draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-07.txt   draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-08.txt 
RTCWEB M. Perumal RTCWEB M. Perumal
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: March 19, 2015 R. Ravindranath Expires: April 30, 2015 R. Ravindranath
T. Reddy T. Reddy
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
M. Thomson M. Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
September 15, 2014 October 27, 2014
STUN Usage for Consent Freshness STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-07 draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-08
Abstract Abstract
To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent
needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint. needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.
This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage. This same mechanism can Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
also determine connection loss ("liveness") with a remote peer.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 19, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Connection Liveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. DiffServ Treatment for Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent packets . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. DTLS applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. W3C API Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. API Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
To prevent attacks on peers, RTP endpoints have to ensure the remote To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer
peer wants to receive traffic. This is performed both when the is willing to receive traffic. This is performed both when the
session is first established to the remote peer using Interactive session is first established to the remote peer using Interactive
Connectivity Establishment ICE [RFC5245] connectivity checks, and Connectivity Establishment ICE [RFC5245] connectivity checks, and
periodically for the duration of the session using the procedures periodically for the duration of the session using the procedures
defined in this document. defined in this document.
When a session is first established, ICE implementations obtain When a session is first established, ICE implementations obtain an
initial consent by performing STUN connectivity checks as part of initial consent to send by performing STUN connectivity checks. This
ICE. That initial consent is not described further in this document document describes a new STUN usage with exchange of request and
and it is assumed that ICE is being used for that initial consent. response messages that verifies the remote peer's ongoing consent to
receive traffic. This consent expires after a period of time and
Related to consent is loss of connectivity ("liveness"). Many needs to be continually renewed, which ensures that consent can be
applications want notification of connection loss to take appropriate terminated.
actions (e.g., alert the user, try switching to a different
interface).
This document describes a new STUN usage with exchange of request and
response messages to verify the remote peer's consent to receive
traffic, and the absence of which for a period of time indicates a
loss of liveness.
When a (full) ICE implementation interworks with an ICE-lite This applies to full ICE implementations. An ICE-lite implementation
implementation the ICE-lite implementation will not generate consent will not generate consent checks, but will just respond to consent
checks, but will just just respond to consent checks it receives. checks it receives. ICE-lite implementation do not require any
changes to respond to consent checks.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Consent: It is the mechanism of obtaining permission to send traffic Consent: The mechanism of obtaining permission to send to a remote
to a certain transport address. This is the initial consent to transport address. Initial consent is obtained using ICE or a TCP
send traffic, which is obtained by ICE or a TCP handshake. handshake.
Consent Freshness: Permission to continue sending traffic to a
certain transport address. This is performed by the procedure
described in this document.
Session Liveness: Detecting loss of connectivity to a certain Consent Freshness: Maintaining and renewing consent over time.
transport address. This is performed by the procedure described
in this document.
Transport Address: The remote peer's IP address and (UDP or TCP) Transport Address: The remote peer's IP address and UDP or TCP port
port number. number.
3. Design Considerations 3. Design Considerations
Although ICE requires periodic keepalive traffic to keep NAT bindings Although ICE requires periodic keepalive traffic to keep NAT bindings
alive (Section 10 of [RFC5245], [RFC6263]), those keepalives are sent alive (Section 10 of [RFC5245], [RFC6263]), those keepalives are sent
as STUN Indications which are send-and-forget, and do not evoke a as STUN Indications which are send-and-forget, and do not evoke a
response. A response is necessary both for consent to continue response. A response is necessary for consent to continue sending
sending traffic, as well as to verify session liveness. Thus, we traffic. Thus, we need a request/response mechanism for consent
need a request/response mechanism for consent freshness. ICE can be freshness. ICE can be used for that mechanism because ICE
used for that mechanism because ICE implementations are already implementations are already required to continue listening for ICE
required to continue listening for ICE messages, as described in messages, as described in section 10 of [RFC5245].
section 10 of [RFC5245].
4. Solution 4. Solution
There are two ways consent to send traffic is revoked: expiration of There are two ways consent to send traffic is revoked: expiration of
consent and immediate revocation of consent, which are discussed in consent and immediate revocation of consent, which are discussed in
the following sections. the following sections.
4.1. Expiration of Consent 4.1. Expiration of Consent
A WebRTC implementation [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview], which implements A WebRTC implementation [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview], which implements
ICE, MUST perform a combined consent freshness and session liveness full ICE, performs consent freshness test using STUN request/response
test using STUN request/response as described below: as described below:
An endpoint MUST NOT send application data (e.g., RTP, RTCP, SCTP, An endpoint MUST NOT send paced STUN connectivity checks toward any
DTLS), over any transport protocol (e.g., UDP, TCP) on an ICE- transport address unless the receiving endpoint consents to receive
initiated connection unless the receiving endpoint consents to data. That is, no application data (e.g., RTP or DTLS) can be sent
receive the data. After a successful ICE connectivity check on a until consent is obtained. After a successful ICE connectivity check
particular transport address, subsequent consent MUST be obtained on a particular transport address, consent MUST be obtained following
following the procedure described in this document. The consent the procedure described in this document.
expires after a fixed amount of time. During ICE restart consent
checks MUST continue to be sent on previously validated pair, and
MUST be responded to on the previously validated pair, until ICE
restart completes.
Note: Although TCP has its own consent mechanism (TCP Explicit consent to send is obtained by sending an STUN binding
request to the remote peer's transport address and receiving a
matching, authenticated, non-error STUN binding response from the
remote peer's transport address. These STUN binding requests and
responses are authenticated using the same short-term credentials as
the initial ICE exchange.
Note: Although TCP has its own consent mechanism (TCP
acknowledgements), consent is necessary over a TCP connection acknowledgements), consent is necessary over a TCP connection
because it could be translated to a UDP connection (e.g., because it could be translated to a UDP connection (e.g.,
[RFC6062]). [RFC6062]).
Explicit consent to send is obtained by sending an ICE binding Initial consent is granted as a result of a successful ICE
request to the remote peer's Transport Address and receiving a connectivity check on a particular transport address, and expires 30
matching, authenticated, non-error ICE binding response from the seconds after an ICE candidate par has been selected. Once an ICE
remote peer's Transport Address. These ICE binding requests and candidate pair has been selected, consent for the ICE candidate pairs
responses are authenticated using the same short-term credentials as lasts for 30 seconds. That is, if a valid STUN binding response
the initial ICE exchange. Implementations MUST cease sending data if corresponding to any STUN request sent in the last 30 seconds has not
their consent expires. To prevent expiry of consent, a STUN binding been received from the remote peer's transport address, the endpoint
request MUST be sent every N milliseconds, where N is chosen randomly MUST cease transmission on that 5-tuple. STUN consent responses
with each consent check in the interval [.8N, 1.2N] (to prevent received after consent expiry do not re-establish consent, and may be
network synchronization), where N SHOULD be 5000. Using the value discarded or cause an ICMP error.
5000 milliseconds and that 20% randomization range, N would be a
value between 4000 and 6000. These STUN binding requests for consent
are not re-transmitted. Each STUN binding request for consent re-
calculates a new random value N and a new cryptographically-random
[RFC4086] STUN transaction ID.
The initial Consent to send traffic is obtained by ICE. Consent To prevent expiry of consent, a STUN binding request can be sent
expires after 30 seconds. That is, if a valid STUN binding response periodically. To prevent synchronization of consent checks, each
corresponding to one of the STUN requests sent in the last 30 seconds interval MUST be randomized from between 0.8 and 1.2 times the basic
has not been received from the remote peer's Transport Address, the period. Implementations SHOULD set a default interval of 5 seconds,
endpoint MUST cease transmission on that 5-tuple. resulting in a period between checks of 4 to 6 seconds.
Each STUN binding request for consent MUST use a new
cryptographically-random [RFC4086] STUN transaction ID. Each STUN
binding requests for consent is transmitted once only. Hence, the
sender cannot assume that it will receive a response for each consent
request, and a response might be for a previous request (rather than
for the most recently sent request). Consent expiration causes
immediate termination of all outstanding STUN consent transactions.
Each STUN transaction is maintained until one of the following
criteria is fulfilled:
o A STUN response associated with the transaction is received; or
o A STUN response associated to a newer transaction is received.
To meet the security needs of consent, an untrusted application To meet the security needs of consent, an untrusted application
(e.g., JavaScript) MUST NOT be able to obtain or control the STUN (e.g., JavaScript or signaling servers) MUST NOT be able to obtain or
transaction ID, because that enables spoofing STUN responses, control the STUN transaction ID, because that enables spoofing of
falsifying consent. STUN responses, falsifying consent.
To prevent attacks on the peer during ICE restart, an endpoint that
continues to send traffic on the previously validated candidate pair
during ICE restart MUST continue to perform consent freshness on that
candidate pair as described earlier.
While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961], While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],
[RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP [RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
sender to send packets forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack,
attack, consent checks MUST be performed over all transport consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
connections, including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
spoofing TCP segments can not cause a TCP sender to send packets segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
longer than the consent timer (30 seconds). expires (30 seconds).
An endpoint that is not sending any application traffic does not need An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
to obtain consent which can slightly conserve its resources. maintain consent. However, the endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or
However, the endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or firewall mappings firewall mappings persist which can be done using keepalive or other
persist which can be done using keepalive or other techniques (see techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]). If the
Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]). If the endpoint wants to endpoint wants to send application data, it needs to first obtain
send application traffic, it needs to first obtain consent if its consent if its consent has expired.
consent has expired.
4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent 4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent
The previous section explained how consent expires due to a timeout. In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
In some cases it is useful to signal a connection is terminated, rather than relying on a timeout.
rather than relying on a timeout. This is done by immediately
revoking consent.
Consent for sending traffic on the media or data channel is Consent for sending application data is immediately revoked by
immediately revoked by receipt of an authenticated message that receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g.,
closes the connection (e.g., a TLS fatal alert) or receipt of a valid a TLS fatal alert) or receipt of a valid and authenticated STUN
and authenticated STUN response with error code Forbidden (403). response with error code Forbidden (403). Note however that consent
Those consent revocation messages can be lost on the network, so an revocation messages can be lost on the network, so an endpoint could
implementation wanting to immediately revoke consent needs to resend these messages, or wait for consent to expire.
remember those credentials until consent expiry (30 seconds).
Receipt of an unauthenticated message that closes a connection (e.g., Receipt of an unauthenticated message that closes a connection (e.g.,
TCP FIN) does not indicate revocation of consent. Thus, an endpoint TCP FIN) does not indicate revocation of consent. Thus, an endpoint
receiving an unauthenticated end-of-session message SHOULD continue receiving an unauthenticated end-of-session message SHOULD continue
sending media (over connectionless transport) or attempt to re- sending media (over connectionless transport) or attempt to re-
establish the connection (over connection-oriented transport) until establish the connection (over connection-oriented transport) until
consent expires or it receives an authenticated message revoking consent expires or it receives an authenticated message revoking
consent. consent.
Note that an authenticated SRTCP BYE does not terminate consent; it Note that an authenticated SRTCP BYE does not terminate consent; it
only indicates the associated SRTP source has quit. only indicates the associated SRTP source has quit.
5. Connection Liveness 5. DiffServ Treatment for Consent
A connection is considered "live" if packets are received from a
remote endpoint within an application-dependent period. An
application can request a notification when there are no packets
received for a certain period (configurable).
Similarly, if packets haven't been received within a certain period,
an application can request a consent check (heartbeat) be generated.
These two time intervals might be controlled by the same
configuration item.
Sending consent checks (heartbeats) at a high rate could allow a
malicious application to generate congestion, so applications MUST
NOT be able to send heartbeats at an average rate of more than 1 per
second.
6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent packets
It is RECOMMENDED that STUN consent checks use the same Diffserv It is RECOMMENDED that STUN consent checks use the same Diffserv
Codepoint markings as the ICE connectivity checks described in Codepoint markings as the ICE connectivity checks described in
section 7.1.2.4 of [RFC5245] for a given 5-tuple. Section 7.1.2.4 of [RFC5245] for a given 5-tuple.
Note: It is possible that different Diffserv Codepoints are used by Note: It is possible that different Diffserv Codepoints are used by
different media over the same transport address different media over the same transport address
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]. Such a case is outside the scope of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]. Such a case is outside the scope of
this document. this document.
7. W3C API Implications 6. DTLS applicability
For the consent freshness and liveness test the W3C specification The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in
should provide APIs as described below: Section 4.2 of [RFC7350].
1. Ability for the browser to notify the JavaScript that consent 7. API Recommendations
freshness has failed for a 5-tuple and the browser has stopped
transmitting on that 5-tuple.
2. Ability for the JavaScript to start and stop liveness test and The W3C specification MAY provide the following API to provide
set the liveness test interval. feedback and control over consent:
3. Ability for the browser to notify the JavaScript that a liveness 1. Generate an event when consent has expired for a given 5-tuple,
test has failed for a media stream. meaning that transmission of data has ceased. This could
indicate what application data is affected, such as media or data
channels.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document describes a security mechanism. This document describes a security mechanism.
The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be
taken into account. taken into account.
SRTP is encrypted and authenticated with symmetric keys; that is, SRTP is encrypted and authenticated with symmetric keys; that is,
both sender and receiver know the keys. With two party sessions, both sender and receiver know the keys. With two party sessions,
skipping to change at page 7, line 19 skipping to change at page 6, line 52
sufficient to verify consent. sufficient to verify consent.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any action from IANA. This document does not require any action from IANA.
10. Acknowledgement 10. Acknowledgement
Thanks to Eric Rescorla, Harald Alvestrand, Bernard Aboba, Magnus Thanks to Eric Rescorla, Harald Alvestrand, Bernard Aboba, Magnus
Westerland, Cullen Jennings, Christer Holmberg, Simon Perreault, Paul Westerland, Cullen Jennings, Christer Holmberg, Simon Perreault, Paul
Kyzivat, Emil Ivov, and Jonathan Lennox for their valuable inputs and Kyzivat, Emil Ivov, Jonathan Lennox, Inaki Baz Castillo, Rajmohan
comments. Banavi and Christian Groves for their valuable inputs and comments.
Thanks to Christer Holmberg for doing a through review.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
skipping to change at page 7, line 44 skipping to change at page 7, line 29
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
2010. 2010.
[RFC6263] Marjou, X. and A. Sollaud, "Application Mechanism for [RFC6263] Marjou, X. and A. Sollaud, "Application Mechanism for
Keeping Alive the NAT Mappings Associated with RTP / RTP Keeping Alive the NAT Mappings Associated with RTP / RTP
Control Protocol (RTCP) Flows", RFC 6263, June 2011. Control Protocol (RTCP) Flows", RFC 6263, June 2011.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt] [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt]
McGrew, D. and D. Wing, "Encrypted Key Transport for Mattsson, J., McGrew, D., and D. Wing, "Encrypted Key
Secure RTP", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-02 (work in Transport for Secure RTP", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-03
progress), February 2014. (work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview] [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for
Browser-based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-11 Browser-based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-12
(work in progress), August 2014. (work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos] [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]
Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., Druta, D., Jones, P., and J. Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., Druta, D., Jones, P., and J.
Polk, "DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS", Polk, "DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS",
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-02 (work in progress), June draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-02 (work in progress), June
2014. 2014.
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K. [RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830, Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
August 2004. August 2004.
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 8, line 16
4953, July 2007. 4953, July 2007.
[RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's [RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961, August Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961, August
2010. 2010.
[RFC6062] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays [RFC6062] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays
around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC
6062, November 2010. 6062, November 2010.
[RFC7350] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, August 2014.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal
Ericsson Ericsson
Ferns Icon Ferns Icon
Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura
Bangalore, Karnataka 560037 Bangalore, Karnataka 560037
India India
Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com
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