draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01.txt   draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02.txt 
QUIC M. Duke QUIC M. Duke
Internet-Draft F5 Networks, Inc. Internet-Draft F5 Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track N. Banks Intended status: Standards Track N. Banks
Expires: August 1, 2020 Microsoft Expires: September 10, 2020 Microsoft
January 29, 2020 March 9, 2020
QUIC-LB: Generating Routable QUIC Connection IDs QUIC-LB: Generating Routable QUIC Connection IDs
draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01 draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02
Abstract Abstract
QUIC connection IDs allow continuation of connections across address/ QUIC connection IDs allow continuation of connections across address/
port 4-tuple changes, and can store routing information for stateless port 4-tuple changes, and can store routing information for stateless
or low-state load balancers. They also can prevent linkability of or low-state load balancers. They also can prevent linkability of
connections across deliberate address migration through the use of connections across deliberate address migration through the use of
protected communications between client and server. This creates protected communications between client and server. This creates
issues for load-balancing intermediaries. This specification issues for load-balancing intermediaries. This specification
standardizes methods for encoding routing information given a small standardizes methods for encoding routing information given a small
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Protocol Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Load Balancer Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. First CID octet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. First CID octet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Config Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Config Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Configuration Failover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Configuration Failover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Length Self-Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. Length Self-Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Routing Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Routing Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Plaintext CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Plaintext CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Obfuscated CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Obfuscated CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
skipping to change at page 2, line 43 skipping to change at page 2, line 42
4.3.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Block Cipher CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. Block Cipher CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4.2. Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4.3. Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Common Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1. Common Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. No-Shared-State Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2. No-Shared-State Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1. Service Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2.2. Service Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Shared-State Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2.3. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. Shared-State Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3.2. Service Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3.2. Service Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3.3. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3.3. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Configuration Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. Configuration Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. Additional Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Attackers not between the load balancer and server . . . 21 7.1. Load balancer chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Attackers between the load balancer and server . . . . . 21 7.2. Moving connections between servers . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.1. Attackers not between the load balancer and server . . . 21
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2. Attackers between the load balancer and server . . . . . 22
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 22 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.2. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06 . . . . . . . . . 22 Appendix A. Load Balancer Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.3. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05 . . . . . . . . . 22 A.1. Obfuscated Connection ID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.4. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04 . . . . . . . . . 23 A.2. Stream Cipher Connection ID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.5. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . . 23 A.3. Block Cipher Connection ID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.6. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.7. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.8. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 23 C.1. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 C.2. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 26
C.3. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06 . . . . . . . . . 26
C.4. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05 . . . . . . . . . 26
C.5. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04 . . . . . . . . . 26
C.6. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . . 27
C.7. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . . 27
C.8. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . . 27
C.9. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
QUIC packets usually contain a connection ID to allow endpoints to QUIC packets [QUIC-TRANSPORT] usually contain a connection ID to
associate packets with different address/port 4-tuples to the same allow endpoints to associate packets with different address/port
connection context. This feature makes connections robust in the 4-tuples to the same connection context. This feature makes
event of NAT rebinding. QUIC endpoints usually designate the connections robust in the event of NAT rebinding. QUIC endpoints
connection ID which peers use to address packets. Server-generated usually designate the connection ID which peers use to address
connection IDs create a potential need for out-of-band communication packets. Server-generated connection IDs create a potential need for
to support QUIC. out-of-band communication to support QUIC.
QUIC allows servers (or load balancers) to designate an initial QUIC allows servers (or load balancers) to designate an initial
connection ID to encode useful routing information for load connection ID to encode useful routing information for load
balancers. It also encourages servers, in packets protected by balancers. It also encourages servers, in packets protected by
cryptography, to provide additional connection IDs to the client. cryptography, to provide additional connection IDs to the client.
This allows clients that know they are going to change IP address or This allows clients that know they are going to change IP address or
port to use a separate connection ID on the new path, thus reducing port to use a separate connection ID on the new path, thus reducing
linkability as clients move through the world. linkability as clients move through the world.
There is a tension between the requirements to provide routing There is a tension between the requirements to provide routing
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QUIC-LB is relevant in the region between these extremes: when the QUIC-LB is relevant in the region between these extremes: when the
information that two connection IDs map to the same server is helpful information that two connection IDs map to the same server is helpful
to linking two connection IDs. Obviously, any scheme that to linking two connection IDs. Obviously, any scheme that
transparently communicates this mapping to outside observers transparently communicates this mapping to outside observers
compromises QUIC's defenses against linkability. compromises QUIC's defenses against linkability.
Though not an explicit goal of the QUIC-LB design, concealing the Though not an explicit goal of the QUIC-LB design, concealing the
server mapping also complicates attempts to focus attacks on a server mapping also complicates attempts to focus attacks on a
specific server in the pool. specific server in the pool.
2.3. Load Balancer Chains
While it is possible to construct a scheme that supports multiple
low-state load balancers in the path, by using different parts of the
connection ID to encode routing information for each load balancer,
this use case is out of scope for QUIC-LB.
3. First CID octet 3. First CID octet
The first octet of a Connection ID is reserved for two special The first octet of a Connection ID is reserved for two special
purposes, one mandatory (config rotation) and one optional (length purposes, one mandatory (config rotation) and one optional (length
self-description). self-description).
Subsequent sections of this document refer to the contents of this Subsequent sections of this document refer to the contents of this
octet as the "first octet." octet as the "first octet."
3.1. Config Rotation 3.1. Config Rotation
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verify the address itself (with the server trusting this verify the address itself (with the server trusting this
verification) or make sure there is common context for the server to verification) or make sure there is common context for the server to
verify the address using a service-generated token. verify the address using a service-generated token.
There are two different mechanisms to allow offload of DoS mitigation There are two different mechanisms to allow offload of DoS mitigation
to a trusted network service. One requires no shared state; the to a trusted network service. One requires no shared state; the
server need only be configured to trust a retry service, though this server need only be configured to trust a retry service, though this
imposes other operational constraints. The other requires shared imposes other operational constraints. The other requires shared
key, but has no such constraints. key, but has no such constraints.
Retry services MUST forward all non-Initial QUIC packets, as well as Retry services MUST forward all QUIC packets that are not of type
Initial packets from the server. Initial or 0-RTT. Other packets types might involve changed IP
addresses or connection IDs, so it is not practical for Retry
Services to identify such packets as valid or invalid.
5.1. Common Requirements 5.1. Common Requirements
Regardless of mechanism, a retry service has an active mode, where it Regardless of mechanism, a retry service has an active mode, where it
is generating Retry packets, and an inactive mode, where it is not, is generating Retry packets, and an inactive mode, where it is not,
based on its assessment of server load and the likelihood an attack based on its assessment of server load and the likelihood an attack
is underway. The choice of mode MAY be made on a per-packet basis, is underway. The choice of mode MAY be made on a per-packet or per-
through a stochastic process or based on client address. connection basis, through a stochastic process or based on client
address.
A retry service MUST forward all packets for a QUIC version it does A retry service MUST forward all packets for a QUIC version it does
not understand. Note that if servers support versions the retry not understand. Note that if servers support versions the retry
service does not, this may unacceptably increase loads on the service does not, this may increase load on the servers. However,
servers. However, dropping these packets would introduce chokepoints dropping these packets would introduce chokepoints to block
to block deployment of new QUIC versions. Note that future versions deployment of new QUIC versions. Note that future versions of QUIC
of QUIC might not have Retry packets, or require different might not have Retry packets, require different information in Retry,
information. or use different packet type indicators.
5.2. No-Shared-State Retry Service 5.2. No-Shared-State Retry Service
The no-shared-state retry service requires no coordination, except The no-shared-state retry service requires no coordination, except
that the server must be configured to accept this service. The that the server must be configured to accept this service and know
scheme uses the first bit of the token to distinguish between tokens which QUIC versions the retry service supports. The scheme uses the
from Retry packets (codepoint '0') and tokens from NEW_TOKEN frames first bit of the token to distinguish between tokens from Retry
(codepoint '1'). packets (codepoint '0') and tokens from NEW_TOKEN frames (codepoint
'1').
5.2.1. Service Requirements 5.2.1. Configuration Agent Actions
The configuration agent distributes a list of QUIC versions to be
served by the Retry Service.
5.2.2. Service Requirements
A no-shared-state retry service MUST be present on all paths from A no-shared-state retry service MUST be present on all paths from
potential clients to the server. These paths MUST fail to pass QUIC potential clients to the server. These paths MUST fail to pass QUIC
traffic should the service fail for any reason. That is, if the traffic should the service fail for any reason. That is, if the
service is not operational, the server MUST NOT be exposed to client service is not operational, the server MUST NOT be exposed to client
traffic. Otherwise, servers that have already disabled their Retry traffic. Otherwise, servers that have already disabled their Retry
capability would be vulnerable to attack. capability would be vulnerable to attack.
The path between service and server MUST be free of any potential The path between service and server MUST be free of any potential
attackers. Note that this and other requirements above severely attackers. Note that this and other requirements above severely
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Original Destination Connection ID (...) | | Original Destination Connection ID (...) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque Data (variable) | | Opaque Data (variable) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Format of non-shared-state retry service tokens Figure 5: Format of non-shared-state retry service tokens
The first bit of retry tokens generated by the service must be zero. The first bit of retry tokens generated by the service MUST be zero.
The token has the following additional fields: The token has the following additional fields:
ODCIL: The length of the original destination connection ID from the ODCIL: The length of the original destination connection ID from the
triggering Initial packet. This is in cleartext to be readable for triggering Initial packet. This is in cleartext to be readable for
the server, but authenticated later in the token. the server, but authenticated later in the token.
Original Destination Connection ID: This also in cleartext and Original Destination Connection ID: This also in cleartext and
authenticated later. authenticated later.
Opaque Data: This data MUST contain encrypted information that allows Opaque Data: This data MUST contain encrypted information that allows
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tokens with the first bit set to '0'. If successful, the service tokens with the first bit set to '0'. If successful, the service
MUST forward the packet with the token intact. If unsuccessful, it MUST forward the packet with the token intact. If unsuccessful, it
MUST either drop the packet or forward it with the token removed. MUST either drop the packet or forward it with the token removed.
The latter requires decryption and re-encryption of the entire The latter requires decryption and re-encryption of the entire
Initial packet to avoid authentication failure. Forwarding the Initial packet to avoid authentication failure. Forwarding the
packet causes the server to respond without the packet causes the server to respond without the
original_connection_id transport parameter, which preserves the original_connection_id transport parameter, which preserves the
normal QUIC signal to the client that there is an unauthorized man in normal QUIC signal to the client that there is an unauthorized man in
the middle. the middle.
5.2.2. Server Requirements 5.2.3. Server Requirements
A server behind a non-shared-state retry service MUST NOT send Retry A server behind a non-shared-state retry service MUST NOT send Retry
packets. packets for a QUIC version the retry service understands. It MAY
send Retry for QUIC versions the Retry Service does not understand.
Tokens sent in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST have the first bit be set to Tokens sent in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST have the first bit be set to
'1'. '1'.
If a server receives an Initial Packet with the first bit set to '1', If a server receives an Initial Packet with the first bit set to '1',
it could be from a server-generated NEW_TOKEN frame and should be it could be from a server-generated NEW_TOKEN frame and should be
processed in accordance with the QUIC specification. If a server processed in accordance with the QUIC specification. If a server
receives an Initial Packet with the first bit to '0', it is a Retry receives an Initial Packet with the first bit to '0', it is a Retry
token and the server MUST NOT attempt to validate it. Instead, it token and the server MUST NOT attempt to validate it. Instead, it
MUST assume the address is validated and MUST extract the Original MUST assume the address is validated and MUST extract the Original
Destination Connection ID, assuming the format described in Destination Connection ID, assuming the format described in
Section 5.2.1. Section 5.2.2.
5.3. Shared-State Retry Service 5.3. Shared-State Retry Service
A shared-state retry service uses a shared key, so that the server A shared-state retry service uses a shared key, so that the server
can decode the service's retry tokens. It does not require that all can decode the service's retry tokens. It does not require that all
traffic pass through the Retry service, so servers MAY send Retry traffic pass through the Retry service, so servers MAY send Retry
packets in response to Initial packets that don't include a valid packets in response to Initial packets that don't include a valid
token. token.
Both server and service must have access to Universal time, though Both server and service must have access to Universal time, though
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| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque Data (optional) | | Opaque Data (optional) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Cleartext format of shared-state retry tokens Figure 6: Cleartext format of shared-state retry tokens
The tokens have the following fields: The tokens have the following fields:
ODCIL: The original destination connection ID length. Tokens in ODCIL: The original destination connection ID length. Tokens in
NEW_TOKEN frames SHOULD set this field to zero. NEW_TOKEN frames MUST set this field to zero.
Original Destination Connection ID: This is copied from the field in Original Destination Connection ID: This is copied from the field in
the client Initial packet. the client Initial packet.
Client IP Address: The source IP address from the triggering Initial Client IP Address: The source IP address from the triggering Initial
packet. The client IP address is 16 octets. If an IPv4 address, the packet. The client IP address is 16 octets. If an IPv4 address, the
last 12 octets are zeroes. last 12 octets are zeroes.
date-time: The date-time string is a total of 20 octets and encodes date-time: The date-time string is a total of 20 octets and encodes
the time the token was generated. The format of date-time is the time the token was generated. The format of date-time is
skipping to change at page 20, line 6 skipping to change at page 20, line 6
content of the first CID octet and the presence and mode of any Retry content of the first CID octet and the presence and mode of any Retry
Service. Service.
The following pseudocode depicts the data items necessary to store a The following pseudocode depicts the data items necessary to store a
full QUIC-LB configuration at the server. It is meant to describe full QUIC-LB configuration at the server. It is meant to describe
the conceptual range and not specify the presentation of such the conceptual range and not specify the presentation of such
configuration in an internet packet. The comments signify the range configuration in an internet packet. The comments signify the range
of acceptable values where applicable. of acceptable values where applicable.
uint2 config_rotation_bits; uint2 config_rotation_bits;
enum { in_band_config, out_of_band_config } config_method;
select (config_method) {
case in_band_config: uint64 config_token;
case out_of_band_config: null;
} config-method
boolean first_octet_encodes_cid_length; boolean first_octet_encodes_cid_length;
enum { none, non_shared_state, shared_state } retry_service; enum { none, non_shared_state, shared_state } retry_service;
select (retry_service) { select (retry_service) {
case none: null; case none: null;
case non_shared_state: null; case non_shared_state: uint32 list_of_quic_versions[];
case shared_state: uint8 key[16]; case shared_state: uint8 key[16];
} retry_service_config; } retry_service_config;
enum { none, plaintext, obfuscated, stream_cipher, block_cipher } enum { none, plaintext, obfuscated, stream_cipher, block_cipher }
routing_algorithm; routing_algorithm;
select (routing_algorithm) { select (routing_algorithm) {
case none: null; case none: null;
case plaintext: struct { case plaintext: struct {
uint8 server_id_length; /* 1..19 */ uint8 server_id_length; /* 1..19 */
uint8 server_id[server_id_length]; uint8 server_id[server_id_length];
} plaintext_config; } plaintext_config;
case obfuscated: struct { case obfuscated: struct {
skipping to change at page 20, line 45 skipping to change at page 20, line 40
uint8 key[16]; uint8 key[16];
} stream_cipher_config; } stream_cipher_config;
case block_cipher: struct { case block_cipher: struct {
uint8 server_id_length; uint8 server_id_length;
uint8 zero_padding_length; /* 0..(16 - server_id_length) */ uint8 zero_padding_length; /* 0..(16 - server_id_length) */
uint8 server_id[server_id_length]; uint8 server_id[server_id_length];
uint8 key[16]; uint8 key[16];
} block_cipher_config; } block_cipher_config;
} routing_algorithm_config; } routing_algorithm_config;
7. Security Considerations 7. Additional Use Cases
This section discusses considerations for some deployment scenarios
not implied by the specification above.
7.1. Load balancer chains
Some network architectures may have multiple tiers of low-state load
balancers, where a first tier of devices makes a routing decision to
the next tier, and so on until packets reach the server. Although
QUIC-LB is not explicitly designed for this use case, it is possible
to support it.
If each load balancer is assigned a range of server IDs that is a
subset of the range of IDs assigned to devices that are closer to the
client, then the first devices to process an incoming packet can
extract the server ID and then map it to the correct forwrading
address. Note that this solution is extensible to arbitrarily large
numbers of load-balancing tiers, as the maximum server ID space is
quite large.
7.2. Moving connections between servers
Some deployments may transparently move a connection from one server
to another. The means of transferring connection state between
servers is out of scope of this document.
To support a handover, a server involved in the transition could
issue CIDs that map to the new server via a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame,
and retire CIDs associated with the new server using the "Retire
Prior To" field in that frame.
Alternately, if the old server is going offline, the load balancer
could simply map its server ID to the new server's address.
8. Security Considerations
QUIC-LB is intended to prevent linkability. Attacks would therefore QUIC-LB is intended to prevent linkability. Attacks would therefore
attempt to subvert this purpose. attempt to subvert this purpose.
Note that the Plaintext CID algorithm makes no attempt to obscure the Note that the Plaintext CID algorithm makes no attempt to obscure the
server mapping, and therefore does not address these concerns. It server mapping, and therefore does not address these concerns. It
exists to allow consistent CID encoding for compatibility across a exists to allow consistent CID encoding for compatibility across a
network infrastructure. Servers that are running the Plaintext CID network infrastructure. Servers that are running the Plaintext CID
algorithm SHOULD only use it to generate new CIDs for the Server algorithm SHOULD only use it to generate new CIDs for the Server
Initial Packet and SHOULD NOT send CIDs in QUIC NEW_CONNECTION_ID Initial Packet and SHOULD NOT send CIDs in QUIC NEW_CONNECTION_ID
frames. Doing so might falsely suggest to the client that said CIDs frames. Doing so might falsely suggest to the client that said CIDs
were generated in a secure fashion. were generated in a secure fashion.
A linkability attack would find some means of determining that two A linkability attack would find some means of determining that two
connection IDs route to the same server. As described above, there connection IDs route to the same server. As described above, there
is no scheme that strictly prevents linkability for all traffic is no scheme that strictly prevents linkability for all traffic
patterns, and therefore efforts to frustrate any analysis of server patterns, and therefore efforts to frustrate any analysis of server
ID encoding have diminishing returns. ID encoding have diminishing returns.
7.1. Attackers not between the load balancer and server 8.1. Attackers not between the load balancer and server
Any attacker might open a connection to the server infrastructure and Any attacker might open a connection to the server infrastructure and
aggressively retire connection IDs to obtain a large sample of IDs aggressively retire connection IDs to obtain a large sample of IDs
that map to the same server. It could then apply analytical that map to the same server. It could then apply analytical
techniques to try to obtain the server encoding. techniques to try to obtain the server encoding.
The Encrypted CID algorithm provides robust entropy to making any The Encrypted CID algorithm provides robust entropy to making any
sort of linkage. The Obfuscated CID obscures the mapping and sort of linkage. The Obfuscated CID obscures the mapping and
prevents trivial brute-force attacks to determine the routing prevents trivial brute-force attacks to determine the routing
parameters, but does not provide robust protection against parameters, but does not provide robust protection against
sophisticated attacks. sophisticated attacks.
Were this analysis to obtain the server encoding, then on-path Were this analysis to obtain the server encoding, then on-path
observers might apply this analysis to correlating different client observers might apply this analysis to correlating different client
IP addresses. IP addresses.
7.2. Attackers between the load balancer and server 8.2. Attackers between the load balancer and server
Attackers in this privileged position are intrinsically able to map Attackers in this privileged position are intrinsically able to map
two connection IDs to the same server. The QUIC-LB algorithms do two connection IDs to the same server. The QUIC-LB algorithms do
prevent the linkage of two connection IDs to the same individual prevent the linkage of two connection IDs to the same individual
connection if servers make reasonable selections when generating new connection if servers make reasonable selections when generating new
IDs for that connection. IDs for that connection.
8. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA requirements. There are no IANA requirements.
9. References 10. References
9.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[QUIC-TRANSPORT] [QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic- Multiplexed and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-
transport (work in progress). transport (work in progress).
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
9.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Load Balancer Test Vectors
Appendix B. Change Log Because any connection ID encoding in this specification includes
many bits for server use without affecting extraction of the
connection ID, there are many possible connection IDs for any given
set of parameters. However, every connection ID should result in a
unique server ID. The following connection IDs can be used to verify
that a load balancer implementation extracts the correct server ID.
A.1. Obfuscated Connection ID Algorithm
The following section lists a set of OCID load balancer
configuration, followed by five CIDs from which the load balancer can
extract the server ID.
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask ddc2f17788d77e3239b4ea
divisor 345
cid 0b72715d4745ce26cca8c750 sid b cid 0b63a1785b6c0b0857225e96 sid
3f cid 0b66474fa11329e6bb947818 sid 147 cid 0b34bd7c0882deb0252e2a58
sid ca cid 0b0506ee792163bf9330dc0a sid 14d
cr_bits 0x1 length_self_encoding: n bitmask
4855d35f5b88ddada153af61b6707ee646 divisor 301
cid 542dc4c09e2d548e508dc825bbbca991c131 sid 8 cid
47988071f9f03a25c322cc6fb1d57151d26f sid 93 cid
6a13e05071f74cdb7d0dc24d72687b21e1d1 sid c0 cid
4323c129650c7ee66f37266044ef52e74ffa sid 60 cid
5e95f77e7e66891b57c224c5781c8c5dd8ba sid 8f
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask 9f98bd3df66338c2d2c6
divisor 459
cid 0ad52216e7798c28340fd6 sid 125 cid 0a78f8ecbd087083639f94 sid 4b
cid 0ac7e70a5fe6b353b824aa sid 12 cid 0af9612ae5ccba3ef98b81 sid d1
cid 0a94ab209ea1d2e1e23751 sid 5d
cr_bits 0x2 length_self_encoding: n bitmask dfba93c4f98f57103f5ae331
divisor 461
cid 8b70b8c69e40ef2f3f8937e817 sid d3 cid b1828830ea1789dab13a043795
sid 44 cid 90604a580baa3eb0a47812e490 sid 137 cid
a5b4bc309337ff73e143ff6deb sid 9f cid fce75c0a984a79d3b4af40d155 sid
127
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask 8320fefc5309f7aa670476
divisor 379
cid 0bb110af53dca7295e7d4b7e sid 101 cid 0b0d284cdff364a634a4b93b sid
e3 cid 0b82ff1555c4a95f9b198090 sid 14e cid 0b7a427d3e508ad71e98b797
sid 14e cid 0b71d1d4e3e3cd54d435b3fd sid eb
A.2. Stream Cipher Connection ID Algorithm
Like the previous section, the text below lists a set of load
balancer configuration and 5 CIDs generated with that configuration.
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y nonce_len 13 sid_len 1 key
16eff325e8bf8dfebdae003543fb845f
cid 0eb9eb1fc72eed820cf5658cdd7888 sid 9c cid
0e6f4de5beb5aa4170f44104318c5b sid c0 cid
0e78f0325a8e34a40661f51f235906 sid 1d cid
0ef37923f81c32632299bceabd1d92 sid fa cid
0ea30788c012daa94a83865a2c7f28 sid b3
cr_bits 0x1 length_self_encoding: n nonce_len 9 sid_len 2 key
906220f402ba3bd893ccc4dd9cfc04b0
cid 7b33366764888138f1465352 sid b839 cid 4329458bbe6cb9befc04bdeb
sid 3b27 cid 61e4e8235c4ebd5442d85bb0 sid bb5c cid
4fd790d1d0cf2b50796cad12 sid 4ecd cid 725325eceaca3528d8c0314b sid
54fd
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y nonce_len 8 sid_len 3 key
0a9b8ccdee977a65e3519693fcd55c8c
cid 0bfced0b5727be40af49102e sid 08d342 cid 0b160042b34fe728a9f05376
sid 4d61e0 cid 0b933157fc8c352ee9490ae7 sid 34a912 cid
0b80d1d567aafedb737ed0eb sid 4f2a92 cid 0b3133feac7ae7125b1d0702 sid
1a5db3
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: n nonce_len 8 sid_len 4 key
66c5acdb45a40c91da8cfbbdc77c157e
cid 2da078bbf87c71264879c58a5a sid 20f1e37e cid
04577ce3800cf22ead7f9ba9a5 sid 29e462c4 cid
1a0f6592fcd9167d0aa201e228 sid a0b0fb8a cid
11e4df0eb7db00363b1721e4a4 sid 31f15006 cid
3d54b24c7bd39f081f00f44295 sid 551b8c28
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y nonce_len 12 sid_len 5 key
ba4909a865c19d0234e090197d61bab9
cid 11325919a7205f4f5e222c2ac94ec3309c1e sid 10f115363a cid
11ca85a9e5d02563ebb119acfacb3007993d sid 4108093aaf cid
1196ef4f0936cb6062b5db441395ef9f3831 sid 383c14e754 cid
11ce3a6611da0e75f59dc8fe3cf4cfc6a61d sid d0da150dbf cid
116bd4cf085659d26b39dd5dd107ae87a694 sid b2945466df
A.3. Block Cipher Connection ID Algorithm
Like the previous section, the text below lists a set of load
balancer configuration and 5 CIDs generated with that configuration.
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 1 zp_len 11 key
8c24cb9b9c3289b4ee63c3f3d7f93a9a
cid: 1378e44f874642624fa69e7b4aec15a2a678b8b5 sid: 48 cid:
13772c82fe8ce6a00813f76a211b730eb4b20363 sid: 66 cid:
135ccf507b1c209457f80df0217b9a1df439c4b2 sid: 30 cid:
13898459900426c073c66b1001c867f9098a7aab sid: fe cid:
1397a18da00bf912f20049d9f0a007444f8b6699 sid: 30
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: n sid_len 2 zp_len 10 key
cc7ec42794664a8428250c12a7fb16fa
cid: 0cb28bfc1f65c3de14752bc0fc734ef824ce8f78 sid: 33fa cid:
2345e9fc7a7be55b4ba1ff6ffa04f3f5f8c67009 sid: ee47 cid:
0d32102be441600f608c95841fd40ce978aa7a02 sid: 0c8b cid:
2e6bfc53c91c275019cd809200fa8e23836565ab sid: feca cid:
29b87a902ed129c26f7e4e918a68703dc71a6e0a sid: 8941
cr_bits 0x1 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 3 zp_len 9 key
42e657946b96b7052ab8e6eeb863ee24
cid: 53c48f7884d73fd9016f63e50453bfd9bcfc637d sid: b46b68 cid:
53f45532f6a4f0e1757fa15c35f9a2ab0fcce621 sid: 2147b4 cid:
5361fd4bbcee881a637210f4fffc02134772cc76 sid: e4bf4b cid:
53881ffde14e613ef151e50ba875769d6392809b sid: c2afee cid:
53ad0d60204d88343492334e6c4c4be88d4a3add sid: ae0331
cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: n sid_len 4 zp_len 8 key
ee2dc6a3359a94b0043ca0c82715ce71
cid: 058b9da37f436868cca3cef40c7f98001797c611 sid: eaf846c7 cid:
1259fc97439adaf87f61250afea059e5ddf66e44 sid: 4cc5e84a cid:
202f424376f234d5f014f41cebc38de2619c6c71 sid: f94ff800 cid:
146ac3e4bbb750d3bfb617ef4b0cb51a1cae5868 sid: c2071b1b cid:
36dfe886538af7eb16a196935b3705c9d741479f sid: 26359dbb
cr_bits 0x2 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 5 zp_len 7 key
700837da8834840afe7720186ec610c9
cid: 931ef3cc07e2eaf08d4c1902cd564d907cc3377c sid: 759b1d419a cid:
9398c3d0203ab15f1dfeb5aa8f81e52888c32008 sid: 77cc0d3310 cid:
93f4ba09ab08a9ef997db4fa37a97dbf2b4c5481 sid: f7db9dce32 cid:
93744f4bedf95e04dd6607592ecf775825403093 sid: e264d714d2 cid:
93256308e3d349f8839dec840b0a90c7e7a1fc20 sid: 618b07791f
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
Appendix C. Change Log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document. publication of a final version of this document.
B.1. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00 C.1. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01
o Test vectors for load balancer decoding
o Deleted remnants of in-band protocol
o Light edit of Retry Services section
o Discussed load balancer chains
C.2. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00
o Removed in-band protocol from the document o Removed in-band protocol from the document
B.2. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06 C.3. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06
o Switch to IETF WG draft. o Switch to IETF WG draft.
B.3. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05 C.4. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05
o Editorial changes o Editorial changes
o Made load balancer behavior independent of QUIC version o Made load balancer behavior independent of QUIC version
o Got rid of token in stream cipher encoding, because server might o Got rid of token in stream cipher encoding, because server might
not have it not have it
o Defined "non-compliant DCID" and specified rules for handling o Defined "non-compliant DCID" and specified rules for handling
them. them.
o Added psuedocode for config schema o Added psuedocode for config schema
B.4. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04 C.5. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04
o Added standard for retry services o Added standard for retry services
B.5. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03 C.6. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03
o Renamed Plaintext CID algorithm as Obfuscated CID o Renamed Plaintext CID algorithm as Obfuscated CID
o Added new Plaintext CID algorithm o Added new Plaintext CID algorithm
o Updated to allow 20B CIDs o Updated to allow 20B CIDs
o Added self-encoding of CID length o Added self-encoding of CID length
B.6. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02 C.7. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02
o Added Config Rotation o Added Config Rotation
o Added failover mode o Added failover mode
o Tweaks to existing CID algorithms o Tweaks to existing CID algorithms
o Added Block Cipher CID algorithm o Added Block Cipher CID algorithm
o Reformatted QUIC-LB packets o Reformatted QUIC-LB packets
B.7. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01 C.8. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01
o Complete rewrite o Complete rewrite
o Supports multiple security levels o Supports multiple security levels
o Lightweight messages o Lightweight messages
B.8. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00 C.9. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00
o Converted to markdown o Converted to markdown
o Added variable length connection IDs o Added variable length connection IDs
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Martin Duke Martin Duke
F5 Networks, Inc. F5 Networks, Inc.
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