draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-09.txt   draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-10.txt 
Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy Networks T. Tsao Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy Networks T. Tsao
Internet-Draft R. Alexander Internet-Draft R. Alexander
Intended status: Informational Cooper Power Systems Intended status: Informational Cooper Power Systems
Expires: February 14, 2015 M. Dohler Expires: March 12, 2015 M. Dohler
CTTC CTTC
V. Daza V. Daza
A. Lozano A. Lozano
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Universitat Pompeu Fabra
M. Richardson, Ed. M. Richardson, Ed.
Sandelman Software Works Sandelman Software Works
August 13, 2014 September 8, 2014
A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy
networks (RPL) networks (RPL)
draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-09 draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-10
Abstract Abstract
This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing
Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL, ROLL). The Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL, ROLL). The
development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts
the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power
and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and
evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are
application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability
statements. statements.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 12, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
skipping to change at page 2, line 23 skipping to change at page 2, line 30
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Relationship to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Relationship to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Considerations on RPL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Considerations on RPL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Threats due to failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. Threats due to failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.1. Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.2. Dummy Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.2. Dummy Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.3. Node Resource Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.3. Node Resource Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2. Threats due to failure to keep routing information
confidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology) 6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)
Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . . 17 6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . . 17
6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . . 17 6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . . 18
6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption . . . . . . . . . 19 6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption . . . . . . . . . 19
6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks . . . . . . . 20 7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks . . . . . . . 20
7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks . . . . . . . 21 7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks . . . . . . . 21
7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . . 22 7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks . . . . 23 7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks . . . . 23
7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . . 24 7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . . 24
7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . . 24 7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . . 24
7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . . 24 7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . . 24
7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks . . 25 7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks . . 25
7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing 7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing
Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . . 28 7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . . 28
7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.1. Confidentiality Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.1. Confidentiality Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2. Integrity Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. Integrity Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.3. Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.3. Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an
increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for
reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these
wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical
resources; the constraints include those on computational resources resources; the constraints include those on computational resources
(RAM, clock speed, storage), communication resources (duty cycle, (RAM, clock speed, storage), communication resources (duty cycle,
packet size, etc.), but also form factors that may rule out user packet size, etc.), but also form factors that may rule out user
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deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges. deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges.
This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing
Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the
analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The
second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL. second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL.
As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific
tradeoffs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be tradeoffs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be
used is detailed in applicability statements. used is detailed in applicability statements.
This document uses [ISO.7498-2.1988]] model, which describes This document uses [IS07498-2] model, which describes Authentication,
Authentication, Access Control, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Access Control, Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, and Non-
and Non-Repudiation security services and to which Availability is Repudiation security services and to which Availability is added.
added.
Many of the issues in this document were also covered in The IAB
Smart Object Workshop [RFC6574], and The IAB Smart Object Security
Workshop [I-D.gilger-smart-object-security-workshop].
All of this document concerns itself with securing the control plane All of this document concerns itself with securing the control plane
traffic. As such it does not address authorization or authentication traffic. As such it does not address authorization or authentication
of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of its protocol, of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of it's protocol,
and therefore mechanisms which RPL uses to secure this traffic might and therefore mechanisms which RPL uses to secure this traffic MAY be
also be applicable to MPL control traffic as well: the important part applicable to MPL control traffic as well: the important part is that
is that the threats are similar. the threats are similiar.
2. Relationship to other documents 2. Relationship to other documents
ROLL has specified a set of routing protocols for Lossy and Low- ROLL has specified a set of routing protocols for Lossy and Low-
resource Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts resource Networks (LLN) [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts
describes a subset of these protocols and the conditions which make describes a subset of these protocols and the conditions which make
the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the
accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains
are recognized including: Building and Home, and Advanced Metering are recognized including: Building and Home, and Advanced Metering
Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in
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which these solutions are appropriate. which these solutions are appropriate.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], in This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], in
[RFC4949], and in [RFC7102]. [RFC4949], and in [RFC7102].
The terms control plane and forwarding plane are used consistently The terms control plane and forwarding plane are used consistently
with section 1 of [RFC6192]. with section 1 of [RFC6192].
The term DODAG is from [RFC6550].
EAP-TLS is defined in [RFC5216].
PANA is defined in [RFC5191].
CCM mode is defined in [RFC3610].
The terms SSID, ESSID and PAN refer to network identifiers, defined
in [IEEE.802.11] and [IEEE.802.15.4].
Although this is not a protocol specification, the key words "MUST",
"MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] in order to
clarify and emphasize the guidance and directions to implementers and
deployers of LLN nodes that utilize RPL.
4. Considerations on RPL Security 4. Considerations on RPL Security
Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol
operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure
controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based
on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs
(physical security of device itself and parameters maintained by the (physical security of device itself and parameters maintained by the
device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve
not only authorization of injector's actions, authentication of not only authorization of injector's actions, authentication of
injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also
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observations from those requirements and evaluation of their impact observations from those requirements and evaluation of their impact
on routing security considerations. on routing security considerations.
Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources
As a consequence of these constraints, there is an even more As a consequence of these constraints, there is an even more
critical need than usual for a careful study of trade-offs on critical need than usual for a careful study of trade-offs on
which and what level of security services are to be afforded which and what level of security services are to be afforded
during the system design process. The chosen security during the system design process. The chosen security
mechanisms also needs to work within these constraints. mechanisms also needs to work within these constraints.
Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes is yet Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes is yet
another issue. A non-rechargeable battery powered node may another issue.
well be limited in energy for it's lifetime: once exchausted,
it may well never function again.
Large scale of rolled out network Large scale of rolled out network
The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site
configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can
see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by
many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be
installed and not activated for many years, and additional installed and not activated for many years, and additional
nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory. nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory.
The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this
complicates the operation of key management. complicates the operation of key management.
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that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself. that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself.
6.1.3. Node Resource Spam 6.1.3. Node Resource Spam
If an attacker can join a network with any identify, then it can If an attacker can join a network with any identify, then it can
continously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain continously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain
down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This
may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to
communicate. communicate.
6.2. Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality 6.2. Threats due to failure to keep routing information confidential
The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks
against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of
access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in
Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing
information. information.
6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure 6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure
Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as
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allows disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003] allows disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003]
o Selective forwarding attacks; o Selective forwarding attacks;
|Node_1|--(msg1|msg2|msg3)-->|Attacker|--(msg1|msg3)-->|Node_2| |Node_1|--(msg1|msg2|msg3)-->|Attacker|--(msg1|msg3)-->|Node_2|
Figure 2: Selective forwarding example Figure 2: Selective forwarding example
o Wormhole attacks; o Wormhole attacks;
|Node_1|-------------Unreachable---------x|Node_2| |Node_1|-------------Unreachable---------x|Node_2|
| ^ | ^
| Private Link | | Private Link |
'-->|Attacker_1|===========>|Attacker_2|--' '-->|Attacker_1|===========>|Attacker_2|--'
Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks
o Sinkhole attacks. o Sinkhole attacks.
|Node_1| |Node_4| |Node_1| |Node_4|
| | | |
`--------. | `--------. |
Falsify as \ | Falsify as \ |
Good Link \ | | Good Link \ | |
To Node_5 \ | | To Node_5 \ | |
\ V V \ V V
|Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5| |Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5|
^ ^ \ ^ ^ \
| | \ Falsify as | | \ Falsify as
| | \Good Link | | \Good Link
/ | To Node_5 / | To Node_5
,-------' | ,-------' |
| | | |
|Node_3| |Node_i| |Node_3| |Node_i|
Figure 4: sinkhole attack example Figure 4: sinkhole attack example
These attacks are generally done to both control plane and forwarding These attacks are generally done to both control plane and forwarding
plane traffic. A system that prevents control plane traffic (RPL plane traffic. A system that prevents control plane traffic (RPL
messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual
data from being diverted. data from being diverted.
6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption 6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption
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from a secured ESSID/PAN to an unsecured interface. from a secured ESSID/PAN to an unsecured interface.
A prerequisite to countering this attack is to ensure that the A prerequisite to countering this attack is to ensure that the
communicating nodes are authenticated prior to data encryption communicating nodes are authenticated prior to data encryption
applied in the routing exchange. Authentication ensures that the applied in the routing exchange. Authentication ensures that the
nodes are who they claim to be even though it does not provide an nodes are who they claim to be even though it does not provide an
indication of whether the node has been compromised. indication of whether the node has been compromised.
To mitigate the risk of deliberate exposure, the process that To mitigate the risk of deliberate exposure, the process that
communicating nodes use to establish session keys must be peer-to- communicating nodes use to establish session keys must be peer-to-
peer (i.e., between the routing initiating and responding nodes). As peer (i.e., between the routing initiating and responding nodes).
is pointed out in [RFC4107], automatic key management is critical for This helps ensure that neither node is exchanging routing information
good security. This helps ensure that neither node is exchanging with another peer without the knowledge of both communicating peers.
routing information with another peer without the knowledge of both For a deliberate exposure attack to succeed, the comprised node will
communicating peers. For a deliberate exposure attack to succeed, need to be more overt and take independent actions in order to
the comprised node will need to be more overt and take independent disclose the routing information to 3rd party.
actions in order to disclose the routing information to 3rd party.
Note that the same measures which apply to securing routing/topology Note that the same measures which apply to securing routing/topology
exchanges between operational nodes must also extend to field tools exchanges between operational nodes must also extend to field tools
and other devices used in a deployed network where such devices can and other devices used in a deployed network where such devices can
be configured to participate in routing exchanges. be configured to participate in routing exchanges.
7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks 7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks
A passive wiretap attack seeks to breach routing confidentiality A passive wiretap attack seeks to breach routing confidentiality
through passive, direct analysis and processing of the information through passive, direct analysis and processing of the information
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Consistent with the end-to-end principle of communications, such an Consistent with the end-to-end principle of communications, such an
attack can only be fully addressed through measures operating attack can only be fully addressed through measures operating
directly between the routing entities themselves or by means of directly between the routing entities themselves or by means of
external entities able to access and independently analyze the external entities able to access and independently analyze the
routing information. Verification of the authenticity and liveliness routing information. Verification of the authenticity and liveliness
of the routing entities can therefore only provide a limited counter of the routing entities can therefore only provide a limited counter
against internal (Byzantine) node attacks. against internal (Byzantine) node attacks.
For link state routing protocols where information is flooded with, For link state routing protocols where information is flooded with,
for example, areas (OSPF [RFC2328]) or levels (ISIS [RFC7142]), for example, areas (OSPF [RFC2328]) or levels (ISIS [RFC1142]),
countermeasures can be directly applied by the routing entities countermeasures can be directly applied by the routing entities
through the processing and comparison of link state information through the processing and comparison of link state information
received from different peers. By comparing the link information received from different peers. By comparing the link information
from multiple sources decisions can be made by a routing node or from multiple sources decisions can be made by a routing node or
external entity with regard to routing information validity; see external entity with regard to routing information validity; see
Chapter 2 of [Perlman1988] for a discussion on flooding attacks. Chapter 2 of [Perlman1988] for a discussion on flooding attacks.
For distance vector protocols, such as RPL, where information is For distance vector protocols, such as RPL, where information is
aggregated at each routing node it is not possible for nodes to aggregated at each routing node it is not possible for nodes to
directly detect Byzantine information manipulation attacks from the directly detect Byzantine information manipulation attacks from the
skipping to change at page 34, line 27 skipping to change at page 34, line 34
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic [RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005. Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R., [RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,
Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R. Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.
Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012. Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.
[RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with [RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with
Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719, September 2012. Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719, September 2012.
[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and [RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014. Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014.
skipping to change at page 34, line 50 skipping to change at page 35, line 13
Specification", 2013. Specification", 2013.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[AceCharterProposal] [AceCharterProposal]
Li, Kepeng., Ed., "Authentication and Authorization for Li, Kepeng., Ed., "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environment Charter (work-in-progress)", Constrained Environment Charter (work-in-progress)",
December 2013, <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ December 2013, <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/
wiki/ACE_charter>. wiki/ACE_charter>.
[I-D.gilger-smart-object-security-workshop] [FIPS197] "Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197:
Gilger, J. and H. Tschofenig, "Report from the 'Smart Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", US National Institute
Object Security Workshop', March 23, 2012, Paris, France", of Standards and Technology, Nov. 26 2001.
draft-gilger-smart-object-security-workshop-02 (work in
progress), October 2013. [Huang2003]
Huang, Q., Cukier, J., Kobayashi, H., Liu, B., and J.
Zhang, "Fast Authenticated Key Establishment Protocols for
Self-Organizing Sensor Networks", in Proceedings of the
2nd ACM International Conference on Wireless Sensor
Networks and Applications, San Diego, CA, USA, pp.
141-150, Sept. 19 2003.
[I-D.alexander-roll-mikey-lln-key-mgmt]
Alexander, R. and T. Tsao, "Adapted Multimedia Internet
KEYing (AMIKEY): An extension of Multimedia Internet
KEYing (MIKEY) Methods for Generic LLN Environments",
draft-alexander-roll-mikey-lln-key-mgmt-04 (work in
progress), September 2012.
[I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment] [I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment]
Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", draft-kelsey- Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", draft-kelsey-
intarea-mesh-link-establishment-05 (work in progress), intarea-mesh-link-establishment-05 (work in progress),
February 2013. February 2013.
[I-D.suhopark-hello-wsn] [I-D.suhopark-hello-wsn]
Park, S., "Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood Park, S., "Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood
Attack and Defense", draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00 (work in Attack and Defense", draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00 (work in
progress), December 2005. progress), December 2005.
[IEEE.802.11] [IEEE1149.1]
, "Draft Standard for Information Technology - "IEEE Standard Test Access Port and Boundary Scan
Telecommunications and information exchange between Architecture", IEEE-SA Standards Board, Jun. 14 2001.
systems - Local and metropolitan area networks Specific
requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications ", IEEE
802.11-REVma, 2006.
[IEEE.802.15.4]
, "Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low Rate Wireless Personal
Area Networks (LR-WPANs) ", IEEE Std 802.15.4-2006, June
2006, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.15.html>.
[ISO.7498-2.1988] [ISO.7498-2.1988]
International Organization for Standardization, International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Processing Systems - Open Systems "Information Processing Systems - Open Systems
Interconnection Reference Model - Security Architecture", Interconnection Reference Model - Security Architecture",
ISO Standard 7498-2, 1988. ISO Standard 7498-2, 1988.
[Karlof2003] [Karlof2003]
Karlof, C. and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless Karlof, C. and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless
sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures", Elsevier sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures", Elsevier
AdHoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network AdHoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network
Applications and Protocols, 1(2):293-315, September 2003, Applications and Protocols, 1(2):293-315, September 2003,
<http://nest.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/sensor-route- <http://nest.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/
security.pdf>. sensor-route-security.pdf>.
[Kasumi3gpp]
"3GPP TS 35.202 Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality
and integrity algorithms; Document 2: Kasumi
specification", 3GPP TSG SA3, 2009.
[Messerges2003]
Messerges, T., Cukier, J., Kevenaar, T., Puhl, L., Struik,
R., and E. Callaway, "Low-Power Security for Wireless
Sensor Networks", in Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop
on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Fairfax, VA,
USA, pp. 1-11, Oct. 31 2003.
[Myagmar2005] [Myagmar2005]
Myagmar, S., Lee, AJ., and W. Yurcik, "Threat Modeling as Myagmar, S., Lee, AJ., and W. Yurcik, "Threat Modeling as
a Basis for Security Requirements", in Proceedings of the a Basis for Security Requirements", in Proceedings of the
Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information
Security (SREIS'05), Paris, France, pp. 94-102, Aug 29, Security (SREIS'05), Paris, France, pp. 94-102, Aug 29,
2005. 2005.
[Perlman1988] [Perlman1988]
Perlman, N., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Perlman, N., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine
Robustness", MIT LCS Tech Report, 429, 1988. Robustness", MIT LCS Tech Report, 429, 1988.
[RFC1142] Oran, D., "OSI IS-IS Intra-domain Routing Protocol", RFC
1142, February 1990.
[RFC2080] Malkin, G. and R. Minnear, "RIPng for IPv6", RFC 2080,
January 1997.
[RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998. [RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.
[RFC2453] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, RFC 2453, November
1998.
[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with [RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003. CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
August 2004.
[RFC4046] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
"Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.
[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to [RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006. Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of- [RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. [RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008. (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS [RFC5197] Fries, S. and D. Ignjatic, "On the Applicability of
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. Various Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) Modes and
Extensions", RFC 5197, June 2008.
[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel, [RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel,
"Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy
Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009. Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009.
[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney, [RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney,
"Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy "Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy
Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009. Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009.
[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
skipping to change at page 37, line 9 skipping to change at page 37, line 46
Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010. Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation [RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation
Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC
5826, April 2010. 5826, April 2010.
[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen, [RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen,
"Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and "Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010. Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010.
[RFC6192] Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the [RFC6192] Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011. Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011.
[RFC6574] Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object [RFC6574] Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object
Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012. Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure, [RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013. Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.
[RFC7142] Shand, M. and L. Ginsberg, "Reclassification of RFC 1142
to Historic", RFC 7142, February 2014.
[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop] [SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop]
Klausen, T., Ed., "Workshop on Smart Object Security", Klausen, T., Ed., "Workshop on Smart Object Security",
March 2012, <http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/ March 2012, <http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/
SmartObjectSecurity>. SmartObjectSecurity>.
[SolaceProposal] [SolaceProposal]
Bormann, C., Ed., "Notes from the SOLACE ad-hoc at IETF85 Bormann, C., Ed., "Notes from the SOLACE ad-hoc at IETF85
(work-in-progress)", November 2012, <http://www.ietf.org/ (work-in-progress)", November 2012, <http://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>. mail-archive/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>.
[Sybil2002] [Sybil2002]
Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", First International Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", First International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems , March 2002. Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems , March 2002.
[Szcze2008]
Szczechowiak1, P., Oliveira, L., Scott, M., Collier, M.,
and R. Dahab, "NanoECC: testing the limits of elliptic
curve cryptography in sensor networks", pp. 324-328, 2008,
<http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~leob/publications/ewsn/
NanoECC.pdf>.
[Wan2004] Wan, T., Kranakis, E., and PC. van Oorschot, "S-RIP: A [Wan2004] Wan, T., Kranakis, E., and PC. van Oorschot, "S-RIP: A
Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol", in Proceedings Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol", in Proceedings
of the 2nd International Conference on Applied of the 2nd International Conference on Applied
Cryptography and Network Security, Yellow Mountain, China, Cryptography and Network Security, Yellow Mountain, China,
pp. 103-119, Jun. 8-11 2004. pp. 103-119, Jun. 8-11 2004.
[Wander2005]
Wander, A., Gura, N., Eberle, H., Gupta, V., and S.
Shantz, "Energy analysis of public-key cryptography for
wireless sensor networ", in the Proceedings of the Third
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communications pp. 324-328, March 8-12 2005.
[Yourdon1979] [Yourdon1979]
Yourdon, E. and L. Constantine, "Structured Design", Yourdon, E. and L. Constantine, "Structured Design",
Yourdon Press, New York, Chapter 10, pp. 187-222, 1979. Yourdon Press, New York, Chapter 10, pp. 187-222, 1979.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tzeta Tsao Tzeta Tsao
Cooper Power Systems Cooper Power Systems
910 Clopper Rd. Suite 201S 910 Clopper Rd. Suite 201S
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878 Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878
USA USA
Email: tzeta.tsao@cooperindustries.com Email: tzeta.tsao@cooperindustries.com
Roger K. Alexander Roger K. Alexander
Cooper Power Systems Cooper Power Systems
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