draft-ietf-pana-pana-18.txt   rfc5191.txt 
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg Network Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Request for Comments: 5191 Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Ohba (Ed.) Category: Standards Track Y. Ohba, Ed.
Expires: March 9, 2008 Toshiba Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Nokia Siemens Networks
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
September 6, 2007
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-18
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. In EAP terms, PANA is a UDP- between clients and access networks. In EAP terms, PANA is a
based EAP lower layer that runs between the EAP peer and the EAP UDP-based EAP lower layer that runs between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. authenticator.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Specification of Requirements ..............................4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Protocol Overview ...............................................6
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Protocol Details ................................................7
4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase .....................7
4.2. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Access Phase ..............................................11
4.3. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Re-Authentication Phase ...................................11
4.4. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Termination Phase .........................................13
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Processing Rules ...............................................13
5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Fragmentation .............................................13
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission ........................14
5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.3. PANA Security Association .................................15
5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.4. Message Authentication ....................................17
5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.5. Message Validity Check ....................................17
5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address ...............................19
5.7. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.7. Session Lifetime ..........................................19
6. Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Message Format .................................................20
6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1. IP and UDP Headers ........................................20
6.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.2. PANA Message Header .......................................20
6.3. AVP Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.3. AVP Format ................................................22
7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7. PANA Messages ..................................................24
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) ..............................27
7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) ...................................28
7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) ....................................28
7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) ............................28
7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) .............................29
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) ...........................29
7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) ............................29
8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8. AVPs in PANA ...................................................29
8.1. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.1. AUTH AVP ..................................................30
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. EAP-Payload AVP ...........................................30
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP ...................................31
8.4. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.4. Key-Id AVP ................................................31
8.5. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.5. Nonce AVP .................................................31
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP .........................................32
8.7. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.7. Result-Code AVP ...........................................32
8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP ......................................32
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.9. Termination-Cause AVP .....................................33
9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 9. Retransmission Timers ..........................................33
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 36 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters ................35
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10. IANA Considerations ...........................................35
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number .....................................36
10.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10.2. PANA Message Header ......................................36
10.2.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10.2.1. Message Type ......................................36
10.2.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.2.2. Flags .............................................36
10.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.3. AVP Header ...............................................36
10.3.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.3.1. AVP Code ..........................................37
10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 10.3.2. Flags .............................................37
10.4. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 10.4. AVP Values ...............................................37
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values ............................37
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values ......................38
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 11. Security Considerations .......................................38
11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 11.1. General Security Measures ................................38
11.2. Initial Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11.2. Initial Exchange .........................................40
11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11.3. EAP Methods ..............................................40
11.4. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 11.4. Cryptographic Keys .......................................40
11.5. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering .....................................41
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication ..................................41
11.7. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.7. Liveness Test ............................................41
11.8. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.8. Early Termination of a Session ...........................42
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12. Acknowledgments ...............................................42
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 13. References ....................................................42
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 13.1. Normative References .....................................42
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 13.2. Informative References ...................................43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 49
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network. client and the access network.
Scope of this work is identified as designing a network layer The scope of this work is identified as designing a network-layer
transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication
methods. In other words, PANA carries EAP which can carry various methods. In other words, PANA carries EAP, which can carry various
authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling the transport of
above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748]. lower layer), EAP, and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for
network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in
[RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements
[RFC4058] on the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements [RFC4058] of the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements
are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748]. are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
There are components that are part of a complete secure network There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including authentication method choice, data traffic protection, including PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) discovery, authentication
PAA-EP protocol, and PAA discovery. PANA authentication output is method choice, PANA Authentication Agent-Enforcement Point (PAA-EP)
used for creating access control filters. These components are protocol, access control filter creation, and data traffic
described in separate documents (see [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and protection. These components are described in separate documents
[I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]). The readers are recommended to read the (see [RFC5193] and [RFC5192]).
PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading
this protocol specification document.
1.1. Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC): PANA Client (PaC):
The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device
(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the (e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the
credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for
network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are
co-located in the same access device. colocated in the same access device.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA): PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility it
to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and is to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and
authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the
EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are co-located EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are colocated in
in the same node. Note the authentication and authorization the same node. Note the authentication and authorization
procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to
the backend AAA infrastructure. the back end Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
infrastructure.
PANA Session: PANA Session:
A PANA session is established between the PANA Client (PaC) and A PANA session is established between the PANA Client (PaC) and
the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a result of the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and it terminates as a result
an authentication and authorization or liveness test failure, a of an authentication and authorization or liveness test failure, a
message delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum message delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum
values, session lifetime expiration, an explicit termination values, session lifetime expiration, an explicit termination
message or any event that causes discontinuation of the access message or any event that causes discontinuation of the access
service. A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a service. A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a
session. A session cannot be shared across multiple network session. A session cannot be shared across multiple network
interfaces. interfaces.
Session Lifetime: Session Lifetime:
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an
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established, the lifetime SHOULD be set to a value that allows the established, the lifetime SHOULD be set to a value that allows the
PaC to detect a failed session in a reasonable amount of time. PaC to detect a failed session in a reasonable amount of time.
Session Identifier: Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the
message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier
is allocated by the PAA in the initial request message and freed is allocated by the PAA in the initial request message and freed
when the session terminates. The session identifier is assigned when the session terminates. The session identifier is assigned
by the PAA and unique within the PAA. by the PAA and is unique within the PAA.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA): PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA
by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context. by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context.
The formed duplex security association is used to protect the The formed duplex security association is used to protect the
bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA. bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA.
Enforcement Point (EP): Enforcement Point (EP):
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
access devices. The EP and the PAA may be co-located. EPs should access devices. The EP and the PAA may be colocated. EPs should
prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client unless prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client, unless
that data traffic is either PANA or one of the other allowed that data traffic is either PANA or one of the other allowed
traffic types (e.g., ARP, IPv6 neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.). traffic types (e.g., Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), IPv6
neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.).
Master Session Key (MSK): Master Session Key (MSK):
A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported
to the EAP authenticator [RFC3748]. to the EAP authenticator [RFC3748].
For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework For additional terminology definitions, see the PANA framework
document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]. document [RFC5193].
3. Protocol Overview 3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service. access service.
The protocol messaging consists of a series of requests and answers, The protocol messaging consists of a series of requests and answers,
some of which may be initiated by either end. Each message can carry some of which may be initiated by either end. Each message can carry
zero or more AVPs (Attribute-Value Pairs) within the payload. The zero or more AVPs (Attribute-Value Pairs) within the payload. The
main payload of PANA is EAP which performs authentication. PANA main payload of PANA is EAP, which performs authentication. PANA
helps the PaC and PAA establish an EAP session. helps the PaC and PAA establish an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages. mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases: session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Authentication and authorization phase: This is the phase that o Authentication and authorization phase: This is the phase that
initiates a new PANA session and executes EAP between the PAA and initiates a new PANA session and executes EAP between the PAA and
PaC. The PANA session can be initiated by both the PaC and the PaC. The PANA session can be initiated by both the PaC and the
PAA. The EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is what PAA. The EAP payload (which carries an EAP method inside) is what
is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of
authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this
phase. phase.
o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization o Access phase: After successful authentication and authorization,
the access device gains access to the network and can send and the access device gains access to the network and can send and
receive IP traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this receive IP traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this
phase, the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA notification phase, the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA notification
messages to test liveness of the PANA session on the peer. messages to test liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA may, and o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA may, and
the PaC should, initiate re-authentication if they want to update the PaC should, initiate re-authentication if they want to update
the PANA session lifetime before the PANA session lifetime the PANA session lifetime before the PANA session lifetime
expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform re-authentication. expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform re-authentication.
This phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA This phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA
without any respect to the session lifetime. The re- without any respect to the session lifetime. The
authentication phase is a sub-phase of the access phase. The re-authentication phase is a sub-phase of the access phase. The
session moves to this sub-phase from the access phase when re- session moves to this sub-phase from the access phase when
authentication starts, and returns back there upon successful re- re-authentication starts, and returns back there upon successful
authentication. re-authentication.
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end. liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
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The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
establish a PANA session and carry EAP messages between the PaC and establish a PANA session and carry EAP messages between the PaC and
the PAA. The PANA session can be initiated by either the PaC or the the PAA. The PANA session can be initiated by either the PaC or the
PAA. PAA.
PaC-initiated Session: PaC-initiated Session:
When the PaC initiates a PANA session, it sends a When the PaC initiates a PANA session, it sends a
PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not
configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the
PANA session, DHCP [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] is used as the PANA session, DHCP [RFC5192] is used as the default method for
default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the dynamically configuring the IP address of the PAA. Alternative
PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discovering the IP methods for dynamically discovering the IP address of the PAA may
address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated session but they be used for PaC-initiated sessions, but they are outside the scope
are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that of this specification. The PAA that receives the
receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond to the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond to the PaC with a
PaC with a PANA-Auth-Request message. PANA-Auth-Request message.
PAA-initiated Session: PAA-initiated Session:
When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an
unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA
can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this
specification. specification.
A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA and A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA and
carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. The same session carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. The same session
identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages exchanged identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages exchanged
between the PAA and PaC throughout the session. between the PAA and PaC throughout the session.
When the PaC receives the initial PANA-Auth-Request message from a When the PaC receives the initial PANA-Auth-Request message from a
PAA, it responds with a PANA-Auth-Answer message, if it wishes to PAA, it responds with a PANA-Auth-Answer message, if it wishes to
continue the PANA session. Otherwise, it silently discards the PANA- continue the PANA session. Otherwise, it silently discards the
Auth-Request message. PANA-Auth-Request message.
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have
the 'S' (Start) bit set, regardless of whether the session is the 'S' (Start) bit set, regardless of whether the session is
initiated by the PaC or the PAA. Non-initial PANA-Auth-Request and initiated by the PaC or the PAA. Non-initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages as well as any other messages MUST NOT have PANA-Auth-Answer messages as well as any other messages MUST NOT have
the 'S' (Start) bit set. the 'S' (Start) bit set.
It is recommended that the PAA limit the rate it processes incoming It is recommended that the PAA limit the rate at which it processes
PANA-Client-Initiation messages to provide robustness against incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages to provide robustness
denial-of service (DoS) attacks. Details of rate limiting are against denial of service (DoS) attacks. The details of rate
outside the scope of this specification. limiting are outside the scope of this specification.
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP
method, PRF and integrity algorithms to be used for PANA_AUTH_KEY method, the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) and integrity algorithms to
derivation (see Section 5.3) and AUTH AVP calculation (see be used for PANA_AUTH_KEY derivation (see Section 5.3) and AUTH AVP
Section 5.4) are negotiated as follows. The PAA sends the initial calculation (see Section 5.4) are negotiated as follows: the PAA
PANA-Auth-Request carrying one or more PRF-Algorithm AVPs and one or sends the initial PANA-Auth-Request carrying one or more
more Integrity-Algorithm AVPs for the PRF and integrity algorithms PRF-Algorithm AVPs and one or more Integrity-Algorithm AVPs for the
supported by it, respectively. The PaC then selects one PRF PRF and integrity algorithms supported by it, respectively. The PaC
algorithm and one integrity algorithm from these AVPs carried in the then selects one PRF algorithm and one integrity algorithm from these
initial PANA-Auth-Request and responds with the initial AVPs carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request, and it responds with
PANA-Auth-Answer carrying one PRF-Algorithm AVP and one Integrity- the initial PANA-Auth-Answer carrying one PRF-Algorithm AVP and one
Algorithm AVP for the selected algorithms. The negotiation is Integrity-Algorithm AVP for the selected algorithms. The negotiation
protected after the MSK is available, as described in Section 5.3. is protected after the MSK is available, as described in Section 5.3.
If the PAA wants to stay stateless in response to a If the PAA wants to stay stateless in response to a
PANA-Client-Initiation message, it doesn't include an EAP-Payload AVP PANA-Client-Initiation message, it doesn't include an EAP-Payload AVP
in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message, and it should not re- in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message, and it should not
transmit the message on a timer. For this reason, the PaC MUST retransmit the message on a timer. For this reason, the PaC MUST
retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it receives the retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it receives the
second PANA-Auth-Request message (not a retransmission of the initial second PANA-Auth-Request message (not a retransmission of the initial
one) from the PAA. one) from the PAA.
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the PANA It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the PANA
session at the same time, i.e., the PAA unsolicitedly sends the session at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends the initial PANA-Auth-
initial PANA-Auth-Request message while the PaC sends a Request message without solicitation while the PaC sends a
PANA-Client-Initiation message. To resolve the race condition, the PANA-Client-Initiation message. To resolve the race condition, the
PAA MUST silently discard the PANA-Client-Initiation message received PAA MUST silently discard the PANA-Client-Initiation message received
from the PaC after it has sent the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. from the PaC after it has sent the initial PANA-Auth-Request message.
The PAA uses the source IP address and the source port number of the The PAA uses the source IP address and the source port number of the
PANA-Client-Initiation message to identify the PaC among multiple PANA-Client-Initiation message to identify the PaC among multiple
PANA-Client-Initiation messages sent from different PaCs. PANA-Client-Initiation messages sent from different PaCs.
EAP messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. EAP messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages.
PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of
the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message sent the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message sent
from the PaC MAY include the EAP message. This optimization SHOULD from the PaC MAY include the EAP message. This optimization SHOULD
NOT be used when it takes time to generate the EAP message (due to, NOT be used when it takes time to generate the EAP message (due to,
e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an
PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP message can PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP message can
avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages following the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages following the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages (i.e. with the 'S' (Start) bit set), and PANA-Auth-Answer messages (i.e., with the 'S' (Start) bit set), and
MUST NOT be included in any other message, except during re- MUST NOT be included in any other message, except during
authentication procedures (see Section 4.3). re-authentication procedures (see Section 4.3).
The result of PANA authentication is carried in the last The result of PANA authentication is carried in the last
PANA-Auth-Request message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message PANA-Auth-Request message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message
carries the EAP authentication result and the result of PANA carries the EAP authentication result and the result of PANA
authentication. The last PANA-Auth-Request message MUST be authentication. The last PANA-Auth-Request message MUST be
acknowledged with a PANA-Auth-Answer message. The last acknowledged with a PANA-Auth-Answer message. The last
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have the 'C' PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have the 'C'
(Complete) bit set, and any other message MUST NOT have the 'C' (Complete) bit set, and any other message MUST NOT have the 'C'
(Complete) bit set. Figure 1 shows an example sequence in the (Complete) bit set. Figure 1 shows an example sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase for a PaC-initiated session. authentication and authorization phase for a PaC-initiated session.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0) -----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set // The 'S' (Start) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set // The 'S' (Start) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP-Payload] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP-Payload] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP-Payload]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP-Payload] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP-Payload] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
// Piggybacking EAP // Piggybacking EAP
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload, <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH] Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set // The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set // The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 1: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization Figure 1: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase for a PaC-initiated session ("Piggybacking EAP" is the case in phase for a PaC-initiated session ("Piggybacking EAP" is
which an EAP-Payload AVP is carried in PAN.) the case in which an EAP-Payload AVP is carried in PAN)
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP
method and an MSK is successfully generated, the last method and an MSK is successfully generated, the last
PANA-Auth-Request message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST PANA-Auth-Request message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST
contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP for the first derivation of keys contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP for the first derivation of keys
in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP. in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
SHOULD silently terminate the session, expecting that a session SHOULD silently terminate the session, expecting that a session
timeout on the PaC will clean up the state on the PaC. timeout on the PaC will clean up the state on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message, but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA server or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send the last rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send the last
PANA-Auth-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If PANA-Auth-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
an MSK is available, the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer an MSK is available, the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer
messages with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST be protected with an messages with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST be protected with an
AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA session MUST be terminated AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA session MUST be terminated
immediately after the last PANA-Auth message exchange. immediately after the last PANA-Auth message exchange.
The PaC may need to reconfigure IP address after successful For reasons described in Section 3 of [RFC5193], the PaC may need to
authentication and authorization phase to obtain an IP address that reconfigure the IP address after a successful authentication and
is usable for exchanging data traffic through EP. In this case, the authorization phase to obtain an IP address that is usable for
PAA sets the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit of PANA-Auth-Request exchanging data traffic through EP. In this case, the PAA sets the
messages in the authentication and authorization phase to indicate 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit of PANA-Auth-Request messages in the
the PaC the need for IP address reconfiguration. How IP address authentication and authorization phase to indicate to the PaC the
reconfiguration is performed is outside the scope of this document. need for IP address reconfiguration. How IP address reconfiguration
is performed is outside the scope of this document.
4.2. Access Phase 4.2. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase successfully Once the authentication and authorization phase successfully
completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can send and completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can send and
receive IP data traffic through the EP(s) and the PANA session enters receive IP data traffic through the EP(s), and the PANA session
the access phase. In this phase, PANA-Notification-Request and enters the access phase. In this phase, PANA-Notification-Request
PANA-Notification-Answer messages with the 'P' (Ping) bit set (ping and PANA-Notification-Answer messages with the 'P' (Ping) bit set
request and ping answer messages, respectively) can be used for (ping request and ping answer messages, respectively) can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a ping request to the PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a ping request to the
communicating peer whenever they need to ensure the availability of communicating peer whenever they need to ensure the availability of
the session on the peer and expect the peer to return a ping answer the session on the peer, and they expect the peer to return a ping
message. The ping request and answer messages MUST be protected with answer message. The ping request and answer messages MUST be
an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is available. A ping request MUST NOT be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is available. A ping
sent in the authentication and authorization phase, re-authentication request MUST NOT be sent in the authentication and authorization
phase and termination phase. phase, re-authentication phase, and termination phase.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY rate
rate-limit processing the incoming ping requests. It should be noted limit processing the incoming ping requests. It should be noted that
that if a PAA or PaC which considers its connectivity lost after a if a PAA or PaC that considers its connectivity lost after a
relatively small number of unresponsive pings coupled with a peer relatively small number of unresponsive pings is coupled with a peer
that is aggressively rate-limiting the ping request and answer that is aggressively rate limiting the ping request and answer
messages, false-positives could result. Therefore, a PAA or PaC messages, then false-positives could result. Therefore, a PAA or PaC
should not rely on frequent ping operation to quickly determine loss should not rely on frequent ping operation to quickly determine loss
of connectivity. of connectivity.
4.3. Re-authentication Phase 4.3. Re-Authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is terminated. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
When the PaC initiates re-authentication, it sends a When the PaC initiates re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Notification-Request message with the 'A' (re-Authentication) PANA-Notification-Request message with the 'A' (re-Authentication)
bit set (a re-authentication request message) to the PAA. This bit set (a re-authentication request message) to the PAA. This
message MUST contain the session identifier assigned to the session message MUST contain the session identifier assigned to the session
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can arise due to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the can arise due to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the
PaC and PAA when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. PaC and PAA when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication.
The PaC MUST keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it The PaC MUST keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it
receives the answer to its request. receives the answer to its request.
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the
PaC. The PAA MUST initiate EAP re-authentication before the current PaC. The PAA MUST initiate EAP re-authentication before the current
session lifetime expires. session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST NOT reset the Re-authentication of an ongoing PANA session MUST NOT reset the
sequence numbers. sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, re- For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA,
authentication request and answer messages and subsequent re-authentication request and answer messages and subsequent
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. The final PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer with an AUTH AVP. The final PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer
messages and any subsequent PANA message MUST be protected by using messages and any subsequent PANA message MUST be protected by using
the key generated from the latest EAP authentication. the key generated from the latest EAP authentication.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Notification-Request(q)[AUTH] -----> PANA-Notification-Request(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set // The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Notification-Answer(q)[AUTH] <----- PANA-Notification-Answer(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set // The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP-Payload, Nonce, AUTH] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP-Payload, Nonce, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH, Nonce] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH] <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
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// The 'C' (Complete) bit set // The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 2: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated Figure 2: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC by PaC
4.4. Termination Phase 4.4. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for
indication and session revocation procedures. disconnect-indication and session-revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately. the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately.
5. Processing Rules 5. Processing Rules
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PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages. of messages.
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: One is for setting the The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: one is for setting the
sequence number of the next outgoing request, the other is for sequence number of the next outgoing request; the other is for
matching the sequence number of the next incoming request. These matching the sequence number of the next incoming request. These
sequence numbers are 32-bit unsigned numbers. They are monotonically sequence numbers are 32-bit unsigned numbers. They are monotonically
incremented by 1 as new requests are generated and received, and incremented by 1 as new requests are generated and received, and
wrapped to zero on the next message after 2^32-1. Answers always wrapped to zero on the next message after 2^32-1. Answers always
contain the same sequence number as the corresponding request. contain the same sequence number as the corresponding request.
Retransmissions reuse the sequence number contained in the original Retransmissions reuse the sequence number contained in the original
packet. packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
PAA as they send their very first request messages. PAA as they send their very first request messages.
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of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time. outstanding request at a time.
PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until an PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until an
answer is received (in which case the retransmission timer is answer is received (in which case the retransmission timer is
stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value
(in which case the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately). (in which case the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
Section 9 unless a given deployment chooses to use its own Section 9, unless a given deployment chooses to use its own
retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer
characteristics. characteristics.
Unless dropped due to rate limiting, the PaC and PAA MUST respond to Unless dropped due to rate limiting, the PaC and PAA MUST respond to
all duplicate request messages received. The last transmitted answer all duplicate request messages received. The last transmitted answer
MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer and that MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer, which generates
generates a retransmission of the last request. When available, the a retransmission of the last request. When available, the cached
cached answer can be used instead of fully processing the answer can be used instead of fully processing the retransmitted
retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. request and forming a new answer from scratch.
5.3. PANA Security Association 5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not
created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by
the EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA the EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA
re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be
updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to
distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried
in the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with the in the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with the
'C' (Complete) bit set at the end of the EAP authentication which 'C' (Complete) bit set at the end of the EAP authentication, which
resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32
and MUST contain a value that uniquely identifies the MSK within the and MUST contain a value that uniquely identifies the MSK within the
PANA session. The last PANA-Auth-Answer message with the 'C' PANA session. The last PANA-Auth-Answer message with the 'C'
(Complete) bit set in response to the last PANA-Auth-Request message (Complete) bit set in response to the last PANA-Auth-Request message
with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the
same MSK identifier carried in the request. The last same MSK identifier carried in the request. The last
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP
MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by using the new MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by using the new
PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the specification PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the specification
does not mandate a particular method for calculation of the Key-Id does not mandate a particular method for calculation of the Key-Id
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lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when
the corresponding PANA session is terminated. the corresponding PANA session is terminated.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session Identifier * Session Identifier
* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC. * IP address and UDP port number of the PaC
* IP address and UDP port number of the PAA. * IP address and UDP port number of the PAA
* Sequence number for the next outgoing request * Sequence number for the next outgoing request
* Sequence number for the next incoming request * Sequence number for the next incoming request
* Last transmitted message payload * Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval * Retransmission interval
* Session lifetime * Session lifetime
* PANA SA attributes * PANA SA attributes
PANA SA attributes: PANA SA attributes:
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce) * Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce) * Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
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* MSK * MSK
* MSK Identifier * MSK Identifier
* PANA_AUTH_KEY * PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function * Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm * Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK and it is used to The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK, and it is used
integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in to integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in
the following way: the following way:
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, I_PAR|I_PAN|PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Key_ID) PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, "IETF PANA"|I_PAR|I_PAN|
PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Key_ID)
where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The where:
pseudo-random function to be used for the prf+ function is negotiated
using PRF-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and - The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random
PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set. The length of function to be used for the prf+ function is negotiated using
PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See PRF-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY. I_PAR and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
I_PAN are the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages
(the PANA header and the following PANA AVPs) with 'S' (Start) bit - MSK is the master session key generated by the EAP method.
set, respectively. PaC_nonce and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce
AVP carried in the first non-initial PANA-Auth-Answer and - "IETF PANA" is the ASCII code representation of the non-NULL
PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and authorization terminated string (excluding the double quotes around it).
phase or the first PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in
the re-authentication phase, respectively. Key_ID is the value of - I_PAR and I_PAN are the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
the Key-Id AVP. PANA-Auth-Answer messages (the PANA header and the following PANA
AVPs) with 'S' (Start) bit set, respectively.
- PaC_nonce and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce AVP carried in the
first non-initial PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages
in the authentication and authorization phase or the first
PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the
re-authentication phase, respectively.
- Key_ID is the value of the Key-Id AVP.
The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in
use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY.
5.4. Message Authentication 5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
protecting the message. protecting the message.
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the Value field of
the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way: following way:
AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU) AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with
the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH the AUTH AVP Value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH
represents the integrity algorithm negotiated using Integrity- represents the integrity algorithm negotiated using
Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer Integrity-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set. The PaC and PAA
integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and MUST use the same integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they
receive. originate and receive.
5.5. Message Validity Check 5.5. Message Validity Check
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be
invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met: invalid, at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, flags, session sequence number, message length, message type, flags, session
identifier, etc. identifier, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and state. Specifically, the following messages are unexpected and
invalid: invalid:
* In the authentication and authorization phase: * In the authentication and authorization phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation after completion of the initial + PANA-Client-Initiation after completion of the initial
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S'
(Start) bit set. (Start) bit set.
+ Re-authentication request. + Re-authentication request.
skipping to change at page 19, line 27 skipping to change at page 18, line 34
+ PANA-Client-Initiation. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
* In the termination phase: * In the termination phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation. + PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request and ping request. + All requests but PANA-Termination-Request and ping request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included message type. There is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position, in the payload, and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position. is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is recognized and decoded correctly. o Each AVP is recognized and decoded correctly.
o Once the PANA authentication succeeds using a key-generating EAP o Once the PANA authentication succeeds in using a key-generating
method, the PANA-Auth-Request message that carries the EAP Success EAP method, the PANA-Auth-Request message that carries the EAP
and any subsequent message in that session contain an AUTH AVP. Success and any subsequent message in that session contains an
The AVP value matches the hash value computed against the received AUTH AVP. The AVP value matches the hash value computed against
message. the received message.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. against DoS attacks.
5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address 5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address
A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations, A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations,
e.g., when IP address reconfiguration is needed for the PaC to obtain e.g., when IP address reconfiguration is needed for the PaC to obtain
an IP address after successful PANA authentication (see Section 4.1) an IP address after successful PANA authentication (see Section 3 of
or when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within the same [RFC5193]) or when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within
PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA needs to the same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA
be notified about the change of PaC address. needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send
any valid PANA message. If the message that carries the new PaC IP any valid PANA message. If the message that carries the new PaC IP
address in the Source Address field of the IP header is valid, the address in the Source Address field of the IP header is valid, the
PAA MUST update the PANA session with the new PaC address. If there PAA MUST update the PANA session with the new PaC address. If there
is an established PANA SA, the message MUST be protected with an AUTH is an established PANA SA, the message MUST be protected with an AUTH
AVP. AVP.
5.7. Session Lifetime 5.7. Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime and the lifetime is indicated to the PaC When the session lifetime, and the lifetime is indicated to the PaC when the
network access authorization succeeds. For this purpose, when the network access authorization succeeds. For this purpose, when the
last PANA-Auth-Request message (i.e., with the 'C' (Complete) bit last PANA-Auth-Request message (i.e., with the 'C' (Complete) bit
set) in authentication and authorization phase or re-authentication set) in authentication and authorization phase or re-authentication
phase carries a Result-Code AVP with a value of PANA_SUCCESS, a phase carries a Result-Code AVP with a value of PANA_SUCCESS, a
Session-Lifetime AVP MUST also be carried in the message. A Session- Session-Lifetime AVP MUST also be carried in the message. A
Lifetime AVP MUST be ignored when included in other PANA messages. Session-Lifetime AVP MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC MUST initiate the re- PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC MUST initiate the
authentication phase before the current session lifetime expires if re-authentication phase before the current session lifetime expires,
it wants to extend the session. if it wants to extend the session.
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g., The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only
hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the ping request and answer exchange hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the ping request and answer exchange
to verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless to verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless
information obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the information obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the
detection of a disconnected peer. detection of a disconnected peer.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
ping request messages. These messages can be used for asynchronously ping request messages. These messages can be used for asynchronously
verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to send a ping verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to send a ping
request message is taken locally and does not require coordination request message is made locally and does not require coordination
between the peers. between the peers.
6. Message Format 6. Message Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol. This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1. IP and UDP Headers 6.1. IP and UDP Headers
Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA.
For any PANA message sent from the peer that has initiated the PANA For any PANA message sent from the peer that has initiated the PANA
session, the UDP source port is set to any number on which the peer session, the UDP source port is set to any number on which the peer
can receive incoming PANA messages and the destination port is set to can receive incoming PANA messages, and the destination port is set
the assigned PANA port number (to be assigned by IANA). For any PANA to the assigned PANA port number (716). For any PANA message sent
message sent from the other peer, the source port is set to the from the other peer, the source port is set to the assigned PANA port
assigned PANA port number (to be assigned by IANA) and the number (716), and the destination port is copied from the source port
destination port is copied from the source port of the last received of the last received message. In case both the PaC and PAA initiate
message. In case both the PaC and PAA initiates the session (i.e., the session (i.e., PANA-Client-Initiation and unsolicited PANA-Auth-
PANA-Client-Initiation and unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request messages Request messages cross each other), then the PaC is identified as the
cross each other), then the PaC is identified as the initiator. All initiator. All PANA peers MUST listen on the assigned PANA port
PANA peers MUST listen on the assigned PANA port number (to be number (716).
assigned by IANA).
6.2. PANA Message Header 6.2. PANA Message Header
A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted in network byte order. fields are transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Message Length | | Reserved | Message Length |
skipping to change at page 21, line 47 skipping to change at page 20, line 46
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Identifier | | Session Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ... | AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Reserved Reserved
This 16-bit field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set to This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero and ignored by the receiver.
Message Length Message Length
The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields. the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned: The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S C A P I r r r r r r r r r r| |R S C A P I r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R (Request) R (Request)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is an
an answer. answer.
S (Start) S (Start)
If set, the message is the first PANA-Auth-Request or PANA- If set, the message is the first PANA-Auth-Request or
Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For
other messages, this bit MUST be cleared. other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
C (Complete) C (Complete)
If set, the message is the last PANA-Auth-Request or PANA-Auth- If set, the message is the last PANA-Auth-Request or
Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For other PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For
messages this bit MUST be cleared. other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
A (re-Authentication) A (re-Authentication)
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or PANA- If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or
Notification-Answer to initiate re-authentication. For other PANA-Notification-Answer to initiate re-authentication. For other
messages this bit MUST be cleared. messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
P (Ping) P (Ping)
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or PANA- If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or
Notification-Answer for liveness test. For other messages this PANA-Notification-Answer for liveness test. For other messages,
bit MUST be cleared. this bit MUST be cleared.
I (IP Reconfiguration) I (IP Reconfiguration)
If set, it indicates that the PaC is required to perform IP If set, it indicates that the PaC is required to perform IP
address reconfiguration after successful authentication and address reconfiguration after successful authentication and
authorization phase to configure an IP address that is usable authorization phase to configure an IP address that is usable for
for exchanging data traffic across EP. This bit is set by the exchanging data traffic across EP. This bit is set by the PAA
PAA and only for PANA-Auth-Request messages in the only for PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and
authentication and authorization phase. For other messages, authorization phase. For other messages, this bit MUST be
this bit MUST be cleared . cleared.
r (reserved) r (reserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to The Message Type field is two octets, and it is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. Message Type communicate the message type with the message. Message Type
allocation is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. allocation is managed by IANA [IANAWEB].
Session Identifier Session Identifier
This field contains a 32 bit session identifier. This field contains a 32-bit session identifier.
Sequence Number Sequence Number
This field contains contains a 32 bit sequence number. This field contains a 32-bit sequence number.
AVPs AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on PANA message. See Section 6.3 for more information on AVPs.
AVPs.
6.3. AVP Format 6.3. AVP Format
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of
zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Value field till a zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Value field until a
word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected
in the AVP Length field [RFC3588]. in the AVP Length field [RFC3588].
The fields in the AVP are sent in network byte order. The AVP format The fields in the AVP are sent in network byte order. The AVP format
is: is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags | | AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved | | AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) | | Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value ... | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Code AVP Code
The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor ID field, The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor-Id field,
identifies attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set, the identifies an attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set,
Vendor ID is not present and the AVP Code refers to an IETF then the Vendor-Id is not present and the AVP Code refers to an
attribute. IETF attribute.
AVP Flags AVP Flags
The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are
assigned: assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |V r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
V (Vendor) V (Vendor)
The 'V' (Vendor) bit indicates whether the optional Vendor-Id The 'V' (Vendor) bit indicates whether the optional Vendor-Id
field is present in the AVP header. When set the AVP Code field is present in the AVP header. When set, the AVP Code
belongs to the specific vendor code address space. All AVPs belongs to the specific vendor code address space. All AVPs
defined in this document MUST have the 'V' (Vendor) bit defined in this document MUST have the 'V' (Vendor) bit cleared.
cleared.
r (reserved) r (reserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero and ignored by the receiver.
AVP Length AVP Length
The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of
octets in the Value field. The length of the AVP Code, AVP octets in the Value field. The length of the AVP Code, AVP
Length, AVP Flags, Reserved and Vendor-Id fields are not counted Length, AVP Flags, Reserved and Vendor-Id fields are not counted
in the AVP Length value. in the AVP Length value.
Reserved Reserved
This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set This two-octet field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set
to zero, and ignored by the receiver. to zero and ignored by the receiver.
Vendor-Id Vendor-Id
The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' (Vendor) bit is set in The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' (Vendor) bit is set in
the AVP Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field the AVP Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field
contains the IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private contains the IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private
Enterprise Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order. Enterprise Codes" [IANAWEB] value, encoded in network byte order.
Any vendor wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST Any vendor wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST
use their own Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP use their own Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP
address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with any address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with any
other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s) nor with future IETF
applications. applications.
Value Value
The Value field is zero or more octets and contains information The Value field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format of the Value field is specific to the Attribute. The format of the Value field is
determined by the AVP Code and Vendor-Id fields. The length of determined by the AVP Code and Vendor-Id fields. The length of
the Value field is determined by the AVP Length field. the Value field is determined by the AVP Length field.
7. PANA Messages 7. PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a sequence number, and
the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R'
(Request) bit in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header. (Request) bit in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header.
Every PANA message MUST contain a message type in its header's Every PANA message MUST contain a message type in its header's
Message Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to Message Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to
be taken for a particular message. Figure 3 lists all PANA messages be taken for a particular message. Figure 3 lists all PANA messages
defined in this document: defined in this document:
Message Name Abbrev. Message PaC<->PAA Ref. Message Name Abbrev. Message PaC<->PAA Ref.
Type Type
---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1 PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 2 <-------> 7.2 PANA-Auth-Request PAR 2 <-------> 7.2
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 2 <-------> 7.3 PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 2 <-------> 7.3
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 3 <-------> 7.4 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 3 <-------> 7.5 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Notification-Request PNR 4 <-------> 7.6 PANA-Notification-Request PNR 4 <-------> 7.6
PANA-Notification-Answer PNA 4 <-------> 7.7 PANA-Notification-Answer PNA 4 <-------> 7.7
---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3: Table of PANA Messages Figure 3: Table of PANA Messages
The language used for PANA message definitions (i.e., AVPs valid for The language used for PANA message definitions (i.e., AVPs valid for
that PANA message type) in Section 7.1 through Section 7.7 is defined that PANA message type), in Section 7.1 through Section 7.7, is
using ABNF [RFC4234] as follows: defined using ABNF [RFC5234] as follows:
message-def = Message-Name LWSP "::=" LWSP PANA-message message-def = Message-Name LWSP "::=" LWSP PANA-message
Message-Name = PANA-name Message-Name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header LWSP *fixed LWSP *required PANA-message = header LWSP *fixed LWSP *required
LWSP *optional LWSP *fixed LWSP *optional LWSP *fixed
skipping to change at page 27, line 46 skipping to change at page 26, line 45
fixed = [qual] "<" LWSP avp-spec LWSP ">" fixed = [qual] "<" LWSP avp-spec LWSP ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP. ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" LWSP avp-spec LWSP "}" required = [qual] "{" LWSP avp-spec LWSP "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message. ; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" LWSP avp-name LWSP "]" optional = [qual] "[" LWSP avp-name LWSP "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included ; evaluate any AVP Name that is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can ; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message. ; appear anywhere in the message.
qual = [min] "*" [max] qual = [min] "*" [max]
; See ABNF conventions, RFC 4234 Section 3.6. ; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234 Section 3.6.
; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether ; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether
; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional ; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional
; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no ; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no
; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST ; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
; be present. If an optional rule has no ; be present. If an optional rule has no
; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be ; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
; present. ; present.
; ;
; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning ; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning
; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above). ; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above).
skipping to change at page 30, line 16 skipping to change at page 29, line 16
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request. or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 > PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
*[ AVP ] *[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH > 0*1< AUTH >
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) 7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR)
The PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) message is used for signaling re- The PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) message is used for signaling
authentication and performing liveness test. See Section 4.3 and re-authentication and performing liveness test. See Section 4.3 and
Section 4.2 for details on re-authentication and liveness test, Section 4.2 for details on re-authentication and liveness test,
respectively. respectively.
The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P' The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P'
(Ping) bits exclusively set. (Ping) bits exclusively set.
PANA-Notification-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4,REQ[,REA][,PIN] > PANA-Notification-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4,REQ[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ] *[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH > 0*1< AUTH >
skipping to change at page 31, line 12 skipping to change at page 29, line 48
*[ AVP ] *[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH > 0*1< AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA 8. AVPs in PANA
This document uses AVP Value Format such as 'OctetString' and This document uses AVP Value Format such as 'OctetString' and
'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3588]. The definitions 'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3588]. The definitions
of these data formats are not repeated in this document. of these data formats are not repeated in this document.
The following table lists the AVPs used in this document, and The following table lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present. specifies in which PANA messages they MAY or MAY NOT be present.
The table uses the following symbols: The table uses the following symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message. 0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
It is considered an error if there are more than one instance It is considered an error if there is more than one instance of
of the AVP. the AVP.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. 1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
0+ Zero or more instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message.
+---------------------------+ +---------------------------+
| Message Type | | Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PCI|PAR|PAN|PTR|PTA|PNR|PNA| Attribute Name |PCI|PAR|PAN|PTR|PTA|PNR|PNA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
AUTH | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| AUTH | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Integrity-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Integrity-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
skipping to change at page 32, line 14 skipping to change at page 31, line 8
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP 8.2. EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for encapsulating the actual The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString. authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP 8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP
The Integrity-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for conveying the The Integrity-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for conveying the
the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of type
type Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm. All PANA version 2 (IKEv2) Transform ID of Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the
implementations MUST support AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC4595]. integrity algorithm. All PANA implementations MUST support
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC4595].
8.4. Key-Id AVP 8.4. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is of type Integer32, and contains an MSK The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is of type Integer32 and contains an MSK
identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique
within the PANA session. within the PANA session.
8.5. Nonce AVP 8.5. Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 5) carries a randomly chosen value that is The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 5) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in
[RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP [RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP
data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated data is of type OctetString, and it contains a randomly generated
value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256
octets inclusive. octets, inclusive.
The length of the nonces are determined based on the available The length of the nonces are determined based on the available
pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into
the PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the the PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the
random value for the nonce is determined in one of the two ways, random value for the nonce is determined in one of two ways,
depending on whether depending on whether:
1. The PaC and the PAA each are likely to be able to compute a 1. The PaC and the PAA each are likely to be able to compute a
random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length of the nonce random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length of the nonce
has to be 1/2 the length of the PRF key (e.g., 10 octets in the has to be 1/2 the length of the PRF key (e.g., 10 octets in the
case of HMAC-SHA1). case of HMAC-SHA1).
2. The PaC and the PAA each are not trusted with regard to the 2. The PaC and the PAA each are not trusted with regard to the
computation of a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The computation of a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The
length of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key length of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key
(e.g., 20 octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1). (e.g., 20 octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be Furthermore, the strongest available PRF for PANA has to be
considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely
HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20 HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20
octets). The maximum length of the nonce value SHOULD be therefore octets. Therefore, the maximum length of the nonce value SHOULD be
20 octets. 20 octets.
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP 8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP
The PRF-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for conveying the pseudo- The PRF-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for conveying the
random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY. The AVP data is of type pseudo-random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY. The AVP data is of
Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform type Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Type 2 [RFC4306]. All PANA implementations MUST support Transform Type 2 [RFC4306]. All PANA implementations MUST support
PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104]. PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104].
8.7. Result-Code AVP 8.7. Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully. Result- whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully.
Code AVP values are described below. Result-Code AVP values are described below.
PANA_SUCCESS 0 PANA_SUCCESS 0
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1 PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1
Authentication has failed. When authentication fails, Authentication has failed. When authentication fails,
authorization is also considered to have failed. authorization is also considered to have failed.
skipping to change at page 34, line 7 skipping to change at page 33, line 14
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP 8.9. Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) is used for indicating the The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA. used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA) LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect The client initiated a disconnect.
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC) ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to The client was not granted access or was disconnected due to
administrative reasons. administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC) SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated. The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
9. Retransmission Timers 9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the
PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages. PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request/response-based protocol. The specification. PANA is a request/response-based protocol. The
message exchange terminates when the requester successfully receives message exchange terminates when the requester successfully receives
the answer or the message exchange is considered to have failed the answer, or the message exchange is considered to have failed
according to the retransmission mechanism described below. according to the retransmission mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
following variables: following variables:
RT Retransmission timeout from the previous RT Retransmission timeout from the previous (re)transmission
(re)transmission
IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission
MRC Maximum retransmission count MRC Maximum retransmission count
MRT Maximum retransmission time MRT Maximum retransmission time
MRD Maximum retransmission duration MRD Maximum retransmission duration
RAND Randomization factor RAND Randomization factor
skipping to change at page 35, line 32 skipping to change at page 34, line 4
IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission
MRC Maximum retransmission count MRC Maximum retransmission count
MRT Maximum retransmission time MRT Maximum retransmission time
MRD Maximum retransmission duration MRD Maximum retransmission duration
RAND Randomization factor RAND Randomization factor
With each message transmission or retransmission, the sender sets RT With each message transmission or retransmission, the sender sets RT
according to the rules given below. If RT expires before the message according to the rules given below. If RT expires before the message
exchange terminates, the sender recomputes RT and retransmits the exchange terminates, the sender recomputes RT and retransmits the
message. message.
Each of the computations of a new RT include a randomization factor Each of the computations of a new RT include a randomization factor
(RAND), which is a random number chosen with a uniform distribution (RAND), which is a random number chosen with a uniform distribution
between -0.1 and +0.1. The randomization factor is included to between -0.1 and +0.1. The randomization factor is included to
minimize synchronization of messages. minimize the synchronization of messages.
The algorithm for choosing a random number does not need to be The algorithm for choosing a random number does not need to be
cryptographically sound. The algorithm SHOULD produce a different cryptographically sound. The algorithm SHOULD produce a different
sequence of random numbers from each invocation. sequence of random numbers from each invocation.
RT for the first message retransmission is based on IRT: RT for the first message retransmission is based on IRT:
RT = IRT + RAND*IRT RT = IRT + RAND*IRT
RT for each subsequent message retransmission is based on the RT for each subsequent message retransmission is based on the
skipping to change at page 36, line 33 skipping to change at page 35, line 8
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests that are retransmitted retransmission behavior of PANA requests (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-
(REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows default values.
default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout. PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value. PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PCI_MRC 0 Max PCI retransmission attempts. PCI_MRC 0 Max PCI retransmission attempts.
PCI_MRD 0 Max PCI retransmission duration. PCI_MRD 0 Max PCI retransmission duration.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retransmission attempts. REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retransmission attempts.
REQ_MRD 0 Max Request retransmission duration. REQ_MRD 0 Max Request retransmission duration.
So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using So, for example, the first RT for the PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message
REQ_IRT as the IRT: is calculated using REQ_IRT as the IRT:
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the PANA Authority (IANA) regarding the registration of values related to the
protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following policies PANA protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following
are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use", policies are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private
"First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required", Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification
"IETF Consensus", "Standards Action". Required", "IETF Consensus", and "Standards Action".
This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for
assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document. assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document.
For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be
consulted, the responsible IESG area director should appoint the consulted, the responsible IESG Area Director should appoint the
Designated Expert. For Designated Expert with Specification Designated Expert. For Designated Expert with Specification
Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if
it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director) it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director)
for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public
specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated
Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable. request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
An IANA registry for PANA needs to be created by IANA. IANA has created a registry for PANA.
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number Section 6.1), which needs to PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (see Section 6.1), which has
be assigned by the IANA. been assigned by the IANA (716).
10.2. PANA Message Header 10.2. PANA Message Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two
fields that requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and fields that require IANA namespace management; the Message Type and
Flags fields. Flags fields.
10.2.1. Message Type 10.2.1. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. The The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages.
range of values 0 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types, Message Type 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. The range of
values 1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types,
allocated by IETF Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the range allocated by IETF Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the range
of values 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both the request of values 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both the request
and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request bit and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request bit
distinguishes requests from answers. See Section 7 for the distinguishes requests from answers. See Section 7 for the
assignment of the namespace in this specification. assignment of the namespace in this specification.
The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 - The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 -
0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are 0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are
only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.2.2. Flags 10.2.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header. There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
This document assigns bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3 ('A'), 4 ('P') This document assigns bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3 ('A'), 4
and 5 ('I') in Section 6.2. The remaining bits MUST only be assigned ('P'), and 5 ('I') in Section 6.2. The remaining bits MUST only be
via a Standards Action [IANA]. assigned via a Standards Action [IANA].
10.3. AVP Header 10.3. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and require IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags, and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new Vendor-Id fields, where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags created new
namespaces. namespaces.
10.3.1. AVP Code 10.3.1. AVP Code
The 16-bit AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There The 16-bit AVP code namespace is used to identify attributes. There
are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP codes
namespace which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as namespace, which will be identified by their Vendor-Id (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their Enterprise-Number), and they control the assignments of their
vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of
a Vendor-ID identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP Codes namespace. a Vendor-Id identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP codes namespace.
The AVP Codes and sometimes also possible values in an AVP are The AVP codes, and sometimes also possible values in an AVP, are
controlled and maintained by IANA. controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-9. AVP Code 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. This document
See Section 8.1 through Section 8.9 for the assignment of the defines the AVP Codes 1-9. See Section 8.1 through Section 8.9 for
namespace in this specification. the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert Review with AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert Review with
Specification Required [IANA] or Standards Action. Specification Required [IANA] or Standards Action.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVP codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead. be encouraged instead.
10.3.2. Flags 10.3.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'). The remaining in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'). The remaining
skipping to change at page 39, line 20 skipping to change at page 37, line 47
10.4. AVP Values 10.4. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values 10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.7 the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) defines As defined in Section 8.7, the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) defines
the values 0-2. the values 0-2.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values 10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.9, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) As defined in Section 8.9, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. defines the values 1, 4, and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes. Various security threats that are between two IP-enabled nodes. Various security threats that are
relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined in [RFC4016]. relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined in [RFC4016].
Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP and EAP methods Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP and EAP methods
are discussed in [RFC3748] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]. This section are discussed in [RFC3748] [EAP-KEYING]. This section provides a
provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are related discussion on the security-related issues that are related to PANA
to PANA framework and protocol design. framework and protocol design.
An important element in assessing security of PANA design and An important element in assessing the security of PANA design and
deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer security. In deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer security. In
the context of this document, lower-layers are said to be secure if the context of this document, lower layers are said to be secure if
the environment provides adequate protection against spoofing and the environment provides adequate protection against spoofing and
confidentiality based on its operational needs. For example, DSL and confidentiality based on its operational needs. For example, DSL and
cdma2000 networks' lower-layer security is enabled even before cdma2000 networks' lower-layer security is enabled even before
running the first PANA-based authentication. In the absence of such running the first PANA-based authentication. In the absence of such
a pre-established secure channel prior to running PANA, one can be a preestablished secure channel prior to running PANA, one can be
created after the successful PANA authentication using a link-layer created after the successful PANA authentication using a link-layer
or network-layer cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec). or network-layer cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
11.1. General Security Measures 11.1. General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session. PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and they are
against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence verified against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose
number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In sequence number is different than the expected one is silently
addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and discarded. In addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP
duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary messages and duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an
spoofing messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it adversary from spoofing messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP
can also eavesdrop to synchronize on the expected sequence number. sessions unless it can also eavesdrop to synchronize with the
Furthermore, impact of replay attacks is reduced as any stale message expected sequence number. Furthermore, impact of replay attacks is
(i.e., a request or answer with an unexpected sequence number and/or reduced as any stale message (i.e., a request or answer with an
a session identifier for a non-existing session) and any duplicate unexpected sequence number and/or a session identifier for a
answer are immediately discarded, and a duplicate request can trigger non-existing session) and any duplicate answer are immediately
transmission of the cached answer (i.e., no need to process the discarded, and a duplicate request can trigger transmission of the
request and generate a new answer). cached answer (i.e., no need to process the request and generate a
new answer).
The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network The PANA framework defines EP, which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as the initial PANA-Auth-Request discard unauthorized packets, such as the initial PANA-Auth-Request
message that is received from the segment of the access network where message that is received from the segment of the access network,
only the PaCs are supposed to be connected (i.e., preventing PAA where only the PaCs are supposed to be connected (i.e., preventing
impersonation). PAA impersonation).
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by
the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete
EAP message). EAP message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the PANA-Auth-Request earliest this protection can be enabled is when the PANA-Auth-Request
message that signals a successful authentication (EAP Success) is message that signals a successful authentication (EAP Success) is
generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message
until the session gets torn down can be cryptographically protected. can be cryptographically protected until the session gets torn down.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to the PANA session lifetime,
bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication which is bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the
server. An implementation MAY add a grace period to that value. authentication server. An implementation MAY add a grace period to
Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP that value. Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another
authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session EAP authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires. expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating environment. Insecure lower layers necessitate the use of
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured, key-generating EAP methods. In networks where lower layers are
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary. already secured, cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not
necessary.
11.2. Initial Exchange 11.2. Initial Exchange
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange is The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange is
vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these messages are not vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these messages are not
authenticated and integrity protected. In order to prevent very authenticated and integrity protected. In order to prevent very
basic DoS attacks an adversary should not be able to cause state basic DoS attacks, an adversary should not be able to cause state
creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation messages to the PAA. This creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation messages to the PAA. This
protection is achieved by allowing the responder (PAA) to create as protection is achieved by allowing the responder (PAA) to create as
little amount of state as possible in the initial message exchange. little state as possible in the initial message exchange. However,
However, it is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the it is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the initial
initial message exchange entirely. message exchange entirely.
11.3. EAP Methods 11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used, then it allows
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy the adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case, a
problem is prevalent. privacy problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using To prevent these threats, [RFC5193] suggests using proper EAP methods
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the for particular environments. Depending on the deployment
deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports environment, an EAP authentication method that supports user-identity
user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks, and
and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the session-key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method. EAP method.
11.4. Cryptographic Keys 11.4. Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into is unique to the PANA session, and it takes PANA-based nonce values
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK. into computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for the authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session. protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new MSK, and updates the PANA SA, execution of the EAP method yields a new MSK, and it updates the PANA
PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID. SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY, and key ID.
11.5. Per-packet Ciphering 11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data-traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and use the keys generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and uses the keys
with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic
protection such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering protection, such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering [PANA-IPSEC].
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. These mechanisms ultimately establish a These mechanisms ultimately establish a cryptographic binding between
cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a the data traffic generated by and for a client and the authenticated
client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic identity of the client. Data traffic can be data origin
can be data origin authenticated, replay and integrity protected, and authenticated, replay and integrity protected, and optionally
optionally encrypted using the cryptographic keys. How these keys encrypted using the cryptographic keys. How these keys are generated
are generated from the PANA SA and used with a secure association from the PANA SA and used with a secure association protocol is
protocol is outside the scope of this document. outside the scope of this document.
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication 11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. The protocol The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. The protocol
exchange between the PAA and EP for provisioning authorized PaC exchange between the PAA and EP for provisioning authorized PaC
information on the EP must be protected for authentication, integrity information on the EP must be protected for authentication,
and replay protection. integrity, and replay protection.
11.7. Liveness Test 11.7. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected is when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
in access phase, expecting the peer to respond with an answer in access phase with the expectation that the peer responds with an
message. A successful round-trip of this exchange is a simple answer message. A successful round-trip of this exchange is a simple
verification that the peer is alive. verification that the peer is alive.
This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the peer This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the peer
might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data
traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this
exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care as it might result exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care, as it might result
in congestion and hence false alarms. in congestion and hence false alarms.
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality. this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness. request message can be taken as an indication of a peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit ping request message if The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit ping request message if
a recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive. a recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.8. Early Termination of a Session 11.8. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan
Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen,
Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson,
Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer
Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba, Subir Das and all members of the PANA Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba, Subir Das, John Vollbrecht, Prakash
working group for their valuable comments to this document. Jayaraman, and all members of the PANA working group for their
valuable comments on this document.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September
2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", H. Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
RFC 3748, June 2004. (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC
4086, June 2005.
[RFC4234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005. Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January
2008.
[I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] [RFC5192] Morand, L., Yegin A., Kumar S., and S. Madanapalli,
Morand, L., "DHCP options for PANA Authentication Agents", "DHCP Options for Protocol for Carrying Authentication
draft-ietf-dhc-paa-option-05 (work in progress), for Network Access (PANA) Authentication Agents", RFC
December 2006. 5192, May 2008.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC
October 1998. 2434, October 1998.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication [RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security Authentication and Network Access (PANA) Threat
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005. Analysis and Security Requirements", RFC 4016, March
2005.
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang, [RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ed., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access C. Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005. Network Access (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May
2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, [RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005. (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
RFC 4306, December 2005. Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel [RFC4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre
Security Association Management Protocol", RFC 4595, Channel Security Association Management Protocol", RFC
July 2006. 4595, July 2006.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying] [RFC5193] Jayaraman, P., Lopez R., Ohba Y., Ed., Parthasarathy,
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key M., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-18 (work in for Network Access (PANA) Framework", RFC 5193, May
progress), February 2007. 2008.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [EAP-KEYING] Aboba, B., Simon D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress), Framework", Work in Progress, November 2007.
July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [PANA-IPSEC] Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Jayaraman, P., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Control", Work in progress, July 2005.
Network Access (PANA) Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-09 (work in progress),
June 2007.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [IANAWEB] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407 P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470 Phone: +358 50 4839470
Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com EMail: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Yoshihiro Ohba Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc. Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive 1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854 Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5305 Phone: +1 732 699 5305
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com EMail: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Basavaraj Patil Basavaraj Patil
Nokia Nokia Siemens Networks
6000 Connection Dr. 6000 Connection Drive
Irving, TX 75039 Irving, TX 75039
USA USA
Phone: +1 972-894-6709 EMail: basavaraj.patil@nsn.com
Email: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens Corporate Technology Nokia Siemens Networks
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600
81739 Munich Finland
Germany
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Alper E. Yegin Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology Samsung
Istanbul, Istanbul, Turkey
Turkey
Phone: +90 533 348 2402 EMail: a.yegin@partner.samsung.com
Email: alper.yegin@yegin.org
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
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attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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