draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12.txt   draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13.txt 
RTCWEB M. Perumal RTCWEB M. Perumal
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: November 5, 2015 R. Ravindranath Expires: November 14, 2015 R. Ravindranath
T. Reddy T. Reddy
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
M. Thomson M. Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
May 4, 2015 May 13, 2015
STUN Usage for Consent Freshness STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12 draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13
Abstract Abstract
To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent
needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint. needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.
This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage. Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 14, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961], While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],
[RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP [RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack, sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack,
consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections, consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
expires (30 seconds). expires (30 seconds).
An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
maintain consent. However, failure to send could cause any NAT or maintain consent. However, not sending any traffic could cause NAT
firewall mappings for the flow to expire. Furthermore, having one or firewall mappings to expire. Furthermore, having one peer unable
peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols. Absent better to send is detrimental to many protocols. Absent better information
information about the network, an endpoint SHOULD maintain consent if about the network, if an endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or firewall
there is any possibility that a flow might be needed again. mappings do not expire, it can be done using keepalive or other
techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]).
After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST
NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new
session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send. session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send.
4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent 4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent
In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
rather than relying on a timeout. rather than relying on a timeout.
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