draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-11.txt   draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12.txt 
RTCWEB M. Perumal RTCWEB M. Perumal
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: June 20, 2015 R. Ravindranath Expires: November 5, 2015 R. Ravindranath
T. Reddy T. Reddy
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
M. Thomson M. Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
December 17, 2014 May 4, 2015
STUN Usage for Consent Freshness STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-11 draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12
Abstract Abstract
To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent
needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint. needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.
This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage. Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 20, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. DiffServ Treatment for Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. DiffServ Treatment for Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. DTLS applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. DTLS applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. API Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. API Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer
is willing to receive traffic. This is performed both when the is willing to receive traffic. This is performed both when the
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[RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP [RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack, sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack,
consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections, consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
expires (30 seconds). expires (30 seconds).
An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
maintain consent. However, failure to send could cause any NAT or maintain consent. However, failure to send could cause any NAT or
firewall mappings for the flow to expire. Furthermore, having one firewall mappings for the flow to expire. Furthermore, having one
peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols. peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols. Absent better
information about the network, an endpoint SHOULD maintain consent if
there is any possibility that a flow might be needed again.
After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST
NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new
session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send. session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send.
4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent 4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent
In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
rather than relying on a timeout. rather than relying on a timeout.
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[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]. Such a case is outside the scope of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]. Such a case is outside the scope of
this document. this document.
6. DTLS applicability 6. DTLS applicability
The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in
Section 4.2 of [RFC7350]. Section 4.2 of [RFC7350].
7. API Recommendations 7. API Recommendations
The W3C specification MAY provide the following API points to provide The W3C specification [W3C-WEBRTC] may provide an API hook that
feedback and control over consent: generates an event when consent has expired for a given 5-tuple,
meaning that transmission of data has ceased. This could indicate
1. Generate an event when consent has expired for a given 5-tuple, what application data is affected, such as media or data channels.
meaning that transmission of data has ceased. This could
indicate what application data is affected, such as media or data
channels.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document describes a security mechanism. This document describes a security mechanism.
The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be
taken into account. taken into account.
SRTP is encrypted and authenticated with symmetric keys; that is, SRTP is encrypted and authenticated with symmetric keys; that is,
both sender and receiver know the keys. With two party sessions, both sender and receiver know the keys. With two party sessions,
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2010. 2010.
[RFC6062] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays [RFC6062] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays
around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC
6062, November 2010. 6062, November 2010.
[RFC7350] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport [RFC7350] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, August 2014. Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, August 2014.
[W3C-WEBRTC]
Bergkvist, A., Burnett, D., Narayanan, A., and C.
Jennings, "WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between
Browsers", february 2015.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal
Ericsson Ericsson
Ferns Icon Ferns Icon
Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura
Bangalore, Karnataka 560037 Bangalore, Karnataka 560037
India India
Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com
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