draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec-04.txt   draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec-05.txt 
Network Working Group E. Ertekin Network Working Group E. Ertekin
Internet-Draft C. Christou Internet-Draft C. Christou
Expires: August 6, 2009 Booz Allen Hamilton Expires: February 13, 2010 Booz Allen Hamilton
C. Bormann C. Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI Universitaet Bremen TZI
February 2, 2009 August 12, 2009
IPsec Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec IPsec Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec
(ROHCoIPsec) (ROHCoIPsec)
draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec-04 draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec-05
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Abstract Abstract
Integrating ROHC with IPsec (ROHCoIPsec) offers the combined benefits Integrating ROHC with IPsec (ROHCoIPsec) offers the combined benefits
of IP security services and efficient bandwidth utilization. of IP security services and efficient bandwidth utilization.
However, in order to integrate ROHC with IPsec, extensions to the SPD However, in order to integrate ROHC with IPsec, extensions to the SPD
and SAD are required. This document describes the IPsec extensions and SAD are required. This document describes the IPsec extensions
required to support ROHCoIPsec. required to support ROHCoIPsec.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Extensions to IPsec Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Extensions to IPsec Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Security Policy Database (SPD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Security Policy Database (SPD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Security Association Database (SAD) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Security Association Database (SAD) . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Extensions to IPsec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Extensions to IPsec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Addition to the IANA Protocol Numbers Registry . . . . . . 5 3.1. Addition to the IANA Protocol Numbers Registry . . . . . . 5
3.2. Verifying the Integrity of Decompressed Packet Headers . . 5 3.2. Verifying the Integrity of Decompressed Packet Headers . . 6
3.2.1. ICV Computation and Integrity Verification . . . . . . 6 3.2.1. ICV Computation and Integrity Verification . . . . . . 7
3.3. Nested IPComp and ROHCoIPsec Processing . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. ROHC Segmentation and IPsec Tunnel MTU . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Nested IPComp and ROHCoIPsec Processing . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Using IPsec ([IPSEC]) protection offers various security services for Using IPsec ([IPSEC]) protection offers various security services for
IP traffic. However, these benefits come at the cost of additional IP traffic. However, these benefits come at the cost of additional
packet headers, which increase packet overhead. As described in packet headers, which increase packet overhead. As described in
[ROHCOIPSEC], Robust Header Compression (ROHC [ROHC]) can be used [ROHCOIPSEC], Robust Header Compression (ROHC [ROHC]) can be used
with IPsec to reduce the overhead associated with IPsec-protected with IPsec to reduce the overhead associated with IPsec-protected
packets. packets.
skipping to change at page 3, line 51 skipping to change at page 3, line 51
parameters will dictate the security and header compression services parameters will dictate the security and header compression services
that are provided to packets. that are provided to packets.
The fields contained within each SPD entry are defined in [IPSEC], The fields contained within each SPD entry are defined in [IPSEC],
Section 4.4.1.2. To support ROHC, several processing info fields Section 4.4.1.2. To support ROHC, several processing info fields
must be added to the SPD; these fields contain information regarding must be added to the SPD; these fields contain information regarding
the ROHC profiles and channel parameters supported by the local ROHC the ROHC profiles and channel parameters supported by the local ROHC
instance. instance.
The following ROHC channel parameters must be included if the The following ROHC channel parameters must be included if the
processing info field in the SPD is set to PROTECT (suggested values processing info field in the SPD is set to PROTECT:
for these parameters are consistent with [ROHCPPP]):
MAX_CID: The field indicates the highest context ID that will be MAX_CID: The field indicates the highest context ID that will be
decompressed by the local decompressor. MAX_CID must be at least decompressed by the local decompressor. MAX_CID must be at least
0 and at most 16383 (The value 0 implies having one context). The 0 and at most 16383 (The value 0 implies having one context).
suggested value for MAX_CID is 15.
MRRU: The MRRU parameter indicates the the size of the largest
reconstructed unit (in octets) that the local decompressor is
expected to reassemble from ROHC segments. This size includes the
CRC and the ROHC ICV. NOTE: Since in-order delivery of ROHC
packets cannot be guaranteed, the MRRU parameter is recommended to
be set to 0 (as stated in Section 5.2.5.1 of [ROHC] and Section
6.1 of [ROHCV2]), which indicates that no segment headers are
allowed on the ROHCoIPsec channel.
PROFILES: This field is a list of ROHC profiles supported by the PROFILES: This field is a list of ROHC profiles supported by the
local decompressor. Possible values for this list are contained local decompressor. Possible values for this list are contained
in the [ROHCPROF] registry. in the [ROHCPROF] registry.
In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, a field within the SPD In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, a field within the SPD
is required to store a list of integrity algorithms supported by the is required to store a list of integrity algorithms supported by the
ROHCoIPsec instance: ROHCoIPsec instance:
INTEGRITY ALGORITHM: This field is a list of integrity algorithms INTEGRITY ALGORITHM: This field is a list of integrity algorithms
supported by the ROHCoIPsec instance. This will be used by the supported by the ROHCoIPsec instance. This will be used by the
ROHC process to ensure that packet headers are properly ROHC process to ensure that packet headers are properly
decompressed (see Section 3.2). decompressed (see Section 3.2). Algorithms that must be supported
are specified in Section 3.2 of [CRYPTO-ALG]. More explicitly,
the implementation conformance requirements for authentication
algorithms are as follows:
Requirement Algorithm
----------- ----------------
Must AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96
Should+ AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC_96
May AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96
Several other ROHC channel parameters are omitted from the SPD, Several other ROHC channel parameters are omitted from the SPD,
because they are set implicitly. The omitted channel parameters are because they are set implicitly. The omitted channel parameters are
LARGE_CIDS, MRRU, and FEEDBACK_FOR. The LARGE_CIDS channel parameter LARGE_CIDS and FEEDBACK_FOR. The LARGE_CIDS channel parameter is set
is set implicitly, based on the value of MAX_CID (e.g. if MAX_CID is implicitly, based on the value of MAX_CID (e.g. if MAX_CID is <= 15,
<= 15, LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be 0). Furthermore, since in-order LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be 0). Finally, the ROHC FEEDBACK_FOR
delivery of ROHC packets cannot be guaranteed, the MRRU parameter channel parameter is set implicitly to the ROHC channel associated
must be set to 0 (as stated in Section 5.2.5.1 of [ROHC] and Section with the SA in the reverse direction. If an SA in the reverse
6.1 of [ROHCV2]). Finally, the ROHC FEEDBACK_FOR channel parameter direction does not exist, the FEEDBACK_FOR channel parameter is not
is set implicitly to the ROHC channel associated with the SA in the set, and ROHC must not operate in bidirectional Mode.
reverse direction. If an SA in the reverse direction does not exist,
the FEEDBACK_FOR channel parameter is not set, and ROHC must not
operate in bidirectional Mode.
2.2. Security Association Database (SAD) 2.2. Security Association Database (SAD)
Each entry within the SAD defines the parameters associated with each Each entry within the SAD defines the parameters associated with each
established SA. Unless the "populate from packet" (PFP) flag is established SA. Unless the "populate from packet" (PFP) flag is
asserted for a particular field, SAD entries are determined by the asserted for a particular field, SAD entries are determined by the
corresponding SPD entries during the creation of the SA. corresponding SPD entries during the creation of the SA.
The data items contained within the SAD are defined in [IPSEC], The data items contained within the SAD are defined in [IPSEC],
Section 4.4.2.1. To support ROHC, this list of data items is Section 4.4.2.1. To support ROHC, this list of data items is
augmented to include a "ROHC Data Item" that contains the parameters augmented to include a "ROHC Data Item" that contains the parameters
used by ROHC instance. The ROHC Data Item exists for both inbound used by ROHC instance. The ROHC Data Item exists for both inbound
and outbound SAs. and outbound SAs.
The ROHC Data Item includes the ROHC channel parameters for the SA. The ROHC Data Item includes the ROHC channel parameters for the SA.
These channel parameters (i.e., MAX_CID, PROFILES) are enumerated These channel parameters (i.e., MAX_CID, PROFILES, MRRU) are
above in Section 2.1. For inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item includes enumerated above in Section 2.1. For inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item
ROHC channel parameters that are used by the local decompressor includes ROHC channel parameters that are used by the local
instance; conversely, for outbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item includes decompressor instance; conversely, for outbound SAs, the ROHC Data
ROHC channel parameters that are used by local compressor instance. Item includes ROHC channel parameters that are used by local
compressor instance.
In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, the ROHC Data Item for In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, the ROHC Data Item for
both inbound and outbound SAs includes two additional parameters. both inbound and outbound SAs includes two additional parameters.
Specifically, these parameters store the integrity algorithm and Specifically, these parameters store the integrity algorithm and
respective key used by ROHC (see Section 3.2). The integrity respective key used by ROHC (see Section 3.2). The integrity
algorithm and its associated key are used to calculate a ROHC ICV; algorithm and its associated key are used to calculate a ROHC ICV;
this ICV is used to verify the packet headers post-decompression. this ICV is used to verify the packet headers post-decompression.
Finally, for inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item includes a FEEDBACK_FOR Finally, for inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item includes a FEEDBACK_FOR
parameter. The parameter is a reference to a ROHC channel in the parameter. The parameter is a reference to a ROHC channel in the
skipping to change at page 5, line 38 skipping to change at page 6, line 7
3. Extensions to IPsec Processing 3. Extensions to IPsec Processing
3.1. Addition to the IANA Protocol Numbers Registry 3.1. Addition to the IANA Protocol Numbers Registry
In order to demultiplex header-compressed from uncompressed traffic In order to demultiplex header-compressed from uncompressed traffic
on a ROHC-enabled SA, a "ROHC" value must be reserved in the IANA on a ROHC-enabled SA, a "ROHC" value must be reserved in the IANA
Protocol Numbers registry. If an outbound packet has a compressed Protocol Numbers registry. If an outbound packet has a compressed
header, the Next Header field of the security protocol header (e.g., header, the Next Header field of the security protocol header (e.g.,
AH [AH], ESP [ESP]) must be set to the "ROHC" protocol identifier. AH [AH], ESP [ESP]) must be set to the "ROHC" protocol identifier.
If the packet header has not been compressed, the Next Header field If the packet header has not been compressed by ROHC, the Next Header
remains unaltered. Conversely, for an inbound packet, the value of field does not contain the "ROHC" protocol identifier. Conversely,
the security protocol Next Header field is checked to determine if for an inbound packet, the value of the security protocol Next Header
the packet includes a ROHC header, in order to determine if it field is checked to determine if the packet includes a ROHC header,
requires ROHC decompression. in order to determine if it requires ROHC decompression.
Use of the "ROHC" protocol identifier for purposes other than
ROHCOIPsec is currently not defined. Future protocols that make use
of the allocation (e.g., other applications of ROHC in multi-hop
environments) require specification of the logical compression
channel between the ROHC compressor and decompressor. In addition,
these specifications will require the investigation of the security
considerations associated with use of the "ROHC" protocol identifier
outside the context of the next-header field of security protocol
headers.
3.2. Verifying the Integrity of Decompressed Packet Headers 3.2. Verifying the Integrity of Decompressed Packet Headers
Since ROHC is inherently a lossy compression algorithm, ROHCoIPsec Since ROHC is inherently a lossy compression algorithm, ROHCoIPsec
may use an additional Integrity Algorithm (and respective key) to may use an additional Integrity Algorithm (and respective key) to
compute a second Integrity Check Value (ICV) for the uncompressed compute a second Integrity Check Value (ICV) for the uncompressed
packet. This ICV is computed over the uncompressed IP header, as packet. This ICV is computed over the uncompressed IP header, as
well at the higher-layer headers and the packet payload, and is well at the higher-layer headers and the packet payload, and is
appended to the ROHC-compressed packet. At the decompressor, the appended to the ROHC-compressed packet. At the decompressor, the
decompressed packet (including the uncompressed IP header, higher- decompressed packet (including the uncompressed IP header, higher-
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Note: The authentication data must not be included in the calculation Note: The authentication data must not be included in the calculation
of the ICV. of the ICV.
3.2.1. ICV Computation and Integrity Verification 3.2.1. ICV Computation and Integrity Verification
In order to correctly verify the integrity of the decompressed In order to correctly verify the integrity of the decompressed
packets, the processing steps for ROHCoIPsec must be implemented in a packets, the processing steps for ROHCoIPsec must be implemented in a
specific order, as given below. specific order, as given below.
For outbound packets that are to be processed by ROHC: For outbound packets that are processed by ROHC and IPsec-protected:
o An ICV is computed for the uncompressed packet via ROHCoIPsec's o Compute an ICV for the uncompressed packet with the negotiated
Integrity Algorithm (and respective key) (ROHC) integrity algorithm and its respective key
o The packet header(s) is(are) compressed by the ROHC process o Compress the packet headers (as specified by the ROHC process)
o The ICV is appended to the end of the compressed packet o Append the ICV to the compressed packet
o The security protocol is applied to the packet o Apply AH or ESP processing to the packet, as specified in the
appropriate SAD entry
For inbound packets that are to be decompressed by ROHC: For inbound packets that are to be decompressed by ROHC:
o A packet received on a ROHC-enabled SA is IPsec-processed o Apply AH or ESP processing, as specified in the appropriate SAD
o Packet header(s) is(are) decompressed by the ROHC process entry
o The decompressed packet is used with the integrity algorithm (and o Remove the ICV from the packet
its respective key) to compute a ROHC ICV that is compared to the o Decompress the packet header(s)
appended ICV (if these two values differ, the packet is dropped) o Compute an ICV for the decompressed packet with the negotiated
(ROHC) integrity algorithm and its respective key
o Compare the computed ICV to the original ICV calculated at the
compressor: if these two values differ, the packet must be
dropped; otherwise resume IPsec processing
3.3. Nested IPComp and ROHCoIPsec Processing 3.3. ROHC Segmentation and IPsec Tunnel MTU
In certain scenarios, a ROHCoIPsec-processed packet may exceed the
size of the IPsec tunnel MTU. [IPSEC] currently stipulates the
following for outbound traffic that exceeds the SA PMTU:
Case 1: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the DF
bit set. The implementation should discard the packet
and send a PMTU ICMP message.
Case 2: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the DF
bit clear. The implementation should fragment (before or
after encryption per its configuration) and then forward
the fragments. It should not send a PMTU ICMP message.
Case 3: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv6. The implementation
should discard the packet and send a PMTU ICMP message.
For ROHCOIPsec, Cases 1 and 3, and the post-encryption fragmentation
for Case 2 are employed. However, since current ROHC compression
profiles do not support the compression of IP packet fragments, pre-
encryption fragmentation is not compatible with the current set of
ROHC profiles. In place of pre-encryption fragmentation, ROHC
segmentation may be used at the compressor to divide the packet,
where each segment conforms to the tunnel MTU. However, because in-
order delivery of ROHC segments is not guaranteed, the use of ROHC
segmentation is not recommended.
If the compressor determines that the compressed packet exceeds the
tunnel MTU, ROHC segmentation may be applied to the compressed packet
before AH or ESP processing. This determination can be made by
comparing the anticipated ROHCoIPsec packet size to the Path MTU data
item specified in the SAD entry. If the MRRU for the channel is non-
zero, the compressor applies ROHC segmentation. The segmentation
process should account for the additional overhead imposed by IPsec
process (e.g., AH or ESP overhead, crypto synchronization data, the
additional IP header, etc.) such that the final IPsec-processed
segments are less than the tunnel MTU. After segmentation, each ROHC
segment receives AH or ESP processing.
For channels where the MRRU is non-zero, the ROHCoIPsec decompressor
must re-assemble the ROHC segments that are received. To accomplish
this, the decompressor must identify the ROHC segments (as documented
in Section 5.2.6 of [ROHC]), and attempt reconstruction using the
ROHC segmentation protocol (Section 5.2.5 of [ROHC]). If
reconstruction fails, the packet must be discarded.
As stated in Section 3.2.1, if the ROHC integrity algorithm is used
to verify the decompression of packet headers, this ICV is appended
to the compressed packet. If ROHC segmentation is performed, the
segmentation algorithm is executed on the compressed packet and the
appended ICV. Note that the ICV is not appended to each ROHC
segment.
3.4. Nested IPComp and ROHCoIPsec Processing
IPComp ([IPCOMP]) is another mechanism that can be implemented to IPComp ([IPCOMP]) is another mechanism that can be implemented to
reduce the size of an IP datagram. If IPComp and ROHCoIPsec are reduce the size of an IP datagram. If IPComp and ROHCoIPsec are
implemented in a nested fashion, the following steps must be followed implemented in a nested fashion, the following steps must be followed
for outbound and inbound packets. for outbound and inbound packets.
For outbound packets that are to be processed by IPcomp and ROHC: For outbound packets that are to be processed by IPcomp and ROHC:
o The ICV is computed for the uncompressed packet, and the o The ICV is computed for the uncompressed packet, and the
appropriate ROHC compression profile is applied to the packet appropriate ROHC compression profile is applied to the packet
o IPComp is applied, and the packet is sent to the IPsec process o IPComp is applied, and the packet is sent to the IPsec process
skipping to change at page 8, line 25 skipping to change at page 10, line 19
OPnet for their contributions and support for developing this OPnet for their contributions and support for developing this
document. document.
The authors would also like to thank Mr. Yoav Nir, and Mr. Robert A The authors would also like to thank Mr. Yoav Nir, and Mr. Robert A
Stangarone Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this Stangarone Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this
specification. specification.
Finally, the authors would like to thank the following for their Finally, the authors would like to thank the following for their
numerous reviews and comments to this document: numerous reviews and comments to this document:
o Mr. Magnus Westerlund
o Dr. Stephen Kent o Dr. Stephen Kent
o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonsson o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonsson
o Mr. Carl Knutsson o Mr. Carl Knutsson
o Mr. Pasi Eronen o Mr. Pasi Eronen
o Dr. Jonah Pezeshki o Dr. Jonah Pezeshki
o Mr. Tero Kivinen o Mr. Tero Kivinen
o Dr. Joseph Touch o Dr. Joseph Touch
o Mr. Rohan Jasani o Mr. Rohan Jasani
7. References 7. References
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 10, line 46
[ROHC] Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust [ROHC] Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust
Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995, July 2007. Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995, July 2007.
[ROHCV2] Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression [ROHCV2] Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression
Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and
UDP-Lite", RFC 5225. UDP-Lite", RFC 5225.
[IPCOMP] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, and Thomas, "IP Payload [IPCOMP] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, and Thomas, "IP Payload
Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173, September 2001. Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173, September 2001.
[ROHCPPP] Bormann, C., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over PPP",
RFC 3241, April 2002.
[IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[IKEV2EXT] [IKEV2EXT]
Ertekin, et al., "Extensions to IKEv2 to Support Robust Ertekin, et al., "Extensions to IKEv2 to Support Robust
Header Compression over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec)", work in Header Compression over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec)", work in
progress , February 2009. progress , August 2009.
[AH] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, [AH] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
December 2005. December 2005.
[ESP] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", [ESP] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005. RFC 4303, December 2005.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[ROHCOIPSEC] [ROHCOIPSEC]
Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann,
"Integration of Header Compression over IPsec Security "Integration of Header Compression over IPsec Security
Associations", work in progress , February 2009. Associations", work in progress , August 2009.
[ROHCPROF] [ROHCPROF]
"RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile Identifiers", "RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile Identifiers",
www.iana.org/assignments/rohc-pro-ids , October 2005. www.iana.org/assignments/rohc-pro-ids , October 2005.
[CRYPTO-ALG]
Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007.
[ROHC-TERM] [ROHC-TERM]
Jonsson, L-E., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC): Jonsson, L-E., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC):
Terminology and Channel Mapping Examples", RFC 3759, Terminology and Channel Mapping Examples", RFC 3759,
April 2004. April 2004.
[PROTOCOL] [PROTOCOL]
IANA, ""Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", IANA registry IANA, ""Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", IANA registry
at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers". at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers".
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
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