PANA Working GroupV. Fajardo, Ed.Weihong Wang Internet-DraftY. OhbaZhejiang University of Technology, China Intended status:Informational TARIExperimental Tieming Chen Expires:October 25, 2009 R. Lopez Univ. of Murcia April 23,January 2, 2010 Zhejiang University of Technology, China Yubing Lin Zhejiang University of Technology, China Yiling Cui Zhejiang University of Technology, China July 3, 2009State Machines for Protocol for CarryingBasic Security Requirements of Authenticationfor Network Access (PANA) draft-ietf-pana-statemachine-12Protocol on Ad hoc draft-ietf-pana-statemachine-13.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. 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Abstract This documentdefines the conceptual state machines for the Protocol for Carrying Authenticationspecifies basic security standards forNetwork Access (PANA).authentication protocol on Ad hoc. Thestate machines consist ofsecurity standards are based on thePANA Client (PaC) state machineECDH to discover a authentication protocol between two nodes, and on thePANA Authentication Agent (PAA) state machine. TheTinyOS simulation platform and Mica nodes. This document also defines elements of procedure for authentication protocol, including System Initialization, Key extract and the identity authentication. With these standards, authentication between twostate machines show how PANAnodes caninterface with the EAP state machines. The state machinesbe completed in a certain time andassociated model are informative only. Implementations may achieve the same results using different methods.a certain circles. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 3.Interface Between PANAOverview of ECC Encryption andEAPTinyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. ECC Encryption . . . .6 4. Document Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. TinyOS . . . .8 5. Notations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1 Struce of TinyOS. . . . .9 6. Common Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2 NesC programming language . . . . . . . . . .11 6.1. Common Procedures. . . . . 7 3.3 Introduction of TinyECC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 6.2. Common Variables. . . 8 3.3.1 System's main modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.2 Working process .13 6.3. Configurable Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 6.4. Common Message Initialization Rules8 4. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . .15 6.5. Common Retransmition Rules. . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Flow and Structure . . . . . .15 6.6. Common State Transitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Implementation . . .15 7. PaC State Machine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Analysis of Protocol . . .18 7.1. Interface between PaC and EAP Peer. . . . . . . . . . . .18 7.1.1. Delivering EAP Messages from PaC to EAP Peer. . . . 10 4.3.1 Performance Analysis .18 7.1.2. Delivering EAP Messages from EAP Peer to PaC. . . . .18 7.1.3. EAP Restart Notification from PaC to EAP Peer. . . .18 7.1.4. EAP Authentication Result Notification from EAP Peer to PaC. . . . . . . 10 4.3.2 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 7.1.5. Alternate Failure Notification from PaC to EAP Peer.19 7.2. Configurable Values. . . . 11 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 7.3. Variables. . . . 11 5.1. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. IANA Considerations . .19 7.4. Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Contributors . . . . .20 7.5. PaC State Transition Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 8. PAA State Machine. . . . 12 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 8.1. Interface between PAA and EAP Authenticator. . . . . 13 9. References . .27 8.1.1. EAP Restart Notification from PAA to EAP Authenticator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 8.1.2. Delivering EAP Responses from PAA to EAP Authenticator. . . . 13 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 8.1.3. Delivering EAP Messages from EAP Authenticator to PAA. . . 13 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . .27 8.1.4. EAP Authentication Result Notification from EAP Authenticator to PAA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 8.2. Variables. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8.3. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.4. PAA State Transition Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 9.1. PAA and PaC Interface to Service Management Entity . . . . 35 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 1. Introduction This document defines the state machines for Protocol Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191]. There are state machines for the PANA client (PaC) and for the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA). Each state machine is specified through a set of variables, procedures and a state transition table. The state machines and associated models described in this document are informative only. Implementations may achieve similar results using different models and/or methods. A PANA protocol execution consists of several exchanges to carry authentication information. Specifically, EAP PDUs are transported inside PANA PDUs between PaC and PAA, that is PANA represents a lower layer for EAP protocol. Thus, a PANA state machine bases its execution on an EAP state machine execution and vice versa. Thus this document also shows for each of PaC and PAA an interface between an EAP state machine and a PANA state machine and how this interface allows to exchange information between them. Thanks to this interface, a PANA state machine can be informed about several events generated in an EAP state machine and make its execution conditional to its events. The details of EAP state machines are out of the scope of this document. Additional information can be found in [RFC4137]. Nevertheless PANA state machines presented here have been coordinated with state machines shown by [RFC4137]. This document, apart from defining PaC and PAA state machines and their interfaces to EAP state machines (running on top of PANA), provides some implementation considerations, taking into account that it is not a specification but an implementation guideline. 2. Terminology This document reuses the terminology used in [RFC5191]. 3. Interface Between PANA and EAP PANA carries EAP messages exchanged between an EAP peer and an EAP authenticator (see Figure 1). Thus a PANA state machine interacts with an EAP state machine. Two state machines are defined in this document : the PaC state machine (see Section 7) and the PAA state machine (see Section 8). The definition of each state machine consists of a set of variables, procedures and a state transition table. A subset of these variables and procedures defines the interface between a PANA state machine and an EAP state machine and the state transition table defines the PANA state machine behavior based on results obtained through them. On the one hand, the PaC state machine interacts with an EAP peer state machine in order to carry out the PANA protocol on the PaC side. On the other hand, the PAA state machine interacts with an EAP authenticator state machine to run the PANA protocol on the PAA side. Peer |EAP Auth EAP <---------|------------> EAP ^ | | ^ | | | | EAP-Message | | EAP-Message EAP-Message | |EAP-Message | | | | v |PANA | v PaC <---------|------------> PAA Figure 1: Interface between PANA and EAP Thus two interfaces are needed between PANA state machines and EAP state machines, namely: o Interface between the PaC state machine and the EAP peer state machine o Interface between the PAA state machine and the EAP authenticator state machine In general, the PaC and PAA state machines present EAP messages to the EAP peer and authenticator state machines through the interface, respectively. The EAP peer and authenticator state machines process these messages and sends EAP messages through the PaC and PAA state machines that is responsible for actually transmitting this message, respectively. For example, [RFC4137] specifies four interfaces to lower layers: (i) an interface between the EAP peer state machine and a lower layer, (ii) an interface between the EAP standalone authenticator state machine and a lower layer, (iii) an interface between the EAP full authenticator state machine and a lower layer and (iv) an interface between the EAP backend authenticator state machine and a lower layer. In this document, the PANA protocol is the lower layer of EAP and only the first three interfaces are of interest to PANA. The second and third interfaces are the same. In this regard, the EAP standalone authenticator or the EAP full authenticator and its state machine in [RFC4137] are referred to as the EAP authenticator and the EAP authenticator state machine, respectively, in this document. If an EAP peer and an EAP authenticator follow the state machines defined in [RFC4137], the interfaces between PANA and EAP could be based on that document. Detailed definition of interfaces between PANA and EAP are described in the subsequent sections. 4. Document Authority This document is intended to comply with the technical contents of any of the related documents ([RFC5191] and [RFC4137]). When there is a discrepancy, the related documents are considered authoritative and they take precedence over this document. 5. Notations The following state transition tables are completed mostly based on the conventions specified in [RFC4137]. The complete text is described below. State transition tables are used to represent the operation of the protocol by a number of cooperating state machines each comprising a group of connected, mutually exclusive states. Only one state of each machine can be active at any given time. All permissible transitions from a given state to other states and associated actions performed when the transitions occur are represented by using triplets of (exit condition, exit action, exit state). All conditions are expressions that evaluate to TRUE or FALSE; if a condition evaluates to TRUE, then the condition is met. A state "ANY" is a wildcard state that matches any state in each state machine except those explicity enumerated as exception states. The exit conditions of a wildcard state are evaluated after all other exit conditions of specific to the current state are met. On exit from a state, the exit actions defined for the state and the exit condition are executed exactly once, in the order that they appear. (Note that the procedures defined in [RFC4137] are executed on entry to a state, which is one major difference from this document.) Each exit action is deemed to be atomic; i.e., execution of an exit action completes before the next sequential exit action starts to execute. No exit action execute outside of a state block. The exit actions in only one state block execute at a time even if the conditions for execution of state blocks in different state machines are satisfied. All exit actions in an executing state block complete execution before the transition to and execution of any other state blocks. The execution of any state block appears to be atomic with respect to the execution of any other state block and the transition condition to that state from the previous state is TRUE when execution commences. The order of execution of state blocks in different state machines is undefined except as constrained by their transition conditions. A variable that is set to a particular value in a state block retains this value until a subsequent state block executes an exit action that modifies the value. On completion of the transition from the previous state to the current state, all exit conditions occurring during the current state (including exit conditions defined for the wildcard state) are evaluated until an exit condition for that state is met. Any event variable is set to TRUE when the corresponding event occurs and set to FALSE immediately after completion of the action associated with the current state and the event. The interpretation of the special symbols and operators used is defined in [RFC4137]. 6. Common Rules There are following procedures, variables, message initializing rules and state transitions that are common to both the PaC and PAA state machines. Throughout this document, the character string "PANA_MESSAGE_NAME" matches any one of the abbreviated PANA message names, i.e., "PCI", "PAR", "PAN", "PTR", "PTA", "PNR", "PNA". 6.1. Common Procedures void None() A null procedure, i.e., nothing is done. void Disconnect() A procedure to delete the PANA session as well as the corresponding EAP session and authorization state. boolean Authorize() A procedure to create or modify authorization state. It returns TRUE if authorization is successful. Otherwise, it returns FALSE. It is assumed that Authorize() procedure of PaC state machine always returns TRUE. In the case that a non-key-generating EAP method is used but a PANA SA is required after successful authentication (generate_pana_sa() returns TRUE), Authorize() procedure must return FALSE. void Tx:PANA_MESSAGE_NAME[flag](AVPs) A procedure to send a PANA message to its peering PANA entity. The "flag" argument contains one or more flag (e.g., Tx:PAR[C]) to be set to the message, except for 'R' (Request) flag. The "AVPs" contains a list of names of optional AVPs to be inserted in the message, except for AUTH AVP. This procedure includes the following action before actual transmission: if (flag==S) PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.S_flag=Set; if (flag==C) PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.C_flag=Set; if (flag==A) PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.A_flag=Set; if (flag==P) PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.P_flag=Set; PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.insert_avp(AVPs); if (key_available()) PANA_MESSAGE_NANE.insert_avp("AUTH"); void TxEAP() A procedure to send an EAP message to the EAP state machine it interfaces to. void RtxTimerStart() A procedure to start the retransmission timer, reset RTX_COUNTER variable to zero and set an appropriate value to RTX_MAX_NUM variable. Note that RTX_MAX_NUM is assumed to be set to the same default value for all messages. However, implementations may also reset RTX_MAX_NUM in this procedure and its value may vary depending on the message that was sent. void RtxTimerStop() A procedure to stop the retransmission timer. void SessionTimerReStart(TIMEOUT) A procedure to (re)start PANA session timer. TIMEOUT specifies the expiration time associated of the session timer. Expiration of TIMEOUT will trigger a SESS_TIMEOUT event. void SessionTimerStop() A procedure to stop the current PANA session timer. void Retransmit() A procedure to retransmit a PANA message and increment RTX_COUNTER by one(1). void EAP_Restart() A procedure to (re)start an EAP conversation resulting in the re- initialization of an existing EAP session. void PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.insert_avp("AVP_NAME1", "AVP_NAME2",...) A procedure to insert AVPs for each specified AVP name in the list of AVP names in the PANA message. When an AVP name ends with "*", zero, one or more AVPs are inserted, otherwise one AVP is inserted. boolean PANA_MESSAGE_NAME.exist_avp("AVP_NAME") A procedure that checks whether an AVP of the specified AVP name exists in the specified PANA message and returns TRUE if the specified AVP is found, otherwise returns FALSE. boolean generate_pana_sa() A procedure to check whether the EAP method being used generates keys and that a PANA SA will be established on successful authentication. For the PaC, the procedure is also used to check and match the PRF and Integrity algorithm AVPs advertised by the PAA in PAR[S] message. For the PAA, it is used to indicate whether a PRF and Integrity algorithm AVPs will be sent in the PAR[S]. This procedure will return true if a PANA SA will be generated. Otherwise, it returns FALSE. boolean key_available() A procedure to check whether the PANA session has a PANA_AUTH_KEY. If the state machine already has a PANA_AUTH_KEY, it returns TRUE. If the state machine does not have a PANA_AUTH_KEY, it tries to retrieve an MSK from the EAP entity. If an MSK is retrieved, it computes a PANA_AUTH_KEY from the MSK and returns TRUE. Otherwise, it returns FALSE. 6.2. Common Variables PAR.RESULT_CODE This variable contains the Result-Code AVP value in the PANA-Auth- Request message in process. When this variable carries PANA_SUCCESS it is assumed that the PAR message always contains an EAP-Payload AVP which carries an EAP-Success message. NONCE_SENT This variable is set to TRUE to indicate that a Nonce-AVP has already been sent. Otherwise it is set to FALSE. RTX_COUNTER This variable contains the current number of retransmissions of the outstanding PANA message. Rx:PANA_MESSAGE_NAME[flag] This event variable is set to TRUE when the specified PANA message is received from its peering PANA entity. The "flag" contains a flag (e.g., Rx:PAR[C]), except for 'R' (Request) flag. RTX_TIMEOUT This event variable is set to TRUE when the retransmission timer is expired. REAUTH This event variable is set to TRUE when an initiation of re- authentication phase is triggered. This event variable can only be set while in the OPEN state. TERMINATE This event variable is set to TRUE when initiation of PANA session termination is triggered. This event variable can only be set while in the OPEN state. PANA_PING This event variable is set to TRUE when initiation of liveness test based on PANA-Notification exchange is triggered. This event variable can only be set while in the OPEN state. SESS_TIMEOUT This event is variable is set to TRUE when the session timer has expired. LIFETIME_SESS_TIMEOUT Configurable value used by the PaC and PAA to close or disconnect an established session in the access phase. This variable indicates the expiration of the session and is set to the value of Session-Lifetime AVP if present in the last PANA-Auth-Request message in the case of the PaC. Otherwise, it is assumed that the value is infinite and therefore has no expiration. Expiration of LIFETIME_SESS_TIMEOUT will cause the event variable SESS_TIMEOUT to be set. ANY This event variable is set to TRUE when any event occurs. 6.3. Configurable Values RTX_MAX_NUM Configurable maximum for how many retransmissions should be attempted before aborting. 6.4. Common Message Initialization Rules When a message is prepared for sending, it is initialized as follows: o For a request message, R-flag of the header is set. Otherwise, R-flag is not set. o Other message header flags are not set. They are set explicitly by specific state machine actions. o AVPs that are mandatory included in a message are inserted with appropriate values set. 6.5. Common Retransmition Rules The state machines defined in this document assumes that the PaC and the PAA caches the last transmitted answer message. This scheme is described in Sec 5.2 of [RFC5191]. When the PaC or PAA receives a re-transmitted or duplicate request, it would be able to re-send the corresponding answer without any aid from the EAP layer. However, to simplify the state machine description, this caching scheme is omitted in the state machines below. In the case that there is not corresponding answer to a re-transmitted request, the request will be handled by the corresponding statemachine. 6.6. Common State Transitions The following transitions can occur at any state with exemptions explicitly noted. ---------- State: ANY ---------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Re-transmissions)- - - - - - - - - - RTX_TIMEOUT && Retransmit(); (no change) RTX_COUNTER< RTX_MAX_NUM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Reach maximum number of transmissions)- - - - - - (RTX_TIMEOUT && Disconnect(); CLOSED RTX_COUNTER>= RTX_MAX_NUM) || SESS_TIMEOUT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------- State: ANY except INITIAL ------------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - (liveness test initiated by peer)- - - - - - Rx:PNR[P] Tx:PNA[P](); (no change) ------------------------------- State: ANY except WAIT_PNA_PING ------------------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - (liveness test response) - - - - - - - - Rx:PNA[P] None(); (no change) The following transitions can occur on any exit condition within the specified state. ------------- State: CLOSED ------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - -(Catch all event on closed state) - - - - - - - - ANY None(); CLOSED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. PaC State Machine 7.1. Interface between PaC and EAP Peer This interface defines the interactions between a PaC and an EAP peer. The interface serves as a mechanism to deliver EAP messages for the EAP peer. It allows the EAP peer to receive EAP requests and send EAP responses via the PaC. It also provides a mechanism to notify the EAP peer of PaC events and a mechanism to receive notification of EAP peer events. The EAP message delivery mechanism as well as the event notification mechanism in this interface have direct correlation with the PaC state transition table entries. These message delivery and event notifications mechanisms occur only within the context of their associated states or exit actions. 7.1.1. Delivering EAP Messages from PaC to EAP Peer TxEAP() procedure in the PaC state machine serves as the mechanism to deliver EAP messages contained in PANA-Auth-Request messages to the EAP peer. This procedure is enabled only after an EAP restart event is notified to the EAP peer and before any event resulting in a termination of the EAP peer session. In the case where the EAP peer follows the EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137], TxEAP() procedure sets eapReq variable of the EAP peer state machine and puts the EAP request in eapReqData variable of the EAP peer state machine. 7.1.2. Delivering EAP Messages from EAP Peer to PaC An EAP message is delivered from the EAP peer to the PaC via EAP_RESPONSE event variable. The event variable is set when the EAP peer passes the EAP message to its lower-layer. In the case where the EAP peer follows the EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137], EAP_RESPONSE event variable refers to eapResp variable of the EAP peer state machine and the EAP message is contained in eapRespData variable of the EAP peer state machine. 7.1.3. EAP Restart Notification from PaC to EAP Peer The EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137] has an initialization procedure before receiving an EAP message. To initialize the EAP state machine, the PaC state machine defines an event notification mechanism to send an EAP (re)start event to the EAP peer. The event notification is done via EAP_Restart() procedure in the initialization action of the PaC state machine. 7.1.4. EAP Authentication Result Notification from EAP Peer to PaC In order for the EAP peer to notify the PaC of an EAP authentication result, EAP_SUCCESS and EAP_FAILURE event variables15 1. Introduction he main safety problems that aredefined. In the case where the EAP peer follows the EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137], EAP_SUCCESS and EAP_FAILURE event variables refer to eapSuccess and eapFail variables of the EAP peer state machine, respectively. In this case, if EAP_SUCCESS event variable is setneeded toTRUE and an MSK is generated by the EAP authentication methodsolve inuse, eapKeyAvailable variableWSN are confidentiality, node authentication, message integrity, freshness etc. Public-key cryptosystem isset to TRUE and eapKeyData variable contains the MSK. Note that EAP_SUCCESS and EAP_FAILURE event variables may be set to TRUE even before the PaC receives a PAR with a 'Complete' flag set from the PAA. 7.1.5. Alternate Failure Notification from PaC to EAP Peer alt_reject() procedure in the PaC state machine serves asthemechanism to deliver an authentication failure eventmost extensive tool to solve theEAP peer without accompanying an EAP message. In the case where the EAP peer follows the EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137], alt_reject() procedure sets altReject variableproblem of information security. Many scholars have token research on theEAP peer state machine. Note that the EAP peer state machine in [RFC4137] also defines altAccept variable, however, it is never used in PANA in which EAP- Success messages are reliably delivered by the last PANA-Auth exchange. 7.2. Configurable Values FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT Configurable value that allows the PaC to determine whether a PaC authentication and authorization phase has stalled without an explicit EAP success or failure notification. 7.3. Variables AUTH_USER This event variable is set to TRUE when initiationusing ofEAP-based (re-)authentication is triggered by the application. EAP_SUCCESS This event variable is set to TRUE when the EAP peer determines that EAP conversation completes with success. EAP_FAILURE This event variable is set to TRUE when the EAP peer determines that EAP conversation completes with failure. EAP_RESPONSE This event variable is set to TRUE when the EAP peer delivers an EAP message to the PaC. This event accompanies an EAP message received from the EAP peer. EAP_RESP_TIMEOUT This event variable is set to TRUE when the PaC that has passed an EAP message topublic key algorithm on sensor node, and obtained someachievements. Gura and his partner have realized theEAP-layer does not receiveECC and RSA algorithm on 8-bit microcontroller. R.Watro proposed asubsequent EAP message fromTinyPK entity authentication schema based on the low exponent RSA algorithm. In 2006 theEAP-layer in a given period. This provides a time limit for certain EAP methods where user interaction maybe required. EAP_DISCARDscholar of NCSU, An Liu and Peng Ning provided an Elliptic Curve Cryptography library TinyECC based on TinyOs. Thisevent variableisset to TRUE when the EAP peer indicates that it has silently discarded the last received EAP-Request. This event does not accompany any EAP message.great progress. In 2007, based on TinyECC, Leonardo B and other four Brazil scholars realized thecase whereTate paring on theEAP peer follows the EAP peer state machine defined in [RFC4137],sensor node, thisevent variable refers to eapNoResp. 7.4. Procedures boolean eap_piggyback() This procedures returns TRUE to indicate whether the next EAP response will be carried inis thepending PAN message for optimization. void alt_reject() This procedure informsfirst implementation of Pairing-based cryptosystem on wireless sensor node. With theEAP peerincrease ofanhardware speed, use of public key cryptography in the sensors will become more and more common. Identity authenticationfailure event without accompanying an EAP message. void EAP_RespTimerStart() A procedure to start a timer to receiveis anEAP-Response from the EAP peer. void EAP_RespTimerStop() A procedure to stop a timereffective way toreceive an EAP-Response fromsolve theEAP peer. 7.5. PaC State Transition Table ------------------------------ State: INITIAL (Initial State) ------------------------------ Initialization Action: NONCE_SENT=Unset; RTX_COUNTER=0; RtxTimerStop(); Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+----------- - - - - - - - - - - (PaC-initiated Handshake) - - - - - - - - - AUTH_USER Tx:PCI[](); INITIAL RtxTimerStart(); SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PAA-initiated Handshake, not optimized) - - - - - Rx:PAR[S] && EAP_Restart(); WAIT_PAA !PAR.exist_avp SessionTimerReStart ("EAP-Payload") (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); if (generate_pana_sa()) Tx:PAN[S]("PRF-Algorithm", "Integrity-Algorithm"); else Tx:PAN[S](); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PAA-initiated Handshake, optimized) - - - - - - Rx:PAR[S] && EAP_Restart(); INITIAL PAR.exist_avp TxEAP(); ("EAP-Payload") && SessionTimerReStart eap_piggyback() (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); Rx:PAR[S] && EAP_Restart(); WAIT_EAP_MSG PAR.exist_avp TxEAP(); ("EAP-Payload") && SessionTimerReStart !eap_piggyback() (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); if (generate_pana_sa()) Tx:PAN[S]("PRF-Algorithm", "Integrity-Algorithm"); else Tx:PAN[S](); EAP_RESPONSE if (generate_pana_sa()) WAIT_PAA Tx:PAN[S]("EAP-Payload", "PRF-Algorithm", "Integrity-Algorithm"); else Tx:PAN[S]("EAP-Payload"); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------- State: WAIT_PAA --------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PAR-PAN exchange) - - - - - - - - Rx:PAR[] && RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_EAP_MSG !eap_piggyback() TxEAP(); EAP_RespTimerStart(); if (NONCE_SENT==Unset) { NONCE_SENT=Set; Tx:PAN[]("Nonce"); } else Tx:PAN[](); Rx:PAR[] && RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_EAP_MSG eap_piggyback() TxEAP(); EAP_RespTimerStart(); Rx:PAN[] RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_PAA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PANA result) - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PAR[C] && TxEAP(); WAIT_EAP_RESULT PAR.RESULT_CODE== PANA_SUCCESS Rx:PAR[C] && if (PAR.exist_avp WAIT_EAP_RESULT_ PAR.RESULT_CODE!= ("EAP-Payload")) CLOSE PANA_SUCCESS TxEAP(); else alt_reject(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------- State: WAIT_EAP_MSG ------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - (Return PAN/PAR from EAP) - - - - - - - - - EAP_RESPONSE && EAP_RespTimerStop() WAIT_PAA eap_piggyback() if (NONCE_SENT==Unset) { Tx:PAN[]("EAP-Payload", "Nonce"); NONCE_SENT=Set; } else Tx:PAN[]("EAP-Payload"); EAP_RESPONSE && EAP_RespTimerStop() WAIT_PAA !eap_piggyback() Tx:PAR[]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); EAP_RESP_TIMEOUT && Tx:PAN[](); WAIT_PAA eap_piggyback() EAP_DISCARD && Tx:PAN[](); CLOSED eap_piggyback() SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); EAP_FAILURE || SessionTimerStop(); CLOSED (EAP_DISCARD && Disconnect(); !eap_piggyback()) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------- State: WAIT_EAP_RESULT ---------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - (EAP Result) - - - - - - - - - - - - - EAP_SUCCESS if (PAR.exist_avp OPEN ("Key-Id")) Tx:PAN[C]("Key-Id"); else Tx:PAN[C](); Authorize(); SessionTimerReStart (LIFETIME_SESS_TIMEOUT); EAP_FAILURE Tx:PAN[C](); CLOSED SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------------- State: WAIT_EAP_RESULT_CLOSE ---------------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - (EAP Result) - - - - - - - - - - - - - EAP_SUCCESS || if (EAP_SUCCESS && CLOSED EAP_FAILURE PAR.exist_avp("Key-Id")) Tx:PAN[C]("Key-Id"); else Tx:PAN[C](); SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------- State: OPEN ----------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - (liveness test initiated by PaC)- - - - - - PANA_PING Tx:PNR[P](); WAIT_PNA_PING RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PaC)- - - - - - REAUTH NONCE_SENT=Unset; WAIT_PNA_REAUTH Tx:PNR[A](); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PAA)- - - - - - Rx:PAR[] EAP_RespTimerStart(); WAIT_EAP_MSG TxEAP(); if (!eap_piggyback()) Tx:PAN[]("Nonce"); else NONCE_SENT=Unset; SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(Session termination initiated by PAA) - - - - - - Rx:PTR[] Tx:PTA[](); CLOSED SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(Session termination initiated by PaC) - - - - - - TERMINATE Tx:PTR[](); SESS_TERM RtxTimerStart(); SessionTimerStop(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------- State: WAIT_PNA_REAUTH ---------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - -(re-authentication initiated by PaC) - - - - - Rx:PNA[A] RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_PAA SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(Session termination initiated by PAA) - - - - - - Rx:PTR[] RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED Tx:PTA[](); SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------------- State: WAIT_PNA_PING -------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - -(liveness test initiated by PaC) - - - - - - - Rx:PNA[P] RtxTimerStop(); OPEN - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PAA)- - - - - Rx:PAR[] RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_EAP_MSG EAP_RespTimerStart(); TxEAP(); if (!eap_piggyback()) Tx:PAN[]("Nonce"); else NONCE_SENT=Unset; SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(Session termination initiated by PAA) - - - - - - Rx:PTR[] RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED Tx:PTA[](); SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------- State: SESS_TERM ---------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - -(Session termination initiated by PaC) - - - - - Rx:PTA[] Disconnect(); CLOSED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. PAA State Machine 8.1. Interface between PAA and EAP Authenticatorsecurity issues of WSN. Theinterface between a PAA and an EAP authenticator provides a mechanism to deliver EAP messages forpapers structure is: Section 2 describes theEAP authenticatortheoretical background we use in this article, as well as the knowledge of the environment of the development platform. In section 3 based on the Tate Pairing, this paper designs amechanism to notifysafe and effective ID-based node authentication scheme. In The fourth quarter, this paper implements the authentication scheme, and analyzes its results. Finally, its theEAP authenticatorconclusion and future outlook Overview ofPAA eventsWSN andto receive notificationAuthentication. 2. Terminology 3. Overview ofEAP authenticator events. These message deliveryECC Encryption andevent notification mechanisms occur only within contextTinyOS 3.1 ECC Encryption The basement oftheir associated states or exit actions. 8.1.1. EAP Restart Notification from PAA to EAP Authenticator An EAP authenticator state machine definedElliptic Curve can be used in[RFC4137] has an initialization procedure before sending the first EAP request. To initialize the EAP state machine, the PAA state machine defines an event notification mechanism to send an EAP (re)start event to the EAP authenticator.Public Key cryptosystem is: Theevent notification is done via EAP_Restart() procedure in the initialization actionpoint set of Elliptic Curve defined on finite domain composite a circulatory loop. Then we can use thePAA state machine. 8.1.2. Delivering EAP Responses from PAA to EAP Authenticator TxEAP() procedure in the PAA state machine serves as the mechanism to deliver EAP-Responses contained in PANA-Auth-Answer messages todiscrete logarithm problem on theEAP authenticator. This procedure is enabled only after an EAP restart eventElliptic Curve point set.Continuous Elliptic Curve isnotified to the EAP authenticatornot suitable for encryption andbefore any event resulting in a terminationdecryption. The ECC is based on discrete points. 3.2 TinyOS 3.2.1 Struce of TinyOS TinyOS is a Micro-OS designed by theEAP authenticator session. In the case where the EAP authenticator follows the EAP authenticator state machines defined in [RFC4137], TxEAP() procedure sets eapResp variableUniversity of California, Berkeley,which is designed for theEAP authenticator state machine and puts the EAP responseWSNs. Because there are many nodes ineapRespData variableWSN and most of them are work on concurrency, theEAP authenticator state machine. 8.1.3. Delivering EAP Messages from EAP Authenticator to PAA An EAP request is delivered fromOS adopts technologies of lightweight threads, active information communication, event-driven model and components-based programming, After theEAP authenticatorstudy found that these technologies help to improve thePAA via EAP_REQUEST event variable. The event variable is set when the EAP authenticator passesperformance of wireless sensor networks, enjoy theEAP requestadvantage of hardware characteristics, lower power consumption and simplify application development. TinyOS uses component model. From bottom to up, itslower-layer. Incomponents can be divided into: abstract hardware components, composite components and high-level software components. TinyOS's high-level components send commands to thecase wherelow-level components, and theEAP authenticator follows the EAP authenticator state machines defined in [RFC4137], EAP_REQUEST event variable referslow-level components report events toeapReq variable ofhigh-level components. The whole structure looks like a Network protocol stack. The bottom level components are responsible to communicate with theEAP authenticator state machinehardware, send and receive theEAP request is contained in eapReqData variable of the EAP authenticator state machine. 8.1.4. EAP Authentication Result Notification from EAP Authenticator to PAA In order forbit stream and map theEAP authenticatorphysic hardware tonotifythePAA ofTinyOS components (eg: RRM). The composite components simulate theEAP authentication result, EAP_SUCCESS, EAP_FAILURE and EAP_TIMEOUT event variables are defined. Insenior hardware behavior.Make thecase wheredata communicate with theEAP authenticator follows the EAP authenticator state machines definedhigh-level components in[RFC4137], EAP_SUCCESS, EAP_FAILUREbyte unit, andEAP_TIMEOUT event variables refer to eapSuccess, eapFailcommunicate with low-level in bit unit. It achieves the Encoding andeapTimeout variables ofDecoding work in internal. The high-level software model achieves theEAP authenticator state machine, respectively. In this case, if EAP_SUCCESS event variablecontrol, route and data transmission. 3.2.2 NesC programming language TinyOS is Micro-OS code and realized with the NesC programming language. NesC's syntax issetsimilar toTRUE,C programming language, and it's a component-based programming language. It is anEAP-Success messageextension of C language. A NesC application iscontained in eapReqData variableconsisted of many components connected together. These components include configuration components and module components. Every relatively independent hardware or software modules can be realized with one or more components to. TinyOS is built on such idea which makesthe application of theEAP authenticator state machine, and additionally, eapKeyAvailable variablesystem reductive. (1) Interface: Interface isset to TRUEtwo-way, defined many commands andeapKeyData variable containsevents. Commands are realized by the providers and the active operation for anMSK ifevent is implements by theMSKusers. (2) Configuration: The configuration isgenerated asaresult of successful authentication bycomponent which can be used to assemble theEAP authentication method in use. Similarly, if EAP_FAILURE event variablecomponents. It issetused toTRUE,connect the various components of the interface providers and users. Such anEAP- Failure messageact iscontained in eapReqData variable ofcalled conduction or wiring. (3) Module: Module provides theEAP authenticator state machine.application code, implemented one or more interfaces. ThePAA uses EAP_SUCCESSrealization of all methods is defined in this place. Inside the module, it defines the interface it provides andEAP_FAILURE event variables as a trigger to send a PAR message toused. And realizes thePaC. 8.2. Variables OPTIMIZED_INIT This variable indicates whethercommands in thePAA is able to piggyback an EAP-Requestinterface it provides and the events in theinitial PANA-Auth-Request. Otherwiseinterface it uses. 3.3 Introduction of TinyECC TinyECC isset to FALSE. PAC_FOUND This variable is set to TRUE asaresult ofcode packet provided by aPAA initiated handshake. REAUTH_TIMEOUT This event variable is set to TRUE to indicate that the PAA initiatesNorth Carolina State University develops team. It provides are-authentication withbase arithmetic operation of ECC on TinyOS. It provides all ECC operations on domain, including thePaC.point add, double and scalar multiplication. 3.3.1 System's main modules (1) NN module: There-authentication timeout should be set to a value less than the session timeout carriedmethods in this module are modified from RSAREF2.0. It provides theSession-Lifetime AVP if present. EAP_SUCCESS This event variable is set to TRUE when EAP conversation completes with success. This event accompaniesrealization of large numbers operations in different sensor nodes (Micaz and TELOSB). (2) ECC module: The ECC module provides many basic operations on elliptic curve. For example, initialization of anEAP- Success message passed from the EAP authenticator. EAP_FAILUREelliptic curve, point adding, point doubling, point scalar multiplication and some operations based on sliding window. (3) ECDSA module: Thisevent variablemodule realized a signature protocol based on ECC. ECDSA issetbased on ECC component, SHA1 hash component and NN component. It realized a signature protocol based on ECC. ECC is the core of TinyECC. It calls the CurveParam component toTRUE when EAP conversation completes with failure. This event accompaniesinitialize anEAP- Failure message passed fromElliptic Curve and theEAP authenticator. EAP_REQUEST This event variable is setNN component toTRUE whenrealize theEAP authenticator deliverslarge number operations. 3.3.2 Working process (1) Initialize anEAP Request to the PAA. This event accompanieselliptic curve: The TinyECC provides anEAP-Request message received from the EAP authenticator. EAP_TIMEOUT This event variable is setinterface CurveParam toTRUE when EAP conversation times out without generating an EAP-Success orinitialize anEAP-Failure message. This event does not accompany any EAP message. EAP_DISCARDelliptic curve. Thisevent variable isinterface was implemented by secp128r1, secp128r2, secp160k1, secp160r2, secp160r2, secp192k1 and secp192r17, which defined 7 elliptic curves with 128,160 and 192bits. (2) Base operations on elliptical curve: The ECC interface defined all base operations of the points set on elliptical curve, including the point add, double, scalar multiplication and optimized operation based on sliding window methods. For example, we can call ECC.win_mul(&myTb,RInv,&pointArray) toTRUE when EAP authenticator indicates that it has silently discarded the last received EAP- Response message.realize a scalar multiplication. 4. Protocol Description 4.1 Flow and Structure Thisevent does not accompany any EAP message. Insection describes thecase where the EAP authenticator follows the EAP authenticator state machines defined in [RFC4137], this event variable refersnodes authentication based on TinyECC. Based on TinyECC, we designed a simple node authentication protocol on WSNs toeapNoReq. 8.3. Procedures boolean new_key_available()realize simple node authentication. The protocol can be divided into the following steps: Alice Bob | 1. Aprocedureselects random number a, and sends Ta=a*P tocheck whether the PANA session has a new PANA_AUTH_KEY. If the state machine already have a PANA_AUTH_KEY, it returns FALSE. If the state machine does not have a PANA_AUTH_KEY, it triesB. | +------------------------------------------------------->| | | | 2. B selects random number b, and sends Tb=b*P toretrieve an MSK from the EAP entity. If an MSK has been retrieved, it computes a PANA_AUTH_KEY from the MSKA. | |<-------------------------------------------------------+ | | | 3. A calculates Tab=a*b*P, andreturns TRUE. Otherwise,itreturns FALSE. 8.4. PAA State Transition Table ------------------------------ State: INITIAL (Initial State) ------------------------------ Initialization Action: OPTIMIZED_INIT=Set|Unset; NONCE_SENT=Unset; RTX_COUNTER=0; RtxTimerStop(); Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - (PCI and PAA initiated PANA) - - - - - - - - - (Rx:PCI[] || if (OPTIMIZED_INIT == INITIAL PAC_FOUND) Set) { EAP_Restart(); SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); } else { if (generate_pana_sa()) Tx:PAR[S]("PRF-Algorithm", "Integrity-Algorithm"); else Tx:PAR[S](); } EAP_REQUEST if (generate_pana_sa()) INITIAL Tx:PAR[S]("EAP-Payload", "PRF-Algorithm", "Integrity-Algorithm"); else Tx:PAR[S]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (PAN Handling) - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PAN[S] && if (PAN.exist_avp WAIT_EAP_MSG ((OPTIMIZED_INIT == ("EAP-Payload")) Unset) || TxEAP(); PAN.exist_avp else { ("EAP-Payload")) EAP_Restart(); SessionTimerReStart (FAILED_SESS_TIMEOUT); } Rx:PAN[S] && None(); WAIT_PAN_OR_PAR (OPTIMIZED_INIT == Set) && ! PAN.exist_avp ("EAP-Payload") - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------- State: WAIT_EAP_MSG ------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - -(Receiving EAP-Request)- - - - - - - - - EAP_REQUEST if (NONCE_SENT==Unset) { WAIT_PAN_OR_PAR Tx:PAR[]("Nonce", "EAP-Payload"); NONCE_SENT=Set; } else Tx:PAR[]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(Receiving EAP-Success/Failure) - - - - - EAP_FAILURE PAR.RESULT_CODE = WAIT_FAIL_PAN PANA_AUTHENTICATION_ REJECTED; Tx:PAR[C]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); SessionTimerStop(); EAP_SUCCESS && PAR.RESULT_CODE = WAIT_SUCC_PAN Authorize() PANA_SUCCESS; if (new_key_available()) Tx:PAR[C]("EAP-Payload", "Key-Id"); else Tx:PAR[C]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); EAP_SUCCESS && PAR.RESULT_CODE = WAIT_FAIL_PAN !Authorize() PANA_AUTHORIZATION_ REJECTED; if (new_key_available()) Tx:PAR[C]("EAP-Payload", "Key-Id"); else Tx:PAR[C]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Receiving EAP-Timeout or invalid message) - - - - - EAP_TIMEOUT || SessionTimerStop(); CLOSED EAP_DISCARD Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------------- State: WAIT_SUCC_PAN -------------------- Event/Condition Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - (PAN Processing)- - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PAN[C] RtxTimerStop(); OPEN SessionTimerReStart (LIFETIME_SESS_TIMEOUT); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------------- State: WAIT_FAIL_PAN -------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (PAN Processing)- - - - - - - - - - Rx:PAN[C] RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------- State: OPEN ----------- Event/Condition Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PaC) - - - - - - Rx:PNR[A] NONCE_SENT=Unset; WAIT_EAP_MSG EAP_Restart(); Tx:PNA[A](); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PAA)- - - - - - REAUTH || NONCE_SENT=Unset; WAIT_EAP_MSG REAUTH_TIMEOUT EAP_Restart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (liveness test based on PNR-PNA exchange initiated by PAA)- PANA_PING Tx:PNR[P](); WAIT_PNA_PING RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Session termination initated from PAA) - - - - TERMINATE Tx:PTR[](); SESS_TERM SessionTimerStop(); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Session termination initated from PaC) - - - - Rx:PTR[] Tx:PTA[](); CLOSED SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------------- State: WAIT_PNA_PING -------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PNA processing) - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PNA[P] RtxTimerStop(); OPEN - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (re-authentication initiated by PaC) - - - - - - Rx:PNR[A] RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_EAP_MSG NONCE_SENT=Unset; EAP_Restart(); Tx:PNA[A](); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Session termination initated from PaC) - - - - Rx:PTR[] RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED Tx:PTA[](); SessionTimerStop(); Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------- State: WAIT_PAN_OR_PAR ---------------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - (PAR Processing)- - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PAR[] TxEAP(); WAIT_EAP_MSG RtxTimerStop(); Tx:PAN[](); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Pass EAP Responsetothe EAP authenticator)- - - - Rx:PAN[] && TxEAP(); WAIT_EAP_MSG PAN.exist_avp RtxTimerStop(); ("EAP-Payload") - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (PAN without an EAP response) - - - - - - - Rx:PAN[] && RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_PAN_OR_PAR !PAN.exist_avp ("EAP-Payload") - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(EAP retransmission) - - - - - - - - - - EAP_REQUEST RtxTimerStop(); WAIT_PAN_OR_PAR Tx:PAR[]("EAP-Payload"); RtxTimerStart(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (EAP authentication timeout or failure)- - - - - EAP_FAILURE || RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED EAP_TIMEOUT || SessionTimerStop(); EAP_DISCARD Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------- State: SESS_TERM ---------------- Exit Condition Exit Action Exit State ------------------------+--------------------------+------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(PTA processing) - - - - - - - - - - Rx:PTA[] RtxTimerStop(); CLOSED Disconnect(); - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9. Implementation Considerations 9.1. PAAB. | +------------------------------------------------------->| | | | 4. B calculates Tba=b*a*P, andPaC Interface to Service Management Entity In general,itis assumed each device or network equipment has a PANAto A. | |<-------------------------------------------------------+ A calculates Tb and verifies it. B calculates Ta and verifies it. 4.2 Implementation This protocolstack available for use by other modules within the device or network equipment. One such moduleisthe Service Management Entity (SME).based on TinyECC. The call relation between components of this program can be described as: main compoment | | | | | | base node compoment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ECC NN Timer, Led, GenericComm TheSMEmain component isa generic term for modules that manages different services (including network protocols) that installed on a device or equipment. To integrate PANA protocol withentrance of this program. It provides theSME, it is recommended that a genericStdControl interface(i.e.,which realizes some hardware initialization work. BaseNode is theSME-PANA interface) betweencore of theSME andprogram. It calls thePANA protocol stack be provided byTimer component to trigger event in times; calls theimplementation. This interface should include common procedures such as startup, shutdown and re-authenticate signals. It should also provision for extracting keying material. ForLeds component to trigger indicators; uses thePAA,GenericComm component to send messages and receive messages; calls theSME-PANA interface should also provide a method for communicating filtering parametersECC and NN components to realize the data encryption in the process of the protocol. 4.3 Analysis of Protocol 4.3.1 Performance Analysis For the protocol, theEP(s) when cryptographic filteringlargest comustion isused.the point multiplication. Thefiltering parameters include keying material usednumber of computing forbootstrapping secured transport suchboth sides of communication show asIPsec. When a PAA device interacts withtable 1. +-------------------+----------------------------------+ | Node | Counts of Point multiplication | +-------------------+----------------------------------+ | A | 3 | +-------------------+----------------------------------+ | B | 3 | +-------------------+----------------------------------+ Table 1: Number of Computing The protocol is Lightweight two-way authentication protocol. Though the three times of point multiplication, it completes thebackendtwo-way authenticationserver using a AAA protocol, its SME may also provide an interface toand is based on theAAA protocol toECDH. 4.3.2 Security Analysis Definition: Passive attack means that enemy just collects information in passive way, rather than obtainauthorization parametersthe data through active access. Data legitimate users would not be aware of suchasactivities. Passive attacks includesniffer, information-collecting etc. Conclusion: If theauthorization lifetime and additional filtering parameters. 10. Security Considerations This document's intentECDH problem isto describedifficult on thePANA state machines fully. To this end, any security concerns with this document are likely a reflection of security concerns with PANA itself. 11.point group G, then the authentication scheme is secure against impersonation under passive attack. 5. Security Considerations 5.1. Privacy Considerations 6. IANA Considerations This documenthas no actions for IANA. 12. Acknowledgmentsdoes not propose a standard and does not require the PANA to do anything. 7. Contributors Thiswork was started from state machines originallydraft is a product of a design team which also included Marcelo Bagnulo and Philip Matthews who both have madeby Dan Forsberg. 13.major contributions to this document. 8. Acknowledgments The following people have contributed to this document. Listing their names here does not mean that they endorse the document, but that they have contributed to its substance. Dujuan Yan, Sugang Bai, Liang Ge, 9. References13.1.9.1. Normative References[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008. 13.2.9.2. Informative References[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.Authors' AddressesVictor Fajardo (editor) Toshiba America Research, Inc. 1 Telcordia Drive Piscataway, NJ 08854 USAWeihong Wang Zhejiang University of Technology, China Phone:+1 732 699 5368+86 0571-85290115 Email:vfajardo@tari.toshiba.com Yoshihiro Ohba Toshiba America Research, Inc. 1 Telcordia Drive Piscataway, NJ 08854 USAwwh@zjut.edu.cn Tieming Chen Zhejiang University of Technology, China Phone:+1 732 699 5305+86 0571-85290110 Email:tiemingchen@gmail.com Yubing Lin Zhejiang University of Technology, China Phone: +86 0571-85290115 Email:yohba@tari.toshiba.com Rafa Marin Lopezyulin@126.com Yiling Cui Zhejiang University ofMurcia 30071 Murcia SpainTechnology, China Phone: +86 0571-85294110 Email:rafa@dif.um.escyllingling_00@126.com