed-AVP AVP 8.4 Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588]. Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].
In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole
grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the
Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP. Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP.
7.3.5 ISP-Information AVP 8.5 ISP-Information AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 5) contains zero or one Provider- The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 5) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 5 > ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 5 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name } { Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.3.6 Key-Id AVP 8.6 Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Integer32, and contains an The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session. MUST be unique within the PANA session.
7.3.7 MAC AVP 8.7 MAC AVP
The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity
protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 7) protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 7)
data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload
contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm
name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies
depending on the used algorithm. depending on the used algorithm.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
skipping to change at page 54, line 15 skipping to change at page 52, line 19
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Algorithm Algorithm
1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes) 1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes)
MAC MAC
The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order. The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order.
7.3.8 NAP-Information AVP 8.8 NAP-Information AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 8) contains zero or one Provider- The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 8) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 8 > NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 8 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name } { Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.3.9 Nonce AVP 8.9 Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 9) carries a randomly chosen value that is The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 9) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type used in cryptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type
OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque
format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive. format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive.
7.3.10 Notification AVP 8.10 Notification AVP
The Notification AVP (AVP Code 10) is optionally used to convey a The Notification AVP (AVP Code 10) is optionally used to convey a
displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be
included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case
a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message
to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a
Notification AVP SHOULD be generated. Notification AVP SHOULD be generated.
Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state. Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state.
AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains UTF-8 encoded ISO AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains UTF-8 encoded ISO
10646 characters [RFC2279]. The length of the displayable message is 10646 characters [RFC2279]. The length of the displayable message is
determined by the AVP Length field. The message MUST NOT be null determined by the AVP Length field. The message MUST NOT be null
terminated. terminated.
7.3.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP 8.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 11) is used for conveying the available types The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 11) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. At least one or more of the mechanisms is represented by a flag. The AVP data is of type
flags MUST be set when sent by the PAA, and exactly one flag MUST be Unsigned32.
set when sent by the PaC. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows: The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|D|A|T|I| Reserved | |N|F|S|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags PPAC Flags
N (No configuration) N (No configuration)
The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent
by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA. by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
D (DHCP) F (DHCPv4)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use DHCP The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
[RFC2131] [RFC3315] to configure a new IP address after PANA. DHCPv4 [RFC2131] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
S (DHCPv6)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration) A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IP address after PANA. [RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
T (DHCP with IPsec tunnel mode) T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IP address The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address
after PANA. after PANA.
I (IKEv2) I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to configure a new The PaC can/will use [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to configure (a)
IP address after PANA. new IPv4 and/or IPv6 address(es) after PANA.
Reserved Reserved
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST configure a new IP address The PAA MUST set either the N-flag, or one or more of the other
using one of the methods indicated by the other flags. Refer to flags. If the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST only set its N-flag in its
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed discussion on when these response. If the N-flag is not set by the PAA, that means the PaC
methods can be used. MUST configure POPA(s) using the method(s) indicated by the flags.
If IPsec-based access control is not used, the F-flag, S-flag or
A-flag MUST be set by the PAA, and the PaC MUST echo the same flag(s)
in its response. Refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed
discussion on when these methods can be used.
7.3.12 Protection-Capability AVP 8.12 Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 12) indicates the The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 12) indicates the
cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
valid data values and associated protection capabilities: valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION 0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION 1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
7.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP 8.13 Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order. Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
7.3.14 Provider-Name AVP 8.14 Provider-Name AVP
The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type UTF8String, and The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider. contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
7.3.15 Result-Code AVP 8.15 Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA. [RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.
7.3.15.1 Authentication Results Codes 8.15.1 Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
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Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed. assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003 PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded. PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
7.3.15.2 Protocol Error Result Codes 8.15.2 Protocol Error Result Codes
These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA. otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001 PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001
Message type not recognized or supported. Message type not recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002 PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002
The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the
authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code. authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008 PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008
A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either
set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent
with the message type definition. with the message type definition.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009 PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009
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message length. message length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016 PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016
This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but
does not support the protection capability specified in the does not support the protection capability specified in the
Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code. Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017 PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
This error is returned when there is no match between the list of This error is returned when there is no match between the list of
PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC. PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC.
Only the PaC can generate this code. Only the PaC can generate this code.
7.3.16 Session-Id AVP 8.16 Session-Id AVP
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 16) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 16) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP SHOULD appear immediately following the present, the Session-Id AVP SHOULD appear immediately following the
PANA header. PANA header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other to identify a PANA session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588]. the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
7.3.17 Session-Lifetime AVP 8.17 Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 17) contains the number of seconds The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 17) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32. data is of type Unsigned32.
7.3.18 Termination-Cause AVP 8.18 Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18) is used for indicating the The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA. used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA) LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC) ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
administrative reasons. administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC) SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated. The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
8. Retransmission Timers 9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover
message and all request messages, with the exception that the PANA- message and all request messages, with the exception that the PANA-
Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start- Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-
Request message in stateless PAA discovery. Request message in stateless PAA discovery.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender message exchange terminates when either the request sender
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once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the
message. message.
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are
retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The
table shows default values. table shows default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout. PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout.
PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value. PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value.
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REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts. REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts.
REQ_MRD 0 Configurable. REQ_MRD 0 Configurable.
So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using
REQ_IRT as the IRT: REQ_IRT as the IRT:
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
9. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the PANA Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the PANA
protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following policies protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following policies
are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use", are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use",
"First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required",
"IETF Consensus", "Standards Action". "IETF Consensus", "Standards Action".
This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for
assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document. assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document.
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Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if
it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director) it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director)
for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public
specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated
Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable. request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
9.1 PANA UDP Port Number 10.1 PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 5.1, Section 4.2 PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3
and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA. and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
9.2 PANA Multicast Address 10.2 PANA Multicast Address
PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast
address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast
address (Section 4.2 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by address (Section 4.3 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by
the IANA. the IANA.
9.3 PANA Header 10.3 PANA Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field. requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.
9.3.1 Message Type 10.3.1 Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF 0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See
Section 7.2.1 through Section 7.2.19 for the assignment of the Section 7.1 through Section 7.19 for the assignment of the namespace
namespace in this specification. in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
9.3.2 Flags 10.3.2 Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2 document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2
('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via ('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via
a Standards Action [IANA]. a Standards Action [IANA].
9.4 AVP Header 10.4 AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new
namespaces. namespaces.
9.4.1 AVP Code 10.4.1 AVP Code
The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor- Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor-
specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a
Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA. possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-18. AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-18.
See Section 7.3.1 through Section 7.3.18 for the assignment of the See Section 8.1 through Section 8.18 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification. namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification
Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time
for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead. be encouraged instead.
9.4.2 Flags 10.4.2 Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and
bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via
a Standards Action . a Standards Action .
9.5 AVP Values 10.5 AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP 10.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP
As defined in Section 7.3.7, the Algorithm field of MAC AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 8.7, the Algorithm field of MAC AVP (AVP Code
7) defines the value of 1 (one) for HMAC-SHA1. 7) defines the value of 1 (one) for HMAC-SHA1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
9.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values 10.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.11, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP As defined in Section 8.11, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
(AVP Code 11) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('D': (AVP Code 11) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F':
DHCP), 2 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 3 ('T': DHCP with IPsec DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4
tunnel mode) and 4 ('I': IKEv2). ('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
9.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values 10.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.12, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 8.12, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
12) defines the values 0 and 1. 12) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values 10.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.15.1 and Section 7.3.15.2 the Result-Code As defined in Section 8.15.1 and Section 8.15.2 the Result-Code AVP
AVP (AVP Code 15) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, (AVP Code 15) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001,
4001, 5001-5009 and 5011-5017. 5001-5009 and 5011-5017.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
9.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values 10.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.18, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18) As defined in Section 8.18, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
10. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security
threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined
in [RFC4016]. Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP in [RFC4016]. Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP
and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748]. This section provides a and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].
discussion on the security-related issues that are related to PANA This section provides a discussion on the security-related issues
framework and protocol design. that are related to PANA framework and protocol design.
An important element in assessing security of PANA design and An important element in assessing security of PANA design and
deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer (physical and deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer (physical and
link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers
are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing
of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL
networks and 3GPP2 networks with crytographically-secured cdma2000 networks and 3GPP2 networks with cryptographically-secured cdma2000
link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled
even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the
absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be
created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer
cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec). cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
10.1 General Security Measures 11.1 General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session. PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified
against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence
number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In
addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and
duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary
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Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a
successful authentication is generated. Starting with these successful authentication is generated. Starting with these
messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn
down can be cryptographically protected. down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication. there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is
bounded by the lifetime granted by the authentication server. An bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication
implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value. Unless the server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value.
PANA session is extended by executing another EAP authentication, the Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP
PANA SA is removed when the current session expires. authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured, EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary. cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
10.2 Discovery 11.2 Discovery
The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks
as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In
order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary
should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery
messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie- messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie-
based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA) based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA)
to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. A return- to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it
routability test does not provide additional protection as PANA is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the discovery and
traffic is not routed but simply forwarded on-link. It is difficult handshake phase entirely.
to prevent this threat entirely.
In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA, In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,
the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection- the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection-
Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start- Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start-
Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of
service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery
and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED. and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED.
The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind- The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind-
Request upon successful authentication. Request upon successful authentication.
10.3 EAP Methods 11.3 EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent. problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the
deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports
user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks
and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method. EAP method.
10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 11.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same
PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP, PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP,
and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant
authorization, which is a combination of the individual authorization, which is a combination of the individual
authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside
the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security, the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security,
both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to
generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically
binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks. attacks.
10.5 Cryptographic Keys 11.5 Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_MAC_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_MAC_KEY PANA SA with PANA_MAC_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_MAC_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key. computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key.
The PANA_MAC_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity The PANA_MAC_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session. protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP
authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is
the combination of both keys. the combination of both keys.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA
SA, PANA_MAC_KEY and key ID. SA, PANA_MAC_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a separate enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP-
PaC-EP master key is generated based on the AAA-Key, session Master-Key is generated for each EP from the AAA-Key, session
identifier, key identifier, and EP device identifier. identifier, key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC-
EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures
cryptographic independency among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys.
The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and
transient keys. transient keys.
10.6 Per-packet Ciphering 11.6 Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per- generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per-
packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based
ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not
readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure
association protocol [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] may be needed to produce association protocol [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] may be needed to produce
the required keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish the required keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish
a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for
a client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic a client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
protected, and optionally encrypted. protected, and optionally encrypted.
10.7 PAA-to-EP Communication 11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3 The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP. EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
skipping to change at page 72, line 50 skipping to change at page 70, line 4
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP. EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into
computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of
another EP or the PAA. another EP or the PAA.
10.8 Liveness Test 11.8 Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive. alive.
skipping to change at page 73, line 32 skipping to change at page 70, line 35
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality. this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness. request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive. recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address 11.9 Updating PaC's IP Address
There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by
the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by
spoofing a victim's IP address. spoofing a victim's IP address.
10.10 Early Termination of a Session 11.10 Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
11. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo
and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments
to this document. to this document.
12. References 13. References
12.1 Normative References 13.1 Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997. RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
skipping to change at page 75, line 45 skipping to change at page 72, line 45
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003. IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06 (work in
progress), April 2005.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
12.2 Informative References 13.2 Informative References
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management [RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999. Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication [RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005. Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements] [RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
Yegin, A. and Y. Ohba, "Protocol for Carrying "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Requirements", (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
draft-ietf-pana-requirements-09 (work in progress),
August 2004. [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06 (work in
progress), April 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA enabling IPsec based Access Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-05 (work in progress), Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-06 (work in progress),
December 2004. May 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework", Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-pana-framework-04 (work in progress), May 2005.
December 2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface", Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
draft-ietf-pana-snmp-03 (work in progress), February 2005. draft-ietf-pana-snmp-04 (work in progress), July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine] [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]
Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", (EAP) Peer and Authenticator",
draft-ietf-eap-statemachine-06 (work in progress), draft-ietf-eap-statemachine-06 (work in progress),
December 2004. December 2004.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2]
Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
skipping to change at page 77, line 5 skipping to change at page 73, line 51
October 2004. October 2004.
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information] [I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]
Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-01 Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-01
(work in progress), February 2005. (work in progress), February 2005.
[I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery] [I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery]
Adrangi, F., "Identity selection hints for Extensible Adrangi, F., "Identity selection hints for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-adrangi-eap-network-discovery-12 (work in progress), draft-adrangi-eap-network-discovery-13 (work in progress),
April 2005. May 2005.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
skipping to change at page 80, line 9 skipping to change at page 77, line 9
o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and
replay protected with MAC AVPs. replay protected with MAC AVPs.
o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not
shown. shown.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
----------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase // Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set <----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set.
[Nonce, Cookie, [Cookie,
ISP-Information("ISP1"), ISP-Information("ISP1"),
ISP-Information("ISP2"), ISP-Information("ISP2"),
NAP-Information("MyNAP")] NAP-Information("MyNAP")]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set.
[Nonce, Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1" [Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1".
ISP-Information("ISP1")] ISP-Information("ISP1")]
// Authentication and authorization phase // Authentication and authorization phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication.
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] // S- and N-flags set [Session-Id, Nonce, // (S,N)-flags set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // S- and N-flags set EAP{Request}] // for all messages during
[Session-Id] // No piggybacking // NAP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) // S- and N-flags set -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Session-Id, Nonce]
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id] // S- and N-flags set <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) // S- and N-flags set <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // S- and N-flags set <----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] // Piggybacking
<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3) // S- and N-flags set -----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Key-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, Key-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication.
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] // S-flag set [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] // Only S-flag set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4) // S-flag set // for all messages during
[Session-Id, MAC] // No piggybacking // ISP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1) // S-flag set -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4)[Session-Id, MAC]
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1) // S-flag set <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1)[Session-Id, MAC]
[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5) // S-flag set -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6)
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] // Piggybacking
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6) // S-flag set -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6)[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
PPAC, MAC] PPAC, MAC]
Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication Authentication
Intellectual Property Statement Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
 End of changes. 

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