draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-11.txt   draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-12.txt 
Roll A. Brandt Roll A. Brandt
Internet-Draft Sigma Designs Internet-Draft Sigma Designs
Intended status: Standards Track E. Baccelli Intended status: Standards Track E. Baccelli
Expires: January 3, 2016 INRIA Expires: January 22, 2016 INRIA
R. Cragie R. Cragie
ARM Ltd. ARM Ltd.
P. van der Stok P. van der Stok
Consultant Consultant
July 2, 2015 July 21, 2015
Applicability Statement: The use of the RPL protocol suite in Home Applicability Statement: The use of the RPL protocol suite in Home
Automation and Building Control Automation and Building Control
draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-11 draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building-12
Abstract Abstract
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in the selection The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in the selection
and use of protocols from the RPL protocol suite to implement the and use of protocols from the RPL protocol suite to implement the
features required for control in building and home environments. features required for control in building and home environments.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 44 skipping to change at page 2, line 44
4.1.4. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.4. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.5. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.5. Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.6. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.6. DODAG Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.7. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1.7. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.8. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1.8. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.9. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.9. P2P communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.10. IPv6 address configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Layer 2 features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2. Layer 2 features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.1. Specifics about layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.2. Services provided at layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.3. 6LowPAN options assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.4. Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) and other things . . . 19 4.2.4. Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) and other things . . . 20
4.3. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 19 4.3. Recommended Configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 20
4.3.1. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3.1. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.2. Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3.2. Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. MPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. MPL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Recommended configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 21 5.1. Recommended configuration Defaults and Ranges . . . . . . 21
5.1.1. Real-Time optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1.1. Real-Time optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.2. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1.2. Trickle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.3. Other parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1.3. Other parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment . . . . 23 7.1. Security considerations during initial deployment . . . . 23
7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment . . 24 7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment . . 24
7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4. MPL routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.4. MPL routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.5. RPL Security features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.5. RPL Security features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. Other related protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. Other related protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments . 32 Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments . 33
A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.1.1. Traffic concentration at the root . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.1.2. Excessive battery consumption in source nodes . . . . 33 A.1.2. Excessive battery consumption in source nodes . . . . 34
A.2. Risk of delayed route repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.2. Risk of delayed route repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.2.1. Broken service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.2.1. Broken service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix B. Communication failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix B. Communication failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The primary purpose of this document is to give guidance in the use The primary purpose of this document is to give guidance in the use
of the Routing Protocol for Low power and lossy networks (RPL) of the Routing Protocol for Low power and lossy networks (RPL)
protocol suite in two application domains: protocol suite in two application domains:
o Home automation o Home automation
o Building automation o Building automation
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is common in home and building automation networks. Often, a is common in home and building automation networks. Often, a
thermostat in a living room responds to temperature changes by thermostat in a living room responds to temperature changes by
sending temperature acquisitions to several fans and valves sending temperature acquisitions to several fans and valves
consecutively. This paradigm is also closely related to the PS consecutively. This paradigm is also closely related to the PS
paradigm in the case where a single server device has multiple paradigm in the case where a single server device has multiple
subscribers. subscribers.
2.2.6. Additional considerations: Duocast and N-cast 2.2.6. Additional considerations: Duocast and N-cast
This paradigm translates to a device sending a message to many This paradigm translates to a device sending a message to many
destinations in one network transfer invocation. Multicast is well destinations in one network transfer invocation. Multicast is well-
suited for lighting where a presence sensor sends a presence message suited for lighting where a presence sensor sends a presence message
to a set of lighting devices. Multicast increases the probability to a set of lighting devices. Multicast increases the probability
that the message is delivered within the strict time constraints. that the message is delivered within the strict time constraints.
The recommended multicast algorithm (e.g. The recommended multicast algorithm (e.g.
[I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast]) assures that messages are delivered to [I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast]) provides a mechanism for delivering
ALL intended destinations. messages to all intended destinations.
2.2.7. RPL applicability per communication paradigm 2.2.7. RPL applicability per communication paradigm
In the case of the SS paradigm applied to a wireless sub-network to a In the case of the SS paradigm applied to a wireless sub-network to a
server reachable via a border router, the use of RPL [RFC6550] in server reachable via a border router, the use of RPL [RFC6550] in
non-storing mode is appropriate. Given the low resources of the non-storing mode is appropriate. Given the low resources of the
devices, source routing will be used from the border router to the devices, source routing will be used from the border router to the
destination in the wireless sub-network for messages generated destination in the wireless sub-network for messages generated
outside the mesh network. No specific timing constraints are outside the mesh network. No specific timing constraints are
associated with the SS type messages so network repair does not associated with the SS type messages so network repair does not
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links, it is advisable to choose the network such that at least 2 links, it is advisable to choose the network such that at least 2
forwarders per hop repeat messages to the same set of destinations. forwarders per hop repeat messages to the same set of destinations.
There are no rules about selecting forwarders for MPL. In buildings There are no rules about selecting forwarders for MPL. In buildings
with central management tools, the forwarders can be selected, but in with central management tools, the forwarders can be selected, but in
the home is not possible to automatically configure the forwarder the home is not possible to automatically configure the forwarder
topology at the time of writing this document. topology at the time of writing this document.
4.1.8. Security 4.1.8. Security
RPL MAY use unsecured messages to reduce message size. If there is a RPL MAY use unsecured RPL messages to reduce message size. If there
single node that uses unsecured RPL messages, link-layer security is a single node that uses unsecured RPL messages, link-layer
MUST be present. In both cases, a symmetric key is used to secure a security MUST be used on all nodes. Therefore all RPL messages MUST
message. The symmetric key MUST be distributed or established in a be secured using either:
secure fashion.
o RPL message security, or
o Link-layer security, or
o Both RPL message security and link-layer security
A symmetric key is used to secure a RPL message using either RPL
message security or link-layer security. The symmetric key MUST be
distributed or established in a secure fashion. There may be more
than one symmetric key in use by any node at any one time. The same
symmetric key MUST NOT be used for both RPL message security and
link-layer security between two peer nodes.
4.1.8.1. Symmetric key distribution 4.1.8.1. Symmetric key distribution
The scope of the symmetric key distribution MUST be no greater than The scope of symmetric key distribution MUST be no greater than the
the network itself, i.e. a group key. This document describes what network itself, i.e. a group key. This document describes what needs
needs to be implemented to meet this requirement. The scope of the to be implemented to meet this requirement. The scope of symmetric
symmetric key distribution MAY be smaller than the network, for key distribution MAY be smaller than the network, for example:
example:
o A pairwise symmetric key between two peers. o A pairwise symmetric key between two peers.
o A group key shared between a subset of nodes in the network. o A group key shared between a subset of nodes in the network.
4.1.8.2. Symmetric key distribution mechanism 4.1.8.2. Symmetric key distribution mechanism
The authentication mechanism as described in Section 6.9 of The authentication mechanism as described in Section 6.9 of
[ZigBeeIP] SHALL be used to securely distribute a network-wide [ZigBeeIP] SHALL be used to securely distribute a network-wide
symmetric key. symmetric key.
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Wireless mesh networks are typically secured at the link layer in Wireless mesh networks are typically secured at the link layer in
order to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the information order to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the information
exchanged over the links. It is a basic practice to create a network exchanged over the links. It is a basic practice to create a network
of nodes which share the same keys for link layer security and of nodes which share the same keys for link layer security and
exclude nodes sending unsecured messages. With per-message data exclude nodes sending unsecured messages. With per-message data
origin authentication, it is possible to prevent unauthorized nodes origin authentication, it is possible to prevent unauthorized nodes
joining the mesh. joining the mesh.
At initial deployment the network is secured by consecutively At initial deployment the network is secured by consecutively
securing nodes at the link layer, thus building a network of secured securing nodes at the link layer, thus building a network of secured
nodes. The Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access nodes. Section 4.1.8.2 describes a mechanism for building a network
(PANA) [RFC5191] [RFC6345] with an Extensible Authentication Protocol of secured nodes.
(EAP) provides a framework for network access and delivery of common
link keys. Several versions of EAP exist. ZigBee specifies the use
of EAP-TLS [RFC5216] (see section 5 of [ZigBeeIP]), which is also
recommended in Section 4.1.8.2.1. Wi-SUN HAN (Home Area Network)
uses EAP-PSK [RFC4764] (see section 5.6 of [WI-SUN]), which also
looks promising for building control at this moment.
This document does not specify a multicast security solution. This document does not specify a multicast security solution.
Networks deployed with this specification will depend upon layer-2 Networks deployed with this specification will depend upon layer-2
security to prevent outsiders from sending multicast traffic. It is security to prevent outsiders from sending multicast traffic. It is
recognized that this does not protect this control traffic from recognized that this does not protect this control traffic from
impersonation by already trusted devices. This is an area for a impersonation by already trusted devices. This is an area for a
future specification. future specification.
For building control an installer will use an installation tool that For building control an installer will use an installation tool that
establishes a secure communication path with the joining node. It is establishes a secure communication path with the joining node. It is
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This recommendation is in line with the countermeasures described in This recommendation is in line with the countermeasures described in
section 6.1.1 of [RFC7416]. section 6.1.1 of [RFC7416].
7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment 7.2. Security Considerations during incremental deployment
Once a network is operational, new nodes need to be added, or nodes Once a network is operational, new nodes need to be added, or nodes
fail and need to be replaced. When a new node needs to be added to fail and need to be replaced. When a new node needs to be added to
the network, the new node is joined to the network via an assisting the network, the new node is joined to the network via an assisting
node in the manner described in Section 7.1. node in the manner described in Section 7.1.
On detection of a compromised node, all trusted nodes need to be re- On detection of a compromised node, all trusted nodes need to have
their symmetric keys known to be shared with the compromised node re-
keyed, and the trusted network is built up as described in keyed, and the trusted network is built up as described in
Section 7.1. Section 7.1.
7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses 7.3. Security Considerations for P2P uses
Refer to the security considerations of [RFC6997]. Refer to the security considerations of [RFC6997].
7.4. MPL routing 7.4. MPL routing
The routing of MPL is determined by the enabling of the interfaces The routing of MPL is determined by the enabling of the interfaces
for specified Multicast addresses. The specification of these for specified Multicast addresses. The specification of these
addresses can be done via a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) addresses can be done via a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
application as specified in [RFC7390]. An alternative is the application as specified in [RFC7390]. An alternative is the
creation of a MPL MIB and use of Simple Network Management Protocol creation of a MPL MIB and use of Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)v3 [RFC3411] or equivalent techniques to specify the Multicast (SNMP)v3 [RFC3411] or equivalent techniques to specify the Multicast
addresses in the MIB. The application of security measures for the addresses in the MIB. For secure dissemination of MPL packets, layer
specification of the multicast addresses assures that the routing of 2 security SHOULD be used and the configuration of multicast
MPL packets is secured. addresses as described in this section MUST be secure.
7.5. RPL Security features 7.5. RPL Security features
This section follows the structure of section 7, "RPL security This section follows the structure of section 8, "RPL security
features" of [RFC7416], where a thorough analysis of security threats features" of [RFC7416]. [RFC7416] provides a thorough analysis of
and proposed counter measures relevant to RPL and MPL are done. security threats and proposed counter measures relevant to RPL and
MPL.
In accordance with section 7.1 of [RFC7416], "Confidentiality In accordance with section 8.1 of [RFC7416], "Confidentiality
features", a secured RPL protocol implements payload protection, as features", RPL message security implements payload protection, as
explained in Section 7 of this document. The attributes key-length explained in Section 7 of this document. The attributes key-length
and life-time of the keys depend on operational conditions, and life-time of the keys depend on operational conditions,
maintenance and installation procedures. maintenance and installation procedures.
Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 of this document recommend link-layer Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 of this document recommend link-layer
measures to assure integrity in accordance with section 7.2 of security to assure integrity in accordance with section 8.2 of
[RFC7416], "Integrity features". [RFC7416], "Integrity features".
The provision of multiple paths recommended in section 7.3 The provision of multiple paths recommended in section 8.3
"Availability features" of [RFC7416] is also recommended from a "Availability features" of [RFC7416] is also recommended from a
reliability point of view. Randomly choosing paths MAY be supported. reliability point of view. Randomly choosing paths MAY be supported.
Key management discussed in section 7.4, "Key Management" of A mechanism for key management, discussed in section 8.4, "Key
[RFC7416], is not standardized and discussions continue. Management" of [RFC7416], is provided in Section 4.1.8.2.
Section 7.5, "Considerations on Matching Application Domain Needs" of Section 7.5, "Considerations on Matching Application Domain Needs" of
[RFC7416] applies as such. [RFC7416] applies as such.
8. Other related protocols 8. Other related protocols
Application and transport protocols used in home and building Application and transport protocols used in home and building
automation domains are expected to mostly consist in CoAP over UDP, automation domains are expected to mostly consist in CoAP over UDP,
or equivalents. Typically, UDP is used for IP transport to keep down or equivalents. Typically, UDP is used for IP transport to keep down
the application response time and bandwidth overhead. CoAP is used the application response time and bandwidth overhead. CoAP is used
skipping to change at page 26, line 15 skipping to change at page 26, line 16
requirements. requirements.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
No considerations for IANA pertain to this document. No considerations for IANA pertain to this document.
10. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
This document reflects discussions and remarks from several This document reflects discussions and remarks from several
individuals including (in alphabetical order): Stephen Farrell, Mukul individuals including (in alphabetical order): Stephen Farrell, Mukul
Goyal, Sandeep Kumar, Jerry Martocci, Catherine Meadows, Yoshira Goyal, Sandeep Kumar, Jerry Martocci, Catherine Meadows, Yoshihira
Ohba, Charles Perkins, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Michael Richardson, Ines Ohba, Charles Perkins, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Michael Richardson, Ines
Robles, Zach Shelby, and Meral Sherazipour. Robles, Zach Shelby, and Meral Sherazipour.
11. Changelog 11. Changelog
RFC editor, please delete this section before publication. RFC editor, please delete this section before publication.
Changes from version 0 to version 1. Changes from version 0 to version 1.
o Adapted section structure to template. o Adapted section structure to template.
skipping to change at page 28, line 5 skipping to change at page 27, line 51
intention of section 7.2 intention of section 7.2
Changes from version 5 to version 6. Changes from version 5 to version 6.
o Issues #162 - #166 addressed o Issues #162 - #166 addressed
Changes from version 6 to version 7. Changes from version 6 to version 7.
o Text of section 7.1 edited for better security coverage. o Text of section 7.1 edited for better security coverage.
Changes from version 7 to version 8.
o Requirements language paragraph removed
o Acronyms clarified
o MPL parameters clarified
Changes from version 8 to version 9.
o More acronyms clarified
o References updated
Changes from version 9 to version 10.
o Changes due to IESG and security review
o Requirements language reinstated
o RPL security parameter selection clarified
o Removed multicast security reference
Changes from version 10 to 11.
o Further changes due to IESG and security review
o ZigBee IP authentication and key establishment specified
Changes from version 11 to 12.
o Further clarifications added
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
3748, June 2004. (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites [RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
2005. RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006. for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
[RFC4764] Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: A <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Method", RFC 4764, January 2007.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA- [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007. 384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, [RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007. Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008. Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. [RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008. Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191,
May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois [RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008. DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- [RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
August 2008. DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA- [RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
2009. DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel, [RFC5548] Dohler, M., Ed., Watteyne, T., Ed., Winter, T., Ed., and
"Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy D. Barthel, Ed., "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power
Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009. and Lossy Networks", RFC 5548, DOI 10.17487/RFC5548, May
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5548>.
[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney, [RFC5673] Pister, K., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Dwars, S., and T.
"Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Phinney, "Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009. Lossy Networks", RFC 5673, DOI 10.17487/RFC5673, October
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5673>.
[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation [RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation
Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks",
5826, April 2010. RFC 5826, DOI 10.17487/RFC5826, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5826>.
[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen, [RFC5867] Martocci, J., Ed., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen,
"Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and "Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010. Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, DOI 10.17487/RFC5867, June
2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5867>.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
5996, September 2010. RFC 5996, DOI 10.17487/RFC5996, September 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5996>.
[RFC6282] Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 [RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
September 2011. DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
[RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., and A. [RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., Ed., and
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345, August 2011. Network Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6345, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6345>.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R., [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R. Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012. Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
[RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Kim, M., Pister, K., Dejean, N., and D. [RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Ed., Kim, M., Ed., Pister, K., Dejean, N.,
Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation in and D. Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551, March 2012. in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6551, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6551>.
[RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6 [RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6
Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol
for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554, March for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554,
2012. DOI 10.17487/RFC6554, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6554>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012. Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC6786] Yegin, A. and R. Cragie, "Encrypting the Protocol for [RFC6786] Yegin, A. and R. Cragie, "Encrypting the Protocol for
Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Attribute-Value Pairs", RFC 6786, November 2012. Attribute-Value Pairs", RFC 6786, DOI 10.17487/RFC6786,
November 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6786>.
[RFC6997] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Philipp, M., Brandt, A., and J. [RFC6997] Goyal, M., Ed., Baccelli, E., Philipp, M., Brandt, A., and
Martocci, "Reactive Discovery of Point-to-Point Routes in J. Martocci, "Reactive Discovery of Point-to-Point Routes
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6997, August 2013. in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6997,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6997, August 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6997>.
[RFC6998] Goyal, M., Baccelli, E., Brandt, A., and J. Martocci, "A [RFC6998] Goyal, M., Ed., Baccelli, E., Brandt, A., and J. Martocci,
Mechanism to Measure the Routing Metrics along a Point-to- "A Mechanism to Measure the Routing Metrics along a Point-
Point Route in a Low-Power and Lossy Network", RFC 6998, to-Point Route in a Low-Power and Lossy Network",
August 2013. RFC 6998, DOI 10.17487/RFC6998, August 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6998>.
[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and [RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014. Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, DOI 10.17487/RFC7102, January
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7102>.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES- [RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, June 2014. TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.
[RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A., [RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A.,
and M. Richardson, "A Security Threat Analysis for the and M. Richardson, Ed., "A Security Threat Analysis for
Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)", the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
RFC 7416, January 2015. (RPLs)", RFC 7416, DOI 10.17487/RFC7416, January 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7416>.
[I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast] [I-D.ietf-roll-trickle-mcast]
Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low power Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low power
and Lossy Networks (MPL)", draft-ietf-roll-trickle- and Lossy Networks (MPL)", draft-ietf-roll-trickle-
mcast-12 (work in progress), June 2015. mcast-12 (work in progress), June 2015.
[IEEE802.15.4] [IEEE802.15.4]
"IEEE 802.15.4 - Standard for Local and metropolitan area "IEEE 802.15.4 - Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks -- Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area networks -- Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
Networks", <IEEE Standard 802.15.4>. Networks", <IEEE Standard 802.15.4>.
[G.9959] "ITU-T G.9959 Short range narrow-band digital [G.9959] "ITU-T G.9959 Short range narrow-band digital
radiocommunication transceivers - PHY and MAC layer radiocommunication transceivers - PHY and MAC layer
specifications", <ITU-T G.9959>. specifications", <ITU-T G.9959>.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An [RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411, Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
December 2002. DOI 10.17487/RFC3411, December 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3411>.
[RFC3561] Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E., and S. Das, "Ad hoc On- [RFC3561] Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E., and S. Das, "Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", RFC 3561, July Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", RFC 3561,
2003. DOI 10.17487/RFC3561, July 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3561>.
[RFC5889] Baccelli, E. and M. Townsley, "IP Addressing Model in Ad [RFC5889] Baccelli, E., Ed. and M. Townsley, Ed., "IP Addressing
Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, September 2010. Model in Ad Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, DOI 10.17487/RFC5889,
September 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5889>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for [RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014. Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7390] Rahman, A. and E. Dijk, "Group Communication for the [RFC7390] Rahman, A., Ed. and E. Dijk, Ed., "Group Communication for
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390,
October 2014. DOI 10.17487/RFC7390, October 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7390>.
[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets [RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, February 2015. over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>.
[SOFT11] Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., and M. Goyal, "The P2P-RPL [SOFT11] Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., and M. Goyal, "The P2P-RPL
Routing Protocol for IPv6 Sensor Networks: Testbed Routing Protocol for IPv6 Sensor Networks: Testbed
Experiments", Proceedings of the Conference on Software Experiments", Proceedings of the Conference on Software
Telecommunications and Computer Networks, Split, Croatia,, Telecommunications and Computer Networks, Split, Croatia,,
September 2011. September 2011.
[INTEROP12] [INTEROP12]
Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., Brandt, A., Valev , H., and J. Baccelli, E., Phillip, M., Brandt, A., Valev , H., and J.
Buron , "Report on P2P-RPL Interoperability Testing", Buron , "Report on P2P-RPL Interoperability Testing",
RR-7864 INRIA Research Report RR-7864, January 2012. RR-7864 INRIA Research Report RR-7864, January 2012.
[RT-MPL] van der Stok, P., "Real-Time multicast for wireless mesh [RT-MPL] van der Stok, P., "Real-Time multicast for wireless mesh
networks using MPL", White paper, networks using MPL", White paper,
http://www.vanderstok.org/papers/Real-time-MPL.pdf, April http://www.vanderstok.org/papers/Real-time-MPL.pdf, April
2014. 2014.
[occuswitch] [occuswitch]
Lighting, Philips., "OccuSwitch wireless", Brochure, http: Lighting, Philips., "OccuSwitch wireless", Brochure, http
//www.philipslightingcontrols.com/assets/cms/uploads/files ://www.philipslightingcontrols.com/assets/cms/uploads/file
/osw/MK_OSWNETBROC_5.pdf, May 2012. s/osw/MK_OSWNETBROC_5.pdf, May 2012.
[office-light] [office-light]
Clanton and Associates, ., "A Life Cycle Cost Evaluation Clanton and Associates, ., "A Life Cycle Cost Evaluation
of Multiple Lighting Control Strategies", Wireless of Multiple Lighting Control Strategies", Wireless
Lighting Control, http://www.daintree.net/wp- Lighting Control, http://www.daintree.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/ content/uploads/2014/02/
clanton_lighting_control_report_0411.pdf, February 2014. clanton_lighting_control_report_0411.pdf, February 2014.
[RTN2011] Holtman, K. and P. van der Stok, "Real-time routing for [RTN2011] Holtman, K. and P. van der Stok, "Real-time routing for
low-latency 802.15.4 control networks", International low-latency 802.15.4 control networks", International
Workshop on Real-Time Networks; Euromicro Conference on Workshop on Real-Time Networks; Euromicro Conference on
Real-Time Systems, July 2011. Real-Time Systems, July 2011.
[MEAS] Holtman, K., "Connectivity loss in large scale IEEE [MEAS] Holtman, K., "Connectivity loss in large scale IEEE
802.15.4 network", Private Communication, November 2013. 802.15.4 network", Private Communication, November 2013.
[BCsurvey] [BCsurvey]
Kastner, W., Neugschwandtner, G., Soucek, S., and H. Kastner, W., Neugschwandtner, G., Soucek, S., and H.
Newman, "Communication Systems for Building Automation and Newman, "Communication Systems for Building Automation and
Control", Proceedings of the IEEE Vol 93, No 6, June 2005. Control", Proceedings of the IEEE Vol 93, No 6, June
2005.
[ZigBeeIP] [ZigBeeIP]
ZigBee Alliance, ., "ZigBee IP specification", ZigBee ZigBee Alliance, ., "ZigBee IP specification", ZigBee
document 095023r34, March 2014. document 095023r34, March 2014.
[WI-SUN] ECHONET Lite, ., "Home network Communication Interface for
ECHONET Lite (IEEE802.15.4/4e/4g 920MHz-band Wireless)",
Japanese TTC standard JJ-300.10, May 2014.
Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments Appendix A. RPL shortcomings in home and building deployments
A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes A.1. Risk of undesired long P2P routes
The DAG, being a tree structure is formed from a root. If nodes The DAG, being a tree structure is formed from a root. If nodes
residing in different branches have a need for communicating residing in different branches have a need for communicating
internally, DAG mechanisms provided in RPL [RFC6550] will propagate internally, DAG mechanisms provided in RPL [RFC6550] will propagate
traffic towards the root, potentially all the way to the root, and traffic towards the root, potentially all the way to the root, and
down along another branch [RFC6998]. In a typical example two nodes down along another branch [RFC6998]. In a typical example two nodes
could reach each other via just two router nodes but in unfortunate could reach each other via just two router nodes but in unfortunate
 End of changes. 65 change blocks. 
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