draft-ietf-pana-pana-12.txt   draft-ietf-pana-pana-13.txt 
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: February 23, 2007 Y. Ohba (Ed.) Intended status: Standards Track Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba Expires: June 9, 2007 Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
August 22, 2006 December 6, 2006
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-12 draft-ietf-pana-pana-13
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification
covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall
secure network access framework, which additionally includes other secure network access framework, which additionally includes other
protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as
a result of initial authentication, and accounting. a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description . . . . . . . 11 4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.7. Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.7. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.8. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.9. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.10. Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 8.3. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.4. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.5. Failed-Message-Header AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.3. Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.6. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.4. Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.7. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.5. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.8. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.6. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.8.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.7. ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.8.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.8. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.9. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.9. NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.10. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.10. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.11. Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 44
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . . 48 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.13. Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.15. Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.2.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.16. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.2.2. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.2.3. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.17. Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 10.3.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.19. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.4. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 56 10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 11.2. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.2.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10.2.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 11.4. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 11.5. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10.3.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 11.7. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.4. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 11.8. IP Address Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.4.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . 60 11.9. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.4.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . 60 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.4.3. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.4.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.2. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.4. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.5. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.7. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.8. Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.9. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix A. IP Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 75
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network. client and the access network.
Currently there is no standard network-layer solution for Scope of this work is identified as designing a network layer
authenticating clients for network access. Appendix A of [RFC4058]
describes the problem statement that led to the development of PANA.
Scope of this work is identified as designing a link-layer agnostic
transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication
methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various
authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP
above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748]. lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network- Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for
layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016]. network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in
These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] on [RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements
the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed [RFC4058] on the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements
by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748]. are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
There are components that are part of a complete secure network There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including IP address configuration, authentication method choice, including authentication method choice, data traffic protection,
filter rule installation, data traffic protection, PAA-EP protocol PAA-EP protocol, and PAA discovery. PANA authentication output is
and PAA discovery. These components except for IP address used for creating access control filters. These components are
configuration are described in separate documents (see [I-D.ietf- described in separate documents (see [I-D.ietf-pana-framework],
pana-framework], [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] and [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]). [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] and [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]). The readers are
See Appendix A for the IP address configuration component. The recommended to read the PANA Framework document
readers are recommended to go through the PANA Framework document
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading this protocol [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading this protocol
specification document. specification document.
1.1. Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC): PANA Client (PaC):
The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device
(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the (e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the
credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for
network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are co- network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are
located in the same access device. co-located in the same access device.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA): PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is
to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and
authorize network access to the device associated with the client authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the
and identified by a Device Identifier (DI). The PAA and the EAP EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are co-located
authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are co-located in in the same node. Note the authentication and authorization
the same node. Note the authentication and authorization procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to
procedure can, according to the EAP model, be also offloaded to
the backend AAA infrastructure. the backend AAA infrastructure.
PANA Session: PANA Session:
A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client
(PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a (PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a
result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message
delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values, delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values,
session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message. session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message.
A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A
session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces. Only session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces.
one device identifier of the PaC is allowed to be bound to a PANA
session for simplicity.
Session Lifetime: Session Lifetime:
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an
established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the
lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The
session lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP session lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. authentication before it expires.
Session Identifier: Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the
cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier
messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This is allocated by the PAA in handshake phase and freed when the
bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the session terminates. The session identifier is assigned by the PAA
handshake and freed when the session terminates. and unique within the PAA during the lifetime of the session.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA): PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA
by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context. by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context.
The formed duplex security association is used to protect the The formed duplex security association is used to protect the
bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and the PAA. bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA.
Device Identifier (DI):
The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and
police the network access of a device. Depending on the access
technology, this identifier may contain an address that is carried
in protocol headers (e.g., IP or link-layer address), or a locally
significant identifier that is made available by the local
protocol stack (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id) of a connected
device.
Enforcement Point (EP): Enforcement Point (EP):
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
access devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally) access devices. The EP and the PAA may be co-located. EPs should
cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client unless
generating filters on the EP. The EP and PAA may be co-located. it's either PANA or one of the other allowed traffic types (e.g.,
ARP, IPv6 neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.). Detailed enforcement
Network Access Provider (NAP): policies may be specified in deployment-specific PANA
applicability documents.
A service provider that provides physical and link-layer
connectivity to an access network it manages.
MSK: Master Session Key (MSK):
A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported
the authenticator [RFC3748]. to the EAP authenticator [RFC3748].
For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework
document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]. document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework].
3. Protocol Overview 3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service. access service.
skipping to change at page 10, line 31 skipping to change at page 9, line 31
<----- PANA-Ping-Request <----- PANA-Ping-Request
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer -----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase // Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request -----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer <----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited PANA- flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited
Start-Request message can be sent without PANA-Client-Initiation, EAP PANA-Start-Request message can be sent without
responses can be piggybacked on the PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping PANA-Client-Initiation, EAP responses can be piggybacked on the
and PANA-Termination usage is optional). PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping and PANA-Termination usage is
optional).
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication. integrity protection and authentication.
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response. incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
skipping to change at page 11, line 29 skipping to change at page 10, line 29
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document (see Section 8). the document (see Section 8).
o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity
algorithm. algorithm.
o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity
protects the PANA message. protects the PANA message.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
according to [RFC4086] and used for making the handshake phase
robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU. o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure. o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
o Key-Id AVP: contains an MSK identifier. o Failed-Message-Header AVP: contains the header of an offending
message that caused a failure.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier o Key-Id AVP: contains an MSK identifier.
of a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used
in cryptographic key computations. in cryptographic key computations.
o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
o Provider-Identifier AVP: contains the identifier of a NAP or an
ISP.
o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Provider-Name AVP: contains a name of a NAP or an ISP.
o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution
results. results.
o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access. o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.
o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination. o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.
4.3. Handshake Phase 4.3. Handshake Phase
The handshake phase can be initiated by either the PaC or the PAA. The handshake phase can be initiated by either the PaC or the PAA.
PaC-initiated Handshake: PaC-initiated Handshake:
When the PaC initiates the handshake phase, it sends a PANA- When the PaC initiates the handshake phase, it sends a
Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not
configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the
handshake phase, DHCP [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] is used as the handshake phase, DHCP [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] is used as the
default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the
PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discoverying the IP PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discovering the IP
address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated handshake but address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated handshake but
they are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that they are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that
receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond with a receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond with a
PANA-Start-Request message sent to the PaC. PANA-Start-Request message sent to the PaC.
PAA-initiated Handshake: PAA-initiated Handshake:
When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an
unsolicited PANA-Start-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA unsolicited PANA-Start-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA
can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this
specificaiton. specification.
A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA in the
handshake phase and carried in the PANA-Start-Request message. The
same session identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages
exchanged between the PAA and PaC throughout the session.
When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase. authentication and authorization phase.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a The PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming
random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to PANA-Client-Initiation messages.
as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-Client-Initiation messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism
the PAA can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can
produce the same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order
to do that, the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does
not require any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to
verify the cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The
handshake phase that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless
handshake". The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to
generate cookies does not affect interoperability and hence is not
specified here. Additionally, the PAA MAY limit the rate it
processes incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA-
Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie matches the send cookie. If the match is verified,
the protocol enters the authentication and authorization phase.
Otherwise, the PAA MUST silently discard the received message.
The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA is desired to be stateless
in the handshake phase since transmission of an EAP Request message
creates a state at EAP layer. See [RFC4137] for more information on
the EAP state machine and the allocation of state information in the
respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP, an Algorithm AVP and a Post-PANA-
Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-
Request in order to indicate required and available capabilities for
the network access. These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing
the capability match even before the authentication takes place.
Since these AVPs are provided during the insecure handshake phase,
there are certain security risks involved in using the provided
information. See Section 11 for further discussion on this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start- An Algorithm AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order
Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA- to indicate required and available capabilities for the network
Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. access. This AVP MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability
match even before the authentication takes place. Since this AVP is
provided during the insecure handshake phase, there are certain
security risks involved in using the provided information. See
Section 11 for further discussion on this.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA- The initial EAP Request message MAY be carried by the
Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase PANA-Start-Request message (as oppose to by a later PANA-Auth-Request
when stateless handshake is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and PANA- message) in order to reduce the number of round-trips. If the
Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise. initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-Request
message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the
PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless handshake MUST NOT be In order to prevent potential DoS attacks, the PAA MAY refrain from
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead, timeout-based retransmission of the PANA-Start-Request message in
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it response to a PaC-initiated handshake. For this reason, the PaC MUST
receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start- retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it enters the
Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The authentication and authorization phase by receiving the first
PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless handshake by PANA-Auth-Request message from the PAA.
looking at the L-flag in the PANA header. The PANA-Start-Request
message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
message when stateful handshake is used (L-flag is not set).
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the handshake It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the handshake
procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-Start-Request procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-Start-Request
message while the PaC sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message. To message while the PaC sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message. To
resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently discard the PANA- resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently discard the
Client-Initiation message received from the PaC after it has sent a PANA-Client-Initiation message received from the PaC after it has
PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., L-flag is not sent a PANA-Start-Request message.
set) for the PaC. In this case the PAA will retransmit the PANA-
Start-Request message based on a timer, if the PaC doesn't respond in
time (the message was lost for example). If the PAA had sent a PANA-
Start-Request message without creating a state for the PaC (i.e.,
L-flag is set), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-Client-Initiation
message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake. Figure 2 shows an example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0) -----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie] <----- PANA-Start-Request(x)
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie] -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake phase Figure 2: Example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake phase
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA- Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages.
Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of
requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY
the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it include the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used
takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g., when it takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to,
intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth- e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an
Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message
unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another can avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request
optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/ message. Another optimization allows optionally carrying the first
Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in EAP Request/Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as
Section 4.3. described in Section 4.3.
When stateless handshake was performed in the handshake phase, a A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and
Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA- PANA-Auth-Answer messages.
Auth-Answer messages.
The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the EAP message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the EAP
authentication result and the result of PANA authentication. The authentication result and the result of PANA authentication. The
PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-Bind- PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a
Answer (PBA) message. Figure 3 shows an example sequence in the PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 3 shows an example sequence
authentication and authorization phase. in the authentication and authorization phase.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from the handshake phase) (continued from the handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP{Request}]
[Session-Id, Nonce, EAP{Request}] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP{Response}]
[Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP{Request}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP{Response}]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Key-Id,
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response Algorithm, Lifetime, AUTH]
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 3: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization Figure 3: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
message (i.e., a PANA-Bind-Request message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP message (i.e., a PANA-Bind-Request message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP
and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm AVP for the first derivation of and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm AVP for the first derivation of
keys in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH keys in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH
AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST NOT be contained in a PANA-Bind-Request AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST NOT be contained in a PANA-Bind-Request
message after the first derivation of keys in the session. message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the
PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device
identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a
Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request
message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a
Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as
the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST
contain the PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is
already presented with that of EP(s) in the request with using the
same type of device identifier as contained in the request. If the
PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a
Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the
request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a
PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer
message to terminate the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST
also contain a Protection-Capability AVP if link-layer or network-
layer ciphering is enabled after the authentication and authorization
phase. The PANA-Bind-Request message MAY also contain a Protection-
Capability AVP to indicate if link-layer or network-layer ciphering
should be enabled after the authentication and authorization phase.
No link-layer or network-layer specific information is included in
the Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware
of the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA
protocol does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-
Capability AVP will be used to provide per-packet protection for data
traffic. When the PaC does not support the protection capability
indicated in the Protection-Capability AVP, the PaC MUST send a PANA-
Error-Request message with a PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session.
Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS
result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC)
AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP
address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In
this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer
message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a
match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods
available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a
PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state
unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any
case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC. case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA- rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a
Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If an PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
MSK is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when the an MSK is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the case the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the PANA- case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the
Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected with an PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected
AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request
also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first derivation of keys message MUST also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first
in the session. The MSK and the PANA session MUST be deleted derivation of keys in the session. The MSK and the PANA session MUST
immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange. be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.
4.5. Access Phase 4.5. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re- Once the authentication and authorization phase or the
authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to re-authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access
the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the to the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the
availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return
a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping- a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a
available. PANA SA is available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY
rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests. rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show liveness tests as they are initiated by Figure 4 and Figure 5 show liveness tests as they are initiated by
the PaC and the PAA respectively. the PaC and the PAA respectively.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[AUTH]
Figure 4: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test Figure 4: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[AUTH]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[AUTH]
Figure 5: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test Figure 5: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.6. Re-authentication Phase 4.6. Re-authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA- When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a
Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the the session identifier assigned to the session being
PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC re-authenticated. If the PAA already has an established PANA session
with the matching session identifier, it MUST first respond with a for the PaC with the matching session identifier, it MUST first
PANA-Reauth-Answer message, followed by a PANA-Auth-Request that respond with a PANA-Reauth-Answer message, followed by a
starts a new EAP authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the PANA-Auth-Request message that starts a new EAP authentication. If
session, it MAY respond with a PANA-Error-Request message with a the PAA cannot identify the session, it MUST silently discard the
result code PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. Transmission of this error message. A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request
request is made optional in case this behavior is leveraged for a DoS and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the re-authentication phase.
attack on the PAA.
The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer
to its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due to its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due
to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA
when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST
keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the
answer to its request. answer to its request.
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Auth- When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a
Request message containing the session identifier for the PaC to PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the
enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re- PaC to enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate
authentication before the current session lifetime expires. EAP re-authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers. existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA- For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA,
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by PANA-Reauth-Request, PANA-Reauth-Answer, PANA-Auth-Request and
adding a MAC AVP to each message. If a network selection (see PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by adding an AUTH AVP to
Section 5.10 was made during the handshake phase, any subsequent EAP each message.
authentication MUST be performed with the already selected ISP and
NAP.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q) -----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)[AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP{Request}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP{Response}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP{Request}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP{Response}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)[Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Key-Id,
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH] Algorithm, Lifetime, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)[Key-Id, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success},
Device-Id, Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 6: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated Figure 6: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC by PaC
4.7. Termination Phase 4.7. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
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The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately. the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH] <----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[AUTH]
Figure 7: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC Figure 7: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
5. Processing Rules 5. Processing Rules
5.1. Fragmentation 5.1. Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
skipping to change at page 21, line 28 skipping to change at page 17, line 28
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be
used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in
a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the
sequence number contained in the original packet. sequence number contained in the original packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
PAA as they send their very first request messages. PANA-Client- PAA as they send their very first request messages.
Initiation message carries sequence number 0. PANA-Client-Initiation message carries sequence number 0.
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-Client- expected value. This check does not apply to the
Initiation, PANA-Start-Request messages. PANA-Client-Initiation and PANA-Start-Request messages.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time. outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the response is received (in which case the retransmission timer is
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). (in which case the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
Section 9 unless a given deployment chooses to use its own Section 9 unless a given deployment chooses to use its own
retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer
characteristics. characteristics.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the
responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last
transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
5.3. PANA Security Association 5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not
created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by
any EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA any EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA
re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be
updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to
distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried
in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages at the end of the in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages at the end of the
skipping to change at page 22, line 45 skipping to change at page 18, line 42
granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The
lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the
lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when
the corresponding PANA session is deleted. the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id * Session Identifier
* Device-Id of PaC
* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC. * IP address and UDP port number of the PaC.
* IP address of PAA * IP address and UDP port number of the PAA
* List of device identifiers of EPs
* Sequence number of the last transmitted request * Sequence number of the last transmitted request
* Sequence number of the last received request * Sequence number of the last received request
* Last transmitted message payload * Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval * Retransmission interval
* Session lifetime * Session lifetime
* Protection-Capability
* PANA SA attributes * PANA SA attributes
PANA SA attributes: PANA SA attributes:
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce) * Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce) * Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
* MSK * MSK
skipping to change at page 23, line 43 skipping to change at page 19, line 32
* PANA_AUTH_KEY * PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function * Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm * Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK and it is used to The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK and it is used to
integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in
the following way: the following way:
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID) PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Session_ID|Key_ID)
where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo- where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The
random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified in the pseudo-random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified
Algorithm AVP in a PANA-Bind-Request message. The length of in the Algorithm AVP in a PANA-Bind-Request message. The length of
PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See
Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY. Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY. PaC_nonce
and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce AVP carried in the first
PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication
and authorization phase or the re-authentication phase, respectively.
Session_ID is the session identifier of the session. Key_ID is the
value of the Key-ID AVP.
5.4. Message Authentication 5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
protecting the message. protecting the message.
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of
the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way: following way:
AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU) AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with
the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH
represents the integrity algorithm specified in the Algorithm AVP in represents the integrity algorithm specified in the Algorithm AVP in
a PANA-Bind-Request message. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same a PANA-Bind-Request message. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same
integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and
receive. The algorithm is determined by the PAA. When the PaC does receive. The algorithm is determined by the PAA. When the PaC does
not support the integrity algorithm specified in the PANA-Bind- not support the integrity algorithm specified in the
Request message, it MUST silently discard the message. PANA-Bind-Request message, it MUST silently discard the message.
5.5. Message Validity Check 5.5. Message Validity Check
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be
invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met: invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, version number, sequence number, message length, message type, version number,
flags, etc. flags, session identifier, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and
invalid: invalid:
* In the handshake phase: * In the handshake phase:
+ PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request. + PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request.
+ PANA-Bind-Request. + PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Reauth-Request. + PANA-Reauth-Request.
+ PANA-Error-Request. + PANA-Error-Request.
* In the authentication and authorization phase and the re- * In the authentication and authorization phase and the
authentication phase: re-authentication phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid + PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid
PANA-Auth-Request. PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first + PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first
successful PANA-Bind-Request. successful PANA-Bind-Request.
* In the access phase: * In the access phase:
+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate PANA-Bind- + PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate
Request. PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-Client-Initiation. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
* In the termination phase: * In the termination phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request. + All requests but PANA-Termination-Request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position, in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position. is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is decoded correctly. o Each AVP is decoded correctly.
o When an AUTH AVP is included, the AVP value matches the hash value o When an AUTH AVP is included, the AVP value matches the hash value
computed against the received message. computed against the received message.
o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device
identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed
by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check
performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the
device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA
and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA
to the PaC.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details. be returned to the sender. See Section 5.8 for details.
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key
As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering
mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in
the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization
phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the MSK for
each EP and used by a secure association protocol for bootstrapping
link-layer or IPsec ciphering between the PaC and EP. The PaC-EP-
Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows.
PaC-EP-Master-Key = The first 64 octets of
prf+(MSK, "PaC-EP master key" |
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id)
The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random
function used for the prf+ function is specified in the Algorithm AVP
carried in a PANA-Bind-Request message.
EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the
corresponding EP.
5.7. Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that may not be carried in
data packets but has local significance in identifying a connected
device (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of
identifiers (i.e., locally-significant identifiers) are commonly used
in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not available and
lower-layers are already physically or cryptographically secured.
The locally-significant identifiers are used locally to associate
PANA sessions with the local interfaces and are not meant to be
exchanged with the peers.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
mechanisms being provided or required on the access network based on
configuration by the network administrator. For example, one network
administrator might want to use IPsec for securing the network access
while another one (for a different network) might rely on physical
security.
When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of
access control, the PAA MUST provide IP addresses as device
identifiers of EPs, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in
return. Similarly, IP addresses are used as the device identifiers
when the EPs are not on the same IP subnet as the PaC.
In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when
they are available.
If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not
available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id)
MUST be used as device identifiers. Note that these identifiers are
not exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-
layers to provide them along with received PANA messages.
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example, 5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address
Appendix A describes a case in which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA
address (PRPA - the IP address configured prior to PANA) with a post-
PANA address (POPA - the new IP address configured after PANA, as
required by some deployments). In another situation a PaC may change
its IP address used for PANA when it moves from one IP link to
another within the same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA
session, the PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC
address.
If the device identifier of the PaC is the IP address, it is also A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations,
subject to the same change. The PAA needs to be notified about the e.g., when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within the same
change of device identifier as well so that the PAA can update the PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA needs to
EPs. If IPsec is used between the PaC and the EPs, an IKE [RFC2409] be notified about the change of PaC address.
IKEv2 [RFC4306] or MOBIKE [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] run is needed
following such a change.
After the PaC has changed its IP address, it MUST send a PANA-Update- After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send
Request message to the PAA. If the PaC has also changed its device a PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The PAA MUST update the
identifier, the PANA-Update-Request message MUST include a Device-Id
AVP containing the new device identifier. The PAA MUST update the
PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address
field of the IP header and the new device identifier carried in the field of the IP header and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. If
Device-Id AVP, and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. The PANA- there is an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Request and
Update-Answer message MUST contain one or more Device-Id AVPs for the PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
EPs if the set of EPs serving the PaC has also changed. If there is
an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
5.9. Session Lifetime 5.7. Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The
Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind- Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the
Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the PANA-Bind-Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime
PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA of the PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages. messages.
When the Session-Lifetime AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind- When the Session-Lifetime AVP is not included in the
Request message then the PaC has no knowledge about a PANA session PANA-Bind-Request message then the PaC has no knowledge about a PANA
limitation and must therefore conclude that the session is not session limitation and must therefore conclude that the session is
limited. not limited.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local
state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase
before the current session lifetime expires. before the current session lifetime expires.
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g., The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
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verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless information verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless information
obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the detection of a obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the detection of a
disconnected peer. disconnected peer.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
require coordination between the peers. require coordination between the peers.
5.10. Network Selection 5.8. Error Handling
The handshake phase allows the PaC to learn identity of the NAP and a
list of ISPs that are available through the NAP. The PaC can not
only learn the ISPs but also convey the selected ISP explicitly
during the handshake phase. The PAA is assumed to be pre-configured
with the information of ISPs that are served by the NAP.
A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an ISP-Information
AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC MAY convey its ISP
even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the PANA-
Start-Request message. The PaC can do that when it is pre-configured
with ISP information.
In the absence of an ISP explicitly selected and conveyed by the PaC,
ISP selection is typically performed based on the client identifier
(e.g., using the realm portion of an NAI carried in EAP method). A
backend AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS) will run between the AAA client
on the PAA and a AAA server in the selected ISP domain.
The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA
proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through
its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the
selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA
proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP selection mechanism is outlined in [RFC4284] which
suggests advertising ISP information in-band with the ongoing EAP
method execution. Deployments using the ISP selection mechanism
defined in PANA need not use the alternative ISP selection mechanism.
5.11. Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error- errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a
Answer message. PANA-Error-Answer message.
An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial
of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a rate- of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a
limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be rate-limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may
overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a PANA- be overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a
Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request PANA-Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a
message does not require either the PaC or the PAA to create a state. PANA-Error-Request message does not require either the PaC or the PAA
to create a state.
If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH
AVP) then the error message MUST be processed such that the receiver AVP) then the error message MUST be processed such that the receiver
does not change its state. does not change its state.
6. Header Format 6. Header Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol. This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1. IP and UDP Headers 6.1. IP and UDP Headers
Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The source Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA.
and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on the
interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
respectively.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message, from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively. respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value For other PANA messages, the source port MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's chosen by the sender and the destination port MUST be set to the
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise.
6.2. PANA Header 6.2. PANA Message Header
A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The
transmitted in network byte order. fields are transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Reserved | Message Length | | Version | Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type | | Flags | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ... | AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Version Version
This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1. This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1.
Reserved Reserved
skipping to change at page 31, line 19 skipping to change at page 25, line 17
The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields. the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned: The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R L r r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |R r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R(equest) R(equest)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is
an answer. an answer.
L(stateLess handshake)
When the L-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that the PAA is performing stateless handshake.
Cookie AVP MUST be included in both the PANA-Start-Request and
the PANA-Start-Answer messages when performing stateless
handshake.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address space is managed by IANA [ianaweb].
space for this field.
Session Identifier
This field contains a 32 bit session identifier.
Sequence Number Sequence Number
The Sequence Number field contains a 32 bit value.
This field contains contains a 32 bit sequence number.
AVPs AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on
AVPs. AVPs.
6.3. AVP Header 6.3. AVP Header
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero- boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of
valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a word zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a
boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected
the AVP Length field [RFC3588]. in the AVP Length field [RFC3588].
The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The
format of the header is: format of the header is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags | | AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved | | AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) | | Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ... | Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Code AVP Code
The AVP Code, combined with the Vendor-Id field, identifies the The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor ID field,
attribute uniquely. AVP numbers are allocated by IANA [ianaweb]. identifies attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set, the
PANA uses its own address space for this field although some of Vendor ID is not present and the AVP Code refers to an IETF
the AVP formats are borrowed from Diameter protocol [RFC3588]. attribute.
AVP Flags AVP Flags
The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are
assigned: assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
M(andatory)
The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether
support of the AVP is required.
If an AVP with the 'M' bit set is received by the PaC or PAA
and either the AVP or its value is unrecognized, the message
MUST be rejected and the receiver MUST send a PANA-Error-
Request message. If the AVP was unrecognized the PANA-Error-
Request message result code MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If
the AVP value was unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message
result code MUST be PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the
PANA-Error-Request message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP
containing the offending mandatory AVP.
AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a
receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not
recognized, or whose value is not recognized, MAY simply ignore
the AVP.
V(endor) V(endor)
The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates
whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP
header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor
code address space. code address space.
M(andatory)
The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether
support of the AVP is required. If an AVP with the 'M' bit set
is received by the PaC or PAA and either the AVP or its value
is unrecognized, the message MUST be rejected and the receiver
MUST send a PANA-Error-Request message. If the AVP was
unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If the AVP value was unrecognized the
PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the PANA-Error-Request
message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP containing the offending
mandatory AVP. AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational
only and a receiver that receives a message with such an AVP
that is not recognized, or whose value is not recognized, MAY
simply ignore the AVP.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have
the following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST
be set. The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set.
AVP Length AVP Length
The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of
octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags, octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags,
and the AVP data. and the AVP data.
Reserved Reserved
This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set
to zero, and ignored by the receiver. to zero, and ignored by the receiver.
skipping to change at page 35, line 5 skipping to change at page 28, line 6
Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space, Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space,
guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's
vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications. vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications.
Data Data
The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields. field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have the
following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST be set.
The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set.
7. PANA Messages 7. PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and
the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit
in the Message Flags field of the PANA header. in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header.
Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Message Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Message
Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to be taken Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to be taken
for a particular message. Figure 8 lists all PANA messages defined for a particular message. Figure 8 lists all PANA messages defined
in this document: in this document:
Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref. Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref.
---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1 PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2 PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2
PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3 PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4 PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request PRR 4 --------> 7.6
PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer PRA 4 <-------- 7.7
PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8 PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8
PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9
PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10 PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10
PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14 PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15 PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15
PANA-Update-Request PUR 9 <-------> 7.16 PANA-Update-Request PUR 9 <-------> 7.16
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 9 <-------> 7.17 PANA-Update-Answer PUA 9 <-------> 7.17
skipping to change at page 36, line 4 skipping to change at page 30, line 4
message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message
message-name = PANA-name message-name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional] PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional]
[ *fixed] [ *fixed]
header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Type header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Type
[r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">" [r-bit] ">"
Message-Type = 1*DIGIT Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
; The Message Type assigned to the message ; The Message Type assigned to the message
r-bit = ", REQ" r-bit = ", REQ"
; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message ; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer. ; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
l-bit = ", SLS"
; If present, the 'L' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating PAA is performing
; stateless handshake.
fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">" fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP. ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}" required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message. ; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]" optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included ; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included
skipping to change at page 37, line 23 skipping to change at page 31, line 18
; in the base or extended PANA protocol ; in the base or extended PANA protocol
; specifications. ; specifications.
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP" avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary ; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the ; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in ; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition. ; the message definition.
Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ > Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) 7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI)
The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated
handshake. The sequence number in this message is always set to zero handshake. The Sequence Number and Session Identifier fields in this
(0). message MUST be set to zero (0).
PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 > PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
start PANA authentication. The PAA sets the sequence number to an start PANA authentication. The PAA sets the Sequence Number field to
initial random value. an initial random value and sets the Session Identifier field to a
newly assigned value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SLS] > PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ >
[ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability]
[ Algorithm ] [ Algorithm ]
[ PPAC ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
handshake to start PANA authentication. handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 > PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 >
[ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP. PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ > PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload > < EAP-Payload >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP- PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an
Payload AVP. EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 > PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
< Session-Id >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR)
The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
to re-initiate EAP authentication. to re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ > PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) 7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA)
The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC in
in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message. response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 > PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
deliver the result of PANA authentication. deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ > PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ PPAC ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ] [ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ] [ Algorithm ]
* [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Bind-Request message. response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 > PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 >
< Session-Id >
[ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the
PAA for performing liveness test. PAA for performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ > PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) 7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a
Ping-Request. PANA-Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 > PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) 7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA to terminate a PANA session. or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ > PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause > < Termination-Cause >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) 7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request. or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 > PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) 7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER)
The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the
PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message. PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message. This
message MUST contain one Failed-Message-Header AVP which carries the
content of the PANA message header of the erroneous message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ > PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< Result-Code > < Result-Code >
{ Failed-Message-Header }
* [ Failed-AVP ] * [ Failed-AVP ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) 7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a
Error-Request. PANA-Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 > PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) 7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope the PAA to deliver attribute updates. In the scope of this
of this specification only the IP address and device identifer of the specification only the IP address the PaC can be updated via this
PaC can be updated via this message. message.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ > PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) 7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the
PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA). PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9 > PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9 >
< Session-Id >
* [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH > 0*1 < AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA 8. AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A This document uses AVP Data Format such as 'OctetString' and
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other 'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3588]. The definitions
documents such as [RFC3588]. of these data formats are not repeated in this document.
The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present. specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.
The table uses the following symbols: The table uses the following symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message. 0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the 0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message. message.
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
It is considered an error if there are more than one instance It is considered an error if there are more than one instance
of the AVP. of the AVP.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. 1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message. message.
+---------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| Message Type | | Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PCI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA| Attribute Name |PCI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRR|PRA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-Message-Header | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 9: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2) Figure 9: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
| Message Type | | Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PUR|PUA| Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PUR|PUA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-Message-Header | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2) Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
8.1. Algorithm AVP 8.1. Algorithm AVP
The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the pseudo- The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the
random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY and PaC-EP-Master-Key as well pseudo-random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY as well as the
as the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of type
of type Unsigned32. Unsigned32.
The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation
function. function.
The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm. Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm.
All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for
the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [ianaweb] the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC4595]
corresponding to the integrity algorithm. corresponding to the integrity algorithm.
8.2. AUTH AVP 8.2. AUTH AVP
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages. The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.
The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded
in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the
integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP. integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP.
8.3. Cookie AVP 8.3. EAP-Payload AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA according to [RFC4086]. The AVP data is of type
OctetString. The random value is referred to as a cookie and used
for making the handshake phase robust against blind resource
consumption DoS attacks. The exact algorithms and syntax used by the
PAA to generate a cookie does not affect interoperability and not
specified in this document.
8.4. Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link-
layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that
are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this
AVP.
8.5. EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 5) is used for encapsulating the actual The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString. authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.6. Failed-AVP AVP 8.4. Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 6) provides debugging information in The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to cases where a message is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588]. Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP using the ABNF grammar
defined in [RFC3588] for Grouped AVP is as follows.
<Failed-AVP> ::= < AVP Header: 4 >
1* {AVP}
In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole
grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the
Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP. Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP.
8.7. ISP-Information AVP 8.5. Failed-Message-Header AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 7) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 7 > The Failed-Message-Header AVP (AVP Code 5) provides debugging
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } information in cases where a message is rejected or not fully
{ Provider-Name } processed due to erroneous information in the message. The AVP data
* [ AVP ] is of type OctetString. The AVP data contains the 16-octet header of
the message that caused the error.
8.8. Key-Id AVP 8.6. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Integer32, and contains an MSK The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Integer32, and contains an MSK
identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique
within the PANA session. within the PANA session.
8.9. NAP-Information AVP 8.7. Nonce AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
8.10. Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 10) carries a randomly chosen value that is The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 7) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in
[RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP [RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP
data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated
value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256
octets inclusive. octets inclusive.
The length of the nonces are determined based on the available The length of the nonces are determined based on the available
pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into
the two PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the the two PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the
random value for the nonce is determined whether random value for the nonce is determined whether
skipping to change at page 48, line 9 skipping to change at page 39, line 17
computation a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length computation a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length
of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20 of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20
octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1). octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be
considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely
HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20 HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20
octets). The recommended maximum length of the nonce value is octets). The recommended maximum length of the nonce value is
therefore currently 20 octets. therefore currently 20 octets.
8.11. Notification AVP 8.8. Result-Code AVP
The Notification AVP (AVP Code 11) is optionally used to convey a
displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be
included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case
a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message
to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a
Notification AVP SHOULD be generated.
The 'M' bit in the AVP header of this AVP MUST NOT be set.
Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state.
AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains the following fields
in the listed order:
Language Tag Length
This field contains the length of the Language Tag in octets. The
length of this field is 2 octets.
Language Tag
This field contains the language tag defined in [I-D.ietf-ltru-
registry] to indicate the language used for Displayable String.
The length of this data is determined by the Language Tag Length
field.
Displayable String
This field contains UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646 characters [RFC2279]
using the language indicated by the Language Tag. The length of
this data is determined by the AVP Length field and the Language
Tag Length field. This data MUST NOT be null terminated.
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 12) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. The AVP data is of type
Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|F|S|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags
N (No configuration)
The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent
by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
F (DHCPv4)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv4 [RFC2131] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
S (DHCPv6)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address
after PANA.
I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [RFC4306] to configure (a) new IPv4 and/or
IPv6 address(es) after PANA.
Reserved
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.
The PAA MUST set either the N-flag, or one or more of the other
flags. If the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST only set its N-flag in its
response. If the N-flag is not set by the PAA, that means the PaC
MUST configure POPA(s) using the method(s) indicated by the flags.
If IPsec-based access control is not used, the F-flag, S-flag or
A-flag MUST be set by the PAA, and the PaC MUST echo the same flag(s)
in its response. Refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed
discussion on when these methods can be used.
8.13. Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 13) indicates the
cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
8.15. Provider-Name AVP
The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
8.16. Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from an error occurred. Result-Code AVP values are described in the
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA. subsequent sections.
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes 8.8.1. Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request
message. message.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 0
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001 PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1
Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed. assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003 PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 2
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded. PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes 8.8.2. Protocol Error Result Codes
These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA. otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001 PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 1001
Message type not recognized or supported. Message type not recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002 PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 1002
The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the
authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code. authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008 PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 1003
A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either A message was received whose bits in the PANA message header were
set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent either set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is
with the message type definition. inconsistent with the message type definition.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009 PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 1004
A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are
set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the
AVP's definition. AVP's definition.
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001 PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 1005
The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or
supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message
with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing
the AVPs that caused the failure. the AVPs that caused the failure.
PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002 PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 1006
The message contained an unknown Session-Id. A PANA message
indicating this error MUST include the unknown Session-Id AVP
within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 5004
The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data
portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005 PANA_MISSING_AVP 1007
The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message
type definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a type definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a
Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the
Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP
should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes. should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.
PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006 PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 1008
A message was received that cannot be authorized because the A message was received that cannot be authorized because the
client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this
error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session
and attempts to establish a second session. Only the PAA can and attempts to establish a second session. Only the PAA can
generate this code. generate this code.
PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007 PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 1009
The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each
other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One
or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that
contradicted each other. Only the PAA can generate this code. contradicted each other. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008 PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 1010
A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The
Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the
offending AVP. offending AVP.
PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009 PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 1011
A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of
the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences. the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011 PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 1012
This error is returned when a message was received, whose version This error is returned when a message was received, whose version
number is unsupported. number is unsupported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012 PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 1013
This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified
reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP
pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP Failure message pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP Failure message
to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in
the PANA-Error-Request message. the PANA-Error-Request message.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014 PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 1014
The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The PANA- The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The
Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the PANA-Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015 PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 1015
This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid
message length. message length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016 8.9. Session-Lifetime AVP
This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid AUTH AVP but
does not support the protection capability specified in the
Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
This error is returned when there is no match between the list of
PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC.
Only the PaC can generate this code.
8.17. Session-Id AVP
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 17) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP MUST appear immediately following the
PANA header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 18) contains the number of seconds The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 9) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32. data is of type Unsigned32.
8.19. Termination-Cause AVP 8.10. Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) is used for indicating the The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 10) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA. used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA) LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC) ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
administrative reasons. administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC) SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated. The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
9. Retransmission Timers 9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-Client- The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the
Initiation message and all request messages, with the exception that PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages.
the PANA-Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-
Start-Request message in stateless handshake.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender message exchange terminates when the request sender successfully
successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message receives the appropriate answer, or when a protected
exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission PANA-Error-Request message for the request is received, or when the
mechanism described below. message exchange is considered to have failed according to the
retransmission mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
following variables: following variables:
RT Retransmission timeout RT Retransmission timeout
IRT Initial retransmission time IRT Initial retransmission time
MRC Maximum retransmission count MRC Maximum retransmission count
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If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are retransmission behavior of PANA requests that are retransmitted
retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*). (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows
The table shows default values. default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout. PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value. PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PCI_MRC 0 Configurable. PCI_MRC 0 Configurable.
PCI_MRD 0 Configurable. PCI_MRD 0 Configurable.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
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publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable. request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3 PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3
and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA. and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
10.2. PANA Header 10.2. PANA Message Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field. fields that requires IANA namespace management; the Version, Message
Type and Flags fields.
10.2.1. Message Type 10.2.1. Version
The Version namespace is used to identify PANA versions. The Version
values are assigned by Standards Action [IANA]. This document
defines the Version 1.
10.2.2. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF 0-65,519 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-9. See Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-9. See
Section 7.1 through Section 7.17 for the assignment of the namespace Section 7.1 through Section 7.17 for the assignment of the namespace
in this specification. in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are The values 65,520 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.2.2. Flags 10.2.3. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 (state'L'ess handshake). This document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest). The remaining bits MUST
The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via a Standards Action only be assigned via a Standards Action [IANA].
[IANA].
10.3. AVP Header 10.3. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new
namespaces. namespaces.
10.3.1. AVP Code 10.3.1. AVP Code
The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are The 16-bit AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as namespace which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor- Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their
specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of
Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA a Vendor-ID identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP Codes namespace.
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also The AVP Codes and sometimes also possible values in an AVP are
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA. controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-19. AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-10.
See Section 8.1 through Section 8.19 for the assignment of the See Section 8.1 through Section 8.10 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification. namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification
Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time Required [IANA] or Standards Action. AVPs with 'M' bit set MUST be
for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. allocated by Standards Action.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead. be encouraged instead.
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bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via
a Standards Action . a Standards Action .
10.4. AVP Values 10.4. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.4.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values 10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
(AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F':
DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4
('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA].
10.4.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
13) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA].
10.4.3. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.16.1 and Section 8.16.2 the Result-Code AVP As defined in Section 8.8.1 and Section 8.8.2 the Result-Code AVP
(AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001, (AVP Code 8) defines the values 0-3 and 1001-1015.
5001-5009 and 5011-5017.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
10.4.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values 10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) As defined in Section 8.10, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 10)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security
threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined
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device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
that is received from the segment of the access network where only that is received from the segment of the access network where only
the PaCs are supposed to be connected. the PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by
the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete
message). EAP message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA- earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first
Bind-Request message that signals a successful authentication is PANA-Bind-Request message that signals a successful authentication is
generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message
until the session gets torn down can be cryptographically protected. until the session gets torn down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is
bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication
server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value. server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value.
Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP
authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires. expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured, EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary. cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
11.2. Handshake 11.2. Handshake
The handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these The handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these
messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In order to messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In order to
prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary should not prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary should not
be able to cause state creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation be able to cause state creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation
messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie- messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by allowing the
based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA) responder (PAA) to create as less amount of state as possible in the
to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it first round of message exchange. However, it is difficult to prevent
is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the handshake phase all spoofing attacks in the handshake phase entirely.
entirely.
In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA, In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,
the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection- the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of an Algorithm
Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start- AVP in a PANA-Start-Request message is susceptible to spoofing
Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of leading to denial-of service attacks. Therefore, usage of this AVP
service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the handshake during the handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT
phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED. The same AVPs RECOMMENDED. The same AVP is delivered via an integrity-protected
are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind-Request upon PANA-Bind-Request upon successful authentication.
successful authentication.
11.3. EAP Methods 11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent. problem is prevalent.
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is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK. computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session. protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new MSK, and updates the PANA SA, execution of EAP method yields in a new MSK, and updates the PANA SA,
PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID. PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP-
Master-Key is generated for each EP from the MSK, session identifier,
key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC-EP-Master-Key
derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures cryptographic
independence among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys.
The lifetime of a PaC-EP-Master-Key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[RFC4306] to produce further cipher-specific and transient keys.
11.5. Per-packet Ciphering 11.5. Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a PaC-EP-Master-Key from an MSK for using with a per- generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and use the keys
packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic
ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not protection such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering
readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
association protocol [RFC4306] may be needed to produce the required
keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a
client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
protected, and optionally encrypted. protected, and optionally encrypted. How cryptographic keys are
generated from the PANA SA and used with a secure association
protocol is outside the scope of this document.
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. SNMPv3 The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] MAY be used between the PAA and EP for [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] MAY be used between the PAA and EP for
provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange
MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for
authentication, integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be authentication, integrity and replay protection.
privacy-protected when a PaC-EP-Master-Key for per-packet ciphering
is transmitted to the EP.
The PaC-EP-Master-Key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into
computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of
another EP or the PAA.
11.7. Liveness Test 11.7. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
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This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality. this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness. request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive. recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.8. Updating PaC's IP Address 11.8. IP Address Spoofing
There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by PANA does not provide any means to prove ownership of the IP address
the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by presented by the PaC. Hence, an authorized PaC can launch a redirect
spoofing a victim's IP address. attack by spoofing a victim's IP address. This problem and its
solution are outside the scope of PANA.
11.9. Early Termination of a Session 11.9. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen,
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo, Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson,
Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer
Aboba and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba and all members of the PANA working
comments to this document. group for their valuable comments to this document.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ltru-registry] [RFC4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel
Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying Security Association Management Protocol", RFC 4595,
Languages", draft-ietf-ltru-registry-14 (work in July 2006.
progress), October 2005.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]
Kumar, S., "DHCP options for PANA Authentication Agents", Morand, L., "DHCP options for PANA Authentication Agents",
draft-ietf-dhc-paa-option-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-dhc-paa-option-04 (work in progress),
July 2006. September 2006.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996. IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
December 1998.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
May 2005.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication [RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005. Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang, [RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005. (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, [RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005. (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity
Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 4284, January 2006.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4307] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the
Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307,
December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-14 (work in Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-15 (work in
progress), June 2006. progress), October 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress), Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
July 2005. July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework", Jayaraman, P., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
draft-ietf-pana-framework-06 (work in progress), Network Access (PANA) Framework",
March 2006. draft-ietf-pana-framework-07 (work in progress),
August 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface", Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
draft-ietf-pana-snmp-06 (work in progress), June 2006. draft-ietf-pana-snmp-06 (work in progress), June 2006.
[I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol]
Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-08 (work in
progress), February 2006.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Appendix A. IP Address Configuration
The PaC configures an IP address before the PANA exchange begins.
This address is called a pre-PANA address (PRPA). After a successful
authentication, the client may have to configure a new IP address for
communication with other nodes, if the PRPA is a local-use (e.g., a
link-local or private address) or a temporarily allocated IP address.
This IP address is called a post-PANA address (POPA). An operator
might choose allocating a POPA only after successful PANA
authorization either to prevent waste of premium (e.g., globally
routable) IP resources until the client is authorized, or to enable
client identity based address assignment.
There are different methods by which a PRPA can be configured.
1. In some deployments (e.g., DSL networks) the PaC may be statically
configured with an IP address. This address can be used as a
PRPA.
2. In IPv4, some clients attempt to configure an address dynamically
using DHCP [RFC2131]. If they are unable to configure an address
using DHCP, they can configure a link-local address using
[RFC3927].
When the network access provider is able to run a DHCP server on
the access link, the client would configure the PRPA using DHCP.
This address may be from a private address pool [RFC1918]. Also,
the lease time on the address may vary. For example, a PRPA
configured solely for running PANA can have a short lease time.
The PRPA may be used for local-use only (i.e., only for on-link
communication, such as for PANA and IPsec tunneling with EP), or
also for ultimate end-to-end data communication.
In case there is no running DHCP server on the link, the client
might fall back to configuring a PRPA via zeroconfiguration
technique [RFC3927]. This yields a long-term address that can
only be used for on-link communication. (Note: At time of this
writing, the zeroconfiguration technique is not widely implemented
in routers.)
3. In IPv6, clients automatically configure a link-local address
[RFC2462] when they initialize an interface. Additionally, they
may also configure non-link-local address(es) when DHCP or router
advertisements with prefixes are made available to the them.
In case PAA is not on the same IP subnet as the PaCs are, the
deployment needs to ensure that a non-link-local PRPA is configurable
by the clients.
When a PRPA is configured, the client starts the PANA exchange. By
that time, a dual stacked client might have configured both an IPv4
address and an IPv6 address as PRPAs. Regardless of whether the PaC
has both IPv4 and IPv6 PRPAs or only one of those, only one PANA run
is required. When a dual-stack PaC or PAA initiates PANA
authentication, it chooses either IPv4 or IPv6 where the choice is
made depending on the deployment.
When the client successfully authenticates to the network, it may be
required to configure POPAs for its subsequent data communication
with the other nodes.
If the client is already configured with an address that can be used
with data communication, it is not required to configure a POPA.
Otherwise, the PANA-Bind-Request message allows the PAA to indicate
the available configuration methods to the PaC. The PaC can choose
one of the methods and act accordingly.
1. If the network relies on physical or link layer security, the PaC
can configure a POPA using DHCP [RFC2131] [RFC3315] or using IPv6
stateless auto-configuration [RFC2461]. An IPv4 PRPA SHOULD be
unconfigured when the POPA is configured to prevent IPv4 address
selection problem [RFC3927].
If the PaC is a dual-stacked node, it can configure both IPv4 and
IPv6 type POPAs. The available POPA configuration methods are
indicated within PANA.
2. If the network uses IPsec for protecting the traffic on the link
subsequent to PANA authentication [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec], the PaC
would use the PRPA as the outer address of IPsec tunnel mode SA
(IPsec-TOA). The PaC also needs to configure an inner address
(IPsec-TIA). There are different ways to configure an IPsec-TIA
which are indicated in a PANA-Bind-Request message.
When an IPv4 PRPA is configured, the same address may be used as
both IPsec-TOA and IPsec-TIA. In this case, a POPA is not
configured. Alternatively, an IPsec-TIA can be obtained via the
configuration method available within [RFC3456] for IPv4,
[RFC4307] for both IPv4 and IPv6. This newly configured address
constitutes a POPA. Please refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] for
more details.
IKEv2 [RFC4307] can enable configuration of one IPv4 IPsec-TIA and
one IPv6 IPsec-TIA for the same IPsec tunnel mode SA. Therefore,
IKEv2 is recommended for handling dual-stacked PaCs where single
execution of PANA and IKE is desired. In this case, the same IP
version that has been used for PANA is used for IKE, and the IKE
entity on the dual-stack PaC will request one or both of IPv4 and
IPv6 IPsec-TIAs from the IKE entity on the EP and obtain the
one(s) that is/are available on the EP.
Although there are potentially a number of different ways to
configure a PRPA, and POPA when necessary, it should be noted that
the ultimate decision to use one or more of these in a deployment
depends on the operator. The decision is dictated by the operator's
choice of per-packet protection capability (physical and link-layer
vs network-layer), PRPA type (local and temporary vs global and long-
term), and POPA configuration mechanisms available in the network.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407 P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470 Phone: +358 50 4839470
Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
skipping to change at page 75, line 5 skipping to change at page 59, line 5
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Alper E. Yegin Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
Istanbul, Istanbul,
Turkey Turkey
Phone: +90 538 719 0181 Phone: +90 538 719 0181
Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com
Intellectual Property Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
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on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
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skipping to change at page 75, line 29 skipping to change at page 59, line 45
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Internet Society. Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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