QUIC                                                             M. Duke
Internet-Draft                                         F5 Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                                N. Banks
Expires: 11 January 15 February 2021                                      Microsoft
                                                            10 July
                                                          14 August 2020

            QUIC-LB: Generating Routable QUIC Connection IDs


   QUIC connection IDs allow continuation of connections across address/
   port 4-tuple changes, and can store routing information for stateless
   or low-state load balancers.  They also can prevent linkability of
   connections across deliberate address migration through the use of
   protected communications between client and server.  This creates
   issues for load-balancing intermediaries.  This specification
   standardizes methods for encoding routing information given a small
   set of configuration parameters.  This framework also enables offload
   of other QUIC functions to trusted intermediaries, given the explicit
   cooperation of the QUIC server.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 January 15 February 2021.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Simplicity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  First CID octet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Config Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Configuration Failover  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Length Self-Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Routing Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Plaintext CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . .
     3.4.  Format  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Routing Algorithms  . .   9
       4.1.3.  Server Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Obfuscated   8
     4.1.  Plaintext CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1. .   9
       4.1.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.2.   9
       4.1.2.  Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.3.   9
       4.1.3.  Server Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  10
     4.2.  Stream Cipher CID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.3.1.  10
       4.2.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.3.2.  10
       4.2.2.  Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.3.3.  10
       4.2.3.  Server Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  12
     4.3.  Block Cipher CID Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.4.1.  12
       4.3.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.4.2.  12
       4.3.2.  Load Balancer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.4.3.  13
       4.3.3.  Server Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  13
   5.  ICMP Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  13
   6.  Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  14
     6.1.  Common Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  14
     6.2.  No-Shared-State Retry Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  15
       6.2.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  15
       6.2.2.  Service Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  15
       6.2.3.  Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  17
     6.3.  Shared-State Retry Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  17
       6.3.1.  Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  19
       6.3.2.  Service Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  19
       6.3.3.  Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  19
   7.  Configuration Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22  20
   8.  Additional Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  21
     8.1.  Load balancer chains  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  21
     8.2.  Moving connections between servers  . . . . . . . . . . .  24  22
   9.  Version Invariance of QUIC-LB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24  22
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  23
     10.1.  Attackers not between the load balancer and server . . .  25  23
     10.2.  Attackers between the load balancer and server . . . . .  26  24
     10.3.  Multiple Configuration IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.4.  Limited configuration scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     10.4.  24
     10.5.  Stateless Reset Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  25
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  25
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  25
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  25
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  25
   Appendix A.  Load Balancer Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  26
     A.1.  Obfuscated  Plaintext Connection ID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . .  27 .  26
     A.2.  Stream Cipher Connection ID Algorithm . . . . . . . . . .  28  26
     A.3.  Block Cipher Connection ID Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . .  29  27
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30  28
   Appendix C.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30  28
     C.1.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . .  30  28
     C.2.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . .  30  28
     C.3.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . .  30  28
     C.4.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . .  29
     C.5.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06 . . . . . . . . .  30
     C.5.  29
     C.6.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05 . . . . . . . . .  31
     C.6.  29
     C.7.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04 . . . . . . . . .  31
     C.7.  29
     C.8.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . .  31
     C.8.  29
     C.9.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . .  31
     C.9.  29
     C.10. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . .  31
     C.10.  30
     C.11. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . .  32  30
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32  30

1.  Introduction

   QUIC packets [QUIC-TRANSPORT] usually contain a connection ID to
   allow endpoints to associate packets with different address/port
   4-tuples to the same connection context.  This feature makes
   connections robust in the event of NAT rebinding.  QUIC endpoints
   usually designate the connection ID which peers use to address
   packets.  Server-generated connection IDs create a potential need for
   out-of-band communication to support QUIC.

   QUIC allows servers (or load balancers) to designate an initial
   connection ID to encode useful routing information for load
   balancers.  It also encourages servers, in packets protected by
   cryptography, to provide additional connection IDs to the client.
   This allows clients that know they are going to change IP address or
   port to use a separate connection ID on the new path, thus reducing
   linkability as clients move through the world.

   There is a tension between the requirements to provide routing
   information and mitigate linkability.  Ultimately, because new
   connection IDs are in protected packets, they must be generated at
   the server if the load balancer does not have access to the
   connection keys.  However, it is the load balancer that has the
   context necessary to generate a connection ID that encodes useful
   routing information.  In the absence of any shared state between load
   balancer and server, the load balancer must maintain a relatively
   expensive table of server-generated connection IDs, and will not
   route packets correctly if they use a connection ID that was
   originally communicated in a protected NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame.

   This specification provides common algorithms for encoding the server
   mapping in a connection ID given some shared parameters.  The mapping
   is generally only discoverable by observers that have the parameters,
   preserving unlinkability as much as possible.

   Aside from load balancing, a QUIC server may also desire to offload
   other protocol functions to trusted intermediaries.  These
   intermediaries might include hardware assist on the server host
   itself, without access to fully decrypted QUIC packets.  For example,
   this document specifies a means of offloading stateless retry to
   counter Denial of Service attacks.  It also proposes a system for
   self-encoding connection ID length in all packets, so that crypto
   offload can consistently look up key information.

   While this document describes a small set of configuration parameters
   to make the server mapping intelligible, the means of distributing
   these parameters between load balancers, servers, and other trusted
   intermediaries is out of its scope.  There are numerous well-known
   infrastructures for distribution of configuration.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.

   In this document, "client" and "server" refer to the endpoints of a
   QUIC connection unless otherwise indicated.  A "load balancer" is an
   intermediary for that connection that does not possess QUIC
   connection keys, but it may rewrite IP addresses or conduct other IP
   or UDP processing.  A "configuration agent" is the entity that
   determines the QUIC-LB configuration parameters for the network and
   leverages some system to distribute that configuration.

   Note that stateful load balancers that act as proxies, by terminating
   a QUIC connection with the client and then retrieving data from the
   server using QUIC or another protocol, are treated as a server with
   respect to this specification.

   For brevity, "Connection ID" will often be abbreviated as "CID".

2.  Protocol Objectives

2.1.  Simplicity

   QUIC is intended to provide unlinkability across connection
   migration, but servers are not required to provide additional
   connection IDs that effectively prevent linkability.  If the
   coordination scheme is too difficult to implement, servers behind
   load balancers using connection IDs for routing will use trivially
   linkable connection IDs.  Clients will therefore be forced to choose
   between terminating the connection during migration or remaining
   linkable, subverting a design objective of QUIC.

   The solution should be both simple to implement and require little
   additional infrastructure for cryptographic keys, etc.

2.2.  Security

   In the limit where there are very few connections to a pool of
   servers, no scheme can prevent the linking of two connection IDs with
   high probability.  In the opposite limit, where all servers have many
   connections that start and end frequently, it will be difficult to
   associate two connection IDs even if they are known to map to the
   same server.

   QUIC-LB is relevant in the region between these extremes: when the
   information that two connection IDs map to the same server is helpful
   to linking two connection IDs.  Obviously, any scheme that
   transparently communicates this mapping to outside observers
   compromises QUIC's defenses against linkability.

   Though not an explicit goal of the QUIC-LB design, concealing the
   server mapping also complicates attempts to focus attacks on a
   specific server in the pool.

3.  First CID octet

   The first octet of a Connection ID is reserved for two special
   purposes, one mandatory (config rotation) and one optional (length

   Subsequent sections of this document refer to the contents of this
   octet as the "first octet."

3.1.  Config Rotation

   The first two bits of any connection-ID connection ID MUST encode an identifier for
   the configuration
   phase of that ID.  QUIC-LB messages indicate the phase of the
   algorithm and parameters that they encode.

   A new configuration may change one or more parameters of the old
   configuration, or change the algorithm used.

   It is possible for servers to have mutually exclusive sets of
   supported algorithms, or for a transition from one algorithm to
   another to result in Fail Payloads.  The four states encoded in these
   two bits allow two mutually exclusive server pools to coexist, and
   for each connection ID uses.  This enables
   incremental deployment of them to transition to a new set of parameters. QUIC-LB settings (e.g., keys).

   When new configuration is distributed to servers, there will be a
   transition period when connection IDs reflecting old and new
   configuration coexist in the network.  The rotation bits allow load
   balancers to apply the correct routing algorithm and parameters to
   incoming packets.

   Configuration Agents SHOULD make an effort to deliver new configurations to load
   balancers before doing so to servers, so that load balancers are
   ready to process CIDs using the new parameters when they arrive.

   A Configuration Agent SHOULD NOT use a codepoint to represent a new
   configuration until it takes precautions to make sure that all
   connections using CIDs with an old configuration at that codepoint
   have closed or transitioned.

   Servers MUST NOT generate new connection IDs using an old
   configuration after receiving a new one from the configuration agent.
   Servers MUST send NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that provide CIDS CIDs using
   the new configuration, and retire CIDs using the old configuration
   using the "Retire Prior To" field of that frame.

   It also possible to use these bits for more long-lived distinction of
   different configurations, but this has privacy implications (see
   Section 10.3).

3.2.  Configuration Failover

   If a server has not received a valid QUIC-LB configuration, and
   believes that low-state, Connection-ID aware load balancers are in
   the path, it SHOULD generate connection IDs with the config rotation
   bits set to '11' and SHOULD use the "disable_migration" "disable_active_migration"
   transport parameter in all new QUIC connections.  It SHOULD NOT send
   NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames with new values.

   A load balancer that sees a connection ID with config rotation bits
   set to '11' MUST revert to 5-tuple routing.

3.3.  Length Self-Description

   Local hardware cryptographic offload devices may accelerate QUIC
   servers by receiving keys from the QUIC implementation indexed to the
   connection ID.  However, on physical devices operating multiple QUIC
   servers, it is impractical to efficiently lookup these keys if the
   connection ID does not self-encode its own length.

   Note that this is a function of particular server devices and is
   irrelevant to load balancers.  As such, load balancers MAY omit this
   from their configuration.  However, the remaining 6 bits in the first
   octet of the Connection ID are reserved to express the length of the
   following connection ID, not including the first octet.

   A server not using this functionality SHOULD make the six bits appear
   to be random.

3.4.  Format

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |C R|  CID Len  |

                        Figure 1: First Octet Format

   The first octet has the following fields:

   CR: Config Rotation bits.

   CID Len: Length Self-Description (if applicable).  Encodes the length
   of the Connection ID following the First Octet.

4.  Routing Algorithms

   In QUIC-LB, load balancers do not generate individual connection IDs
   to servers.  Instead, they communicate the parameters of an algorithm
   to generate routable connection IDs.

   The algorithms differ in the complexity of configuration at both load
   balancer and server.  Increasing complexity improves obfuscation of
   the server mapping.

   As clients sometimes generate the DCIDs in long headers, these might
   not conform to the expectations of the routing algorithm.  These are
   called "non-compliant DCIDs":

   *  The DCID might not be long enough for the routing algorithm to

   *  The extracted server mapping might not correspond to an active

   *  A field that should be all zeroes after decryption may not be so.

   Load balancers MUST forward packets with long headers with non-
   compliant DCIDs to an active server using an algorithm of its own
   choosing.  It need not coordinate this algorithm with the servers.
   The algorithm SHOULD be deterministic over short time scales so that
   related packets go to the same server.  The design of this algorithm
   SHOULD consider the version-invariant properties of QUIC described in
   [QUIC-INVARIANTS] to maximize its robustness to future versions of
   QUIC.  For example, a non-compliant DCID might be converted to an
   integer and divided by the number of servers, with the modulus used
   to forward the packet.  The number of servers is usually consistent
   on the time scale of a QUIC connection handshake.  See also
   Section 9.

   As a partial exception to the above, load balancers MAY drop packets
   with long headers and non-compliant DCIDs if and only if it knows
   that the encoded QUIC version does not allow a non-compliant DCID in
   a packet with that signature.  For example, a load balancer can
   safely drop a QUIC version 1 Handshake packet with a non-compliant
   DCIDs.  The prohibition against dropping packets with long headers
   remains for unknown QUIC versions.

   Load balancers SHOULD drop packets with non-compliant DCIDs in a
   short header.

   A QUIC-LB configuration MAY significantly over-provision the server
   ID space (i.e., provide far more codepoints than there are servers)
   to increase the probability that a randomly generated Destination
   Connection ID is non- compliant.

   Load balancers MUST forward packets with compliant DCIDs to a server
   in accordance with the chosen routing algorithm.

   The load balancer MUST NOT make the routing behavior dependent on any
   bits in the first octet of the QUIC packet header, except the first
   bit, which indicates a long header.  All other bits are QUIC version-
   dependent and intermediaries would cannot build their design on
   version-specific templates.

   There are situations where a server pool might be operating two or
   more routing algorithms or parameter sets simultaneously.  The load
   balancer uses the first two bits of the connection ID to multiplex
   incoming DCIDs over these schemes.

   This section describes three participants: the configuration agent,
   the load balancer, and the server.

4.1.  Plaintext CID Algorithm

   The Plaintext CID Algorithm makes no attempt to obscure the mapping
   of connections to servers, significantly increasing linkability.  The
   format is depicted in the figure below.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |  First octet  |             Server ID (X=8..152)              |
   |                        Any (0..152-X)                         |

                       Figure 1: 2: Plaintext CID Format

4.1.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent selects a number of bytes of the server
   connection ID to encode individual server IDs, called the "routing
   bytes".  The number of bytes MUST have enough entropy to have a
   different code point for each server.

   It also assigns a server ID to each server.

4.1.2.  Load Balancer Actions

   On each incoming packet, the load balancer extracts consecutive
   octets, beginning with the second octet.  These bytes represent the
   server ID.

4.1.3.  Server Actions

   The server chooses a connection ID length.  This MUST be at least one
   byte longer than the routing bytes.

   When a server needs a new connection ID, it encodes its assigned
   server ID in consecutive octets beginning with the second.  All other
   bits in the connection ID, except for the first octet, MAY be set to
   any other value.  These other bits SHOULD appear random to observers.

4.2.  Obfuscated  Stream Cipher CID Algorithm

   The Obfuscated Stream Cipher CID Algorithm makes an attempt to obscure algorithm provides cryptographic protection at
   the mapping cost of connections to servers additional per-packet processing at the load balancer to reduce linkability, while not requiring
   true encryption and decryption.
   decrypt every incoming connection ID.  The CID format is depicted in the figure

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |  First octet Octet  |  Mixed routing and non-routing bits (64..152)            Nonce (X=64..128)                  |
   |                 Encrypted Server ID (Y=8..152-X)              |
   |                   For server use (0..152-X-Y)                 |

                     Figure 2: Obfuscated 3: Stream Cipher CID Format

4.2.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent selects an arbitrary set of bits of the
   server connection ID that it will use to route to a given server,
   called the "routing bits".  The number of bits MUST have enough
   entropy to have a different code point for each server, and SHOULD
   have enough entropy so that there are many codepoints for each

   The configuration agent MUST NOT select a routing mask with more than
   136 routing bits set to 1, which allows for the first octet and up to
   2 octets for server purposes in a maximum-length connection ID.

   The configuration agent selects a divisor that MUST be larger than
   the number of servers.  It SHOULD be large enough to accommodate
   reasonable increases in the number of servers.  The divisor MUST be
   an odd integer so certain addition operations do not always produce
   an even number.

   The configuration agent also assigns each server a "modulus", an
   integer between 0 and the divisor minus 1.  These MUST be unique for
   each server, and SHOULD be distributed across the entire number space
   between zero and the divisor.

4.2.2.  Load Balancer Actions

   Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer extracts the
   selected bits of the Server CID and expresses them as an unsigned
   integer of that length.  The load balancer then divides the result by
   the chosen divisor.  The modulus of this operation maps to the
   modulus for the destination server.

   Note that any Server CID that contains a server's modulus, plus an
   arbitrary integer multiple of the divisor, in the routing bits is
   routable to that server regardless of the contents of the non-routing
   bits.  Outside observers that do not know the divisor or the routing
   bits will therefore have difficulty identifying that two Server CIDs
   route to the same server.

   Note also that not all Connection IDs are necessarily routable, as
   the computed modulus may not match one assigned to any server.  These
   DCIDs are non-compliant as described above.

4.2.3.  Server Actions

   The server chooses a connection ID length.  This MUST contain all of
   the routing bits and MUST be at least 9 octets to provide adequate

   When a server needs a new connection ID, it adds an arbitrary
   nonnegative integer multiple of the divisor to its modulus, without
   exceeding the maximum integer value implied by the number of routing
   bits.  The choice of multiple should appear random within these

   The server encodes the result in the routing bits.  It MAY put any
   other value into bits that used neither for routing nor config
   rotation.  These bits SHOULD appear random to observers.

4.3.  Stream Cipher CID Algorithm

   The Stream Cipher CID algorithm provides true cryptographic
   protection, rather than mere obfuscation, at the cost of additional
   per-packet processing at the load balancer to decrypt every incoming
   connection ID.  The CID format is depicted below.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |  First Octet  |            Nonce (X=64..128)                  |
   |                 Encrypted Server ID (Y=8..152-X)              |
   |                   For server use (0..152-X-Y)                 |

                     Figure 3: Stream Cipher CID Format

4.3.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent assigns a assigns a server ID to every server in its
   pool, and determines a server ID length (in octets) sufficiently
   large to encode all server IDs, including potential future servers.

   The configuration agent also selects a nonce length and an 16-octet
   AES-ECB key to use for connection ID decryption.  The nonce length
   MUST be at least 8 octets and no more than 16 octets.  The nonce
   length and server ID length MUST sum to 19 or fewer octets.


4.2.2.  Load Balancer Actions

   Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer extracts as many of
   the earliest octets from the destination connection ID as necessary
   to match the nonce length.  The server ID immediately follows.

   The load balancer decrypts the nonce and the server ID using the
   following three pass algorithm:

   *  Pass 1: The load balancer decrypts the server ID using 128-bit AES
      Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, much like QUIC header protection.
      The encrypted nonce octets are zero-padded to 16 octets.  AES-ECB
      encrypts this encrypted nonce using its key to generate a mask
      which it applies to the encrypted server id.  This provides an
      intermediate value of the server ID, referred to as server-id

   server_id_intermediate = encrypted_server_id ^ AES-ECB(key, padded-

   *  Pass 2: The load balancer decrypts the nonce octets using 128-bit
      AES ECB mode, using the server-id intermediate as "nonce" for this
      pass.  The server-id intermediate octets are zero-padded to 16
      octets.  AES-ECB encrypts this padded server-id intermediate using
      its key to generate a mask which it applies to the encrypted
      nonce.  This provides the decrypted nonce value.

   nonce = encrypted_nonce ^ AES-ECB(key, padded-server_id_intermediate)

   *  Pass 3: The load balancer decrypts the server ID using 128-bit AES
      ECB mode.  The nonce octets are zero-padded to 16 octets.  AES-ECB
      encrypts this nonce using its key to generate a mask which it
      applies to the intermediate server id.  This provides the
      decrypted server ID.

   server_id = server_id_intermediate ^ AES-ECB(key, padded-nonce)

   For example, if the nonce length is 10 octets and the server ID
   length is 2 octets, the connection ID can be as small as 13 octets.
   The load balancer uses the the second through eleventh octets of the
   connection ID for the nonce, zero-pads it to 16 octets, uses xors the
   result with the twelfth and thirteenth octet.  The result is padded
   with 14 octets of zeros and encrypted to obtain a mask that is xored
   with the nonce octets.  Finally, the nonce octets are padded with six
   octets of zeros, encrypted, and the first two octets xored with the
   server ID octets to obtain the actual server ID.

   This three-pass algorithm is a simplified version of the FFX
   algorithm, with the property that each encrypted nonce value depends
   on all server ID bits, and each encrypted server ID bit depends on
   all nonce bits and all server ID bits.  This mitigates attacks
   against stream ciphers in which attackers simply flip encrypted
   server-ID bits.

   The output of the decryption is the server ID that the load balancer
   uses for routing.


4.2.3.  Server Actions

   When generating a routable connection ID, the server writes arbitrary
   bits into its nonce octets, and its provided server ID into the
   server ID octets.  Servers MAY opt to have a longer connection ID
   beyond the nonce and server ID.  The additional bits MAY encode
   additional information, but SHOULD appear essentially random to

   If the decrypted nonce bits increase monotonically, that guarantees
   that nonces are not reused between connection IDs from the same

   The server encrypts the server ID using exactly the algorithm as
   described in Section 4.3.2, 4.2.2, performing the three passes in reverse


4.3.  Block Cipher CID Algorithm

   The Block Cipher CID Algorithm, by using a full 16 octets of
   plaintext and a 128-bit cipher, provides higher cryptographic
   protection and detection of non-compliant connection IDs.  However,
   it also requires connection IDs of at least 17 octets, increasing
   overhead of client-to-server packets.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |  First octet  |       Encrypted server ID (X=8..128)          |
   |           Encrypted Zero Padding (Y=0..128-X)               |
   |           Encrypted bits for server use (128-X-Y) (128-X)               |
   |           Unencrypted bits for server use (0..24)             |

                     Figure 4: Block Cipher CID Format


4.3.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent assigns a server ID to every server in its
   pool, and determines a server ID length (in octets) sufficiently
   large to encode all server IDs, including potential future servers.
   The server ID will start in the second octet of the decrypted
   connection ID and occupy continuous octets beyond that.

   The configuration agent selects a zero-padding length.  This SHOULD
   be at least four octets to allow detection of non-compliant DCIDs.

   They server ID and zero- padding length MUST sum to be no more than 16
   octets.  They octets and SHOULD sum
   to no more than 12 octets, to provide servers adequate space to
   encode their own opaque data.

   The configuration agent also selects an 16-octet AES-ECB key to use
   for connection ID decryption.


4.3.2.  Load Balancer Actions

   Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer reads the first
   octet to obtain the config rotation bits.  It then decrypts the
   subsequent 16 octets using AES-ECB decryption and the chosen key.

   The decrypted plaintext contains the server id, zero padding, id and opaque server data
   in that order.  The load balancer uses the server ID octets for


4.3.3.  Server Actions

   When generating a routable connection ID, the server MUST choose a
   connection ID length between 17 and 20 octets.  The server writes its
   provided server ID into the server ID octets, zeroes into the zero-
   padding octets, octets and arbitrary bits into
   the remaining bits.  These arbitrary bits MAY encode additional
   information.  Bits in the first, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth
   octets SHOULD appear essentially random to observers.  The first
   octet is reserved as described in Section 3.

   The server then encrypts the second through seventeenth octets using
   the 128-bit AES-ECB cipher.

5.  ICMP Processing

   For protocols where 4-tuple load balancing is sufficient, it is
   straightforward to deliver ICMP packets from the network to the
   correct server, by reading the IP and transport-layer headers to
   obtain the 4-tuple.  When routing is based on connection ID, further
   measures are required, as most QUIC packets that trigger ICMP
   responses will only contain a client-generated connection ID that
   contains no routing information.

   To solve this problem, load balancers MAY maintain a mapping of
   Client IP and port to server ID based on recently observed packets.

   Alternatively, servers MAY implement the technique described in
   Section 14.4.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] to increase the likelihood a
   Source Connection ID is included in ICMP responses to Path Maximum
   Transmission Unit (PMTU) probes.  Load balancers MAY parse the echoed
   packet to extract the Source Connection ID, if it contains a QUIC
   long header, and extract the Server ID as if it were in a Destination

6.  Retry Service

   When a server is under load, QUICv1 allows it to defer storage of
   connection state until the client proves it can receive packets at
   its advertised IP address.  Through the use of a Retry packet, a
   token in subsequent client Initial packets, and the
   original_destination_connection_id transport parameter, servers
   verify address ownership and clients verify that there is no "man in
   the middle" generating Retry packets.

   As a trusted Retry Service is literally a "man in the middle," the
   service must communicate the original_destination_connection_id back
   to the server so that it can pass client verification.  It also must
   either verify the address itself (with the server trusting this
   verification) or make sure there is common context for the server to
   verify the address using a service-generated token.

   The service must also communicate the source connection ID of the
   Retry packet to the server so that it can include it in a transport
   parameter for client verification.

   There are two different mechanisms to allow offload of DoS mitigation
   to a trusted network service.  One requires no shared state; the
   server need only be configured to trust a retry service, though this
   imposes other operational constraints.  The other requires shared
   key, but has no such constraints.

   Retry services MUST forward all QUIC packets that are not of type
   Initial or 0-RTT.  Other packets types might involve changed IP
   addresses or connection IDs, so it is not practical for Retry
   Services to identify such packets as valid or invalid.

6.1.  Common Requirements

   Regardless of mechanism, a retry service has an active mode, where it
   is generating Retry packets, and an inactive mode, where it is not,
   based on its assessment of server load and the likelihood an attack
   is underway.  The choice of mode MAY be made on a per-packet or per-
   connection basis, through a stochastic process or based on client

   A retry service MUST forward all packets for a QUIC version it does
   not understand.  Note that if servers support versions the retry
   service does not, this may increase load on the servers.  However,
   dropping these packets would introduce chokepoints to block
   deployment of new QUIC versions.  Note that future versions of QUIC
   might not have Retry packets, require different information in Retry,
   or use different packet type indicators.

6.2.  No-Shared-State Retry Service

   The no-shared-state retry service requires no coordination, except
   that the server must be configured to accept this service and know
   which QUIC versions the retry service supports.  The scheme uses the
   first bit of the token to distinguish between tokens from Retry
   packets (codepoint '0') and tokens from NEW_TOKEN frames (codepoint

6.2.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent distributes a list of QUIC versions to be
   served by the Retry Service.

6.2.2.  Service Requirements

   A no-shared-state retry service MUST be present on all paths from
   potential clients to the server.  These paths MUST fail to pass QUIC
   traffic should the service fail for any reason.  That is, if the
   service is not operational, the server MUST NOT be exposed to client
   traffic.  Otherwise, servers that have already disabled their Retry
   capability would be vulnerable to attack.

   The path between service and server MUST be free of any potential
   attackers.  Note that this and other requirements above severely
   restrict the operational conditions in which a no-shared-state retry
   service can safely operate.

   Retry tokens generated by the service MUST have the format below.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |0| ODCIL (7) |   RSCIL (8)   |
   |        Original Destination Connection ID (0..160)            |
   |                             ...                               |
   |              Retry Source Connection ID (0..160)              |
   |                             ...                               |
   |                     Opaque Data (variable)                    |

         Figure 5: Format of non-shared-state retry service tokens

   The first bit of retry tokens generated by the service MUST be zero.
   The token has the following additional fields:

   ODCIL: The length of the original destination connection ID from the
   triggering Initial packet.  This is in cleartext to be readable for
   the server, but authenticated later in the token.

   RSCIL: The retry source connection ID length.

   Original Destination Connection ID: This also in cleartext and
   authenticated later.

   Retry Source Connection ID: This also in cleartext and authenticated

   Opaque Data: This data MUST contain encrypted information that allows
   the retry service to validate the client's IP address, in accordance
   with the QUIC specification.  It MUST also provide a
   cryptographically secure means to validate the integrity of the
   entire token.

   Upon receipt of an Initial packet with a token that begins with '0',
   the retry service MUST validate the token in accordance with the QUIC

   In active mode, the service MUST issue Retry packets for all Client
   initial packets that contain no token, or a token that has the first
   bit set to '1'.  It MUST NOT forward the packet to the server.  The
   service MUST validate all tokens with the first bit set to '0'.  If
   successful, the service MUST forward the packet with the token
   intact.  If unsuccessful, it MUST drop the packet.  The Retry Service
   MAY send an Initial Packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with
   the INVALID_TOKEN error code when dropping the packet.

   Note that this scheme has a performance drawback.  When the retry
   service is in active mode, clients with a token from a NEW_TOKEN
   frame will suffer a 1-RTT penalty even though it has proof of address
   with its token.

   In inactive mode, the service MUST forward all packets that have no
   token or a token with the first bit set to '1'.  It MUST validate all
   tokens with the first bit set to '0'.  If successful, the service
   MUST forward the packet with the token intact.  If unsuccessful, it
   MUST either drop the packet or forward it with the token removed.
   The latter requires decryption and re-encryption of the entire
   Initial packet to avoid authentication failure.  Forwarding the
   packet causes the server to respond without the
   original_destination_connection_id transport parameter, which
   preserves the normal QUIC signal to the client that there is an
   unauthorized man in the middle.

6.2.3.  Server Requirements

   A server behind a non-shared-state retry service MUST NOT send Retry
   packets for a QUIC version the retry service understands.  It MAY
   send Retry for QUIC versions the Retry Service does not understand.

   Tokens sent in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST have the first bit be set to

   If a server receives an Initial Packet with the first bit set to '1',
   it could be from a server-generated NEW_TOKEN frame and should be
   processed in accordance with the QUIC specification.  If a server
   receives an Initial Packet with the first bit to '0', it is a Retry
   token and the server MUST NOT attempt to validate it.  Instead, it
   MUST assume the address is validated and MUST extract the Original
   Destination Connection ID and Retry Source Connection ID, assuming
   the format described in Section 6.2.2.

6.3.  Shared-State Retry Service

   A shared-state retry service uses a shared key, so that the server
   can decode the service's retry tokens.  It does not require that all
   traffic pass through the Retry service, so servers MAY send Retry
   packets in response to Initial packets that don't include a valid

   Both server and service must have access to Universal time, though
   tight synchronization is not necessary.

   All tokens, generated by either the server or retry service, MUST use
   the following format.  This format is the cleartext version.  On the
   wire, these fields are encrypted using an AES-ECB cipher and the
   token key.  If the token is not a multiple of 16 octets, the last
   block is padded with zeroes.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |    ODCIL    |      RSCIL    |
   |        Original Destination Connection ID (0..160)            |
   |                             ...                               |
   |              Retry Source Connection ID (0..160)              |
   |                             ...                               |
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                    Client IP Address (128)                    +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                         date-time (160)                       |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   |                      Opaque Data (optional)                   |

          Figure 6: Cleartext format of shared-state retry tokens

   The tokens have the following fields:

   ODCIL: The original destination connection ID length.  Tokens in
   NEW_TOKEN frames MUST set this field to zero.

   RSCIL: The retry source connection ID length.  Tokens in NEW_TOKEN
   frames MUST set this field to zero.

   Original Destination Connection ID: The server or Retry Service
   copies this from the field in the client Initial packet.

   Retry Source Connection ID: The server or Retry service copies this
   from the Source Connection ID of the Retry packet.

   Client IP Address: The source IP address from the triggering Initial
   packet.  The client IP address is 16 octets.  If an IPv4 address, the
   last 12 octets are zeroes.

   date-time: The date-time string is a total of 20 octets and encodes
   the time the token was generated.  The format of date-time is
   described in Section 5.6 of [RFC3339].  This ASCII field MUST use the
   "Z" character for time-offset.

   Opaque Data: The server may use this field to encode additional
   information, such as congestion window, RTT, or MTU.  Opaque data
   SHOULD also allow servers to distinguish between retry tokens (which
   trigger use of the original_destination_connection_id transport
   parameter) and NEW_TOKEN frame tokens.

6.3.1.  Configuration Agent Actions

   The configuration agent generates and distributes a "token key."

6.3.2.  Service Requirements

   When in active mode, the service MUST generate Retry tokens with the
   format described above when it receives a client Initial packet with
   no token.

   In active mode, the service SHOULD decrypt incoming tokens.  The
   service SHOULD drop packets with an IP address that does not match,
   and SHOULD forward packets that do, regardless of the other fields.

   In inactive mode, the service SHOULD forward all packets to the
   server so that the server can issue an up-to-date token to the

6.3.3.  Server Requirements

   The server MUST validate all tokens that arrive in Initial packets,
   as they may have bypassed the Retry service.  It SHOULD use the date-
   time field to apply its expiration limits for tokens.  This need not
   be synchronized with the retry service.  However, servers MAY allow
   retry tokens marked as being a few seconds in the future, due to
   possible clock synchronization issues.

   After decrypting the token, the server uses the corresponding fields
   to populate the original_destination_connection_id transport
   parameter, with a length equal to ODCIL, and the
   retry_source_connection_id transport parameter, with length equal to

   As discussed in [QUIC-TRANSPORT], a server MUST NOT send a Retry
   packet in response to an Initial packet that contains a retry token.

7.  Configuration Requirements

   QUIC-LB requires common configuration to synchronize understanding of
   encodings and guarantee explicit consent of the server.

   The load balancer and server MUST agree on a routing algorithm and
   the relevant parameters for that algorithm.

   For Plaintext CID Routing, this consists of the Server ID and the
   routing bytes.  The Server ID is unique to each server, and the
   routing bytes are global.

   For Obfuscated CID Routing, this consists of the Routing Bits,
   Divisor, and Modulus.  The Modulus is unique to each server, but the
   others MUST be global.

   For Stream Cipher CID Routing, this consists of the Server ID, Server
   ID Length, Key, and Nonce Length.  The Server ID is unique to each
   server, but the others MUST be global.  The authentication token MUST
   be distributed out of band for this algorithm to operate.

   For Block Cipher CID Routing, this consists of the Server ID, Server
   ID Length, Key, and Zero-Padding Length.  The Server ID is unique to
   each server, but the others MUST be global.

   A full QUIC-LB configuration MUST also specify the information
   content of the first CID octet and the presence and mode of any Retry

   The following pseudocode describes the data items necessary to store
   a full QUIC-LB configuration at the server.  It is meant to describe
   the conceptual range and not specify the presentation of such
   configuration in an internet packet.  The comments signify the range
   of acceptable values where applicable.

    uint2    config_rotation_bits;
    boolean  first_octet_encodes_cid_length;
    enum     { none, non_shared_state, shared_state } retry_service;
    select (retry_service) {
        case none: null;
        case non_shared_state: uint32 list_of_quic_versions[];
        case shared_state:     uint8 key[16];
    } retry_service_config;
    enum     { none, plaintext, obfuscated, stream_cipher, block_cipher }
    select (routing_algorithm) {
        case none: null;
        case plaintext: struct {
            uint8 server_id_length; /* 1..19 */
            uint8 server_id[server_id_length];
        } plaintext_config;
        case obfuscated: struct {
           uint8  routing_bit_mask[19];
           uint16 divisor; /* Must be odd */
           uint16 modulus; /* 0..(divisor - 1) */
       } obfuscated_config;
       case stream_cipher: struct {
            uint8  nonce_length; /* 8..16 */
            uint8  server_id_length; /* 1..(19 - nonce_length) */
            uint8  server_id[server_id_length];
            uint8  key[16];
        } stream_cipher_config;
        case block_cipher: struct {
            uint8  server_id_length;
            uint8  zero_padding_length; /* 0..(16 - server_id_length) */
           uint8  server_id[server_id_length];
            uint8  key[16];
        } block_cipher_config;
   } routing_algorithm_config;

8.  Additional Use Cases

   This section discusses considerations for some deployment scenarios
   not implied by the specification above.

8.1.  Load balancer chains

   Some network architectures may have multiple tiers of low-state load
   balancers, where a first tier of devices makes a routing decision to
   the next tier, and so on until packets reach the server.  Although
   QUIC-LB is not explicitly designed for this use case, it is possible
   to support it.

   If each load balancer is assigned a range of server IDs that is a
   subset of the range of IDs assigned to devices that are closer to the
   client, then the first devices to process an incoming packet can
   extract the server ID and then map it to the correct forwrading
   address.  Note that this solution is extensible to arbitrarily large
   numbers of load-balancing tiers, as the maximum server ID space is
   quite large.

8.2.  Moving connections between servers

   Some deployments may transparently move a connection from one server
   to another.  The means of transferring connection state between
   servers is out of scope of this document.

   To support a handover, a server involved in the transition could
   issue CIDs that map to the new server via a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame,
   and retire CIDs associated with the new server using the "Retire
   Prior To" field in that frame.

   Alternately, if the old server is going offline, the load balancer
   could simply map its server ID to the new server's address.

9.  Version Invariance of QUIC-LB

   Retry Services are inherently dependent on the format (and existence)
   of Retry Packets in each version of QUIC, and so Retry Service
   configuration explicitly includes the supported QUIC versions.

   The server ID encodings, and requirements for their handling, are
   designed to be QUIC version independent (see [QUIC-INVARIANTS]).  A
   QUIC-LB load balancer will generally not require changes as servers
   deploy new versions of QUIC.  However, there are several unlikely
   future design decisions that could impact the operation of QUIC-LB.

   The maximum Connection ID length could be below the minimum necessary
   for one or more encoding algorithms.

   Section 4 provides guidance about how load balancers should handle
   non-compliant DCIDs.  This guidance, and the implementation of an
   algorithm to handle these DCIDs, rests on some assumptions:

   *  Incoming short headers do not contain DCIDs that are client-

   *  The use of client-generated incoming DCIDs does not persist beyond
      a few round trips in the connection.

   *  While the client is using DCIDs it generated, some exposed fields
      (IP address, UDP port, client-generated destination Connection ID)
      remain constant for all packets sent on the same connection.

   While this document does not update the commitments in
   [QUIC-INVARIANTS], the additional assumptions are minimal and
   narrowly scoped, and provide a likely set of constants that load
   balancers can use with minimal risk of version- dependence.

   If these assumptions are invalid, this specification is likely to
   lead to loss of packets that contain non-compliant DCIDs, and in
   extreme cases connection failure.

10.  Security Considerations

   QUIC-LB is intended to prevent linkability.  Attacks would therefore
   attempt to subvert this purpose.

   Note that the Plaintext CID algorithm makes no attempt to obscure the
   server mapping, and therefore does not address these concerns.  It
   exists to allow consistent CID encoding for compatibility across a
   network infrastructure, which makes QUIC robust to NAT rebinding.
   Servers that are running the Plaintext CID algorithm SHOULD only use
   it to generate new CIDs for the Server Initial Packet and SHOULD NOT
   send CIDs in QUIC NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames, except that it sends one
   new Connection ID in the event of config rotation Section 3.1.  Doing
   so might falsely suggest to the client that said CIDs were generated
   in a secure fashion.

   A linkability attack would find some means of determining that two
   connection IDs route to the same server.  As described above, there
   is no scheme that strictly prevents linkability for all traffic
   patterns, and therefore efforts to frustrate any analysis of server
   ID encoding have diminishing returns.

10.1.  Attackers not between the load balancer and server

   Any attacker might open a connection to the server infrastructure and
   aggressively simulate migration to obtain a large sample of IDs that
   map to the same server.  It could then apply analytical techniques to
   try to obtain the server encoding.

   The Stream and Block Cipher CID algorithms provide robust entropy to
   making protection
   against any sort of linkage.  The Obfuscated Plaintext CID obscures the mapping
   and prevents trivial brute-force attacks algorithm makes no
   attempt to determine the routing
   parameters, but does not provide robust protection against
   sophisticated attacks. protect this encoding.

   Were this analysis to obtain the server encoding, then on-path
   observers might apply this analysis to correlating different client
   IP addresses.

10.2.  Attackers between the load balancer and server

   Attackers in this privileged position are intrinsically able to map
   two connection IDs to the same server.  The QUIC-LB algorithms do
   prevent the linkage of two connection IDs to the same individual
   connection if servers make reasonable selections when generating new
   IDs for that connection.

10.3.  Multiple Configuration IDs

   During the period in which there are multiple deployed configuration
   IDs (see Section 3.1), there is a slight increase in linkability.
   The server space is effectively divided into segments with CIDs that
   have different config rotation bits.  Entities that manage servers
   SHOULD strive to minimize these periods by quickly deploying new
   configurations across the server pool.

10.4.  Limited configuration scope

   A simple deployment of QUIC-LB in a cloud provider might use the same
   global QUIC-LB configuration across all its load balancers that route
   to customer servers.  An attacker could then simply become a
   customer, obtain the configuration, and then extract server IDs of
   other customers' connections at will.

   To avoid this, the configuration agent SHOULD issue QUIC-LB
   configurations to mutually distrustful servers that have different
   keys (for the block cipher or stream cipher algorithms) or routing
   masks and divisors (for the obfuscated algorithm). for encryption algorithms.  The load balancers can distinguish
   these configurations by external IP address, or by assigning
   different values to the config rotation bits (Section 3.1).  Note
   that either of these techniques exposes
   information to outside observers, as traffic destined for each server
   set can be easily distinguished. solution has a privacy impact; see Section 10.3.

   These techniques are not necessary for the plaintext algorithm, as it
   does not attempt to conceal the server ID.


10.5.  Stateless Reset Oracle

   Section 21.9 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] discusses the Stateless Reset Oracle
   attack.  For a server deployment to be vulnerable, an attacking
   client must be able to cause two packets with the same Destination
   CID to arrive at two different servers that share the same
   cryptographic context for Stateless Reset tokens.  As QUIC-LB
   requires deterministic routing of DCIDs over the life of a
   connection, it is a sufficient means of avoiding an Oracle without
   additional measures.

11.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA requirements.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

              Thomson, M., Ed., "Version-Independent Properties of
              QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-

              Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-transport,

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,

12.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

Appendix A.  Load Balancer Test Vectors

   Because any connection ID encoding in this specification includes
   many bits for server use without affecting extraction of the server
   ID, there are many possible connection IDs for any given set of
   parameters.  However, every connection ID should result in a unique
   server ID.  The following connection IDs can be used to verify that a
   load balancer implementation extracts the correct server ID.

A.1.  Obfuscated  Plaintext Connection ID Algorithm


A.2.  Stream Cipher Connection ID Algorithm

   The following section lists a set of OCID load balancer
   configuration, followed by five CIDs from which the load balancer can
   extract the server ID.

   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask ddc2f17788d77e3239b4ea
   divisor 345 nonce_len 10 sid_len 1 key

   cid 0b72715d4745ce26cca8c750 0b05be7bf896ed26cb4cc59a sid b ab cid 0b63a1785b6c0b0857225e96 0b43909398577dd7df1597d4 sid 3f
   37 cid 0b66474fa11329e6bb947818 0bf85fa27034785803747464 sid 147 0e cid 0b34bd7c0882deb0252e2a58 0bc630c588fdecbfbdb62e61
   sid ca 44 cid 0b0506ee792163bf9330dc0a 0b8788901684f5d4e4dc6aeb sid 14d 83

   cr_bits 0x1 0x0 length_self_encoding: n bitmask
   4855d35f5b88ddada153af61b6707ee646 divisor 301 nonce_len 9 sid_len 2 key

   cid 542dc4c09e2d548e508dc825bbbca991c131 08644a29067622f363d4c83e sid 8 846a cid 47988071f9f03a25c322cc6fb1d57151d26f 234b2899f9b213a70abfe193
   sid 93 4417 cid 6a13e05071f74cdb7d0dc24d72687b21e1d1 3ff4ef53bbaad327c1e18fa5 sid c0 7554 cid 4323c129650c7ee66f37266044ef52e74ffa
   08a0eaf4cc08f184e6cf7743 sid 60 b78a cid 5e95f77e7e66891b57c224c5781c8c5dd8ba 3fb2f5cf1b3e08bf97709c42 sid 8f

   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask 9f98bd3df66338c2d2c6
   divisor 459 nonce_len 12 sid_len 3 key

   cid 0ad52216e7798c28340fd6 0f7405813570b8f9a6a10564d7b92834 sid 125 49023c cid 0a78f8ecbd087083639f94
   0f3bb656319c6af210239dcaef77d3b9 sid 4b b0a8ce cid 0ac7e70a5fe6b353b824aa
   0f3ae6d54ee97fc6907b5e2d60436caf sid 12 21f035 cid 0af9612ae5ccba3ef98b81
   0f4774918a6576c88f85829306f6450f sid d1 9e46ea cid 0a94ab209ea1d2e1e23751
   0f7467db6ca1eb4c185e642b0c9f8f44 sid 5d c33db0

   cr_bits 0x2 0x0 length_self_encoding: n bitmask dfba93c4f98f57103f5ae331
   divisor 461 nonce_len 11 sid_len 4 key

   cid 8b70b8c69e40ef2f3f8937e817 0c4b23e27639aef72f861ad2dce39d96 sid d3 125fdba1 cid b1828830ea1789dab13a043795
   063ed9a173d22be11818b77a3bd5ec37 sid 44 0f3f82bc cid 90604a580baa3eb0a47812e490
   1a14e39b0f6ca6a3a48f6fdd2083fa09 sid 137 05950af2 cid a5b4bc309337ff73e143ff6deb
   36cb4df5a7776edb21ec87c35c24e988 sid 9f 3cb80d59 cid fce75c0a984a79d3b4af40d155
   05749809112a91327fef4b3152335298 sid 127 4746cb79
   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y bitmask 8320fefc5309f7aa670476
   divisor 379 nonce_len 8 sid_len 5 key

   cid 0bb110af53dca7295e7d4b7e 0d2a7b43eeaac8b36fce2c14ac96 sid 101 4b00da143a cid 0b0d284cdff364a634a4b93b
   0ddd6cdb6685e75b91f4a1bb0dde sid e3 f9aa795663 cid 0b82ff1555c4a95f9b198090
   0d870ea4d173d29484e41ea4a189 sid 14e e430dcfb3f cid 0b7a427d3e508ad71e98b797
   0df12abe175241b5ab035d23910f sid 14e 8bc66a2596 cid 0b71d1d4e3e3cd54d435b3fd
   0d390df5de76903ca94b2e9daa49 sid eb

A.2.  Stream Cipher Connection ID Algorithm

   TBD 7637d0c172

A.3.  Block Cipher Connection ID Algorithm

   Like the previous section, the text below lists a set of load
   balancer configuration and 5 CIDs generated with that configuration.

   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 1 zp_len 11 key

   cid: 1378e44f874642624fa69e7b4aec15a2a678b8b5 sid: 48
   cid: 13772c82fe8ce6a00813f76a211b730eb4b20363 sid: 66
   cid: 135ccf507b1c209457f80df0217b9a1df439c4b2 sid: 30
   cid: 13898459900426c073c66b1001c867f9098a7aab sid: fe
   cid: 1397a18da00bf912f20049d9f0a007444f8b6699 sid: 30

   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: n sid_len 2 zp_len 10 key

   cid: 0cb28bfc1f65c3de14752bc0fc734ef824ce8f78 sid: 33fa
   cid: 2345e9fc7a7be55b4ba1ff6ffa04f3f5f8c67009 sid: ee47
   cid: 0d32102be441600f608c95841fd40ce978aa7a02 sid: 0c8b
   cid: 2e6bfc53c91c275019cd809200fa8e23836565ab sid: feca
   cid: 29b87a902ed129c26f7e4e918a68703dc71a6e0a sid: 8941

   cr_bits 0x1 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 3 zp_len 9 key

   cid: 53c48f7884d73fd9016f63e50453bfd9bcfc637d sid: b46b68
   cid: 53f45532f6a4f0e1757fa15c35f9a2ab0fcce621 sid: 2147b4
   cid: 5361fd4bbcee881a637210f4fffc02134772cc76 sid: e4bf4b
   cid: 53881ffde14e613ef151e50ba875769d6392809b sid: c2afee
   cid: 53ad0d60204d88343492334e6c4c4be88d4a3add sid: ae0331

   cr_bits 0x0 length_self_encoding: n sid_len 4 zp_len 8 key
   cid: 058b9da37f436868cca3cef40c7f98001797c611 sid: eaf846c7
   cid: 1259fc97439adaf87f61250afea059e5ddf66e44 sid: 4cc5e84a
   cid: 202f424376f234d5f014f41cebc38de2619c6c71 sid: f94ff800
   cid: 146ac3e4bbb750d3bfb617ef4b0cb51a1cae5868 sid: c2071b1b
   cid: 36dfe886538af7eb16a196935b3705c9d741479f sid: 26359dbb

   cr_bits 0x2 length_self_encoding: y sid_len 5 zp_len 7 key

   cid: 931ef3cc07e2eaf08d4c1902cd564d907cc3377c sid: 759b1d419a
   cid: 9398c3d0203ab15f1dfeb5aa8f81e52888c32008 sid: 77cc0d3310
   cid: 93f4ba09ab08a9ef997db4fa37a97dbf2b4c5481 sid: f7db9dce32
   cid: 93744f4bedf95e04dd6607592ecf775825403093 sid: e264d714d2
   cid: 93256308e3d349f8839dec840b0a90c7e7a1fc20 sid: 618b07791f

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

Appendix C.  Change Log

      *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
      publication of a final version of this document.

C.1.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-03

   *  Improved Config Rotation text

   *  Added stream cipher test vectors

   *  Deleted the Obfuscated CID algorithm

C.2.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02

   *  Replaced stream cipher algorithm with three-pass version

   *  Updated Retry format to encode info for required TPs

   *  Added discussion of version invariance

   *  Cleaned up text about config rotation

   *  Added Reset Oracle and limited configuration considerations

   *  Allow dropped long-header packets for known QUIC versions


C.3.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01

   *  Test vectors for load balancer decoding
   *  Deleted remnants of in-band protocol

   *  Light edit of Retry Services section

   *  Discussed load balancer chains


C.4.  since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00

   *  Removed in-band protocol from the document


C.5.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06

   *  Switch to IETF WG draft.


C.6.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05

   *  Editorial changes

   *  Made load balancer behavior independent of QUIC version

   *  Got rid of token in stream cipher encoding, because server might
      not have it

   *  Defined "non-compliant DCID" and specified rules for handling

   *  Added psuedocode for config schema


C.7.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04

   *  Added standard for retry services


C.8.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03

   *  Renamed Plaintext CID algorithm as Obfuscated CID

   *  Added new Plaintext CID algorithm

   *  Updated to allow 20B CIDs

   *  Added self-encoding of CID length


C.9.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02

   *  Added Config Rotation

   *  Added failover mode
   *  Tweaks to existing CID algorithms

   *  Added Block Cipher CID algorithm

   *  Reformatted QUIC-LB packets


C.10.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01

   *  Complete rewrite

   *  Supports multiple security levels

   *  Lightweight messages


C.11.  Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00

   *  Converted to markdown

   *  Added variable length connection IDs

Authors' Addresses

   Martin Duke
   F5 Networks, Inc.

   Email: martin.h.duke@gmail.com

   Nick Banks

   Email: nibanks@microsoft.com