draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-09.txt   draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-10.txt 
REGEXT Working Group S. Hollenbeck REGEXT Working Group S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track 18 January 2022 Intended status: Standards Track 8 February 2022
Expires: 22 July 2022 Expires: 12 August 2022
Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) using OpenID Connect (RDAP) using OpenID Connect
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-09 draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-10
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require
clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 July 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 August 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6
3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 8
3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Specialized Claims for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4. Specialized Claims for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4.1. Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4.1. Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4.2. Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1.4.2. Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Token Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.1. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.1.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant . . . . . . 13
4.4. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1.1.2. UI-limited Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1.1.3. UI-limited Client Login Polling . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2. Session Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3. Client Logout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.4. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. Manual Token Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.5. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. RDAP Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. RDAP Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.1. RDAP Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230]. Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230].
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This document uses the terms "client" and "server" defined by RDAP This document uses the terms "client" and "server" defined by RDAP
[RFC7480]. An RDAP client performs the role of an OpenID Connect [RFC7480]. An RDAP client performs the role of an OpenID Connect
Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of
an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from
Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated
by reference. by reference.
3.1.2. Overview 3.1.2. Overview
At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-based client using At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-like client using
OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps: OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to 1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the type of OpenID Authorization Server that's used by determine the type of OpenID Authorization Server that's used by
the RDAP server. This information is returned in the the RDAP server. This information is returned in the
rdapConformance section of the response. A value of rdapConformance section of the response. A value of
"rdap_openidc_local_level_0" indicates that the server uses a "rdap_openidc_local_level_0" indicates that the server uses a
local Authorization Server. A value of local Authorization Server. A value of
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" indicates that the server uses a "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" indicates that the server uses a
remote Authorization Server. remote Authorization Server.
2. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends a "tokens" 2. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends a "login"
request (see Section 4.2) to an RDAP server. The request MUST request (see Section 4.1) to an RDAP server. The request MUST
include an "id" parameter if the server uses only a remote include an "id" query parameter if the server uses only a remote
Authorization Server. The "id" parameter is OPTIONAL if the Authorization Server. The "id" query parameter is OPTIONAL if
server uses a local Authorization Server. the server uses a local Authorization Server.
3. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP)) 3. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP))
prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired
request parameters. request parameters.
4. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request 4. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request
to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP) to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP)
using an HTTP redirect. using an HTTP redirect.
5. The Authorization Server authenticates the RDAP Client. 5. The Authorization Server authenticates the End-User.
6. The Authorization Server obtains End-User consent/authorization.
6. The Authorization Server obtains RDAP Client consent/
authorization.
7. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP 7. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP
server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect. server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect.
8. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code 8. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code
at the Token Endpoint. at the Token Endpoint.
9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token 9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token
and Access Token in the response body. and Access Token in the response body.
10. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the RDAP 10. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the claims
client's Subject Identifier. associated with the end-user's identity.
The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
access control decisions based on local policies, the ID Token access control decisions based on end-user identity information and
received from the OP, and the received Claims. Note that OpenID local policies. Note that OpenID Connect describes different process
Connect describes different process flows for other types of clients, flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command
such as script-based or command line clients. line clients.
3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
use OpenID Connect with RDAP. An OP SHOULD include support for the use OpenID Connect with RDAP. An OP SHOULD include support for the
claims described in Section 3.1.4 to provide additional information claims described in Section 3.1.4 to provide additional information
needed for RDAP End-User authorization. OpenID Connect requires RPs needed for RDAP End-User authorization. OpenID Connect requires RPs
to register with OPs to use OpenID Connect services for an End-User. to register with OPs to use OpenID Connect services for an End-User.
That process is described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client That process is described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration" protocol [OIDCR]. Registration" protocol [OIDCR].
3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery
An RDAP server/RP needs to receive an identifier from an End-User An RDAP server/RP needs to be able to map an End-User's identifier to
that can be used to discover the End-User's OP. That process is an OP. This can be accomplished using the OPTIONAL "OpenID Connect
required and is documented in the "OpenID Connect Discovery" protocol Discovery" protocol [OIDCD], but that protocol is not widely
[OIDCD]. implemented and can be unreliable. Out-of-band methods are also
possible and can be more dependable. For example, an RP can support
a limited number of OPs and maintain internal associations of those
identifiers with the OPs that issued them. An RP can also ask an
end-user to identify the OP that issued their identifier as part of
an RDAP query workflow. In this case, the RP will need to maintain
state for the association between the user's identifier and the OP in
order to process later queries that rely on passing the access token
and user identifier as authorization parameters. An RP MAY use any
provider discovery approach that is suitable for its operating
environment.
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request 3.1.3.2. Authentication Request
Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed
(authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the (authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the
Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of
the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization
Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the
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described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. The described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. The
Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol) combines elements of the Authorization and Implicit Flows protocol) combines elements of the Authorization and Implicit Flows
by returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others by returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others
from the Token Endpoint. from the Token Endpoint.
An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. Apart from these parameters, it is Core protocol [OIDCC]. Apart from these parameters, it is
RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional "login_hint" parameter RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional "login_hint" parameter
in the request, with the value being that of the "id" from the query in the request, with the value being that of the "id" query parameter
component of the end user's RDAP request. Passing "login_hint" of the End-User's RDAP "login" request. Passing the "login_hint"
allows a client to pre-fill login form information, so logging in can parameter allows a client to pre-fill login form information, so
be more convenient for users. Other parameters MAY be included. logging in can be more convenient for users. Other parameters MAY be
included.
The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to
authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error
response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered. response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization 3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization
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characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_") character. characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_") character.
Value strings contain at least one character and no more than 64 Value strings contain at least one character and no more than 64
characters. characters.
Description: a one- or two-sentence description of the meaning of the Description: a one- or two-sentence description of the meaning of the
purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should be purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should be
interpreted by clients and servers. interpreted by clients and servers.
This registry is operated under the "Specification Required" policy This registry is operated under the "Specification Required" policy
defined in RFC 5226 ([RFC5226]). The set of initial values used to defined in RFC 5226 ([RFC5226]). The set of initial values used to
populate the registry as described in Section 6.3 are taken from the populate the registry as described in Section 7.3 are taken from the
final report (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final- final report (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-
report-06jun14-en.pdf) produced by the Expert Working Group on gTLD report-06jun14-en.pdf) produced by the Expert Working Group on gTLD
Directory Services chartered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Directory Services chartered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN). Names and Numbers (ICANN).
3.1.4.2. Do Not Track 3.1.4.2. Do Not Track
There are also communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to There are also communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to
make and validate claims about a user's wish to not have their make and validate claims about a user's wish to not have their
queries logged, tracked, or recorded. For example, a law enforcement queries logged, tracked, or recorded. For example, a law enforcement
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privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations. privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations.
Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope
of this document. of this document.
4. Protocol Parameters 4. Protocol Parameters
This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP: This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP:
1. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end- 1. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end-
user identity. user identity.
2. A path segment to request an tokens for a specific end-user 2. Path segments to start, stop, and determine the status of an
identity. authenticated session for a specific end-user identity.
3. A query parameter to deliver an Access Token for use with an RDAP
query.
4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response
Client authentication is requested using one of three methods:
1. by adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the 4.1. Client Login
syntax described in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986],
2. by including an HTTP authorization header for the Basic
authentication scheme as described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617], or
3. by including an HTTP authorization header with a Bearer token as
described in RFC 6750 [RFC6750].
Clients can use any of these methods. Servers MUST support all Client authentication is requested by sending a "login" query to an
methods. RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote Authorization
Servers, the "login" query MUST include an End-User identifier that's
delivered using one of two methods: by adding a query component to an
RDAP request URI using the syntax described in Section 3.4 of RFC
3986 [RFC3986], or by including an HTTP authorization header for the
Basic authentication scheme as described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. If
the RDAP server supports a local Authorization Servers, the End-User
identifier MAY be omitted. Clients can use either of these methods.
Servers MUST support both methods.
The query used to request client authentication is represented as an The query used to request client authentication is represented as an
OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value
component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An
example for client identifier "user.idp.example": example for client identifier "user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example https://example.com/rdap/login?id=user.idp.example
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example": "user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com https://example.com/rdap/login
Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ== Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ==
The HTTP Bearer authorization header contains a Base64url-encoded
representation of the Access Token issued by an OP. An example that
has been abbreviated for clarity:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com An example for use with a local Authorization Server:
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9 https://example.com/rdap/login
The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response The response to this query MUST use the response structures specified
structures specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. Information that the in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST include an
end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the indication of the requested operation's success or failure, and, if
response. successful, the client identifier associated with the request, the
claims received from the Authorization Server, and the duration of
the authorized session.
4.2. Token Request and Response An example of a successful "login" response:
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to authenticate an end- {
user and return tokens (an ID Token, an Access Token, and a Refresh "notices": {
Token) from an OP that can be then be passed to the RP/RDAP server to "title": "Login Result",
authenticate and process subsequent queries. An Access Token can be "description": [
refreshed as described in Section 12 of the OpenID Connect Core "Login succeeded",
protocol [OIDCC] and Section 6 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. Clients can [
take advantage of this functionality if it is supported by the OP and "Client ID",
accepted by the RDAP server. Identity provider authentication is "user.idp.example"
requested using a "tokens" path segment and an OPTIONAL query ],
parameter (the query parameter isn't needed if the RDAP server is [
using a local OP) with a key value of "id" and a value component that "Claims",
contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An example for use {
with a remote OP: "iss": "https://accounts.someprovider.com",
"azp": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"aud": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"email": "user@someprovider.com",
"email_verified": true,
"at_hash": "es5maY5y9jBAWCBMhLokAQ",
"nonce": "dcb29f97c836726ddc074f76fbc21bfd",
"name": "User Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.someprovider.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"locale": "en",
"iat": 1644239971,
"exp": 1644243571,
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
}
],
[
"Expires in (seconds)",
3599
]
]
},
"lang": "en-US"
}
https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example Figure 1
An example for use with a local OP: An example of a failed "login" response:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens {
In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this "notices": {
query MUST contain five name-value pairs, in any order, representing "title": "Login Result",
the returned ID Token, Access Token, and Refresh Token. The ID Token "description": [
is represented using a key value of "id_token". The Access Token is "Login failed",
represented using a key value of "access_token". The Access Token [
type is represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of "Client ID",
"bearer" as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749 "user.idp.example"
[RFC6749]. The lifetime of the Access Token is represented using a ]
key value of "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the },
lifetime in seconds of the Access Token as described in Section 4.2.2 "lang": "en-US"
of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The Refresh Token is represented using a key }
value of "refresh_token". The token values returned in the RDAP
server response MUST be Base64url-encoded as described in RFCs 7515
[RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519].
An example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity): Figure 2
4.1.1. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires an end-user to interact
with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This
will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
end-user is using a command line user interface such as curl
(http://curl.haxx.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
This limitation can be addressed using a web browser on a second
device.
4.1.1.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant
The "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides an
OPTIONAL method to request user authorization from devices that have
an Internet connection, but lack a suitable browser for a more
traditional OAuth flow. This method requires a client to use a
second device (such as a smart telephone) that has access to a web
browser for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the
constrained device.
4.1.1.2. UI-limited Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "login/device" query
to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote
Authorization Servers, the "login/device" query MUST include an End-
User identifier that's delivered using one of two methods: by adding
a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax described
in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986], or by including an HTTP
authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme as described
in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. If the RDAP server supports a local
Authorization Servers, the End-User identifier MAY be omitted.
Clients can use either of these methods. Servers MUST support both
methods.
The query used to request client authentication is represented as an
OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value
component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An
example using wget for client identifier "user.idp.example":
wget -qO- --keep-session-cookies --save-
cookies\https://example.com/rdap/login/device?id=user.idp.example
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided. An example using curl and an
authorization header:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ=="\-c
cookies.txt https://example.com/rdap/domain/login/device
The response to this query MUST use the response structures specified
in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST include an
indication of the requested operation's success or failure, and, if
successful, the name-value pairs described in Section 3.2 of RFC 8628
[RFC8628].
An example of a device "login" response (the device_code has been
abbreviated):
{
"notices": {
"title": "Device Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded",
{ {
"access_token" : "eyJ0...NiJ9", "device_code": "AH-1N...iy7yg",
"id_token" : "eyJ0...EjXk", "user_code": "CVYP-SYRC",
"token_type" : "bearer", "expires_in": 1800,
"expires_in" : "3600", "interval": 5,
"refresh_token" : "eyJ0...c8da" "verification_url": "https:\/\/www.example.net\/device"
} }
]
},
"lang": "en-US"
}
Figure 1 Figure 3
An RDAP server that processes this type of query MUST determine if 4.1.1.3. UI-limited Client Login Polling
the identifier is associated with an OP that is recognized and
supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries that include an
identifier associated with an unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not
Implemented) response. An RDAP server that receives a query
containing an identifier associated with a recognized OP MUST perform
the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP using a
browser or browser-like client and return encoded tokens to the
client. Note that tokens are typically valid for a limited period of
time and new tokens will be required when an existing token's
validity period has expired.
The Access Token can then be passed to the server for use with an After successful processing of the "login/device" query, the client
RDAP query by including the encoded token in an HTTP Bearer MUST send a "login/devicepoll" query to the RDAP server to continue
authorization header [RFC6750]. An example (the encoded token has the login process. This query performs the polling function
been abbreviated for clarity): described in RFC 8628 [RFC8628], allowing the RDAP server to wait for
the End-User to enter the information returned from the "login/
device" query using the interface on their second device. After the
End-User has completed that process, or if the process fails or times
out, the OP will respond to the polling requests with an indication
of success or failure. Both should be noted using the response
structures described in Section 4.1. An example using wget:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example wget -qO- --load-cookies cookies.txt\https://example.com/rdap/login/
devicepoll
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9 An example using curl:
The RDAP server can retrieve user information (such as claims
associated with the user) from the OP by querying the UserInfo
endpoint using the given Access Token. The user information can then
be used to determine if the uiser is authorized to receive the
requested information. The response to an authenticated query MUST
use the response structures specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083].
Information that the end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be
omitted from the response.
4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation curl -b cookies.txt https://example.com/rdap/domain/login/devicepoll
The refresh token returned in the token response can be used to The response to this query MUST use the response structures described
refresh an Access Token. An Access Token is refreshed using a in Section 4.1. RDAP query processing can continue normally on the
"tokens" path segment and a query parameter. The query parameter UI-limited device once the "login" process has been completed.
includes a key value of "refresh_token" and a Base64url-encoded value
that represents the refresh token. An example:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens?refresh_token=eyJ0...c8da 4.2. Session Status
In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to determine the status
query MUST contain four name-value pairs, in any order, representing of an existing login session using a "session" path segment. This
a returned Refresh Token and Access Token. The Refresh Token is request MAY include an OPTIONAL "refresh" path segment to refresh the
represented using a key value of "refresh_token". The Access Token access token associated with the current session and to extend the
is represented using a key value of "access_token". The Access Token session for a period of time determined by the OP. As described in
type is represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of RFC 6749 [RFC6749], support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL. An RDAP
"bearer" as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749 server MUST determine if the OP supports token refresh and process
[RFC6749]. The lifetime of the Access Token is represented using a the refresh request by either requesting refresh of the access token
key value of "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the or by returning a response that indicates that token refresh is not
lifetime in seconds of the Access Token as described in Section 4.2.2 supported by the OP. An example "session" request:
of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The token values returned in the RDAP server
response MUST be Base64url-encoded as described in RFCs 7515
[RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519].
Example Access Token refresh response (the encoded tokens have been https://example.com/rdap/session
abbreviated for clarity):
An example "session" request with token refresh included:
https://example.com/rdap/session/refresh
In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or
failure, and, if successful, the client identifier associated with
the session, the claims received from the Authorization Server, and
the duration of the authorized session.
An example without token refresh:
{
"notices": {
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded",
[
"Client ID",
"user.idp.example"
],
[
"Token Refresh Status",
"Token refresh not requested."
]
[
"Expires in (seconds)",
1873
]
[
"Claims",
{ {
"access_token" : "0dac...13b0", "iss": "https://accounts.someprovider.com",
"refresh_token" : "f735...d30c", "azp": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"token_type" : "bearer", "aud": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"expires_in" : "3600" "sub": "103892603076825016132",
"email": "user@someprovider.com",
"email_verified": true,
"at_hash": "es5maY5y9jBAWCBMhLokAQ",
"nonce": "dcb29f97c836726ddc074f76fbc21bfd",
"name": "User Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.someprovider.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"locale": "en",
"iat": 1644239971,
"exp": 1644243571,
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
} }
],
]
},
"lang": "en-US"
}
Figure 2 Figure 4
Access and refresh tokens can be revoked as described in RFC 7009 An example with token refresh:
[RFC7009] by sending a request to an RDAP server that contains a
"tokens/revoke" path segment and a query parameter. The query
parameter includes a key value of "token" and a Base64url-encoded
value that represents the current refresh token. An example:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens/revoke?token=f735...d30c {
"notices": {
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded",
[
"Client ID",
"user.idp.example"
],
[
"Token Refresh Status",
"Token refresh successful."
]
[
"Expires in (seconds)",
3599
]
[
"Claims",
{
"iss": "https://accounts.someprovider.com",
"azp": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"aud": "729559086898-onapsvnhf2og.apps.someprovider.com",
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"email": "user@someprovider.com",
"email_verified": true,
"at_hash": "es5maY5y9jBAWCBMhLokAQ",
"nonce": "dcb29f97c836726ddc074f76fbc21bfd",
"name": "User Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.someprovider.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"locale": "en",
"iat": 1644239971,
"exp": 1644243571,
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
}
],
]
},
"lang": "en-US"
}
Note that this command will revoke both access and refresh tokens at Figure 5
the same time. In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the
response to this query MUST contain a description of the result of
processing the revocation request within the RDAP "notices" data
structure.
Example token revocation success: 4.3. Client Logout
"notices" : Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to terminate an existing
[ login session. Termination of a session is requested using a
{ "logout" path segment. An example:
"title" : "Token Revocation Result",
"description" : "Token revocation succeeded.",
}
],
"lang" : "en-US"
Figure 3 https://example.com/rdap/logout
Example token revocation failure: In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or
failure, and, if successful, the client identifier associated with
the session.
"notices" : Example "logout" response:
[
{
"title" : "Token Revocation Result",
"description" : "Token revocation failed.",
}
],
"errorCode" : 400,
"lang" : "en-US"
Figure 4 {
"notices": {
"title": "Logout Result",
"description": [
"Logout succeeded",
[
"Client ID",
"user.idp.example"
],
"Token revocation successful."
]
},
"lang": "en-US"
}
Figure 6
Access and refresh tokens can be revoked during the "logout" process
as described in RFC 7009 [RFC7009] if supported by the OP (token
revocation endpoint support is OPTIONAL per RFC 8414 [RFC8414]). If
supported, this feature SHOULD be used to ensure that the tokens are
not mistakenly associated with a future RDAP session. In the absence
of a "logout" query, an RDAP session MUST be terminated by the RDAP
server after a server-defined period of time.
4.4. Token Exchange 4.4. Token Exchange
ID tokens include an audience parameter that contains the OAuth 2.0 ID tokens include an audience parameter that contains the OAuth 2.0
client_id of the RP as an audience value. In some operational client_id of the RP as an audience value. In some operational
scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP
can receive tokens with an audience value that does not include the can receive tokens with an audience value that does not include the
RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and the RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and the
RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be remedied RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be remedied
by having the RP exchange these tokens with the OP for a set of by having the RP exchange these tokens with the OP for a set of
trusted tokens that reset the audience parameter. This token trusted tokens that reset the audience parameter. This token
exchange protocol is described in RFC 8693 [RFC8693]. exchange protocol is described in RFC 8693 [RFC8693]. This issue is
not visible to the RDAP client and should be managed by the OpenID
implementation used by the RDAP server.
4.5. Parameter Processing 4.5. Parameter Processing
Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that
processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the end-user processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the end-user
identification information is associated with an OP that is identification information is associated with an OP that is
recognized and supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries recognized and supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries
that include identification information that is not associated with a that include identification information that is not associated with a
supported OP by returning an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An supported OP by returning an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An
RDAP server that receives a query containing identification RDAP server that receives a query containing identification
information associated with a recognized OP MUST perform the steps information associated with a recognized OP MUST perform the steps
required to authenticate the user with the OP, process the query, and required to authenticate the user with the OP, process the query, and
return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end user's level return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the End-User's level
of authorization and access. of authorization and access.
An RDAP server that receives a query containing tokens associated 5. RDAP Query Processing
with a recognized OP and authenticated end user MUST process the
query and return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end
user's level of authorization and access. Errors based on processing
either the ID Token or the Access Token MUST be signaled with an
appropriate HTTP status code as described in Section 3.1 of RFC 6750
[RFC6750].
On receiving a query containing tokens, the RDAP server MUST validate Once an RDAP "login" session is active, an RDAP server MUST determine
the identity information received from a UserInfo endpoint. It can if the End-User is authorized to perform any queries that are
do this independently of the OP, because the response is a JSON received during the duration of the session. This MAY include
object that contains all the data necessary for validation. The rejecting queries outright, and it MAY include omitting or otherwise
Access Token can be validated by sending a request using it to the redacting information that the End-User is not authorized to receive.
UserInfo Endpoint and confirming that a successful response is Specific processing requirements are beyond the scope of this
received. This is different from the OpenID Connect Authorization document. A client can end a session explicitly by sending a
Code and Implicit flows, where the Access Token can be validated "logout" query to the RDAP server. A session can also be ended
against the at_hash claim from the ID Token. With a query containing implicitly by the server after a server-defined period of time. The
tokens, the Access Token might not validate against the at_hash claim status of a session can be determined at any time by sending a
because the Access Token may have been refreshed since the ID Token "session" query to the RDAP server.
was issued.
An RDAP server that processes requests without needing the UserInfo An RDAP server MUST maintain session state information for the
claims does not need to retrieve the claims merely in order to duration of an active session. This is commonly done using HTTP
validate the Access Token. Similarly, an RDAP server that has cached cookies as described in RFC 6265 [RFC6265]>. Doing so allows End-
the UserInfo claims for an end user, in accordance with the HTTP User to submit queries without having to explicitly identify and
headers of a previous UserInfo Endpoint response, does not need to authenticate themselves for each and every query.
retrieve those claims again in order to re-validate the Access Token.
4.6. RDAP Conformance 6. RDAP Conformance
RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST
indicate conformance with this specification by including an indicate conformance with this specification by including an
rdapConformance ([RFC9083]) value of "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" or rdapConformance ([RFC9083]) value of "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" or
"rdap_openidc_local_level_0". Both values MAY be present if a server "rdap_openidc_local_level_0". Both values MAY be present if a server
supports both local and remote OpenID Authorization Servers. The supports both local and remote OpenID Authorization Servers. The
information needed to register this value in the RDAP Extensions information needed to register this value in the RDAP Extensions
Registry is described in Section 6.1. Registry is described in Section 7.1.
Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified: Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified:
"rdapConformance" : "rdapConformance" :
[ [
"rdap_level_0", "rdap_level_0",
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
] ]
Figure 5
5. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires an end-user to interact
with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This
will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
end-user is using a command line user interface such as curl
(http://curl.haxx.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
There are multiple ways to address this limitation using a web
browser on a second device. Two are described here.
5.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant
The "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides one
method to request user authorization from devices that have an
Internet connection, but lack a suitable browser for a more
traditional OAuth flow. This method requires a client to use a
second device (such as a smart telephone) that has access to a web
browser for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the
constrained device.
5.2. Manual Token Management
A second method of requesting user authorization from a constrained
device is possible by producing and managing tokens manually as
follows:
1. Authenticate with the OP as described in Section 4.2 using a
browser or browser-like client.
2. Store the returned ID Token, Access Token, and Refresh Token
locally.
3. Send a request to the content provider/RP along with the client
ID and Access Token received from the OP.
The Access Token MUST be passed to the RP in an HTTP "Authorization"
header [RFC7235]. The Access Token MUST be specified using the
"Bearer" authentication scheme [RFC6750].
Here are two examples using the curl and wget utilities. Start by
authenticating with the OP:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
Save the token information and pass it to the RP along with the URI
representing the RDAP query. Using curl (encoded tokens have been
abbreviated for clarity:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\-k
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\?id=user.idp.example
Using wget:
wget --header="Authorization: Bearer
eyJ0...NiJ9"\https://example.com/rdap/domain/
example.com\id=user.idp.example
Refresh tokens can be useful to automated or command line clients who Figure 7
wish to continue a session without explicitly re-authenticating an
end user. See Section 4.3 for more information.
6. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
6.1. RDAP Extensions Registry 7.1. RDAP Extensions Registry
IANA is requested to register the following values in the RDAP IANA is requested to register the following values in the RDAP
Extensions Registry: Extensions Registry:
* Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_remote_level_0 * Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_remote_level_0
* Registry operator: Any * Registry operator: Any
* Published specification: This document. * Published specification: This document.
* Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> * Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
* Intended usage: This extension describes a federated * Intended usage: This extension describes a federated
authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect,
and a remote Authorization Server. and a remote Authorization Server.
* Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_local_level_0 * Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_local_level_0
* Registry operator: Any * Registry operator: Any
* Published specification: This document. * Published specification: This document.
* Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> * Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
* Intended usage: This extension describes a federated * Intended usage: This extension describes a federated
authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect,
and a local Authorization Server. and a local Authorization Server.
6.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry 7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
IANA is requested to register the following values in the JSON Web IANA is requested to register the following values in the JSON Web
Token Claims Registry: Token Claims Registry:
* Claim Name: "purpose" * Claim Name: "purpose"
* Claim Description: This claim describes the stated purpose for * Claim Description: This claim describes the stated purpose for
submitting a request to access a protected RDAP resource. submitting a request to access a protected RDAP resource.
* Change Controller: IESG * Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.1 of this document. * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.1 of this document.
* Claim Name: "dnt" * Claim Name: "dnt"
* Claim Description: This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that * Claim Description: This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that
describes an End-User's "do not track" preference for identity describes an End-User's "do not track" preference for identity
tracking, logging, or recording when accessing a protected RDAP tracking, logging, or recording when accessing a protected RDAP
resource. resource.
* Change Controller: IESG * Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.2 of this document. * Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.2 of this document.
6.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry 7.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
IANA is requested to create a new protocol registry to manage RDAP IANA is requested to create a new protocol registry to manage RDAP
query purpose values. This registry should appear under its own query purpose values. This registry should appear under its own
heading on IANA's protocol listings, using the same title as the name heading on IANA's protocol listings, using the same title as the name
of the registry. The information to be registered and the procedures of the registry. The information to be registered and the procedures
to be followed in populating the registry are described in to be followed in populating the registry are described in
Section 3.1.4.1. Section 3.1.4.1.
Name of registry: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Name of registry: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Purpose Values Purpose Values
skipping to change at page 21, line 5 skipping to change at page 23, line 23
the scope of this purpose include reporting abuse to someone who can the scope of this purpose include reporting abuse to someone who can
investigate and address that abuse, or contacting entities associated investigate and address that abuse, or contacting entities associated
with a domain name during an offline criminal investigation. with a domain name during an offline criminal investigation.
-----END FORM----- -----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM----- Value: dnsTransparency Description: Tasks within -----BEGIN FORM----- Value: dnsTransparency Description: Tasks within
the scope of this purpose involve querying the registration data made the scope of this purpose involve querying the registration data made
public by registrants to satisfy a wide variety of use cases around public by registrants to satisfy a wide variety of use cases around
informing the general public. -----END FORM----- informing the general public. -----END FORM-----
7. Implementation Status 8. Implementation Status
NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
to publication as an RFC. to publication as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942 Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
[RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing
drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual
skipping to change at page 21, line 35 skipping to change at page 24, line 5
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit". they see fit".
Version -09 of this specification introduced changes that are Version -09 of this specification introduced changes that are
incompatible with earlier implementations. Implementations that are incompatible with earlier implementations. Implementations that are
consistent with this specification will be added as they are consistent with this specification will be added as they are
identified. identified.
8. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481]. Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].
Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0 Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID [RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID
Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption
that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality
services as needed. Security services for ID Tokens and Access services as needed.
Tokens (with references to the JWT specification) are described in
the OpenID Connect Core protocol.
8.1. Authentication and Access Control 9.1. Authentication and Access Control
Having completed the client identification, authorization, and Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
based on a comparison of client-provided information and local based on a comparison of client-provided information and local
policy. For example, a client who provides an email address (and policy. For example, a client who provides an email address (and
nothing more) might be entitled to receive a subset of the nothing more) might be entitled to receive a subset of the
information that would be available to a client who provides an email information that would be available to a client who provides an email
address, a full name, and a stated purpose. Development of these address, a full name, and a stated purpose. Development of these
access control policies is beyond the scope of this document. access control policies is beyond the scope of this document.
9. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to the development of this document: Tom their contributions to the development of this document: Tom
Harrison, Russ Housley, Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, and Alessandro Harrison, Russ Housley, Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, and Alessandro
Vesely. In addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development Vesely. In addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development
team of Joseph Harvey, Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, team of Joseph Harvey, Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena,
Swapneel Sheth, Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof Swapneel Sheth, Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof
of concept" implementation experience that helped demonstrate the of concept" implementation experience that helped demonstrate the
validity of the concepts described in this document. validity of the concepts described in this document.
Mario Loffredo provided significant feedback based on implementation Mario Loffredo provided significant feedback based on implementation
experience that led to welcome improvements in several sections of experience that led to welcome improvements in several sections of
this document. His contributions are greatly appreciated. this document. His contributions are greatly appreciated.
10. References 11. References
10.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect", [OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect",
<http://openid.net/connect/>. <http://openid.net/connect/>.
[OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating [OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating
errata set 1", November 2014, errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 [OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
incorporating errata set 1", November 2014, incorporating errata set 1", November 2014,
skipping to change at page 23, line 20 skipping to change at page 25, line 30
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>. August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015, RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the [RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015, RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
skipping to change at page 24, line 41 skipping to change at page 26, line 42
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access [RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082, Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the [RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021, RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
10.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
00: Initial working group version ported from draft-hollenbeck- 00: Initial working group version ported from draft-hollenbeck-
regext-rdap-openid-10. regext-rdap-openid-10.
01: Modified ID Token delivery approach to note proper use of an 01: Modified ID Token delivery approach to note proper use of an
HTTP bearer authorization header. HTTP bearer authorization header.
02: Modified token delivery approach (Access Token is the bearer 02: Modified token delivery approach (Access Token is the bearer
token) to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header, token) to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header,
fixing the change made in -01. fixing the change made in -01.
03: Updated OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant description and 03: Updated OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant description and
skipping to change at page 25, line 28 skipping to change at page 27, line 33
identifier to be registered with IANA. identifier to be registered with IANA.
05: Keepalive refresh. 05: Keepalive refresh.
06: Keepalive refresh. 06: Keepalive refresh.
07: Added "login_hint" description to Section 3.1.3.2. Added some 07: Added "login_hint" description to Section 3.1.3.2. Added some
text to Section 3.1.4.2 to note that "do not track" requires text to Section 3.1.4.2 to note that "do not track" requires
compliance with local regulations. compliance with local regulations.
08: Rework of token management processing in Sections 4 and 5. 08: Rework of token management processing in Sections 4 and 5.
09: Updated RDAP specification references. Added text to describe 09: Updated RDAP specification references. Added text to describe
both local and remote Authorization Server processing. Removed both local and remote Authorization Server processing. Removed
text that described passing of ID Tokens as query parameters. text that described passing of ID Tokens as query parameters.
10: Updated Section 3.1.3.1. Replaced token processing queries with
"login", "session", and "logout" queries.
Author's Address Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
United States of America United States of America
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
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