draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-12.txt		rfc8063.txt
	eppext H.W. Ribbers		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H.W. Ribbers
	Internet-Draft M.W. Groeneweg		Request for Comments: 8063 M.W. Groeneweg
	Intended status: Standards Track SIDN		Category: Standards Track SIDN
	Expires: December 2, 2016 R. Gieben		ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Gieben
			A.L.J. Verschuren
	A.L.J Verschuren		February 2017
	May 31, 2016
	Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol		Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
	draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-12
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)		This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
	mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material		mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
	between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in RFC5730.		between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in RFC 5730.
	This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator		This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
	of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.		of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 2, 2016.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8063.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1.1. <keyRelayData> Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5.1. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5.2. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.2. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5.3. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.3. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	A.10. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.11. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.12. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.13. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.14. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.15. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.16. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	A.17. draft-ietf-regext-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS-operator that		There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS operator that
	require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS-		require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS
	operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties		operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
	or it is non-scalable and insecure.		or it is non-scalable and insecure.
	One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when		One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
	changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC signed zones. We suggest that		changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC-signed zones. We suggest that
	DNS-operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the		DNS operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
	delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.		delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
	In this document we define an EPP extension to sent DNSSEC key		In this document, we define an EPP extension to send DNSSEC key
	material between EPP clients. This allows DNS operators to bootstrap		material between EPP clients. This allows DNS operators to
	automatically, reliable and securely the transfer of a domain name		automatically, reliably, and securely bootstrap the transfer of a
	while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.		domain name while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119		document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
	[RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications		XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, the XML
	and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the		specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be
	character case presented in order to develop a conforming		interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a
	implementation.		conforming implementation.
	In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and		In the examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and
	"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and		"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and
	white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element		white space in the examples are provided only to illustrate element
	relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol.		relationships and are not mandatory features of this protocol.
	1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material		1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
	Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name		Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
	transfer is one of the phases in the lifecycle of a domain name		transfer is one of the phases in the life cycle of a domain name
	[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change].		[DNSOP].
	DNS-operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the		DNS operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
	registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust		registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
	intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining		intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
	registrar.		registrar.
	The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each		The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
	other (the ~ arrow in Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often		other (see Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
	there is no trusted path between the two. As both can securely		trusted path between the two. As both can securely interact with the
	interact with the registry over the administrative channel through		registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the
	the registrar, the registry can act as a relay for the key material		registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.
	exchange.
	The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore it is up		The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore, it is up
	to the losing DNS-operator to complete the intended transaction. The		to the losing DNS operator to complete the intended transaction. The
	registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the		registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the
	losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction, however this		losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction; however, this
	is beyond this document. This document focuses on the EPP protocol		is beyond the scope of this document. This document focuses on the
	syntax.		EPP protocol syntax.
	+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+		+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+
	|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |		|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
	+--------------------+ +---------------------+		+--------------------+ +---------------------+
	| ^		| ^
	| |		| |
	V |		V |
	+--------------------+ +---------------------+		+--------------------+ +---------------------+
	| gaining registrar | | registrar of record |		| gaining registrar | | registrar of record |
	+--------------------+ +---------------------+		+--------------------+ +---------------------+
	| ^		| ^
	EPP keyrelay | | EPP poll		EPP key relay | | EPP poll
	V |		V |
	+-----------------------------+		+-----------------------------+
	| registry |		| registry |
	+-----------------------------+		+-----------------------------+
	Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC key material.		Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
	There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and		There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and
	DNS-operators, there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP server.		DNS operators, and there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP
	Therefore the term EPP client will be used for the interaction with		server. Therefore, the term "EPP client" will be used for the
	the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.		interaction with the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.
	2. Object Attributes		2. Object Attributes
	2.1. DNSSEC Key Material		2.1. DNSSEC Key Material
	The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>		The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
	element.		element.
	2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element		2.1.1. <keyRelayData> Element
	The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:		The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
	o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key		o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key
	material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4		material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.
	o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime		o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
	of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is		of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is
	provided the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key		provided, the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key
	material from the zone after the expire time. This may be because		material from the zone after the expiry time. This may be because
	the transaction that needed the insertion should either be		the transaction that needed the insertion should be either
	completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key		completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key
	relay object that has been sent previously it MUST update the		relay object that has been sent previously, it MUST update the
	expire time of the key material. This enables the clients to		expiry time of the key material. This enables the clients to
	update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is		update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is
	delayed.		delayed.
	The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child		The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child
	elements:		elements:
	* <absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current		<absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
	date and time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a		and time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a
	date in the past is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation		date in the past is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a
	of a previously sent key relay object.		revocation of a previously sent key relay object.
	* <relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date		<relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
	and time until the end of the specified duration. If a period of		and time until the end of the specified duration. If a period of
	zero is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a		zero is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
	previously sent key relay object.		previously sent key relay object.
	3. EPP Command Mapping		3. EPP Command Mapping
	A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found		A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
	in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command		in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command
	mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay		mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
	mapping.		mapping.
	3.1. EPP Query Commands		3.1. EPP Query Commands
	EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>		EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
	to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve		to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
	detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to		detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
	retrieve object transfer status information.		retrieve object transfer status information.
	3.1.1. EPP <check> Command		3.1.1. EPP <check> Command
	Check semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no		Check that semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is
	mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>		no mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
	response.		response.
	3.1.2. EPP <info> Command		3.1.2. EPP <info> Command
	Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so		Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
	there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> Command.		there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> command.
	The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll		The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
	response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created		response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created
	with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted		with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted
	into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will		into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will
	receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as		receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
	described in [RFC5730].		described in [RFC5730].
	When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay		When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
	poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child		poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
	<keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay		<keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay
	namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following		namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
	child elements:		child elements:
	o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the		o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
	DNSSEC key material is relayed.		DNSSEC key material is relayed.
	o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization		o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
	information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],		information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
	Section 3.2.1).		Section 3.2.1).
	o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be		o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be
	relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server		relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server
	policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that can		policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that
	be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server MUST		can be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server
	respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy		MUST respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy
	violation".		violation".
	o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of the		o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of
	submitted <create> command.		the submitted <create> command.
	o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the		o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the
	client that requested the key relay.		client that requested the key relay.
	o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the		o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the
	client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.		client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
	Example <poll> response:		Example <poll> response:
	S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>		S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
	S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"		S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
	S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"		S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
	S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"		S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
	S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">		S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
	S: <response>		S: <response>
	S: <result code="1301">		S: <result code="1301">
	skipping to change at page 9, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 24 ¶
	object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,		object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
	<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to		<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
	change information associated with an object.		change information associated with an object.
	3.2.1. EPP <create> Command		3.2.1. EPP <create> Command
	The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a		The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
	client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and		client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
	DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is		DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is
	validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the		validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
	key relay info response (See Section 3.1.2), in the receiving		key relay info response (see Section 3.1.2), in the receiving
	client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the		client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
	provided domain name.		provided domain name.
	In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>		In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
	command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified		command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified
	by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains		by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains
	the following child elements:		the following child elements:
	o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for		o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
	which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.		which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
	o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization		o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
	information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],		information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
	Section 3.2.1).		Section 3.2.1).
	o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> element containing		o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> elements containing
	data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1		data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1.
	Example <create> commands:		Example <create> commands:
	Note that in the provided example the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>		Note that in the provided example, the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
	element has a period of zero and thus represents the revocation of a		element has a period of zero, and thus represents the revocation of a
	previously sent key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).		previously sent key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).
	C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>		C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
	C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"		C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
	C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"		C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
	C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"		C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
	C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">		C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
	C: <command>		C: <command>
	C: <create>		C: <create>
	C: <keyrelay:create>		C: <keyrelay:create>
	skipping to change at page 10, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 4 ¶
	C: </keyrelay:keyData>		C: </keyrelay:keyData>
	C: <keyrelay:expiry>		C: <keyrelay:expiry>
	C: <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative>		C: <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative>
	C: </keyrelay:expiry>		C: </keyrelay:expiry>
	C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>		C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
	C: </keyrelay:create>		C: </keyrelay:create>
	C: </create>		C: </create>
	C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>		C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
	C: </command>		C: </command>
	C:</epp>		C:</epp>
			When a server has successfully processed the <create> command, it
	When a server has succesfully processed the <create> command it MUST		MUST respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730],
	respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.		Section 2.6.
	Example <create> response:		Example <create> response:
	S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>		S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
	S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">		S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
	S: <response>		S: <response>
	S: <result code="1000">		S: <result code="1000">
	S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>		S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
	S: </result>		S: </result>
	S: <trID>		S: <trID>
	S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>		S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
	S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>		S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
	S: </trID>		S: </trID>
	S: </response>		S: </response>
	S:</epp>		S:</epp>
	When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server		When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server
	policy it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the		policy, it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the
	case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support		case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support
	keyrelay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.		key relay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
	Example <create> response:		Example <create> response:
	S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>		S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
	S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">		S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
	S: <response>		S: <response>
	S: <result code="2308">		S: <result code="2308">
	S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>		S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>
	S: </result>		S: </result>
	S: <trID>		S: <trID>
	skipping to change at page 13, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 9 ¶
	<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />		<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
	<element name="relative" type="duration" />		<element name="relative" type="duration" />
	</choice>		</choice>
	</complexType>		</complexType>
	</schema>		</schema>
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	5.1. XML Namespace		5.1. XML Namespace
	This document uses URNs to describe a XML namespace conforming to the		This document uses URNs to describe an XML namespace conforming to
	registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI		the registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI
	assignment is requested of IANA:		assignment has been made by IANA:
	URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0		URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
	Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this		Registrant Contact: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
	document.		document.
	XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.		XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
	5.2. XML Schema		5.2. XML Schema
	This document uses URNs to describe a XML schema conforming to the		This document uses URNs to describe an XML schema conforming to the
	registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI		registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI
	assignment is requested of IANA:		assignment has been made by IANA:
	URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0		URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0
	XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.		XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
	5.3. EPP Extension Registry		5.3. EPP Extension Registry
	The EPP extension described in this document should be registered by		The EPP extension described in this document has been registered by
	the IANA in the EPP Extension Registry described in [RFC7451]. The		IANA in the "Extensions for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
	details of the registration are as follows:		(EPP)" registry described in [RFC7451]. The details of the
			registration are as follows:
	Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning		Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
	Protocol"		Protocol"
	Document status: Standards Track		Document status: Standards Track
	Reference: (insert reference to RFC version of this document)		Reference: RFC 8063
	Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org		Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
	TLDs: Any		Top-Level Domains (TLDs): Any
	IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2393/		IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/
	Status: Active		Status: Active
	Notes: None		Notes: None
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server		A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
	management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command. The intent		management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command. The intent
	of this command is to put DNSSEC key material on the poll queue of		of this command is to put DNSSEC key material on the poll queue of
	another client. To make sure that this EPP extension is		another client. Exceptions to this recommendation are allowable only
	interoperable with the different server policies that already have		for the purposes of achieving interoperability with the different
	implemented EPP this extension it is not classified as must not.		server policies that have already implemented this EPP extension.
	Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message		Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
	queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial		queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial-
	of service attack. However this can, and should be detected by the		of-service attack. However, this can and should be detected by the
	server. A server MAY set a server policy which limits or rejects a		server. A server MAY set a server policy that limits or rejects a
	<keyrelay:create> command if it detects the mechanism is being		<keyrelay:create> command if it detects that the mechanism is being
	abused.		abused.
	For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data a correct <domain:authInfo>		For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data, a correct <domain:authInfo>
	element should be used as an indication that putting the key material		element should be used as an indication that putting the key material
	on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the		on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
	_registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients		_registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients
	to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends		to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends
	on registry specific policy.		on registry-specific policy.
	A client that uses this mechanism to send DNSSEC key material to		A client that uses this mechanism to send DNSSEC key material to
	another client could verify through DNS that the DNSSEC key material		another client could verify through DNS that the DNSSEC key material
	is added to the authoritive zone of the domain. This check can be		is added to the authoritative zone of the domain. This check can be
	used to verify that the DNSSEC key material has traveled end-to-end		used to verify that the DNSSEC key material has traveled end-to-end
	from the gaining DNS operator to the losing DNS operator. This check		from the gaining DNS operator to the losing DNS operator. This check
	does not tell anything about the DNSSEC chain of trust and can merely		does not tell anything about the DNSSEC chain of trust and can merely
	be used as a verification of a succesful transfer of the DNSSEC key		be used as a verification of a successful transfer of the DNSSEC key
	material.		material.
	7. Acknowledgements		7. References
	We like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input,
	review, constructive criticism in earlier revisions or support for
	the concepts described in this document:
	Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
	Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
	Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer and Scott
	Hollenbeck.
	8. References
	8.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,		[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
	January 2004.		DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
	[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",		[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
	STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.		STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
	[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)		[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
	Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.		Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
	[RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)		[RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
	Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible		Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
	Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010.		Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5910, May 2010,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910>.
	8.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]		[DNSOP] Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
	Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS		Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", Work in Progress,
	Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", draft-koch-dnsop-		draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06, February 2014.
	dnssec-operator-change-06 (work in progress), February
	2014.
	[RFC7451] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible		[RFC7451] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
	Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, February 2015.		Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, DOI 10.17487/RFC7451,
			February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7451>.
	Appendix A. Changelog
	[This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]
	A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00
	1. Initial document.
	A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01
	1. Style and grammar changes;
	2. Added an expire element as per suggestion by Klaus Malorny;
	3. Make the authInfo element mandatory and make the registry check
	it as per feedback by Klaus Malorny and James Gould.
	A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02
	1. Added element to identify the relaying EPP client as suggested by
	Klaus Malorny;
	2. Corrected XML for missing and excess clTRID as noted by Patrick
	Mevzek;
	3. Added clarifications for the examples based on feedback by
	Patrick Mevzeck;
	4. Reviewed the consistency of using DNS operator versus registrar
	after review comments by Patrick Faltstrom and Ed Lewis.
	A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03
	1. Style and grammar changes
	2. Corrected acknowledgement section
	3. Corrected XML for Expire element to not be mandatory but only
	occur once.
	A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00
	1. Added feedback from Seth Goldman and put him in the
	acknowledgement section.
	2. IDnits formatting ajustments
	A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01
	1. Introducing the <relay> command, and thus separating the data and
	the command.
	2. Updated the Introduction, describing the general use of relay vs
	the intended use-case of relaying DNSSEC key data.
	3. Restructuring the document to make it more inline with existing
	EPP extensions.
	A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02
	1. Updated the XML structure by removing the <relay> command based
	on WG feedback
	2. Updated the wording
	A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03
	1. Updated the document title in the EPP Extension Registry section
	2. Restored Acknowledgement section, thanks to Marco Davids
	3. Incorperated feedback from Patrick Mevzek
	A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04
	1. Incorperated feedback from James Gould
	2. Added additional text when server is aware that receiving clients
	do not support keyrelay transactions or DNSSEC as suggested by
	Kees Monshouwer.
	3. Added additional text for supporting key revocation as suggested
	by Kees Monshouwer
	4. Updated some of the wording
	5. Fix the usage of multiple keys in a create message
	A.10. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-05
	1. Review comments after WG last call
	A.11. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-06
	1. Review comments by Ulrich Wisser during IESG writeup
	A.12. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-07
	1. fixed changelog
	A.13. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-08
	1. fixed issue with authinfo
	2. fixed issue with relative period in example xml
	A.14. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-09
	1. fixed issue with naming
	A.15. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-10
	1. removed 4 spaces
	A.16. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11
	1. Processed editorial changes from AD review
	2. Processed comments made during IETF last call		Acknowledgements
	A.17. draft-ietf-regext-keyrelay-00		We would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable
			input, review, and constructive criticism in earlier revisions or
			support for the concepts described in this document:
	1. Processed comments made during IESG review		Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
			Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
			Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer, Scott
			Hollenbeck, and Job Snijders.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Rik Ribbers		Rik Ribbers
	SIDN		SIDN
	Meander 501		Meander 501
	Arnhem 6825 MD		Arnhem 6825 MD
	NL		The Netherlands
	Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl		Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
	URI: https://www.sidn.nl/		URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
	Marc Groeneweg		Marc Groeneweg
	SIDN		SIDN
	Meander 501		Meander 501
	Arnhem 6825 MD		Arnhem 6825 MD
	NL		The Netherlands
	Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl		Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
	URI: https://www.sidn.nl/		URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
	Miek Gieben		Miek Gieben
	Email: miek@miek.nl		Email: miek@miek.nl
	Antoin Verschuren		Antoin Verschuren
End of changes. 80 change blocks.
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