draft-ietf-pana-pana-11.txt   draft-ietf-pana-pana-12.txt 
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: September 4, 2006 Y. Ohba (Ed.) Expires: February 23, 2007 Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
March 3, 2006 August 22, 2006
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-11 draft-ietf-pana-pana-12
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification
covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall
secure network access framework, which additionally includes other secure network access framework, which additionally includes other
protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as
a result of initial authentication, and accounting. a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21 5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.7. Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.9. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.10. Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.7. Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.9. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.10. Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.3. Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.4. Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.5. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.6. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.7. ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.8. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.3. Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.9. NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.4. Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.10. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.5. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.11. Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.6. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . . 48
8.7. ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.13. Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.8. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.9. NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.15. Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.10. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.16. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.11. Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . 53 8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.13. Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.17. Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.15. Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.19. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.16. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 56
8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.17. Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.19. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.2.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.2.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . 61 10.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.3.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.2. PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . 60
10.3.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.4.3. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.4. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.4.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.4.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.4.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.5. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.2. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 65 11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.4. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.5. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 11.7. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 11.8. Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.9. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 69 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.5. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.6. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Appendix A. IP Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.8. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.10. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 80
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network. client and the access network.
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Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network- Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network-
layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016]. layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016].
These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] on These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] on
the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed
by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748]. by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
There are components that are part of a complete secure network There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including IP address configuration, authentication method choice, including IP address configuration, authentication method choice,
filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP filter rule installation, data traffic protection, PAA-EP protocol
protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see and PAA discovery. These components except for IP address
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are configuration are described in separate documents (see [I-D.ietf-
recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana- pana-framework], [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] and [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]).
framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document. See Appendix A for the IP address configuration component. The
readers are recommended to go through the PANA Framework document
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading this protocol
specification document.
1.1. Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
skipping to change at page 7, line 36 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
access devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally) access devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally)
cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for
generating filters on the EP. The EP and PAA may be co-located. generating filters on the EP. The EP and PAA may be co-located.
Network Access Provider (NAP): Network Access Provider (NAP):
A service provider that provides physical and link-layer A service provider that provides physical and link-layer
connectivity to an access network it manages. connectivity to an access network it manages.
AAA-Key: MSK:
A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to
the authenticator [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]. the authenticator [RFC3748].
For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework
document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]. document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework].
3. Protocol Overview 3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service. access service.
skipping to change at page 8, line 23 skipping to change at page 9, line 23
zero or more AVPs within the payload. The main payload of PANA is zero or more AVPs within the payload. The main payload of PANA is
EAP which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA EAP which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA
establish an EAP session. establish an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages. mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases: session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a o Handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a new PANA
new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either session. The handshake phase can be triggered by both the PaC and
explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving the PAA.
unsolicited advertisements. The PaC's answer sent in response to
an advertisement starts a new session.
o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the
discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA and PaC. The
and PaC. The EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is what is used for
what is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of authentication. The PAA conveys the result of authentication and
authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this authorization to the PaC at the end of this phase.
phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back-
to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP.
o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization
the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP
data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase, data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase,
the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA ping messages to test the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA ping messages to test
liveness of the PANA session on the peer. liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must
initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime
expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This
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o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end. liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
PaC PAA Message PaC PAA Message
----------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase // Handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover -----> PANA-Client-Initiation
<----- PANA-Start-Request <----- PANA-Start-Request
-----> PANA-Start-Answer -----> PANA-Start-Answer
// Authentication and authorization phase // Authentication and authorization phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */ <----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer -----> PANA-Auth-Answer
-----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */ -----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer <----- PANA-Auth-Answer
<----- PANA-Bind-Request /* EAP Success */ <----- PANA-Bind-Request /* EAP Success */
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer -----> PANA-Bind-Answer
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-----> PANA-Ping-Answer -----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase // Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request -----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer <----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited PANA- flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited PANA-
Start-Request can be sent without a triggering PANA-PAA-Discover, EAP Start-Request message can be sent without PANA-Client-Initiation, EAP
responses can be piggybacked on the PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping responses can be piggybacked on the PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping
and PANA-Termination usage is optional). and PANA-Termination usage is optional).
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication. integrity protection and authentication.
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response. incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
4. Protocol Details 4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session. session.
4.1. Transport Layer 4.1. Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages are always unicast.
are always unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast
when the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA.
4.2. Payload Encoding 4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these (Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document (see Section 8). the document (see Section 8).
o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity
algorithm. algorithm.
o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity
protects the PANA message. protects the PANA message.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
according to [RFC4086] and used for making PAA discovery robust according to [RFC4086] and used for making the handshake phase
against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
an IP address) of the PaC or an EP. an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU. o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure. o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier. o Key-Id AVP: contains an MSK identifier.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication. mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier
of a NAP and an ISP, respectively. of a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used
in cryptographic key computations. in cryptographic key computations.
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o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution
results. results.
o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value. o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access. o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.
o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination. o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.
4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase 4.3. Handshake Phase
When the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast
PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange. In other
cases, the PaC MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such as
multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery.
Multicast-based Discovery:
The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where
the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known
administratively scoped multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA)
and UDP port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such
that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s).
In case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the
administratively scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded
by the routers. Details of scope configuration are discussed in
[RFC2365].
The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a
unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC.
Traffic-driven Discovery: The handshake phase can be initiated by either the PaC or the PAA.
Alternatively, the PaC MAY also choose to start sending data PaC-initiated Handshake:
packets before getting authenticated. The EP in an access network
that implements PANA SHOULD drop such unauthorized packets upon
receipt. Additionally, the EP MAY also take this traffic as an
indication of unauthorized PaC and notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA
notification SHOULD be sent via [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In
response, the PAA SHOULD send an unsolicited PANA-Start-Request
message to the PaC. This is called traffic-driven PAA discovery
(an alternative to the PaC explicitly soliciting for a PAA).
Deployment of this alternate scheme is optional.
Other Alternatives: When the PaC initiates the handshake phase, it sends a PANA-
Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not
configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the
handshake phase, DHCP [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] is used as the
default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the
PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discoverying the IP
address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated handshake but
they are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that
receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond with a
PANA-Start-Request message sent to the PaC.
The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in response to PAA-initiated Handshake:
receiving a link-up event notification on the EP [I-D.ietf-dna-
link-information].
Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP- When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an
based) but they are outside the scope of this specification. unsolicited PANA-Start-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA
can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this
specificaiton.
When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase. authentication and authorization phase.
There can be multiple PAAs in the access network and the PaC may
receive multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The
authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA
is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that
sent the first PANA-Start-Request message.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a
random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to
as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA PANA-Client-Initiation messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism
can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the the PAA can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can
same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that, produce the same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order
the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require to do that, the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does
any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the not require any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to
cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery verify the cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The
that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery". handshake phase that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless
The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies handshake". The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to
does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here. generate cookies does not affect interoperability and hence is not
Additionally, the PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming PANA- specified here. Additionally, the PAA MAY limit the rate it
PAA-Discover messages. processes incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA- When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA-
Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request. Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie matches the send cookie. If the match is verified, received cookie matches the send cookie. If the match is verified,
the protocol enters the authentication and authorization phase. the protocol enters the authentication and authorization phase.
Otherwise, the PAA MUST silently discard the received message. Otherwise, the PAA MUST silently discard the received message.
The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request) PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA is desired to be stateless
stateless since transmission of an EAP Request message creates a in the handshake phase since transmission of an EAP Request message
state at EAP layer. See [RFC4137] for more information on the EAP creates a state at EAP layer. See [RFC4137] for more information on
state machine and the allocation of state information in the the EAP state machine and the allocation of state information in the
respective protocol steps. respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP, an Algorithm AVP and a Post-PANA- A Protection-Capability AVP, an Algorithm AVP and a Post-PANA-
Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start- Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-
Request in order to indicate required and available capabilities for Request in order to indicate required and available capabilities for
the network access. These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the network access. These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing
the capability match even before the authentication takes place. the capability match even before the authentication takes place.
Since these AVPs are provided during the insecure discovery and Since these AVPs are provided during the insecure handshake phase,
handshake phase, there are certain security risks involved in using there are certain security risks involved in using the provided
the provided information. See Section 11 for further discussion on information. See Section 11 for further discussion on this.
this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start- If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-
Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA- Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA-
Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the
authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre-
configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover
message is unicast.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA- A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-
Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase
when stateless PAA discovery is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and when stateless handshake is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and PANA-
PANA-Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise. Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise.
A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless handshake MUST NOT be
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead, retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead,
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it
receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start- receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start-
Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The
PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless handshake by
looking at the L-flag in the PANA header. The PANA-Start-Request looking at the L-flag in the PANA header. The PANA-Start-Request
message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
message when stateful PAA discovery is used (L-flag is not set). message when stateful handshake is used (L-flag is not set).
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the handshake
and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA- procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-Start-Request
Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message while the PaC sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message. To
message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently discard the PANA-
discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it Client-Initiation message received from the PaC after it has sent a
has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., L-flag is not
L-flag is not set) for the PaC. In this case the PAA will retransmit set) for the PaC. In this case the PAA will retransmit the PANA-
the PANA-Start-Request message based on a timer, if the PaC doesn't Start-Request message based on a timer, if the PaC doesn't respond in
respond in time (the message was lost for example). If the PAA had time (the message was lost for example). If the PAA had sent a PANA-
sent a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for the Start-Request message without creating a state for the PaC (i.e.,
PaC (i.e., L-flag is set), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA- L-flag is set), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-Client-Initiation
Discover message. message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake Figure 2 shows an example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake.
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie] <----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie] -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when Figure 2: Example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake phase
PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC
PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and
authorization phase)
Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA- Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-
Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the
requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include
the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it
takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g., takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g.,
intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth- intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth-
Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid
unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another
optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/ optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/
Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in
Section 4.3. Section 4.3.
When stateless PAA discovery was performed in the discovery and When stateless handshake was performed in the handshake phase, a
handshake phase, a Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth- Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-
Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages. Auth-Answer messages.
PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one
with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional
feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When
performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is
signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the
next. See Section 4.8 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and
ISP authentication.
The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the final message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the EAP
EAP authentication result (whether it is the second EAP authentication result and the result of PANA authentication. The
authentication result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-Bind-
sole EAP authentication result) and the result of PANA Answer (PBA) message. Figure 3 shows an example sequence in the
authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged authentication and authorization phase.
with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example
sequence in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate
authentication).
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from the discovery and handshake phase) (continued from the handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)
[Session-Id, Nonce, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, Nonce, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, Nonce] [Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id] [Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Algorithm, Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH] Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 4: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization Figure 3: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message (i.e., a PANA-Bind-Request message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP
message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm AVP for the first derivation of
AVP for the first derivation of keys in the session, and any keys in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH
subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST NOT be contained in a PANA-Bind-Request
NOT be contained in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind- message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
Request message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the
PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device
identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a
Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request
message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a
Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as
the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST
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sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state
unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any
case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC. case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA- rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA-
Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If an
AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when MSK is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when the
the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the case
case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the PANA-
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected with an
with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST
message MUST also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first derivation of keys
derivation of keys in the session. The AAA-Key and the PANA session in the session. The MSK and the PANA session MUST be deleted
MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange. immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.
4.5. Access Phase 4.5. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re- Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re-
authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to
the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
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a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping- a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is
available. available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY
rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests. rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by Figure 4 and Figure 5 show liveness tests as they are initiated by
the PaC and the PAA respectively. the PaC and the PAA respectively.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test Figure 4: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test Figure 5: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.6. Re-authentication Phase 4.6. Re-authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA- When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA-
Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a
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When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Auth- When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Auth-
Request message containing the session identifier for the PaC to Request message containing the session identifier for the PaC to
enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re- enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re-
authentication before the current session lifetime expires. authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers. existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA- For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA-
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by
adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication adding a MAC AVP to each message. If a network selection (see
MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during Section 5.10 was made during the handshake phase, any subsequent EAP
the discovery and handshake phase. The value of the S-flag authentication MUST be performed with the already selected ISP and
("separate authentication" flag, see Section 4.8.1) of the PANA NAP.
messages exchanged in the re-authentication phase MUST be inherited
from the previous authentication and authorization phase or re-
authentication phase.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q) -----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)
[Session-Id, AUTH] [Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q) <----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)
[Session-Id, AUTH] [Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response
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[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success},
Device-Id, Key-Id, Algorithm, Device-Id, Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH] Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated Figure 6: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC by PaC
4.7. Termination Phase 4.7. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures. indication and session revocation procedures.
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messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately. the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC Figure 7: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and
ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network
access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the
ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional
authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the
NAP.
Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase is designed only for separate
NAP and ISP authentication. It is not for running arbitrary number
of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try
another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication
and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent.
Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a
network access authorization decision based on the success or failure
of each authentication is a network policy issue.
4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.3
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana-
framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA-
Start-Request message.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is
not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message sent back to the PAA.
If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one
authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.3.
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request
message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the
PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC
cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication
or ISP authentication.)
4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.4
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set.
o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request (PFER) message as well as a PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message MUST be used at
the end of the first EAP authentication and the PANA-Bind-Request
MUST be used for the second EAP authentication. The PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message.
o If the first EAP authentication has failed, the PAA can choose not
to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing the S-flag of
the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. In this case, the S-flag
of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message sent by the PaC MUST be
cleared. If the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message
is set when the first EAP authentication has failed, the PaC can
choose not to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing
the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the
PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second
EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key).
4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this
case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well
as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP
authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA-
Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged
in the access phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase
MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to
derive the AAA-Key.
5. Processing Rules 5. Processing Rules
5.1. Fragmentation 5.1. Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission
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The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be
used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in
a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the
sequence number contained in the original packet. sequence number contained in the original packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
PAA as they send their very first request messages. PANA-PAA- PAA as they send their very first request messages. PANA-Client-
Discover message carries sequence number 0. Initiation message carries sequence number 0.
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-PAA-Discover, expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-Client-
PANA-Start-Request messages. Initiation, PANA-Start-Request messages.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time. outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default Section 9 unless a given deployment chooses to use its own
timer and maximum retransmission count parameters. retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer
characteristics.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the
responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last
transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer. retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
5.3. PANA Security Association 5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not
not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by
produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP any EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA
sessions are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication and re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be
authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived. updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to
If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys. distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried
When a new AAA-Key is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase, in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages at the end of the
any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be updated to a new one EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id
that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order to distinguish the
new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried in PANA-
Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at the end of the EAP
authentication which resulted in deriving a new AAA-Key. The Key-Id
AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely
identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer identifies the MSK within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer
message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message) sent in response message sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message with a Key-Id
to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same MSK identifier carried in
message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same the request. PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages with a
AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA- Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by
Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the
messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of
computed by using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key the Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically
(or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from increasing numbers.
two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a
particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple
method is to use monotonically increasing numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime
granted by the authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime). granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The
The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the
the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when
when the corresponding PANA session is deleted. the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id * Session-Id
* Device-Id of PaC * Device-Id of PaC
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* Protection-Capability * Protection-Capability
* PANA SA attributes * PANA SA attributes
PANA SA attributes: PANA SA attributes:
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce) * Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce) * Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
* AAA-Key * MSK
* AAA-Key Identifier * MSK Identifier
* PANA_AUTH_KEY * PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function * Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm * Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK and it is used to
used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA- integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in
Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one the following way:
failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see
Section 4.8), the PANA_AUTH_KEY computation is based on that single
key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID) PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo- where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-
random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified in the random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified in the
Algorithm AVP in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request Algorithm AVP in a PANA-Bind-Request message. The length of
message. The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See
algorithm in use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY.
PANA_AUTH_KEY.
5.4. Message Authentication 5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
protecting the message. protecting the message.
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of
the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way: following way:
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invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met: invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, version number, sequence number, message length, message type, version number,
flags, etc. flags, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and
invalid: invalid:
* In the discovery and handshake phase: * In the handshake phase:
+ PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request. + PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request.
+ PANA-Bind-Request. + PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Reauth-Request. + PANA-Reauth-Request.
+ PANA-Error-Request. + PANA-Error-Request.
* In the authentication and authorization phase and the re- * In the authentication and authorization phase and the re-
authentication phase: authentication phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid + PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid
PANA-Auth-Request. PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first + PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first
successful PANA-Bind-Request. successful PANA-Bind-Request.
* In the access phase: * In the access phase:
+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate PANA-Bind- + PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate PANA-Bind-
Request. Request.
+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
* In the termination phase: * In the termination phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request. + All requests but PANA-Termination-Request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position, in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position. is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is decoded correctly. o Each AVP is decoded correctly.
skipping to change at page 29, line 22 skipping to change at page 26, line 6
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details. be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details.
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key 5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key
As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering
mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in
the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization
phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the AAA-Key phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the MSK for
for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for bootstrapping
bootstrapping link-layer or IPsec ciphering between the PaC and EP. link-layer or IPsec ciphering between the PaC and EP. The PaC-EP-
The PaC-EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows. Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows.
PaC-EP-Master-Key = The first 64 octets of PaC-EP-Master-Key = The first 64 octets of
prf+(AAA-Key, "PaC-EP master key" | prf+(MSK, "PaC-EP master key" |
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id) Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id)
The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random
function used for the prf+ function is specified in the Algorithm AVP function used for the prf+ function is specified in the Algorithm AVP
carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request carried in a PANA-Bind-Request message.
message.
EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the
corresponding EP. corresponding EP.
5.7. Device ID Choice 5.7. Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that may not be carried in address, a MAC address, or an identifier that may not be carried in
data packets but has local significance in identifying a connected data packets but has local significance in identifying a connected
device (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of device (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of
identifiers are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC identifiers (i.e., locally-significant identifiers) are commonly used
addresses are not available and lower-layers are already physically in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not available and
or cryptographically secured. lower-layers are already physically or cryptographically secured.
The locally-significant identifiers are used locally to associate
PANA sessions with the local interfaces and are not meant to be
exchanged with the peers.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (based on mechanisms being provided or required on the access network based on
configuration of the network administrator). For example, one configuration by the network administrator. For example, one network
network administrator might want to use IPsec for securing the administrator might want to use IPsec for securing the network access
network access while another one (for a different network) might rely while another one (for a different network) might rely on physical
on physical security. security.
When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of
access control, the PAA MUST provide IP address(es) as EP(s)' device access control, the PAA MUST provide IP addresses as device
ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in return. identifiers of EPs, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in
Similarly, IP addresses are used when the EP(s) is not on the same IP return. Similarly, IP addresses are used as the device identifiers
subnet as the PaC is. when the EPs are not on the same IP subnet as the PaC.
In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when
they are available. they are available.
If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not
available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id) available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id)
MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not MUST be used as device identifiers. Note that these identifiers are
exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers not exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-
to provide them along with received PANA messages. layers to provide them along with received PANA messages.
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address 5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example, A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in Appendix A describes a case in which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA address (PRPA - the IP address configured prior to PANA) with a post-
address (POPA). In another situation a PaC may change its IP address PANA address (POPA - the new IP address configured after PANA, as
used for PANA when it moves from one IP link to another within the required by some deployments). In another situation a PaC may change
same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA its IP address used for PANA when it moves from one IP link to
needs to be notified about the change of PaC address. another within the same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA
session, the PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC
address.
If the device identifier of the PaC is the IP address, it is also If the device identifier of the PaC is the IP address, it is also
subject to the same change. The PAA needs to be notified about the subject to the same change. The PAA needs to be notified about the
change of device identifier as well so that the PAA can update the change of device identifier as well so that the PAA can update the
EP(s). If IPsec is used between the PaC and the EPs, an IKE or EPs. If IPsec is used between the PaC and the EPs, an IKE [RFC2409]
MOBIKE [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] run is needed following such a IKEv2 [RFC4306] or MOBIKE [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] run is needed
change. following such a change.
After the PaC has changed its IP address, it MUST send a PANA-Update- After the PaC has changed its IP address, it MUST send a PANA-Update-
Request message to the PAA. If the PaC has also changed its device Request message to the PAA. If the PaC has also changed its device
identifier, the PANA-Update-Request message MUST include a Device-Id identifier, the PANA-Update-Request message MUST include a Device-Id
AVP containing the new device identifier. The PAA MUST update the AVP containing the new device identifier. The PAA MUST update the
PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address
field of the IP header and the new device identifier carried in the field of the IP header and the new device identifier carried in the
Device-Id AVP, and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. The PANA- Device-Id AVP, and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. The PANA-
Update-Answer message MUST contain one or more Device-Id AVPs for the Update-Answer message MUST contain one or more Device-Id AVPs for the
EPs if the set of EPs serving the PaC has also changed. If there is EPs if the set of EPs serving the PaC has also changed. If there is
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The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local
state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase
before the current session lifetime expires. before the current session lifetime expires.
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g., The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
a specific link layer or network topology and are therefore only a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only
hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the PANA-Ping message exchange to hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the PANA-Ping message exchange to
verify the liveness of a peer before taking an action. verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless information
obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the detection of a
disconnected peer.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
require coordination between the peers. require coordination between the peers.
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller
authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA
Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication
will be performed in the re-authentication phase.
5.10. Network Selection 5.10. Network Selection
The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn The handshake phase allows the PaC to learn identity of the NAP and a
identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the list of ISPs that are available through the NAP. The PaC can not
NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the only learn the ISPs but also convey the selected ISP explicitly
selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is during the handshake phase. The PAA is assumed to be pre-configured
assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are with the information of ISPs that are served by the NAP.
served by the NAP.
A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an ISP-Information PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an ISP-Information
AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC MAY convey its ISP AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC MAY convey its ISP
even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the PANA- even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the PANA-
Start-Request message. The PaC can do that when it is pre-configured Start-Request message. The PaC can do that when it is pre-configured
with ISP information. with ISP information.
In the absence of an ISP explicitly selected and conveyed by the PaC, In the absence of an ISP explicitly selected and conveyed by the PaC,
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The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA
proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through
its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the
selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA
proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA. outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [RFC4284] which An alternative ISP selection mechanism is outlined in [RFC4284] which
suggests advertising ISP information in-band with the ongoing EAP suggests advertising ISP information in-band with the ongoing EAP
method execution. Deployments using the PANA's built-in ISP method execution. Deployments using the ISP selection mechanism
discovery mechanism need not use the other mechanism. defined in PANA need not use the alternative ISP selection mechanism.
5.11. Error Handling 5.11. Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error- errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error-
Answer message. Answer message.
An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial
of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a rate- of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a rate-
limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be
overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a PANA- overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a PANA-
Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request
message does not require either the PaC or the PAA to create state. message does not require either the PaC or the PAA to create a state.
If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH
AVP) and the lower-layer is insecure then the error message MUST be AVP) then the error message MUST be processed such that the receiver
processed such that the receiver does not change its state. does not change its state.
6. Header Format 6. Header Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol. This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1. IP and UDP Headers 6.1. IP and UDP Headers
When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The source
of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on the
multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA). A PANA-PAA-Discover interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
message MAY be unicast in some cases as specified in Section 4.3.
Any other PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The
source and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on
the interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
respectively. respectively.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message, from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively. respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA
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The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields. the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned: The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S N L r r r r r r r r r r r r| |R L r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R(equest) R(equest)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is
an answer. an answer.
S(eparate) L(stateLess handshake)
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that PAA is willing to offer separate NAP and ISP
authentication. When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Answer
message it indicates that the PaC accepts on performing
separate NAP and ISP authentication. The PaC may also respond
with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to
authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a
PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and
PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate
NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the
authentication and authorization phase. For other cases,
S-flag MUST NOT be set.
N(AP authentication)
When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request, a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message, it
indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP
authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth-
Request, a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message, it indicates that the current EAP authentication is
for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy the value of the
flag in its answer from the last received request of the PAA.
The value of the flag on an answer MUST be copied from the
request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
L(stateLess discovery)
When the L-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it When the L-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that the PAA is performing stateless discovery. indicates that the PAA is performing stateless handshake.
Cookie AVP MUST be included in both the PANA-Start-Request and Cookie AVP MUST be included in both the PANA-Start-Request and
the PANA-Start-Answer messages when performing stateless the PANA-Start-Answer messages when performing stateless
discovery. handshake.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
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The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields. field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
7. PANA Messages 7. PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and
the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit
in the Message Flags field of the PANA header. in the Message Flags field of the PANA header.
Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Message
Message-Id field, which is used to determine the action that is to be Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to be taken
taken for a particular message. Figure 9 lists all PANA messages for a particular message. Figure 8 lists all PANA messages defined
defined in this document: in this document:
Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref. Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref.
---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
PANA-PAA-Discover PDI 1 --------> 7.1 PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2 PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2
PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3 PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4 PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.6
PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.7
PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8 PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8
PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9
PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10 PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10
PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14 PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15 PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.16 PANA-Update-Request PUR 9 <-------> 7.16
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.17 PANA-Update-Answer PUA 9 <-------> 7.17
PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.18
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.19
----------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------
Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages Figure 8: Table of PANA Messages
Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST [RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST
or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition: or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:
message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message
message-name = PANA-name message-name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional] PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional]
[ *fixed] [ *fixed]
header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Id
header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Type
[r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">" [r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">"
Message-Id = 1*DIGIT Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
; The message code assigned to the message ; The Message Type assigned to the message
r-bit = ", REQ" r-bit = ", REQ"
; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message ; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer. ; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
s-bit = ", SEP"
; If present, the 'S' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating support for
; separate NAP and ISP authentication.
n-bit = ", NAP"
; If present, the 'N' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that current
; EAP authentication is for NAP authentication.
l-bit = ", SLS" l-bit = ", SLS"
; If present, the 'L' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'L' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating PAA is performing ; Flags is set, indicating PAA is performing
; stateless discovery ; stateless handshake.
fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">" fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}" required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message. ; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]" optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included ; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can ; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message. ; appear anywhere in the message.
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; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the ; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in ; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition. ; the message definition.
Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ > Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) 7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated
of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero handshake. The sequence number in this message is always set to zero
(0). (0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 > PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The start PANA authentication. The PAA sets the sequence number to an
PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value. initial random value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SEP] [,SLS] > PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SLS] >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ] [ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ] * [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability] [ Protection-Capability]
[ Algorithm ] [ Algorithm ]
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
handshake to start PANA authentication. handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [,SEP] > PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ] [ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP. PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload > < EAP-Payload >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP- PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP-
Payload AVP. Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)
The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
skipping to change at page 44, line 5 skipping to change at page 39, line 40
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
deliver the result of PANA authentication. deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ] [ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ] [ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ] [ Algorithm ]
* [ Device-Id ] * [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Bind-Request message. response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ] [ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
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The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA-
Error-Request. Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 > PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) 7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to
the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method
when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >
7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to
the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >
7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope
of this specification only the IP address and device identifer of the of this specification only the IP address and device identifer of the
PaC can be updated via this message. PaC can be updated via this message.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ > PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Device-Id ] [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) 7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the
PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA). PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 > PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
* [ Device-Id ] * [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA 8. AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other
skipping to change at page 49, line 6 skipping to change at page 44, line 6
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
It is considered an error if there are more than one instance It is considered an error if there are more than one instance
of the AVP. of the AVP.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. 1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message. message.
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Message | | Message Type |
| Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA| Attribute Name |PCI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2) Figure 9: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+---------------------------------+ +-----------------------+
| Message | | Message Type |
| Type | +---+---+---+---+---+---+
+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PUR|PUA|
Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA| ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1| Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1| PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2) Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
8.1. Algorithm AVP 8.1. Algorithm AVP
The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the pseudo- The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the pseudo-
random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY and PaC-EP-Master-Key as well random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY and PaC-EP-Master-Key as well
as the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is as the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is
of type Unsigned32. of type Unsigned32.
The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation
skipping to change at page 51, line 4 skipping to change at page 45, line 51
The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm. Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm.
All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for
the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [ianaweb] the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [ianaweb]
corresponding to the integrity algorithm. corresponding to the integrity algorithm.
8.2. AUTH AVP 8.2. AUTH AVP
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages. The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.
The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded
in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the
integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP. integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP.
8.3. Cookie AVP 8.3. Cookie AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for carrying a random value The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA according to [RFC4086]. The AVP data is of type generated by the PAA according to [RFC4086]. The AVP data is of type
OctetString. The random value is referred to as a cookie and used OctetString. The random value is referred to as a cookie and used
for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource consumption for making the handshake phase robust against blind resource
DoS attacks. The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to consumption DoS attacks. The exact algorithms and syntax used by the
generate a cookie does not affect interoperability and not specified PAA to generate a cookie does not affect interoperability and not
in this document. An example cookie generation algorithm is shown in specified in this document.
Section 4.3.
8.4. Device-Id AVP 8.4. Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying device The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in [RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit [RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link- specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link-
layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that
skipping to change at page 52, line 13 skipping to change at page 47, line 12
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 7 > ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 7 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name } { Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
8.8. Key-Id AVP 8.8. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Integer32, and contains an The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Integer32, and contains an MSK
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique
MUST be unique within the PANA session. within the PANA session.
8.9. NAP-Information AVP 8.9. NAP-Information AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one Provider- The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 > NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
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by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA. by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
F (DHCPv4) F (DHCPv4)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv4 [RFC2131] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA. DHCPv4 [RFC2131] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
S (DHCPv6) S (DHCPv6)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA. DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration) A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA. [RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address
after PANA. after PANA.
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The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA. [RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes 8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages. message.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001 PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001
Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed. assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
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The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
administrative reasons. administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC) SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated. The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
9. Retransmission Timers 9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-Client-
message and all request messages, with the exception that the PANA- Initiation message and all request messages, with the exception that
Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start- the PANA-Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-
Request message in stateless PAA discovery. Start-Request message in stateless handshake.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender message exchange terminates when either the request sender
successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message
exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission
mechanism described below. mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
skipping to change at page 61, line 36 skipping to change at page 56, line 36
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are
retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*).
table shows default values. The table shows default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout. PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value. PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PDI_MRC 0 Configurable. PCI_MRC 0 Configurable.
PDI_MRD 0 Configurable. PCI_MRD 0 Configurable.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts. REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts.
REQ_MRD 0 Configurable. REQ_MRD 0 Configurable.
So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using
REQ_IRT as the IRT: REQ_IRT as the IRT:
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
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publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable. request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3 PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3
and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA. and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
10.2. PANA Multicast Address 10.2. PANA Header
PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast
address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast
address (Section 4.3 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by
the IANA.
10.3. PANA Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field. requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.
10.3.1. Message Type 10.2.1. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF 0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-9. See
Section 7.1 through Section 7.19 for the assignment of the namespace Section 7.1 through Section 7.17 for the assignment of the namespace
in this specification. in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.3.2. Flags 10.2.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2 document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 (state'L'ess handshake).
('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via a Standards Action
a Standards Action [IANA]. [IANA].
10.4. AVP Header 10.3. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new
namespaces. namespaces.
10.4.1. AVP Code 10.3.1. AVP Code
The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor- Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor-
specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a
Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA. possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA.
skipping to change at page 65, line 6 skipping to change at page 59, line 47
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead. be encouraged instead.
10.4.2. Flags 10.3.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and
bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via
a Standards Action . a Standards Action .
10.5. AVP Values 10.4. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values 10.4.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP As defined in Section 8.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
(AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F': (AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F':
DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4 DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4
('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2). ('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values 10.4.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 8.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
13) defines the values 0 and 1. 13) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values 10.4.3. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.16.1 and Section 8.16.2 the Result-Code AVP As defined in Section 8.16.1 and Section 8.16.2 the Result-Code AVP
(AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001, (AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001,
5001-5009 and 5011-5017. 5001-5009 and 5011-5017.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values 10.4.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) As defined in Section 8.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
skipping to change at page 68, line 7 skipping to change at page 62, line 7
The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
that is received from the segment of the access network where only that is received from the segment of the access network where only
the PaCs are supposed to be connected. the PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by
by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP
message). message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA- earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA-
Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a Bind-Request message that signals a successful authentication is
successful authentication is generated. Starting with these generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message
messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn until the session gets torn down can be cryptographically protected.
down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication. there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is
bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication
server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value. server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value.
Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP
authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires. expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured, EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary. cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
11.2. Discovery 11.2. Handshake
The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks The handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these
as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In order to
order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary should not
should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery be able to cause state creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation
messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie- messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie-
based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA) based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA)
to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it
is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the discovery and is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the handshake phase
handshake phase entirely. entirely.
In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA, In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,
the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection- the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection-
Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start- Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start-
Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of
service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the handshake
and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED. phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED. The same AVPs
The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind- are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind-Request upon
Request upon successful authentication. successful authentication.
11.3. EAP Methods 11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent. problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the
deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports
user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks
and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method. EAP method.
11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 11.4. Cryptographic Keys
The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same
PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP,
and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant
authorization, which is a combination of the individual
authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside
the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security,
both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to
generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically
binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks.
11.5. Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key. computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session. protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another
authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is execution of EAP method yields in a new MSK, and updates the PANA SA,
the combination of both keys. PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA
SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP- enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP-
Master-Key is generated for each EP from the AAA-Key, session Master-Key is generated for each EP from the MSK, session identifier,
identifier, key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC- key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC-EP-Master-Key
EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures cryptographic
cryptographic independency among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys. independence among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys.
The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the The lifetime of a PaC-EP-Master-Key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[RFC4306] to produce further cipher-specific and transient keys. [RFC4306] to produce further cipher-specific and transient keys.
11.6. Per-packet Ciphering 11.5. Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per- generation of a PaC-EP-Master-Key from an MSK for using with a per-
packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based
ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not
readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure
association protocol [RFC4306] may be needed to produce the required association protocol [RFC4306] may be needed to produce the required
keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a
client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
protected, and optionally encrypted. protected, and optionally encrypted.
11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3 The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] MAY be used between the PAA and EP for
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected authentication, integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the privacy-protected when a PaC-EP-Master-Key for per-packet ciphering
EP. is transmitted to the EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP-Master-Key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into
computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of
another EP or the PAA. another EP or the PAA.
11.8. Liveness Test 11.7. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive. alive.
skipping to change at page 71, line 33 skipping to change at page 65, line 15
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality. this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness. request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive. recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address 11.8. Updating PaC's IP Address
There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by
the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by
spoofing a victim's IP address. spoofing a victim's IP address.
11.10. Early Termination of a Session 11.9. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo, Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo,
Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj and all members of the PANA Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard
working group for their valuable comments to this document. Aboba and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable
comments to this document.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997. RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[RFC2365] Meyer, D., "Administratively Scoped IP Multicast", BCP 23,
RFC 2365, July 1998.
[RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address [RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998. Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet [RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998. Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.
[RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission
Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic [RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003. IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
skipping to change at page 74, line 7 skipping to change at page 68, line 5
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ltru-registry] [I-D.ietf-ltru-registry]
Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", draft-ietf-ltru-registry-14 (work in Languages", draft-ietf-ltru-registry-14 (work in
progress), October 2005. progress), October 2005.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]
Kumar, S., "DHCP options for PANA Authentication Agents",
draft-ietf-dhc-paa-option-03 (work in progress),
July 2006.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management [RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999. Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
December 1998.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
May 2005.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication [RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005. Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang, [RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005. (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, [RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005. (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity [RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity
Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 4284, January 2006. (EAP)", RFC 4284, January 2006.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4307] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the
Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307,
December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-09 (work in Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-14 (work in
progress), January 2006. progress), June 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress), Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
July 2005. July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework", Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-05 (work in progress), draft-ietf-pana-framework-06 (work in progress),
July 2005. March 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface", Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
draft-ietf-pana-snmp-05 (work in progress), January 2006. draft-ietf-pana-snmp-06 (work in progress), June 2006.
[I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol]
Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-08 (work in (MOBIKE)", draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-08 (work in
progress), February 2006. progress), February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]
Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-03
(work in progress), October 2005.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication Appendix A. IP Address Configuration
A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is The PaC configures an IP address before the PANA exchange begins.
illustrated in Figure 12. The example assumes the following This address is called a pre-PANA address (PRPA). After a successful
scenario: authentication, the client may have to configure a new IP address for
communication with other nodes, if the PRPA is a local-use (e.g., a
link-local or private address) or a temporarily allocated IP address.
This IP address is called a post-PANA address (POPA). An operator
might choose allocating a POPA only after successful PANA
authorization either to prevent waste of premium (e.g., globally
routable) IP resources until the client is authorized, or to enable
client identity based address assignment.
o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase. There are different methods by which a PRPA can be configured.
o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a 1. In some deployments (e.g., DSL networks) the PaC may be statically
choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer configured with an IP address. This address can be used as a
from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP. PRPA.
o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this 2. In IPv4, some clients attempt to configure an address dynamically
order in the authentication and authorization phase. using DHCP [RFC2131]. If they are unable to configure an address
using DHCP, they can configure a link-local address using
[RFC3927].
o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in When the network access provider is able to run a DHCP server on
each EAP sequence. the access link, the client would configure the PRPA using DHCP.
This address may be from a private address pool [RFC1918]. Also,
the lease time on the address may vary. For example, a PRPA
configured solely for running PANA can have a short lease time.
The PRPA may be used for local-use only (i.e., only for on-link
communication, such as for PANA and IPsec tunneling with EP), or
also for ultimate end-to-end data communication.
o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and In case there is no running DHCP server on the link, the client
replay protected with AUTH AVPs. might fall back to configuring a PRPA via zeroconfiguration
technique [RFC3927]. This yields a long-term address that can
only be used for on-link communication. (Note: At time of this
writing, the zeroconfiguration technique is not widely implemented
in routers.)
o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not 3. In IPv6, clients automatically configure a link-local address
shown. [RFC2462] when they initialize an interface. Additionally, they
may also configure non-link-local address(es) when DHCP or router
advertisements with prefixes are made available to the them.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] In case PAA is not on the same IP subnet as the PaCs are, the
----------------------------------------------------- deployment needs to ensure that a non-link-local PRPA is configurable
// Discovery and handshake phase by the clients.
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set.
[Cookie,
ISP-Information("ISP1"),
ISP-Information("ISP2"),
NAP-Information("MyNAP")]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set.
[Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1".
ISP-Information("ISP1")]
// Authentication and authorization phase When a PRPA is configured, the client starts the PANA exchange. By
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication. that time, a dual stacked client might have configured both an IPv4
[Session-Id, Nonce, // (S,N)-flags set address and an IPv6 address as PRPAs. Regardless of whether the PaC
EAP{Request}] // for all messages during has both IPv4 and IPv6 PRPAs or only one of those, only one PANA run
// NAP authentication. is required. When a dual-stack PaC or PAA initiates PANA
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Session-Id, Nonce] authentication, it chooses either IPv4 or IPv6 where the choice is
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] made depending on the deployment.
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, Algorithm, AUTH]
-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Key-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication.
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] // Only S-flag set
// for all messages during
// ISP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4)[Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6)[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP When the client successfully authenticates to the network, it may be
Authentication required to configure POPAs for its subsequent data communication
with the other nodes.
If the client is already configured with an address that can be used
with data communication, it is not required to configure a POPA.
Otherwise, the PANA-Bind-Request message allows the PAA to indicate
the available configuration methods to the PaC. The PaC can choose
one of the methods and act accordingly.
1. If the network relies on physical or link layer security, the PaC
can configure a POPA using DHCP [RFC2131] [RFC3315] or using IPv6
stateless auto-configuration [RFC2461]. An IPv4 PRPA SHOULD be
unconfigured when the POPA is configured to prevent IPv4 address
selection problem [RFC3927].
If the PaC is a dual-stacked node, it can configure both IPv4 and
IPv6 type POPAs. The available POPA configuration methods are
indicated within PANA.
2. If the network uses IPsec for protecting the traffic on the link
subsequent to PANA authentication [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec], the PaC
would use the PRPA as the outer address of IPsec tunnel mode SA
(IPsec-TOA). The PaC also needs to configure an inner address
(IPsec-TIA). There are different ways to configure an IPsec-TIA
which are indicated in a PANA-Bind-Request message.
When an IPv4 PRPA is configured, the same address may be used as
both IPsec-TOA and IPsec-TIA. In this case, a POPA is not
configured. Alternatively, an IPsec-TIA can be obtained via the
configuration method available within [RFC3456] for IPv4,
[RFC4307] for both IPv4 and IPv6. This newly configured address
constitutes a POPA. Please refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] for
more details.
IKEv2 [RFC4307] can enable configuration of one IPv4 IPsec-TIA and
one IPv6 IPsec-TIA for the same IPsec tunnel mode SA. Therefore,
IKEv2 is recommended for handling dual-stacked PaCs where single
execution of PANA and IKE is desired. In this case, the same IP
version that has been used for PANA is used for IKE, and the IKE
entity on the dual-stack PaC will request one or both of IPv4 and
IPv6 IPsec-TIAs from the IKE entity on the EP and obtain the
one(s) that is/are available on the EP.
Although there are potentially a number of different ways to
configure a PRPA, and POPA when necessary, it should be noted that
the ultimate decision to use one or more of these in a deployment
depends on the operator. The decision is dictated by the operator's
choice of per-packet protection capability (physical and link-layer
vs network-layer), PRPA type (local and temporary vs global and long-
term), and POPA configuration mechanisms available in the network.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407 P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470 Phone: +358 50 4839470
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