draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-06.txt   draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-07.txt 
Network Working Group J. Pezeshki Network Working Group E. Ertekin
Internet-Draft E. Ertekin Internet-Draft C. Christou
Expires: February 16, 2009 R. Jasani Expires: April 17, 2009 R. Jasani
C. Christou J. Pezeshki
Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton
August 15, 2008 October 14, 2008
IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec
(RoHCoIPsec) (ROHCoIPsec)
draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-06 draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-07
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 16, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2009.
Abstract Abstract
In order to integrate RoHC with IPsec [ROHCOIPSEC], a mechanism is In order to integrate ROHC with IPsec [ROHCOIPSEC], a mechanism is
needed to negotiate RoHC configuration parameters between end-points. needed to negotiate ROHC configuration parameters between end-points.
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a mechanism which can be leveraged to Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a mechanism which can be leveraged to
handle these negotiations. This document specifies extensions to handle these negotiations. This document specifies extensions to
IKEv2 [IKEV2] that will allow RoHC and its associated configuration IKEv2 [IKEV2] that will allow ROHC and its associated configuration
parameters to be negotiated for IPsec security associations (SAs). parameters to be negotiated for IPsec security associations (SAs).
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RoHC Channel Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. ROHC Channel Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Negotiation of RoHC Channel Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Negotiation of ROHC Channel Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Increased packet header overhead due to IPsec [IPSEC] can result in Increased packet header overhead due to IPsec [IPSEC] can result in
the inefficient utilization of bandwidth. Coupling RoHC [ROHC] with the inefficient utilization of bandwidth. Coupling ROHC [ROHC] with
IPsec offers an efficient way to transfer protected IP traffic. IPsec offers an efficient way to transfer protected IP traffic.
The operation of RoHCoIPsec [ROHCOIPSEC] requires configuration The operation of ROHCoIPsec [ROHCOIPSEC] requires configuration
parameters to be negotiated between the compressor and decompressor. parameters to be negotiated between the compressor and decompressor.
Current specifications for hop-by-hop RoHC negotiate these parameters Current specifications for hop-by-hop ROHC negotiate these parameters
through a link-layer protocol such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) through a link-layer protocol such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
(i.e. RoHC over PPP [ROHCPPP]). Since key exchange protocols (e.g. (i.e. ROHC over PPP [ROHCPPP]). Since key exchange protocols (e.g.
IKEv2) can be used to negotiate parameters between IPsec peers, this IKEv2) can be used to negotiate parameters between IPsec peers, this
document defines extensions to IKEv2 to negotiate RoHC parameters for document defines extensions to IKEv2 to negotiate ROHC parameters for
RoHCoIPsec. ROHCoIPsec.
2. RoHC Channel Negotiation 2. ROHC Channel Negotiation
The initialization of a RoHC session requires the negotiation of a The initialization of a ROHC session requires the negotiation of a
set of configuration parameters (e.g. MAX_CID, etc.). The following set of configuration parameters (e.g. MAX_CID, PROFILES, etc.). The
subsections define extensions to IKEv2 which enables an initiator to following subsections define extensions to IKEv2 which enables an
propose a set of RoHC parameters; the responder selects the initiator to propose a set of ROHC parameters; the responder selects
appropriate parameters from this list, and responds with the accepted the appropriate parameters from this list, and responds with the
parameters for the RoHC channel. accepted parameters for the ROHC channel.
2.1. Negotiation of RoHC Channel Parameters 2.1. Negotiation of ROHC Channel Parameters
RoHC configuration parameters will be negotiated at either the ROHC configuration parameters will be negotiated at either the
establishment or rekeying of a Child SA. Specifically, a new Notify establishment or rekeying of a Child SA. Specifically, a new Notify
payload is used during the IKE_AUTH and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges to message type is used during the IKE_AUTH and CREATE_CHILD_SA
negotiate these parameters. exchanges to negotiate these parameters.
The Notify payload sent by the initiator contains the configuration The Notify payload sent by the initiator contains the configuration
parameters for the RoHC implementation. Upon receipt of the parameters for the ROHC implementation. Upon receipt of the
initiator's request, the responder will either ignore the payload (if initiator's request, the responder will either ignore the payload (if
it doesn't support RoHC or the proposed parameters) or respond with a it doesn't support ROHC or the proposed parameters) or respond with a
Notify payload that contains the accepted RoHC channel parameters. Notify payload that contains the accepted ROHC channel parameters.
The accepted parameters are an intersection between the parameters The accepted parameters are an intersection between the parameters
proposed by the initiator and the parameters supported by the proposed by the initiator and the parameters supported by the
responder (e.g. if the initiator proposes a MAX_CID value of 15, but responder (e.g. if the initiator proposes a MAX_CID value of 15, but
the responder only supports a MAX_CID value of 13, the responder will the responder only supports a MAX_CID value of 13, the responder will
respond with a value of 13, which is supported by both parties). respond with a value of 13, which is supported by both parties).
Note that only one Notify payload is used to convey RoHC parameters Note that only one Notify payload is used to convey ROHC parameters
per exchange. If multiple Notify payloads relaying RoHC parameters per exchange. If multiple Notify payloads relaying ROHC parameters
are received by the responder, all but the first such Notify payload are received by the responder, all but the first such Notify payload
must be dropped. If the initiator does not receive a Notify Payload must be dropped. If the initiator does not receive a Notify Payload
with the responder's accepted RoHC channel parameters, RoHC must not with the responder's accepted ROHC channel parameters, ROHC must not
be enabled on the Child SA. be enabled on the Child SA.
A new Notify Message Type value, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED, will be A new Notify Message Type value, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED, will
added to indicate that the Notify payload is conveying RoHC channel indicate that the Notify payload is conveying ROHC channel
parameters. Additionally, several fields of the Notify payload (as parameters. The Notify Payload (as defined in [IKEV2]) is
defined in [IKEV2]) are set as follows: illustrated in Figure 1 below:
Critical (1 bit) 1 2 3
This value is set to zero to indicate that the recipient must skip 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
this payload if it does not understand the payload type code in +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
the Next Payload field of the previous payload. ! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Protocol ID ! SPI Size ! Notify Message Type !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Security Parameter Index (SPI) ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Notification Data ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
RESERVED (7 bits) Figure 1. Notify Payload format.
Must be sent as zero, and must be ignored on receipt.
The fields of the Notify Payload are set as follows:
Next Payload (1 octet)
Identifier for the payload type of the next payload in the
message. Further details can be found in [IKEV2].
Critical (1 bit)
Since all IKEv2 implementations must support the Notify Payload,
this value is zero.
Protocol ID (1 octet) Protocol ID (1 octet)
If the RoHC parameters are set at SA creation, this field must be Since this Notification message is used during the creation of a
set to zero. If this notification concerns an existing SA, this Child SA, this field must be set to zero.
value may be set to (2) AH [AH], or (3) ESP [ESP].
SPI Size (1 octet) SPI Size (1 octet)
This value must be set to zero, since no SPI is applicable (RoHC This value must be set to zero, since no SPI is applicable (ROHC
parameters are set at SA creation, thus the SPI has not been parameters are set at SA creation, thus the SPI has not been
defined). defined).
Notify Message Type (2 octets) Notify Message Type (2 octets)
This field must be set to ROHC_SUPPORTED. This field must be set to ROHC_SUPPORTED.
RoHC configuration parameters will be communicated via a new Notify ROHC configuration parameters will be communicated via a new Notify
message type, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED. The RoHC configuration message type, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED. The ROHC configuration
parameters will be listed within the Notification Data field of the parameters will be listed within the Notification Data field of the
Notify payload in the following format (default values for the Notify payload in the following format (default values for the
configuration parameters are consistent with [ROHCPPP]): configuration parameters are consistent with [ROHCPPP]):
1 2 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! MAX_CID ! MRRU ! ! MAX_CID | RESERVED |PROFILES_LENGTH!
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! MAX_HEADER ! PROFILE LENGTH !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! ! ! !
~ PROFILES... ~ ~ PROFILES... ~
! ! ! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! ! ! !
~ INTEGRITY ALGORITHMS... ~ ~ INTEGRITY ALGORITHMS... ~
! ! ! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1. Notification Data field for the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Figure 2. Notification Data field for the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify
message type. message type.
MAX_CID (2 octets) MAX_CID (2 octets)
The MAX_CID field indicates the maximum value of a context The MAX_CID field indicates the maximum value of a context
identifier. This value must be at least 0 and at most 16383 (The identifier. This value must be at least 0 and at most 16383 (The
value 0 implies having one context). value 0 implies having one context).
Suggested value: 15 Suggested value: 15
Note: The value of LARGE_CIDS will be implicitly determined by PROFILES_LENGTH (1 octet)
this value (i.e. if MAX_CID is <= 15, LARGE_CIDS will be assumed
to be 0).
MRRU (2 octets)
The MRRU field indicates the maximum reconstructed reception unit
(see [ROHC], section 5.1.1).
Suggested value: 0
The MRRU value is used in conjunction with the segmentation
protocol defined in RoHC. Since RoHC is implemented over an IPsec
SA, RoHC segmentation is not possible. Therefore, the MRRU value
must be set to zero, indicating that no segment headers are
allowed on the channel.
MAX_HEADER (2 octets)
The largest header size in octets that may be compressed.
Suggested value: 168 octets
Note: The MAX_HEADER parameter is not used for all RoHC profiles.
If none of the RoHC profiles require this field, this value is
ignored.
PROFILE LENGTH (2 octets)
The total number of profiles contained within the PROFILES field The total number of profiles contained within the PROFILES field
(note that each RoHC profile is 2-octets in length). (note that each ROHC profile is 2-octets in length).
PROFILES PROFILES (variable)
The set of profiles to be enabled for the RoHC process. Profiles The set of profiles to be enabled for the ROHC process. Profiles
are further detailed in [ROHC]. In addition, several common are further detailed in [ROHC]. In addition, several common
profiles are defined in [ROHCPROF]. These 16-bit profile profiles are defined in [ROHCPROF]. These 16-bit profile
identifiers are to be sent in network byte order. identifiers are to be sent in network byte order.
INTEGRITY ALGORITHMS INTEGRITY ALGORITHMS
The set of Integrity Algorithms that may be use to ensure the The set of Integrity Algorithms that may be use to ensure the
integrity of the decompressed packets (i.e. ensure that the packet integrity of the decompressed packets (i.e. ensure that the packet
headers are properly decompressed). Each Integrity Algorithm is headers are properly decompressed). Each Integrity Algorithm is
represented by a 2-octet value that corresponds to the value represented by a 2-octet value that corresponds to the value
listed in [IKEV2-PARA] "For Transform Type 3 (Integrity listed in [IKEV2-PARA] "For Transform Type 3 (Integrity
Algorithm)" section. Algorithm)" section.
It is noted that: It is noted that:
1. The length of this field is inferred from the Notify Payload's 1. The length of this field is inferred from the Notify Payload's
"Payload Length" field ([IKEV2], Section 3.10). "Payload Length" field.
2. The key for this Integrity Algorithm is computed using the 2. The key for this Integrity Algorithm is computed using the
same method as is used to compute IPsec's Integrity Algorithm same method as is used to compute IPsec's Integrity Algorithm
key ([IKEV2], Section 2.17). key ([IKEV2], Section 2.17).
3. A ROHCoIPsec implementation may choose to negotiate a value of
"0" in this field (i.e., NONE, as defined in the Integrity
Algorithm Transform ID registry).
When a pair of SAs are created (one in each direction), the RoHC The negotiated set of ROHC parameters are associated with the
channel parameter FEEDBACK_FOR is set implicitly to the other SA of inbound/outbound pair of SAs established by each IKEv2
the pair (i.e. the SA pointing in the reverse direction). CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.
The following ROHC channel parameters are not negotiated:
o LARGE_CIDS: This value is implicitly determined by the value of
MAX_CID (e.g. if MAX_CID is <= 15, LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be 0).
o MRRU: IPsec implementations will always implement path MTU
discovery; therefore, ROHC packets will never need to use ROHC
segmentation over an IPsec SA. As a result, this value will
always be zero, and does not need to be negotiated.
o FEEDBACK_FOR: When a pair of SAs are created (one in each
direction), the ROHC channel parameter FEEDBACK_FOR is set
implicitly to the other SA of the pair (i.e. the SA pointing in
the reverse direction).
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
The RoHC parameters negotiated via IKEv2 do not add any new The ROHC channel parameters negotiated via IKEv2 do not add any new
vulnerabilities beyond those associated with the normal operation of vulnerabilities beyond those associated with the normal operation of
IKEv2. IKEv2.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Notify Message (Status Type). Therefore, This document defines a new Notify Message (Status Type). Therefore,
IANA is requested to allocate one value from the IKEv2 Notify Message IANA is requested to allocate one value from the IKEv2 Notify Message
registry to indicate ROHC_SUPPORTED. Note that, since this Notify registry to indicate ROHC_SUPPORTED. Note that, since this Notify
Message is a Status Type, values ranging from 0 to 16383 must not be Message is a Status Type, values ranging from 0 to 16383 must not be
allocated for ROHC_SUPPORTED. allocated for ROHC_SUPPORTED.
skipping to change at page 7, line 20 skipping to change at page 7, line 16
of this document. The authors would also like to thank Mr. Tero of this document. The authors would also like to thank Mr. Tero
Kivinen for providing his technical expertise for this document. In Kivinen for providing his technical expertise for this document. In
addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their
numerous reviews and comments to this document: numerous reviews and comments to this document:
o Dr. Stephen Kent o Dr. Stephen Kent
o Dr. Carsten Bormann o Dr. Carsten Bormann
o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonnson o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonnson
o Mr. Pasi Eronen o Mr. Pasi Eronen
o Dr. Joseph Touch o Dr. Joseph Touch
o Mr. Yoav Nir
Finally, the authors would also like to thank Mr. Tom Conkle, Ms. Finally, the authors would also like to thank Mr. Tom Conkle, Ms.
Michele Casey, and Mr. Etzel Brower. Michele Casey, and Mr. Etzel Brower.
6. Normative References 6. References
6.1. Normative References
[ROHCOIPSEC]
Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and R. Jasani, "Integration of
Robust Header Compression over IPsec Security
Associations", work in progress , October 2008.
[ROHC] Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima, H., [ROHC] Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima, H.,
Hannu, H., Jonsson, L., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T., Le, K., Hannu, H., Jonsson, L., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T., Le, K.,
Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro, K., Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro, K.,
Wiebke, T., Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust Header Wiebke, T., Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust Header
Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP, Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP,
ESP, and uncompressed", RFC 3095, July 2001. ESP, and uncompressed", RFC 3095, July 2001.
[IPSEC] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [IPSEC] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[ROHCOIPSEC]
Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and R. Jasani, "Integration of
Robust Header Compression over IPsec Security
Associations", work in progress , June 2006.
[IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[ROHCPPP] Bormann, C., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over PPP", [ROHCPPP] Bormann, C., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over PPP",
RFC 3241, April 2002. RFC 3241, April 2002.
[AH] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, 6.2. Informative References
December 2005.
[ESP] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[ROHCPROF] [ROHCPROF]
Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression
Version 2 (RoHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and UDP Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and UDP
Lite", www.iana.org/assignments/ROHC-pro-ids , May 2007. Lite", www.iana.org/assignments/ROHC-pro-ids , May 2007.
[IKEV2-PARA] [IKEV2-PARA]
IANA, "IKEv2 Parameters, IANA, "IKEv2 Parameters,
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters", http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters",
January 2008. January 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jonah Pezeshki Emre Ertekin
Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr. 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171 Herndon, VA 20171
US US
Email: pezeshki_jonah@bah.com Email: ertekin_emre@bah.com
Emre Ertekin Chris Christou
Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr. 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171 Herndon, VA 20171
US US
Email: ertekin_emre@bah.com Email: christou_chris@bah.com
Rohan Jasani Rohan Jasani
Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr. 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171 Herndon, VA 20171
US US
Email: jasani_rohan@bah.com Email: jasani_rohan@bah.com
Chris Christou Jonah Pezeshki
Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton
13200 Woodland Park Dr. 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
Herndon, VA 20171 Herndon, VA 20171
US US
Email: christou_chris@bah.com Email: pezeshki_jonah@bah.com
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
 End of changes. 48 change blocks. 
109 lines changed or deleted 118 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.35. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/