draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-09.txt		draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-10.txt
	Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy Networks T. Tsao		Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy Networks T. Tsao
	Internet-Draft R. Alexander		Internet-Draft R. Alexander
	Intended status: Informational Cooper Power Systems		Intended status: Informational Cooper Power Systems
	Expires: February 14, 2015 M. Dohler		Expires: March 12, 2015 M. Dohler
	CTTC		CTTC
	V. Daza		V. Daza
	A. Lozano		A. Lozano
	Universitat Pompeu Fabra		Universitat Pompeu Fabra
	M. Richardson, Ed.		M. Richardson, Ed.
	Sandelman Software Works		Sandelman Software Works
	August 13, 2014		September 8, 2014
	A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy		A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy
	networks (RPL)		networks (RPL)
	draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-09		draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-10
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing		This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing
	Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL, ROLL). The		Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL, ROLL). The
	development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts		development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts
	the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power		the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power
	and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and		and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and
	evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are		evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are
	application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability		application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability
	statements.		statements.
			Requirements Language
			The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
			"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
			"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
			2119 [RFC2119].
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on March 12, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	skipping to change at page 2, line 23		skipping to change at page 2, line 30
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Relationship to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Relationship to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. Considerations on RPL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Considerations on RPL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . . 8		4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . . 9		4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . . 10
	4.4. RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		4.4. RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	5. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	6. Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		6. Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	6.1. Threats due to failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . . 14		6.1. Threats due to failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . . 14
	6.1.1. Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6.1.1. Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	6.1.2. Dummy Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6.1.2. Dummy Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	6.1.3. Node Resource Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6.1.3. Node Resource Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	6.2. Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . 15		6.2. Threats due to failure to keep routing information
			confidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)		6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)
	Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 16		6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 16
	6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . 17		6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . . 17		6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . . 17		6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . . 17
	6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . . 17		6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . . 18
	6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption . . . . . . . . . 19		6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption . . . . . . . . . 19
	6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	7. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		7. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 20		7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 20
	7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks . . . . . . . 20		7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks . . . . . . . 20
	7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks . . . . . . . 21		7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks . . . . . . . 21
	7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . . 22		7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . . 23
	7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks . . . . 23		7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks . . . . 23
	7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . . 24		7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . . 24
	7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . . 24		7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . . 24
	7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . . 24		7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . . 24
	7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks . . 25		7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks . . 25
	7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 26		7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing		7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing
	Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . . 28		7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . . 28
	7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	8. RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		8. RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	8.1. Confidentiality Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		8.1. Confidentiality Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	8.2. Integrity Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		8.2. Integrity Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	8.3. Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		8.3. Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	8.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		8.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an		In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an
	increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for		increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for
	reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these		reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these
	wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical		wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical
	resources; the constraints include those on computational resources		resources; the constraints include those on computational resources
	(RAM, clock speed, storage), communication resources (duty cycle,		(RAM, clock speed, storage), communication resources (duty cycle,
	packet size, etc.), but also form factors that may rule out user		packet size, etc.), but also form factors that may rule out user
	skipping to change at page 4, line 7		skipping to change at page 4, line 15
	deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges.		deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges.
	This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing		This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing
	Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the		Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the
	analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The		analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The
	second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL.		second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL.
	As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific		As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific
	tradeoffs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be		tradeoffs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be
	used is detailed in applicability statements.		used is detailed in applicability statements.
	This document uses [ISO.7498-2.1988]] model, which describes		This document uses [IS07498-2] model, which describes Authentication,
	Authentication, Access Control, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity,		Access Control, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, and Non-
	and Non-Repudiation security services and to which Availability is		Repudiation security services and to which Availability is added.
	added.
	Many of the issues in this document were also covered in The IAB
	Smart Object Workshop [RFC6574], and The IAB Smart Object Security
	Workshop [I-D.gilger-smart-object-security-workshop].
	All of this document concerns itself with securing the control plane		All of this document concerns itself with securing the control plane
	traffic. As such it does not address authorization or authentication		traffic. As such it does not address authorization or authentication
	of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of its protocol,		of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of it's protocol,
	and therefore mechanisms which RPL uses to secure this traffic might		and therefore mechanisms which RPL uses to secure this traffic MAY be
	also be applicable to MPL control traffic as well: the important part		applicable to MPL control traffic as well: the important part is that
	is that the threats are similar.		the threats are similiar.
	2. Relationship to other documents		2. Relationship to other documents
	ROLL has specified a set of routing protocols for Lossy and Low-		ROLL has specified a set of routing protocols for Lossy and Low-
	resource Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts		resource Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts
	describes a subset of these protocols and the conditions which make		describes a subset of these protocols and the conditions which make
	the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the		the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the
	accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains		accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains
	are recognized including: Building and Home, and Advanced Metering		are recognized including: Building and Home, and Advanced Metering
	Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in		Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in
	skipping to change at page 5, line 5		skipping to change at page 5, line 8
	which these solutions are appropriate.		which these solutions are appropriate.
	3. Terminology		3. Terminology
	This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], in		This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], in
	[RFC4949], and in [RFC7102].		[RFC4949], and in [RFC7102].
	The terms control plane and forwarding plane are used consistently		The terms control plane and forwarding plane are used consistently
	with section 1 of [RFC6192].		with section 1 of [RFC6192].
	The term DODAG is from [RFC6550].
	EAP-TLS is defined in [RFC5216].
	PANA is defined in [RFC5191].
	CCM mode is defined in [RFC3610].
	The terms SSID, ESSID and PAN refer to network identifiers, defined
	in [IEEE.802.11] and [IEEE.802.15.4].
	Although this is not a protocol specification, the key words "MUST",
	"MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
	"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] in order to
	clarify and emphasize the guidance and directions to implementers and
	deployers of LLN nodes that utilize RPL.
	4. Considerations on RPL Security		4. Considerations on RPL Security
	Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol		Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol
	operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure		operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure
	controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based		controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based
	on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs		on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs
	(physical security of device itself and parameters maintained by the		(physical security of device itself and parameters maintained by the
	device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve		device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve
	not only authorization of injector's actions, authentication of		not only authorization of injector's actions, authentication of
	injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also		injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also
	skipping to change at page 10, line 18		skipping to change at page 10, line 23
	observations from those requirements and evaluation of their impact		observations from those requirements and evaluation of their impact
	on routing security considerations.		on routing security considerations.
	Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources		Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources
	As a consequence of these constraints, there is an even more		As a consequence of these constraints, there is an even more
	critical need than usual for a careful study of trade-offs on		critical need than usual for a careful study of trade-offs on
	which and what level of security services are to be afforded		which and what level of security services are to be afforded
	during the system design process. The chosen security		during the system design process. The chosen security
	mechanisms also needs to work within these constraints.		mechanisms also needs to work within these constraints.
	Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes is yet		Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes is yet
	another issue. A non-rechargeable battery powered node may		another issue.
	well be limited in energy for it's lifetime: once exchausted,
	it may well never function again.
	Large scale of rolled out network		Large scale of rolled out network
	The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site		The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site
	configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can		configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can
	see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by		see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by
	many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be		many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be
	installed and not activated for many years, and additional		installed and not activated for many years, and additional
	nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory.		nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory.
	The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this		The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this
	complicates the operation of key management.		complicates the operation of key management.
	skipping to change at page 15, line 5		skipping to change at page 15, line 5
	that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself.		that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself.
	6.1.3. Node Resource Spam		6.1.3. Node Resource Spam
	If an attacker can join a network with any identify, then it can		If an attacker can join a network with any identify, then it can
	continously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain		continously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain
	down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This		down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This
	may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to		may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to
	communicate.		communicate.
	6.2. Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality		6.2. Threats due to failure to keep routing information confidential
	The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks		The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks
	against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of		against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of
	access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in		access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in
	Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing		Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing
	information.		information.
	6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure		6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure
	Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as		Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as
	skipping to change at page 18, line 21		skipping to change at page 18, line 24
	allows disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003]		allows disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003]
	o Selective forwarding attacks;		o Selective forwarding attacks;
	|Node_1|--(msg1|msg2|msg3)-->|Attacker|--(msg1|msg3)-->|Node_2|		|Node_1|--(msg1|msg2|msg3)-->|Attacker|--(msg1|msg3)-->|Node_2|
	Figure 2: Selective forwarding example		Figure 2: Selective forwarding example
	o Wormhole attacks;		o Wormhole attacks;
	|Node_1|-------------Unreachable---------x|Node_2|		|Node_1|-------------Unreachable---------x|Node_2|
	| ^		| ^
	| Private Link |		| Private Link |
	'-->|Attacker_1|===========>|Attacker_2|--'		'-->|Attacker_1|===========>|Attacker_2|--'
	Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks		Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks
	o Sinkhole attacks.		o Sinkhole attacks.
	|Node_1| |Node_4|		|Node_1| |Node_4|
	| |		| |
	`--------. |		`--------. |
	Falsify as \ |		Falsify as \ |
	Good Link \ | |		Good Link \ | |
	To Node_5 \ | |		To Node_5 \ | |
	\ V V		\ V V
	|Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5|		|Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5|
	^ ^ \		^ ^ \
	| | \ Falsify as		| | \ Falsify as
	| | \Good Link		| | \Good Link
	/ | To Node_5		/ | To Node_5
	,-------' |		,-------' |
	| |		| |
	|Node_3| |Node_i|		|Node_3| |Node_i|
	Figure 4: sinkhole attack example		Figure 4: sinkhole attack example
	These attacks are generally done to both control plane and forwarding		These attacks are generally done to both control plane and forwarding
	plane traffic. A system that prevents control plane traffic (RPL		plane traffic. A system that prevents control plane traffic (RPL
	messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual		messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual
	data from being diverted.		data from being diverted.
	6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption		6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption
	skipping to change at page 21, line 17		skipping to change at page 21, line 17
	from a secured ESSID/PAN to an unsecured interface.		from a secured ESSID/PAN to an unsecured interface.
	A prerequisite to countering this attack is to ensure that the		A prerequisite to countering this attack is to ensure that the
	communicating nodes are authenticated prior to data encryption		communicating nodes are authenticated prior to data encryption
	applied in the routing exchange. Authentication ensures that the		applied in the routing exchange. Authentication ensures that the
	nodes are who they claim to be even though it does not provide an		nodes are who they claim to be even though it does not provide an
	indication of whether the node has been compromised.		indication of whether the node has been compromised.
	To mitigate the risk of deliberate exposure, the process that		To mitigate the risk of deliberate exposure, the process that
	communicating nodes use to establish session keys must be peer-to-		communicating nodes use to establish session keys must be peer-to-
	peer (i.e., between the routing initiating and responding nodes). As		peer (i.e., between the routing initiating and responding nodes).
	is pointed out in [RFC4107], automatic key management is critical for		This helps ensure that neither node is exchanging routing information
	good security. This helps ensure that neither node is exchanging		with another peer without the knowledge of both communicating peers.
	routing information with another peer without the knowledge of both		For a deliberate exposure attack to succeed, the comprised node will
	communicating peers. For a deliberate exposure attack to succeed,		need to be more overt and take independent actions in order to
	the comprised node will need to be more overt and take independent		disclose the routing information to 3rd party.
	actions in order to disclose the routing information to 3rd party.
	Note that the same measures which apply to securing routing/topology		Note that the same measures which apply to securing routing/topology
	exchanges between operational nodes must also extend to field tools		exchanges between operational nodes must also extend to field tools
	and other devices used in a deployed network where such devices can		and other devices used in a deployed network where such devices can
	be configured to participate in routing exchanges.		be configured to participate in routing exchanges.
	7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks		7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks
	A passive wiretap attack seeks to breach routing confidentiality		A passive wiretap attack seeks to breach routing confidentiality
	through passive, direct analysis and processing of the information		through passive, direct analysis and processing of the information
	skipping to change at page 25, line 36		skipping to change at page 25, line 39
	Consistent with the end-to-end principle of communications, such an		Consistent with the end-to-end principle of communications, such an
	attack can only be fully addressed through measures operating		attack can only be fully addressed through measures operating
	directly between the routing entities themselves or by means of		directly between the routing entities themselves or by means of
	external entities able to access and independently analyze the		external entities able to access and independently analyze the
	routing information. Verification of the authenticity and liveliness		routing information. Verification of the authenticity and liveliness
	of the routing entities can therefore only provide a limited counter		of the routing entities can therefore only provide a limited counter
	against internal (Byzantine) node attacks.		against internal (Byzantine) node attacks.
	For link state routing protocols where information is flooded with,		For link state routing protocols where information is flooded with,
	for example, areas (OSPF [RFC2328]) or levels (ISIS [RFC7142]),		for example, areas (OSPF [RFC2328]) or levels (ISIS [RFC1142]),
	countermeasures can be directly applied by the routing entities		countermeasures can be directly applied by the routing entities
	through the processing and comparison of link state information		through the processing and comparison of link state information
	received from different peers. By comparing the link information		received from different peers. By comparing the link information
	from multiple sources decisions can be made by a routing node or		from multiple sources decisions can be made by a routing node or
	external entity with regard to routing information validity; see		external entity with regard to routing information validity; see
	Chapter 2 of [Perlman1988] for a discussion on flooding attacks.		Chapter 2 of [Perlman1988] for a discussion on flooding attacks.
	For distance vector protocols, such as RPL, where information is		For distance vector protocols, such as RPL, where information is
	aggregated at each routing node it is not possible for nodes to		aggregated at each routing node it is not possible for nodes to
	directly detect Byzantine information manipulation attacks from the		directly detect Byzantine information manipulation attacks from the
	skipping to change at page 34, line 27		skipping to change at page 34, line 34
	12. References		12. References
	12.1. Normative References		12.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic		[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
	Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.		Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.
			[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
			Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
	[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,		[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,
	Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.		Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.
	Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and		Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
	Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.		Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.
	[RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with		[RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with
	Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719, September 2012.		Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719, September 2012.
	[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and		[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
	Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014.		Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014.
	skipping to change at page 34, line 50		skipping to change at page 35, line 13
	Specification", 2013.		Specification", 2013.
	12.2. Informative References		12.2. Informative References
	[AceCharterProposal]		[AceCharterProposal]
	Li, Kepeng., Ed., "Authentication and Authorization for		Li, Kepeng., Ed., "Authentication and Authorization for
	Constrained Environment Charter (work-in-progress)",		Constrained Environment Charter (work-in-progress)",
	December 2013, <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/		December 2013, <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/
	wiki/ACE_charter>.		wiki/ACE_charter>.
	[I-D.gilger-smart-object-security-workshop]		[FIPS197] "Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197:
	Gilger, J. and H. Tschofenig, "Report from the 'Smart		Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", US National Institute
	Object Security Workshop', March 23, 2012, Paris, France",		of Standards and Technology, Nov. 26 2001.
	draft-gilger-smart-object-security-workshop-02 (work in
	progress), October 2013.		[Huang2003]
			Huang, Q., Cukier, J., Kobayashi, H., Liu, B., and J.
			Zhang, "Fast Authenticated Key Establishment Protocols for
			Self-Organizing Sensor Networks", in Proceedings of the
			2nd ACM International Conference on Wireless Sensor
			Networks and Applications, San Diego, CA, USA, pp.
			141-150, Sept. 19 2003.
			[I-D.alexander-roll-mikey-lln-key-mgmt]
			Alexander, R. and T. Tsao, "Adapted Multimedia Internet
			KEYing (AMIKEY): An extension of Multimedia Internet
			KEYing (MIKEY) Methods for Generic LLN Environments",
			draft-alexander-roll-mikey-lln-key-mgmt-04 (work in
			progress), September 2012.
	[I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment]		[I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment]
	Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", draft-kelsey-		Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", draft-kelsey-
	intarea-mesh-link-establishment-05 (work in progress),		intarea-mesh-link-establishment-05 (work in progress),
	February 2013.		February 2013.
	[I-D.suhopark-hello-wsn]		[I-D.suhopark-hello-wsn]
	Park, S., "Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood		Park, S., "Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood
	Attack and Defense", draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00 (work in		Attack and Defense", draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00 (work in
	progress), December 2005.		progress), December 2005.
	[IEEE.802.11]		[IEEE1149.1]
	, "Draft Standard for Information Technology -		"IEEE Standard Test Access Port and Boundary Scan
	Telecommunications and information exchange between		Architecture", IEEE-SA Standards Board, Jun. 14 2001.
	systems - Local and metropolitan area networks Specific
	requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
	(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications ", IEEE
	802.11-REVma, 2006.
	[IEEE.802.15.4]
	, "Information technology - Telecommunications and
	information exchange between systems - Local and
	metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
	15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
	Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low Rate Wireless Personal
	Area Networks (LR-WPANs) ", IEEE Std 802.15.4-2006, June
	2006, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.15.html>.
	[ISO.7498-2.1988]		[ISO.7498-2.1988]
	International Organization for Standardization,		International Organization for Standardization,
	"Information Processing Systems - Open Systems		"Information Processing Systems - Open Systems
	Interconnection Reference Model - Security Architecture",		Interconnection Reference Model - Security Architecture",
	ISO Standard 7498-2, 1988.		ISO Standard 7498-2, 1988.
	[Karlof2003]		[Karlof2003]
	Karlof, C. and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless		Karlof, C. and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless
	sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures", Elsevier		sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures", Elsevier
	AdHoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network		AdHoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network
	Applications and Protocols, 1(2):293-315, September 2003,		Applications and Protocols, 1(2):293-315, September 2003,
	<http://nest.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/sensor-route-		<http://nest.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/
	security.pdf>.		sensor-route-security.pdf>.
			[Kasumi3gpp]
			"3GPP TS 35.202 Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality
			and integrity algorithms; Document 2: Kasumi
			specification", 3GPP TSG SA3, 2009.
			[Messerges2003]
			Messerges, T., Cukier, J., Kevenaar, T., Puhl, L., Struik,
			R., and E. Callaway, "Low-Power Security for Wireless
			Sensor Networks", in Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop
			on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Fairfax, VA,
			USA, pp. 1-11, Oct. 31 2003.
	[Myagmar2005]		[Myagmar2005]
	Myagmar, S., Lee, AJ., and W. Yurcik, "Threat Modeling as		Myagmar, S., Lee, AJ., and W. Yurcik, "Threat Modeling as
	a Basis for Security Requirements", in Proceedings of the		a Basis for Security Requirements", in Proceedings of the
	Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information		Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information
	Security (SREIS'05), Paris, France, pp. 94-102, Aug 29,		Security (SREIS'05), Paris, France, pp. 94-102, Aug 29,
	2005.		2005.
	[Perlman1988]		[Perlman1988]
	Perlman, N., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine		Perlman, N., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine
	Robustness", MIT LCS Tech Report, 429, 1988.		Robustness", MIT LCS Tech Report, 429, 1988.
			[RFC1142] Oran, D., "OSI IS-IS Intra-domain Routing Protocol", RFC
			1142, February 1990.
			[RFC2080] Malkin, G. and R. Minnear, "RIPng for IPv6", RFC 2080,
			January 1997.
	[RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.		[RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.
			[RFC2453] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, RFC 2453, November
			1998.
	[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with		[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
	CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.		CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.
			[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
			Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
			August 2004.
			[RFC4046] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
			"Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
			Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.
	[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to		[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
	Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.		Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.
	[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of-		[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
	Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.		Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
	[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC		[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
	4949, August 2007.		4949, August 2007.
	[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.		[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
	Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network		Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
	Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.		(SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
	[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS		[RFC5197] Fries, S. and D. Ignjatic, "On the Applicability of
	Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.		Various Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) Modes and
			Extensions", RFC 5197, June 2008.
	[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel,		[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel,
	"Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy		"Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy
	Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009.		Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009.
	[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney,		[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney,
	"Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy		"Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy
	Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009.		Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009.
	[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet		[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
	skipping to change at page 37, line 9		skipping to change at page 37, line 46
	Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.		Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
	[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation		[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation
	Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC		Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC
	5826, April 2010.		5826, April 2010.
	[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen,		[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen,
	"Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and		"Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
	Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010.		Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010.
			[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
			"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
			5996, September 2010.
	[RFC6192] Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the		[RFC6192] Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
	Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011.		Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011.
	[RFC6574] Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object		[RFC6574] Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object
	Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012.		Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012.
	[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,		[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
	"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple		"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
	Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.		Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.
	[RFC7142] Shand, M. and L. Ginsberg, "Reclassification of RFC 1142
	to Historic", RFC 7142, February 2014.
	[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop]		[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop]
	Klausen, T., Ed., "Workshop on Smart Object Security",		Klausen, T., Ed., "Workshop on Smart Object Security",
	March 2012, <http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/		March 2012, <http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/
	SmartObjectSecurity>.		SmartObjectSecurity>.
	[SolaceProposal]		[SolaceProposal]
	Bormann, C., Ed., "Notes from the SOLACE ad-hoc at IETF85		Bormann, C., Ed., "Notes from the SOLACE ad-hoc at IETF85
	(work-in-progress)", November 2012, <http://www.ietf.org/		(work-in-progress)", November 2012, <http://www.ietf.org/
	mail-archive/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>.		mail-archive/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>.
	[Sybil2002]		[Sybil2002]
	Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", First International		Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", First International
	Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems , March 2002.		Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems , March 2002.
			[Szcze2008]
			Szczechowiak1, P., Oliveira, L., Scott, M., Collier, M.,
			and R. Dahab, "NanoECC: testing the limits of elliptic
			curve cryptography in sensor networks", pp. 324-328, 2008,
			<http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~leob/publications/ewsn/
			NanoECC.pdf>.
	[Wan2004] Wan, T., Kranakis, E., and PC. van Oorschot, "S-RIP: A		[Wan2004] Wan, T., Kranakis, E., and PC. van Oorschot, "S-RIP: A
	Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol", in Proceedings		Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol", in Proceedings
	of the 2nd International Conference on Applied		of the 2nd International Conference on Applied
	Cryptography and Network Security, Yellow Mountain, China,		Cryptography and Network Security, Yellow Mountain, China,
	pp. 103-119, Jun. 8-11 2004.		pp. 103-119, Jun. 8-11 2004.
			[Wander2005]
			Wander, A., Gura, N., Eberle, H., Gupta, V., and S.
			Shantz, "Energy analysis of public-key cryptography for
			wireless sensor networ", in the Proceedings of the Third
			IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
			Communications pp. 324-328, March 8-12 2005.
	[Yourdon1979]		[Yourdon1979]
	Yourdon, E. and L. Constantine, "Structured Design",		Yourdon, E. and L. Constantine, "Structured Design",
	Yourdon Press, New York, Chapter 10, pp. 187-222, 1979.		Yourdon Press, New York, Chapter 10, pp. 187-222, 1979.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tzeta Tsao		Tzeta Tsao
	Cooper Power Systems		Cooper Power Systems
	910 Clopper Rd. Suite 201S		910 Clopper Rd. Suite 201S
	Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878		Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878
	USA		USA
	Email: tzeta.tsao@cooperindustries.com		Email: tzeta.tsao@cooperindustries.com
	Roger K. Alexander		Roger K. Alexander
	Cooper Power Systems		Cooper Power Systems
End of changes. 38 change blocks.
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