--- 1/draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-01.txt 2009-02-10 12:12:03.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-02.txt 2009-02-10 12:12:03.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,81 +1,90 @@ Congestion and Pre Congestion T. Moncaster Internet-Draft BT Intended status: Standards Track B. Briscoe -Expires: April 17, 2009 BT & UCL +Expires: August 14, 2009 BT & UCL M. Menth University of Wuerzburg - October 14, 2008 + February 10, 2009 Baseline Encoding and Transport of Pre-Congestion Information - draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-01 + draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-02 Status of This Memo - By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any - applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware - have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes - aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. + This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2009. + This Internet-Draft will expire on August 14, 2009. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Abstract Pre-congestion notification (PCN) provides information to support admission control and flow termination in order to protect the Quality of Service of inelastic flows. It does this by marking packets when traffic load on a link is approaching or has exceeded a threshold below the physical link rate. This document specifies how such marks are to be encoded into the IP header. The baseline encoding described here provides for only two PCN encoding states. It is designed to be easily extended to provide more encoding states but such schemes will be described in other documents. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Encoding two PCN States in IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4.1. Rationale for Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4.2. PCN-Compatible DiffServ Codepoints . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 5. Rules for Experimental Encoding Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 6. Backwards Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 11. Comments Solicited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - Appendix A. Tunnelling Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - Appendix B. PCN Node Behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - Appendix C. Deployment Scenarios for PCN Using Baseline - Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 4.1. Rationale for Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 4.2. PCN-Compatible DiffServ Codepoints . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 5. Rules for Experimental Encoding Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 6. Backwards Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 11. Comments Solicited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + Appendix A. PCN Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + A.1. Choice of Suitable DSCPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + A.2. Rationale for Using ECT(0) for Not Marked . . . . . . . . 10 1. Introduction Pre-congestion notification (PCN) provides information to support admission control and flow termination in order to protect the quality of service (QoS) of inelastic flows. This is achieved by marking packets according to the level of pre-congestion at nodes within a PCN-domain. These markings are evaluated by the egress nodes of the PCN-domain. [pcn-arch] describes how PCN packet markings can be used to assure the QoS of inelastic flows within a single @@ -87,20 +96,33 @@ others require more. The baseline encoding described here only provides for two PCN encoding states. An extension of the baseline encoding described in [PCN-3-enc-state] provides for three PCN encoding states. Other extensions have also been suggested all of which can build on the baseline encoding. In order to ensure backward compatibility any alternative encoding schemes that claim compliance with PCN standards MUST extend this baseline scheme. Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor): + From -01 to -02: + + Removed Appendix A and replaced with reference to [ecn-tunneling] + + Moved Appendix B into main body of text. + + Changed Appendix C to give deployment advice. + + Minor changes throughout including checking consistency of + capitalisation of defined terms. + + Clarified that LU was deliberately excluded from encoding. + From -00 to -01: Added section on restrictions for extension encoding schemes. Included table in Appendix showing encoding transitions at different PCN nodes. Checked for consistency of terminology. Minor language changes for clarity. @@ -144,147 +166,187 @@ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 3. Terminology The following terms are used in this document: o Not-PCN - packets that are not PCN-enabled. o PCN-marked - codepoint indicating packets that have been marked at - a PCN-interior-node using some PCN marking behaviour. Also PM. + a PCN-interior-node using some PCN marking behaviour + [pcn-marking-behaviour]. Also PM. o Not-marked - codepoint indicating packets that are PCN-capable but are not PCN-marked. Also NM. o PCN-enabled codepoints - collective term for all the NM and PM - codepoints. + codepoints. By definition packets carrying such codepoints are + PCN-packets. o PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint - a Diffserv codepoint for which the ECN field is used to carry PCN markings rather than [RFC3168] markings. In addition the document uses the terminology defined in [pcn-arch]. 4. Encoding two PCN States in IP The PCN encoding states are defined using a combination of the DSCP and ECN fields within the IP header. The baseline PCN encoding closely follows the semantics of ECN [RFC3168]. It allows the encoding of two PCN states: Not-Marked and PCN-Marked. It also - allows for traffic that is not PCN capable to be marked as such (not- + allows for traffic that is not PCN capable to be marked as such (Not- PCN). Given the scarcity of codepoints within the IP header the baseline encoding leaves one codepoint free for experimental use. The following table defines how to encode these states in IP: +---------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ - | ECN codepoint | not-ECT | ECT(0) (10) | ECT(1) (01) | CE (11) | + | ECN codepoint | Not-ECT | ECT(0) (10) | ECT(1) (01) | CE (11) | | | (00) | | | | +---------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ - | DSCP n | not-PCN | NM | EXP | PM | + | DSCP n | Not-PCN | NM | EXP | PM | +---------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ Where DSCP n is a PCN-compatible DiffServ codepoint (see Section 4.2) - and EXP means available for Experimental use. + and EXP means available for Experimental use. N.B. we deliberately + reserve this codepoint for experimental use only (and not local use) + to prevent any possible future compatability issues. Table 1: Encoding PCN in IP The following rules apply to all PCN traffic: o PCN-traffic MUST be marked with a PCN-compatible DiffServ Codepoint. To conserve DSCPs, DiffServ Codepoints SHOULD be chosen that are already defined for use with admission controlled traffic, such as the Voice-Admit codepoint defined in [voice-admit]. Guidelines for mixing traffic-types within a PCN- domain are given in [pcn-marking-behaviour]. - o Any packet that is not PCN-enabled (not-PCN) but which shares the + o Any packet that is not PCN-enabled (Not-PCN) but which shares the same DiffServ codepoint as PCN-enabled traffic MUST have the ECN field equal to 00. + The following table sets out the valid and invalid codepoint + transitions at PCN-nodes for this baseline encoding. Extension + encodings may have different rules regarding the validity of the + transitions. Note that this table assumes there is a functional + separation between a PCN-boundary-node and a PCN-interior-node such + that PCN-boundary-nodes do not perform packet metering or marking + functions. PCN-nodes MUST follow the encoding transition rules set + out in this table (e.g. they MUST NOT set invalid codepoints on + packets they forward). This table only applies to PCN-packets. + + +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ + | PCN node | Codepoint | Valid codepoint | Invalid codepoint out | + | type | in | out | | + +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ + | ingress | Any | NM (or Not-PCN) | PM | + | interior | NM | NM or PM | Not-PCN or EXP | + | interior | EXP + | EXP or PM | Not-PCN | + | interior | Not-PCN | Not-PCN | Any other codepoint | + | interior | PM | PM | Any other codepoint | + | egress | Any | 00 | Any other codepoint * | + +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ + + This SHOULD cause an alarm to be raised at a higher layer. The + packet MUST be treated as if it were NM. + * Except where the egress node knows that other marks may be safely + exposed outside the PCN-domain (e.g. [PCN-3-enc-state]). + + Table 2: Valid and Invalid Codepoint Transitions for + PCN-packets at PCN-nodes + + If a pcn-interior-node compliant with this baseline encoding receives + a + 4.1. Rationale for Encoding The exact choice of encoding was dictated by the constraints imposed - by existing IETF RFCs, in particular [RFC3168] and [RFC4774]. One of - the tightest constraints was the need for any PCN encoding to survive - being tunnelled through either an IP in IP tunnel or an IPSec Tunnel. - Appendix A explains this in detail. The main effect of this - constraint is that any PCN marking has to carry the 11 codepoint in - the ECN field. If the packet is being tunneled then only the 11 - codepoint gets copied into the inner header upon decapsulation. An - additional constraint is the need to minimise the use of DiffServ - codepoints as there is a limited supply of standards track codepoints - remaining. Section 4.2 explains how we have minimised this still - further by reusing pre-existing Diffserv codepoint(s) such that non- - PCN traffic can still be distinguished from PCN traffic. There are a - number of factors that were considered before deciding to set 10 as - the NM state. These included similarity to ECN, presence of tunnels - within the domain, leakage into and out of PCN-domain and incremental - deployment. + by existing IETF RFCs, in particular [RFC3168], [RFC4301] and + [RFC4774]. One of the tightest constraints was the need for any PCN + encoding to survive being tunnelled through either an IP in IP tunnel + or an IPSec Tunnel. [ecn-tunneling] explains this in more detail. + The main effect of this constraint is that any PCN marking has to + carry the 11 codepoint in the ECN field. If the packet is being + tunneled then only the 11 codepoint gets copied into the inner header + upon decapsulation. An additional constraint is the need to minimise + the use of DiffServ codepoints as there is a limited supply of + standards track codepoints remaining. Section 4.2 explains how we + have minimised this still further by reusing pre-existing Diffserv + codepoint(s) such that non-PCN traffic can still be distinguished + from PCN traffic. There are a number of factors that were considered + before deciding to set 10 as the NM state. These included similarity + to ECN, presence of tunnels within the domain, leakage into and out + of PCN-domain and incremental deployment. The encoding scheme above seems to meet all these constraints and ends up looking very similar to ECN. This is perhaps not surprising given the similarity in architectural intent between PCN and ECN. 4.2. PCN-Compatible DiffServ Codepoints Equipment complying with the baseline PCN encoding MUST allow PCN to be enabled for certain Diffserv codepoints. This document defines the term "PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint" for such a DSCP. Enabling PCN for a DSCP switches on PCN marking behaviour for packets with that DSCP, but only if those packets also have their ECN field - set to indicate a codepoint other than not-PCN. + set to indicate a codepoint other than Not-PCN. Enabling PCN marking behaviour disables any other marking behaviour (e.g. enabling PCN disables the default ECN marking behaviour introduced in [RFC3168]). All traffic scheduling and conditioning - behaviours are discussed in [pcn-marking-behaviour]. + behaviours are discussed in [pcn-marking-behaviour]. This ensures + compliance with the BCP guidance set out in [RFC4774]. 5. Rules for Experimental Encoding Schemes Any experimental encoding scheme MUST follow these rules to ensure backward compatibility with this baseline scheme: - o The 00 codepoint in the ECN field MUST mean not-PCN. + o The 00 codepoint in the ECN field MUST mean Not-PCN. o The 11 codepoint in the ECN field MUST mean PCN-marked (though this doesn't exclude other codepoints from carrying the same meaning). o Once set the 11 codepoint in the ECN field MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint. + o Any experimental scheme MUST include details of all valid and + invalid codepoint transitions at any PCN nodes. + 6. Backwards Compatibility BCP 124 [RFC4774] gives guidelines for specifying alternative semantics for the ECN field. It sets out a number of factors to be taken into consideration. It also suggests various techniques to allow the co-existence of default ECN and alternative ECN semantics. The baseline encoding specified in this document defines PCN- compatible DiffServ codepoints as no longer supporting the default ECN semantics. As such this document is compatible with BCP 124. It - should be noted that this baseline encoding blocks end-to-end ECN - except where mechanisms are put in place to tunnel such traffic - across the PCN-domain. + should be noted that this baseline encoding effectively disables end- + to-end ECN except where mechanisms are put in place to tunnel such + traffic across the PCN-domain. 7. IANA Considerations This document makes no request to IANA. 8. Security Considerations Packets claim entitlement to be PCN marked by carrying a PCN- Compatible DSCP and a PCN-Enabled ECN codepoint. This encoding document is intended to stand independently of the architecture used to determine whether specific packets are authorised to be PCN marked, which will be described in a future separate document on PCN - edge-node behaviour (see Appendix B). + edge-node behaviour. The PCN working group has initially been chartered to only consider a PCN-domain to be entirely under the control of one operator, or a set of operators who trust each other [PCN-charter]. However there is a requirement to keep inter-domain scenarios in mind when defining the PCN encoding. One way to extend to multiple domains would be to concatenate PCN-domains and use PCN-boundary-nodes back to back at borders. Then any one domain's security against its neighbours would be described as part of the proposed edge-node behaviour document. @@ -322,154 +384,100 @@ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC4774] Floyd, S., "Specifying Alternate Semantics for the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Field", BCP 124, RFC 4774, November 2006. - [pcn-arch] Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion Notification - (PCN) Architecture", - draft-ietf-pcn-architecture-07 (work in - progress), September 2008. - 12.2. Informative References [PCN-3-enc-state] Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M. Menth, "A three state extended PCN encoding scheme", draft-moncaster-pcn-3-state-encoding-00 (work in progress), June 2008. [PCN-charter] IETF, "IETF Charter for Congestion and Pre- Congestion Notification Working Group". [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168, September 2001. [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. - [ecn-tunnelling] Briscoe, B., "Layered Encapsulation of + [RFC5127] Chan, K., Babiarz, J., and F. Baker, + "Aggregation of DiffServ Service Classes", + RFC 5127, February 2008. + + [ecn-tunneling] Briscoe, B., "Layered Encapsulation of Congestion Notification", - draft-briscoe-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-01 (work in - progress), July 2008. + draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-01 (work in + progress), October 2008. + + [pcn-arch] Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion Notification + (PCN) Architecture", + draft-ietf-pcn-architecture-07 (work in + progress), September 2008. [pcn-marking-behaviour] Eardley, P., "Marking behaviour of PCN- - nodes", draft-ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour-00 + nodes", draft-ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour-01 (work in progress), October 2008. [re-PCN] Briscoe, B., "Emulating Border Flow Policing using Re-ECN on Bulk Data", draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-00 (work in progress), July 2007. - [voice-admit] Baker, F., Polk, J., and M. Dolly, "DSCPs - for Capacity-Admitted Traffic", - draft-ietf-tsvwg-admitted-realtime-dscp-04 - (work in progress), February 2008. - -Appendix A. Tunnelling Constraints - - The rules that govern the behaviour of the ECN field for IP-in-IP - tunnels were defined in [RFC3168]. This allowed for two tunnel - modes. The limited functionality mode sets the outer header to not- - ECT, regardless of the value of the inner header, in other words - disabling ECN within the tunnel. The full functionality mode copies - the inner ECN field into the outer header if the inner header is not- - ECT or either of the 2 ECT codepoints. If the inner header is CE - then the outer header is set to ECT(0). On decapsulation, if the CE - codepoint is set on the outer header then this is copied into the - inner header. Otherwise the inner header is left unchanged. The - stated reason for blocking CE from being copied to the outer header - was to prevent this from being used as a covert channel through IPSec - tunnels. - - The IPSec protocol [RFC4301] changed the ECN tunnelling rule to allow - IPSec tunnels to simply copy the inner header into the outer header. - On decapsulation the outer header is discarded and the ECN field is - only copied down if it is set to CE. - - Because of the possible existence of tunnels, only CE (11) can be - used as a PCN marking as it is the only mark that will always survive - decapsulation. However there is a need for caution with all - tunneling within the PCN-domain. RFC3168 full functionality IP in IP - tunnels are expected to set the ECN field to ECT(0) if the inner ECN - field is set to CE. This leads to the possibility that some packets - within the PCN-domain that have already been marked may have that - mark concealed further into the domain. This is undesirable for many - PCN schemes and thus the PCN working group needs to decide whether to - advise against the use of full functionality RFC3168 IP in IP tunnels - within a PCN-domain to support the ongoing work within the Transport - Area to rationalise the behaviour of IP in IP tunnels in respect to - the ECN field and bring them in line with the behaviour of IPSec - tunnels [ecn-tunnelling]. - -Appendix B. PCN Node Behaviours + [voice-admit] Baker, F., Polk, J., and M. Dolly, "DSCP for + Capacity-Admitted Traffic", + draft-ietf-tsvwg-admitted-realtime-dscp-05 + (work in progress), November 2008. - The following table of valid and invalid transitions, while necessary - for the correct functioning of PCN they is not strictly part of the - encoding scheme. The PCN working group needs to decide whether to - include this in this baseline encoding or whether to transfer it to - an alternative document. +Appendix A. PCN Deployment Considerations - +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ - | PCN node | Codepoint | Valid codepoint | Invalid codepoint out | - | type | in | out | | - +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ - | ingress | Any | NM (or Not-PCN) | PM | - | interior | NM | NM or PM | not-PCN | - | interior | Not-PCN | Not-PCN | Any other codepoint | - | egress | Any | 00 | Any other codepoint * | - +-----------+-------------+-----------------+-----------------------+ - * Except where the egress node knows that other marks may be safely - exposed outside the PCN-domain (e.g. [PCN-3-enc-state]). +A.1. Choice of Suitable DSCPs - Table 2: Valid and Invalid Transitions at PCN nodes + The choice of which DSCP is most suitable for the PCN-domain is + dependant on the nature of the traffic entering that domain and the + link rates of all the links making up that domain. In PCN-domains + with uniformly high link rates, the appropriate DSCPs would currently + be those for the Real Time Traffic Class [RFC5127]. If the PCN + domain includes lower speed links it would also be appropriate to use + the DSCPs of the other traffic classes that [voice-admit] defines for + use with admission control, such as the three video classes CS4, CS3 + and AF4 and the Admitted Telephony Class. - It is also necessary to define a safe behaviour for baseline- - compliant nodes to follow should they unexpectedly encounter a packet - carrying the EXP (01) codepoint. The obvious safe behaviour would be - to treat this as if it were a NM packet but to raise an alarm at a - higher layer to check why the packet was there. An alternative safe - approach is to treat it as a not-PCN packet but this might jeopardise - partial deployment of any future experimental encoding scheme. +A.2. Rationale for Using ECT(0) for Not Marked -Appendix C. Deployment Scenarios for PCN Using Baseline Encoding + The choice of which ECT codepoint to use for the Not Marked state was + based on the following considerations: - This appendix illustrates possible PCN deployment scenarios where the - baseline encoding can be used and also explain a case for which - baseline encoding is not sufficient. {Note this appendix is provided - for information only}. + o [RFC3168] full functionality tunnel within PCN-domain: Either ECT + is safe. - 1. an operator requires only admission control. Then admission - control is triggered from PCN-packets that are threshold-marked - and this baseline encdoding scheme suffices. + o Leakage of traffic into PCN-domain: ECT(1) is less often correct. - 2. an operator requires only flow termination. Then flow - termination is triggered from PCN-packets that are excess- - traffic-marked and this baseline encdoding scheme suffices. + o Leakage of traffic out of PCN-domainL Either ECT is equally unsafe + (since this would incorrectly indicate the traffic was ECN capable + outside the controlled PCN-domain). - 3. an operator requires both admission control and flow termination. - If both admission control and flow termination are triggered from - PCN-packets that are excess-traffic-marked then this baseline - encoding scheme suffices. + o Incremental deployment: Either ECT is suitable as long as they are + used consistently. - 4. an operator requires both admission control triggered by packets - that are threshold-marked and flow termination triggered by - packets that are excess-traffic-marked. In this case the - baseline encoding provides insufficient encoding states to - achieve this. + o Conceptual consistency with other schemes: ECT(0) is conceptually + consistent with [RFC3168]. Authors' Addresses Toby Moncaster BT B54/70, Adastral Park Martlesham Heath Ipswich IP5 3RE UK @@ -488,55 +496,10 @@ Michael Menth University of Wuerzburg room B206, Institute of Computer Science Am Hubland Wuerzburg D-97074 Germany Phone: +49 931 888 6644 EMail: menth@informatik.uni-wuerzburg.de - -Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). - - This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions - contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors - retain all their rights. - - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS - OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND - THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS - OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF - THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Intellectual Property - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has - made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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