draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-10.txt   draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-11.txt 
Roll A. Brandt Roll A. Brandt
Internet-Draft Sigma Designs Internet-Draft Sigma Designs
Intended status: Standards Track E. Baccelli Intended status: Standards Track E. Baccelli
Expires: October 28, 2015 INRIA Expires: January 3, 2016 INRIA
R. Cragie R. Cragie
ARM Ltd. ARM Ltd.
P. van der Stok P. van der Stok
Consultant Consultant
April 26, 2015 July 2, 2015
Applicability Statement: The use of the RPL protocol suite in Home Applicability Statement: The use of the RPL protocol suite in Home
Automation and Building Control Automation and Building Control
draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-10 draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-11
Abstract Abstract
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in the selection The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in the selection
and use of protocols from the RPL protocol suite to implement the and use of protocols from the RPL protocol suite to implement the
features required for control in building and home environments. features required for control in building and home environments.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 24 skipping to change at page 2, line 24
1.3. Required Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Required Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Out of scope requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Out of scope requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Deployment Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Deployment Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Network Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Network Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Traffic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Traffic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2. Source-sink (SS) communication paradigm . . . . . . . 8 2.2.2. Source-sink (SS) communication paradigm . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3. Publish-subscribe (PS, or pub/sub)) communication 2.2.3. Publish-subscribe (PS, or pub/sub)) communication
paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.4. Peer-to-peer (P2P) communication paradigm . . . . . . 9 2.2.4. Peer-to-peer (P2P) communication paradigm . . . . . . 9
2.2.5. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) communication paradigm . . . 9 2.2.5. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) communication paradigm . . . 10
2.2.6. Additional considerations: Duocast and N-cast . . . . 10 2.2.6. Additional considerations: Duocast and N-cast . . . . 10
2.2.7. RPL applicability per communication paradigm . . . . 10 2.2.7. RPL applicability per communication paradigm . . . . 10
2.3. Layer-2 applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. Layer-2 applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Using RPL to meet Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Using RPL to meet Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. RPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. RPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. RPL Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. RPL Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.1. RPL Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.1. RPL Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.2. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.2. Storing vs. Non-Storing Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.3. DAO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.3. DAO Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.4. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.4. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.5. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.5. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.6. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.6. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.7. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.7. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.8. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1.8. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.9. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1.9. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Layer 2 features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2. Layer 2 features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.4. Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) and other things . . . 17 4.2.4. Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) and other things . . . 19
4.3. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 17 4.3. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 19
4.3.1. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.1. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.2. Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.2. Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. MPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. MPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Recommended configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 18 5.1. Recommended configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 21
5.1.1. Real-Time optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1.1. Real-Time optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.2. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1.2. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.3. Other parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.1.3. Other parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment . . . . 20 7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment . . . . 23
7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment . . 21 7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment . . 24
7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4. MPL routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.4. MPL routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.5. RPL Security features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.5. RPL Security features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. Other related protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. Other related protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments . 29 Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments . 32
A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root . . . . . . . . . . 29 A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.2. Excessive battery consumption in source nodes . . . . 29 A.1.2. Excessive battery consumption in source nodes . . . . 33
A.2. Risk of delayed route repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 A.2. Risk of delayed route repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.2.1. Broken service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 A.2.1. Broken service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix B. Communication failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Appendix B. Communication failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The primary purpose of this document is to give guidance in the use The primary purpose of this document is to give guidance in the use
of the Routing Protocol for Low power and lossy networks (RPL) of the Routing Protocol for Low power and lossy networks (RPL)
protocol suite in two application domains: protocol suite in two application domains:
o Home automation o Home automation
o Building automation o Building automation
skipping to change at page 4, line 19 skipping to change at page 4, line 19
o Both domains are subject to unreliable links but require instant o Both domains are subject to unreliable links but require instant
and very reliable reactions. This has impact on routing because and very reliable reactions. This has impact on routing because
of timeliness and multipath routing. of timeliness and multipath routing.
The differences between the two application domains mostly appear in The differences between the two application domains mostly appear in
commissioning, maintenance and the user interface, which do not commissioning, maintenance and the user interface, which do not
typically affect routing. Therefore, the focus of this applicability typically affect routing. Therefore, the focus of this applicability
document is on reliability, timeliness, and local routing. document is on reliability, timeliness, and local routing.
It should be noted that adherence to the guidance does not
necessarily guarantee fully interoperable solutions in home
automation networks and building control networks and that additional
rigorous and managed programs will be needed to ensure
interoperability.
1.1. Relationship to other documents 1.1. Relationship to other documents
The Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks (ROLL) working group The Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks (ROLL) working group
has specified a set of routing protocols for Low-Power and Lossy has specified a set of routing protocols for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. This applicability text describes a subset Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. This applicability text describes a subset
of those protocols and the conditions under which the subset is of those protocols and the conditions under which the subset is
appropriate and provides recommendations and requirements for the appropriate and provides recommendations and requirements for the
accompanying parameter value ranges. accompanying parameter value ranges.
In addition, an extension document has been produced specifically to In addition, an extension document has been produced specifically to
skipping to change at page 9, line 37 skipping to change at page 9, line 44
next paragraph. Other building automation networks rely on P2P next paragraph. Other building automation networks rely on P2P
control traffic between controls and a local controller box for control traffic between controls and a local controller box for
advanced group control. A local controller box can be further advanced group control. A local controller box can be further
connected to service control boxes, thus generating more SS or PS connected to service control boxes, thus generating more SS or PS
traffic. traffic.
P2P traffic is typically generated by remote controls and wall P2P traffic is typically generated by remote controls and wall
controllers which push control messages directly to light or heat controllers which push control messages directly to light or heat
sources. P2P traffic has a stringent requirement for low latency sources. P2P traffic has a stringent requirement for low latency
since P2P traffic often carries application messages that are invoked since P2P traffic often carries application messages that are invoked
by humans. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1 application messages should by humans. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, application messages
be delivered within a few hundred milliseconds - even when should be delivered within a few hundred milliseconds - even when
connections fail momentarily. connections fail momentarily.
2.2.5. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) communication paradigm 2.2.5. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) communication paradigm
This paradigm translates to a device sending a message as many times This paradigm translates to a device sending a message as many times
as there are destination devices. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) traffic as there are destination devices. Peer-to-multipeer (P2MP) traffic
is common in home and building automation networks. Often, a is common in home and building automation networks. Often, a
thermostat in a living room responds to temperature changes by thermostat in a living room responds to temperature changes by
sending temperature acquisitions to several fans and valves sending temperature acquisitions to several fans and valves
consecutively. This paradigm is also closely related to the PS consecutively. This paradigm is also closely related to the PS
skipping to change at page 14, line 23 skipping to change at page 14, line 31
If devices in LLNs participate in multiple RPL instances and DODAGs, If devices in LLNs participate in multiple RPL instances and DODAGs,
both the RPLInstance ID and the DODAGID SHOULD be included in the both the RPLInstance ID and the DODAGID SHOULD be included in the
DAO. DAO.
4.1.4. Path Metrics 4.1.4. Path Metrics
Expected Transmission Count (ETX) is the RECOMMENDED metric. Expected Transmission Count (ETX) is the RECOMMENDED metric.
[RFC6551] provides other options. [RFC6551] provides other options.
Packets from asymmetric and/or unstable channels SHOULD be deleted at Packets from asymmetric and/or unstable links SHOULD be deleted at
layer 2. layer 2.
4.1.5. Objective Function 4.1.5. Objective Function
Objective Function 0 (OF0) MUST be the Objective Function. Other Objective Function 0 (OF0) MUST be the Objective Function. Other
Objective Functions MAY be used when dictated by circumstances. Objective Functions MAY be used when dictated by circumstances.
4.1.6. DODAG Repair 4.1.6. DODAG Repair
Since P2P-RPL only creates DODAGs on a temporary basis during route Since P2P-RPL only creates DODAGs on a temporary basis during route
skipping to change at page 15, line 34 skipping to change at page 15, line 46
a message reach the forwarder, it is specified that the copy need not a message reach the forwarder, it is specified that the copy need not
be repeated. Repetition of the message can be inhibited by a small be repeated. Repetition of the message can be inhibited by a small
value of k. To assure timeliness, the value of k should be chosen value of k. To assure timeliness, the value of k should be chosen
high enough to make sure that messages are repeated at the first high enough to make sure that messages are repeated at the first
arrival of the message in the forwarder. However, a network that is arrival of the message in the forwarder. However, a network that is
too dense leads to a saturation of the medium that can only be too dense leads to a saturation of the medium that can only be
prevented by selecting a low value of k. Consequently, timeliness is prevented by selecting a low value of k. Consequently, timeliness is
assured by choosing a relatively high value of k but assuring at the assured by choosing a relatively high value of k but assuring at the
same time a low enough density of forwarders to reduce the risk of same time a low enough density of forwarders to reduce the risk of
medium saturation. Depending on the reliability of the network medium saturation. Depending on the reliability of the network
channels, it is advisable to choose the network such that at least 2 links, it is advisable to choose the network such that at least 2
forwarders per hop repeat messages to the same set of destinations. forwarders per hop repeat messages to the same set of destinations.
There are no rules about selecting forwarders for MPL. In buildings There are no rules about selecting forwarders for MPL. In buildings
with central management tools, the forwarders can be selected, but in with central management tools, the forwarders can be selected, but in
the home is not possible to automatically configure the forwarder the home is not possible to automatically configure the forwarder
topology at the time of writing this document. topology at the time of writing this document.
4.1.8. Security 4.1.8. Security
RPL MAY use unsecured messages to reduce message size. If there is a RPL MAY use unsecured messages to reduce message size. If there is a
single node that uses unsecured RPL messages, link-layer security single node that uses unsecured RPL messages, link-layer security
MUST be present.(see Section 7). If RPL is used with secured MUST be present. In both cases, a symmetric key is used to secure a
messages [RFC6550], the following RPL security parameter values message. The symmetric key MUST be distributed or established in a
SHOULD be used: secure fashion.
o Counter Time Flag: T = '0': Do not use timestamp in the Counter 4.1.8.1. Symmetric key distribution
The scope of the symmetric key distribution MUST be no greater than
the network itself, i.e. a group key. This document describes what
needs to be implemented to meet this requirement. The scope of the
symmetric key distribution MAY be smaller than the network, for
example:
o A pairwise symmetric key between two peers.
o A group key shared between a subset of nodes in the network.
4.1.8.2. Symmetric key distribution mechanism
The authentication mechanism as described in Section 6.9 of
[ZigBeeIP] SHALL be used to securely distribute a network-wide
symmetric key.
The purpose of the authentication procedure is to provide mutual
authentication resulting in:
o Preventing untrusted nodes without appropriate credentials from
joining the trusted network.
o Preventing trusted nodes with appropriate credentials from joining
an untrusted network.
There is an Authentication Server, which is responsible for
authenticating the nodes on the network. If the authentication is
successful, the Authentication Server sends the network security
material to the joining node through the PANA protocol ([RFC5191],
[RFC6345]). The joining node becomes a full participating node in
the network and is able to apply layer 2 security to RPL messages
using the distributed network key.
The joining node does not initially have access to the network
security material. Therefore, it is not able to apply layer 2
security for the packets exchanged during the authentication process.
The enforcement point rules at the edge of the network ensure that
the packets involved in the PANA authentication are processed even
though they are unsecured at MAC layer. The rules also ensure that
any other incoming traffic that is not secured at the MAC layer is
discarded and is not forwarded.
4.1.8.2.1. Authentication Stack
Authentication can be viewed as a protocol stack as a layer
encapsulates the layers above it.
o TLS [RFC5246] MUST be used at the highest layer of the
authentication stack and carries the authentication exchange.
There is one cipher suite based on pre-shared key [RFC6655] and
one cipher suite based on ECC [RFC7251].
o EAP-TLS [RFC5216] MUST be used at the next layer to carry the TLS
records for the authentication protocol.
o The Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748] MUST be used to
provide the mechanisms for mutual authentication. EAP requires a
way to transport EAP packets between the joining node and the node
on which the Authentication Server resides. These nodes are not
necessarily in radio range of each other, so it is necessary to
have multi-hop support in the EAP transport method. The PANA
protocol [RFC5191], [RFC6345], which operates over UDP, MUST be
used for this purpose. [RFC3748] specifies the derivation of a
session key using the EAP key hierarchy; only the EAP Master
Session Key shall be derived, as [RFC5191] specifies that it is
used to set up keys for PANA authentication and encryption.
o PANA [RFC5191] and PANA relay [RFC6345] MUST be used at the next
layer:
* The joining node MUST act as the PANA Client (PaC)
* The parent edge router node MUST act as a PANA relay (PRE)
according to [RFC6345], unless it is also the Authentication
Server. All routers at the edge of the network MUST be capable
of functioning in the PRE role.
* The Authentication Server node MUST act as the PANA
Authentication Agent (PAA). The Authentication Server MUST be
able to handle packets relayed according to [RFC6345].
This network authentication process uses link-local IPv6 addresses
for transport between the new node and its parent. If the parent is
not the Authentication Server, it MUST then relay packets from the
joining node to the Authentication Server and vice-versa using PANA
relay mechanism [RFC6345]. The joining node MUST use a link-local
address based on its EUI-64 as the source address for initial PANA
authentication message exchanges.
4.1.8.2.2. Applicability Statements
The applicability statements describe the relationship between the
various specifications.
4.1.8.2.2.1. Applicability Statement for PSK TLS
[RFC6655] contains AEAD TLS cipher suites that are very similar to
[RFC5487] whose AEAD part is detailed in [RFC5116]. [RFC5487]
references both [RFC5288] and the original PSK cipher suite document
[RFC4279], which references [RFC5246], which defines the TLS 1.2
messages.
4.1.8.2.2.2. Applicability Statement for ECC TLS
[RFC7251] contains AEAD TLS cipher suites that are very similar to
[RFC5289] whose AEAD part is detailed in [RFC5116]. [RFC5289]
references the original ECC cipher suite document [RFC4492], which
references [RFC5246], which defines the TLS 1.2 messages.
4.1.8.2.2.3. Applicability Statement for EAP-TLS and PANA
[RFC5216] specifies how [RFC3748] is used to package [RFC5246] TLS
records into EAP packets. [RFC5191] provides transportation for the
EAP packets and the network-wide key carried in an encrypted AVP
specified in [RFC6786]. The proposed PRF and AUTH hashes based on
SHA-256 are represented as in [RFC5996] and detailed in [RFC4868].
4.1.8.2.3. Security using RPL message security
If RPL is used with secured messages [RFC6550], the following RPL
security parameter values SHOULD be used:
o Counter Time Flag (T) = 0: Do not use timestamp in the Counter
Field. Counters based on timestamps are typically more applicable Field. Counters based on timestamps are typically more applicable
to industrial networks where strict timing synchronization between to industrial networks where strict timing synchronization between
nodes is often implemented. Home and building networks typically nodes is often implemented. Home and building networks typically
do not implement such strict timing synchronization therefore a do not implement such strict timing synchronization therefore a
monotonically increasing counter is more appropriate. monotonically increasing counter is more appropriate.
o Algorithm = '0': Use Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message o Algorithm = 0: Use Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC Mode) (CCM) with Advanced Encryption Authentication Code (CBC-MAC Mode) (CCM) with Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)-128. This is the only assigned mode at present Standard (AES)-128. This is the only assigned mode at present.
o Key Identifier Mode; KIM = '10': Use group key, Key Source o Key Identifier Mode (KIM) = 10: Use group key, Key Source present,
present, Key Index present. Given the relatively confined Key Index present. Given the relatively confined perimeter of a
perimeter of a home or building network, a group key is usually home or building network, a group key is usually sufficient to
sufficient to protect RPL messages sent between nodes. The use of protect RPL messages sent between nodes. The use of the Key
the Key Source field allows multiple group keys to be used within Source field allows multiple group keys to be used within the
the network. network.
o Security Level; LVL = 0: Use MAC-32.This is recommended as o Security Level (LVL) = 0: Use MAC-32. This is recommended as
integrity protection for RPL messages is the basic requirement. integrity protection for RPL messages is the basic requirement.
Encryption is unlikely to be necessary given the relatively non- Encryption is unlikely to be necessary given the relatively non-
confidential nature of RPL message payloads. confidential nature of RPL message payloads.
4.1.9. P2P communications 4.1.9. P2P communications
[RFC6997] MUST be used to accommodate P2P traffic, which is typically [RFC6997] MUST be used to accommodate P2P traffic, which is typically
substantial in home and building automation networks. substantial in home and building automation networks.
4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration 4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration
Assigned IP addresses MUST be routable and unique within the routing Assigned IP addresses MUST be routable and unique within the routing
domain [RFC5889]. domain [RFC5889].
4.2. Layer 2 features 4.2. Layer 2 features
No particular requirements exist for layer 2 but for the ones cited No particular requirements exist for layer 2 but for the ones cited
in the IP over Foo RFCs. (See Section 2.3) in the IP over Foo RFCs (see Section 2.3).
4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2 4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2
Not applicable Not applicable
4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2 4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2
Not applicable Not applicable
4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed 4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed
skipping to change at page 20, line 38 skipping to change at page 23, line 27
The credentials which are relevant in the case of RPL are: (i) the The credentials which are relevant in the case of RPL are: (i) the
credential used at the link layer in the case where link layer credential used at the link layer in the case where link layer
security is applied (see Section 7.1) or (ii) the credential used for security is applied (see Section 7.1) or (ii) the credential used for
securing RPL messages. In both cases, the assumption is that the securing RPL messages. In both cases, the assumption is that the
credential is a shared key. Therefore, there MUST be a mechanism in credential is a shared key. Therefore, there MUST be a mechanism in
place which allows secure distribution of a shared key and place which allows secure distribution of a shared key and
configuration of network identity. Both MAY be done using: (i) pre- configuration of network identity. Both MAY be done using: (i) pre-
installation using an out-of-band method, (ii) delivered securely installation using an out-of-band method, (ii) delivered securely
when a device is introduced into the network or (iii) delivered when a device is introduced into the network or (iii) delivered
securely by a trusted neighbouring device. The shared key MUST be securely by a trusted neighbouring device as described in
stored in a secure fashion which makes it difficult to be read by an Section 4.1.8.1. The shared key MUST be stored in a secure fashion
unauthorized party. which makes it difficult to be read by an unauthorized party.
This document mandates that a layer-2 mechanism be used during This document mandates that a layer-2 mechanism be used during
initial and incremental deployment. Please see the following initial and incremental deployment. Please see the following
sections. sections.
7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment 7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment
Wireless mesh networks are typically secured at the link layer in Wireless mesh networks are typically secured at the link layer in
order to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the information order to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the information
exchanged over the links. It is good practice to create a network of exchanged over the links. It is a basic practice to create a network
nodes which share the same keys for link layer security and exclude of nodes which share the same keys for link layer security and
nodes sending unsecured messages. With per-message data origin exclude nodes sending unsecured messages. With per-message data
authentication, it is possible to prevent unauthorized nodes joining origin authentication, it is possible to prevent unauthorized nodes
the mesh. joining the mesh.
At initial deployment the network is secured by consecutively At initial deployment the network is secured by consecutively
securing nodes at the link layer, thus building a network of secured securing nodes at the link layer, thus building a network of secured
nodes. The Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access nodes. The Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) [RFC5191] [RFC6345] with an Extensible Authentication Protocol (PANA) [RFC5191] [RFC6345] with an Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) provides a framework for network access and delivery of common (EAP) provides a framework for network access and delivery of common
link keys. Several versions of EAP exist. ZigBee specifies the use link keys. Several versions of EAP exist. ZigBee specifies the use
of EAP-TLS [RFC5216] (see section 5 of [ZigBeeIP]. Wi-SUN HAN (Home of EAP-TLS [RFC5216] (see section 5 of [ZigBeeIP]), which is also
Area Network) uses EAP-PSK [RFC4764] (see section 5.6 of [WI-SUN]), recommended in Section 4.1.8.2.1. Wi-SUN HAN (Home Area Network)
which also looks promising for building control at this moment. uses EAP-PSK [RFC4764] (see section 5.6 of [WI-SUN]), which also
looks promising for building control at this moment.
This document does not specify a multicast security solution. This document does not specify a multicast security solution.
Networks deployed with this specification will depend upon layer-2 Networks deployed with this specification will depend upon layer-2
security to prevent outsiders from sending multicast traffic. It is security to prevent outsiders from sending multicast traffic. It is
recognized that this does not protect this control traffic from recognized that this does not protect this control traffic from
impersonation by already trusted devices. This is an area for a impersonation by already trusted devices. This is an area for a
future specification. future specification.
For building control an installer will probably use an installation For building control an installer will use an installation tool that
tool that establishes a secure communication path with the joining establishes a secure communication path with the joining node. It is
node. It is recognized that the recommendations for initial recognized that the recommendations for initial deployment of
deployment of Section 7 and Section 7.1 do not cover all building Section 7 and Section 7.1 do not cover all building requirements such
requirements such as selecting the node-to-secure independent of as selecting the node-to-secure independent of network topology.
network topology.
It is expected that a set of protocol combinations will evolve within
currently existing alliances of building control manufacturers. Each
set satisfies the installation requirements of installers, operators,
and manufacturers of building control networks in a given
installation context, e.g lighting deployment in offices, HVAC
installation, incremental addition of equipment in homes, and others.
In the home, nodes can be visually inspected by the home owner and a In the home, nodes can be visually inspected by the home owner and a
simple procedure, e.g. pushing buttons simultaneously on an already simple procedure, e.g. pushing buttons simultaneously on an already
secured device and an unsecured joining device is usually sufficient secured device and an unsecured joining device is usually sufficient
to ensure that the unsecured joining device is authenticated and to ensure that the unsecured joining device is authenticated and
configured securely, and paired appropriately. configured securely, and paired appropriately.
This recommendation is in line with the countermeasures described in This recommendation is in line with the countermeasures described in
section 6.1.1 of [RFC7416]. section 6.1.1 of [RFC7416].
7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment 7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment
Normally, the network remains secure by not allowing the addition of Once a network is operational, new nodes need to be added, or nodes
new nodes. If a new node needs to be added to the network, the fail and need to be replaced. When a new node needs to be added to
network is usually configured to allow the new node to join via an the network, the new node is joined to the network via an assisting
assisting node in the manner described in Section 7.1. If an node in the manner described in Section 7.1.
existing node becomes lost, it is usually possible to re-key all
other existing nodes to isolate the lost node to ensure that, should On detection of a compromised node, all trusted nodes need to be re-
it be found again, it has to re-join as if it were a new node. keyed, and the trusted network is built up as described in
Section 7.1.
7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses 7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses
Refer to the security considerations of [RFC6997]. Refer to the security considerations of [RFC6997].
7.4. MPL routing 7.4. MPL routing
The routing of MPL is determined by the enabling of the interfaces The routing of MPL is determined by the enabling of the interfaces
for specified Multicast addresses. The specification of these for specified Multicast addresses. The specification of these
addresses can be done via a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) addresses can be done via a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
skipping to change at page 24, line 12 skipping to change at page 27, line 12
o Changed examples, more hvac and less lighting. o Changed examples, more hvac and less lighting.
o Clarified network topologies. o Clarified network topologies.
o replaced reference to smart_object paper by reference to I-D.roll- o replaced reference to smart_object paper by reference to I-D.roll-
security-threats security-threats
o Added a concise definition of secure delivery and secure storage o Added a concise definition of secure delivery and secure storage
o text about securing network with PANA o Text about securing network with PANA
Changes from version 2 to version 3. Changes from version 2 to version 3.
o Changed security section to follow the structure of security o Changed security section to follow the structure of security
threats draft. threats draft.
o Added text to DODAG repair sub-section o Added text to DODAG repair sub-section
Changes from version 3 to version 4. Changes from version 3 to version 4.
skipping to change at page 24, line 45 skipping to change at page 27, line 45
o Replaced RFC2119 terminology by non-normative terminology o Replaced RFC2119 terminology by non-normative terminology
o Rearranged text of section 7, 7.1, and 7.2 to agree with the o Rearranged text of section 7, 7.1, and 7.2 to agree with the
intention of section 7.2 intention of section 7.2
Changes from version 5 to version 6. Changes from version 5 to version 6.
o Issues #162 - #166 addressed o Issues #162 - #166 addressed
Changes from version 6 to version 6. Changes from version 6 to version 7.
o Text of section 7.1 edited for better security coverage. o Text of section 7.1 edited for better security coverage.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
2005.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
[RFC4764] Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: A [RFC4764] Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: A
Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Method", RFC 4764, January 2007. Method", RFC 4764, January 2007.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, [RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007. Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. [RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008. Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
August 2008.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March
2009.
[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel, [RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel,
"Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy
Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009. Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009.
[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney, [RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney,
"Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy "Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy
Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009. Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009.
[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation [RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation
Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC
5826, April 2010. 5826, April 2010.
[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen, [RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen,
"Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and "Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010. Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010.
[RFC6282] Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 [RFC6282] Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
September 2011. September 2011.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., and A.
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345, August 2011.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R., [RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,
Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R. Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.
Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012. Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.
[RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Kim, M., Pister, K., Dejean, N., and D. [RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Kim, M., Pister, K., Dejean, N., and D.
Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation in Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation in
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551, March 2012. Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551, March 2012.
[RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6 [RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6
Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol
for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554, March for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554, March
2012. 2012.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.
[RFC6786] Yegin, A. and R. Cragie, "Encrypting the Protocol for
Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Attribute-Value Pairs", RFC 6786, November 2012.
[RFC6997] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Philipp, M., Brandt, A., and J. [RFC6997] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Philipp, M., Brandt, A., and J.
Martocci, "Reactive Discovery of Point-to-Point Routes in Martocci, "Reactive Discovery of Point-to-Point Routes in
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6997, August 2013. Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6997, August 2013.
[RFC6998] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Brandt, A., and J. Martocci, "A [RFC6998] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Brandt, A., and J. Martocci, "A
Mechanism to Measure the Routing Metrics along a Point-to- Mechanism to Measure the Routing Metrics along a Point-to-
Point Route in a Low-Power and Lossy Network", RFC 6998, Point Route in a Low-Power and Lossy Network", RFC 6998,
August 2013. August 2013.
[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and [RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014. Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, June 2014.
[RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A., [RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A.,
and M. Richardson, "A Security Threat Analysis for the and M. Richardson, "A Security Threat Analysis for the
Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)", Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)",
RFC 7416, January 2015. RFC 7416, January 2015.
[I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast] [I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast]
Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low power Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low power
and Lossy Networks (MPL)", draft-ietf-roll-trickle- and Lossy Networks (MPL)", draft-ietf-roll-trickle-
mcast-11 (work in progress), November 2014. mcast-12 (work in progress), June 2015.
[IEEE802.15.4] [IEEE802.15.4]
"IEEE 802.15.4 - Standard for Local and metropolitan area "IEEE 802.15.4 - Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks -- Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area networks -- Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
Networks", <IEEE Standard 802.15.4>. Networks", <IEEE Standard 802.15.4>.
[G.9959] "ITU-T G.9959 Short range narrow-band digital [G.9959] "ITU-T G.9959 Short range narrow-band digital
radiocommunication transceivers - PHY and MAC layer radiocommunication transceivers - PHY and MAC layer
specifications", <ITU-T G.9959>. specifications", <ITU-T G.9959>.
skipping to change at page 27, line 19 skipping to change at page 31, line 19
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411, Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
December 2002. December 2002.
[RFC3561] Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E., and S. Das, "Ad hoc On- [RFC3561] Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E., and S. Das, "Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", RFC 3561, July Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", RFC 3561, July
2003. 2003.
[RFC5889] Baccelli, E. and M. Townsley, "IP Addressing Model in Ad [RFC5889] Baccelli, E. and M. Townsley, "IP Addressing Model in Ad
Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, September 2010. Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, September 2010.
[RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345, August 2011.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for [RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014. Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.
[RFC7390] Rahman, A. and E. Dijk, "Group Communication for the [RFC7390] Rahman, A. and E. Dijk, "Group Communication for the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390,
October 2014. October 2014.
[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets [RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, February 2015. over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, February 2015.
[I-D.ietf-dice-profile]
Tschofenig, H. and T. Fossati, "A TLS/DTLS Profile for the
Internet of Things", draft-ietf-dice-profile-10 (work in
progress), March 2015.
[I-D.keoh-dice-multicast-security]
Keoh, S., Kumar, S., Garcia-Morchon, O., Dijk, E., and A.
Rahman, "DTLS-based Multicast Security in Constrained
Environments", draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-08 (work
in progress), July 2014.
[I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay]
Kumar, S., Keoh, S., and O. Garcia-Morchon, "DTLS Relay
for Constrained Environments", draft-kumar-dice-dtls-
relay-02 (work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.richardson-6tisch--security-6top]
Richardson, M., "6tisch secure join using 6top", draft-
richardson-6tisch--security-6top-04 (work in progress),
November 2014.
[SOFT11] Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., and M. Goyal, "The P2P-RPL [SOFT11] Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., and M. Goyal, "The P2P-RPL
Routing Protocol for IPv6 Sensor Networks: Testbed Routing Protocol for IPv6 Sensor Networks: Testbed
Experiments", Proceedings of the Conference on Software Experiments", Proceedings of the Conference on Software
Telecommunications and Computer Networks, Split, Croatia,, Telecommunications and Computer Networks, Split, Croatia,,
September 2011. September 2011.
[INTEROP12] [INTEROP12]
Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., Brandt, A., Valev , H., and J. Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., Brandt, A., Valev , H., and J.
Buron , "Report on P2P-RPL Interoperability Testing", Buron , "Report on P2P-RPL Interoperability Testing",
RR-7864 INRIA Research Report RR-7864, January 2012. RR-7864 INRIA Research Report RR-7864, January 2012.
skipping to change at page 28, line 51 skipping to change at page 32, line 30
[BCsurvey] [BCsurvey]
Kastner, W., Neugschwandtner, G., Soucek, S., and H. Kastner, W., Neugschwandtner, G., Soucek, S., and H.
Newman, "Communication Systems for Building Automation and Newman, "Communication Systems for Building Automation and
Control", Proceedings of the IEEE Vol 93, No 6, June 2005. Control", Proceedings of the IEEE Vol 93, No 6, June 2005.
[ZigBeeIP] [ZigBeeIP]
ZigBee Alliance, ., "ZigBee IP specification", ZigBee ZigBee Alliance, ., "ZigBee IP specification", ZigBee
document 095023r34, March 2014. document 095023r34, March 2014.
[WI-SUN] ECHONET Lite, ., "Home network Communication Interface for [WI-SUN] ECHONET Lite, ., "Home network Communication Interface for
ECHONET Lite (IEEE802.15.4/4 e/4g 920MHz-band Wireless)", ECHONET Lite (IEEE802.15.4/4e/4g 920MHz-band Wireless)",
Japanese TTC standard JJ-300.10, May 2014. Japanese TTC standard JJ-300.10, May 2014.
Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments
A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes
The DAG, being a tree structure is formed from a root. If nodes The DAG, being a tree structure is formed from a root. If nodes
residing in different branches have a need for communicating residing in different branches have a need for communicating
internally, DAG mechanisms provided in RPL [RFC6550] will propagate internally, DAG mechanisms provided in RPL [RFC6550] will propagate
traffic towards the root, potentially all the way to the root, and traffic towards the root, potentially all the way to the root, and
down along another branch [RFC6998]. In a typical example two nodes down along another branch [RFC6998]. In a typical example two nodes
could reach each other via just two router nodes but in unfortunate could reach each other via just two router nodes but in unfortunate
cases, RPL may send traffic three hops up and three hops down again. cases, RPL may send traffic three hops up and three hops down again.
This leads to several undesired phenomena described in the following This leads to several undesired phenomena described in the following
sections sections.
A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root
If many P2P data flows have to move up towards the root to get down If many P2P data flows have to move up towards the root to get down
again in another branch there is an increased risk of congestion the again in another branch there is an increased risk of congestion the
nearer to the root of the DAG the data flows. Due to the broadcast nearer to the root of the DAG the data flows. Due to the broadcast
nature of RF systems any child node of the root is not just directing nature of RF systems any child node of the root is not just directing
RF power downwards its sub-tree but just as much upwards towards the RF power downwards its sub-tree but just as much upwards towards the
root; potentially jamming other MP2P traffic leaving the tree or root; potentially jamming other MP2P traffic leaving the tree or
preventing the root of the DAG from sending P2MP traffic into the DAG preventing the root of the DAG from sending P2MP traffic into the DAG
 End of changes. 39 change blocks. 
120 lines changed or deleted 279 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.42. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/