draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-16.txt   rfc7675.txt 
RTCWEB M. Perumal Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Perumal
Internet-Draft Ericsson Request for Comments: 7675 Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing Category: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: February 14, 2016 R. Ravindranath ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems, Inc.
R. Ravindranath
T. Reddy T. Reddy
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
M. Thomson M. Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
August 13, 2015 October 2015
STUN Usage for Consent Freshness Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage for Consent Freshness
draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-16
Abstract Abstract
To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching
attacks by sending traffic to unwilling victims, periodic consent to attacks by sending traffic to unwilling victims, periodic consent to
send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints. send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints.
This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage. Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2016. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.1. Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. DTLS applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. DTLS Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer
is willing to receive traffic. Verification of peer consent before is willing to receive traffic. Verification of peer consent before
sending traffic is necessary in deployments like WebRTC to ensure sending traffic is necessary in deployments like WebRTC to ensure
that a malicious JavaScript cannot use the browser as a platform for that a malicious JavaScript cannot use the browser as a platform for
launching attacks. This is performed both when the session is first launching attacks. This is performed both when the session is first
established to the remote peer using Interactive Connectivity established to the remote peer using Interactive Connectivity
Establishment ICE [RFC5245] connectivity checks, and periodically for Establishment (ICE) [RFC5245] connectivity checks, and periodically
the duration of the session using the procedures defined in this for the duration of the session using the procedures defined in this
document. document.
When a session is first established, ICE implementations obtain an When a session is first established, ICE implementations obtain an
initial consent to send by performing STUN connectivity checks. This initial consent to send by performing STUN connectivity checks. This
document describes a new STUN usage with exchange of request and document describes a new STUN usage with exchange of request and
response messages that verifies the remote peer's ongoing consent to response messages that verifies the remote peer's ongoing consent to
receive traffic. This consent expires after a period of time and receive traffic. This consent expires after a period of time and
needs to be continually renewed, which ensures that consent can be needs to be continually renewed, which ensures that consent can be
terminated. terminated.
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agent (as defined in Section 2.7 of [RFC5245]) does not generate agent (as defined in Section 2.7 of [RFC5245]) does not generate
connectivity checks or run the ICE state machine. Hence, an ICE-lite connectivity checks or run the ICE state machine. Hence, an ICE-lite
agent does not generate consent checks and will only respond to any agent does not generate consent checks and will only respond to any
checks that it receives. No changes are required to ICE-lite checks that it receives. No changes are required to ICE-lite
implementations in order to respond to consent checks, as they are implementations in order to respond to consent checks, as they are
processed as normal ICE connectivity checks. processed as normal ICE connectivity checks.
2. Applicability 2. Applicability
This document defines what it takes to obtain, maintain, and lose This document defines what it takes to obtain, maintain, and lose
consent to send using ICE. Section 4.4 and Section 5.3 of consent to send using ICE. Sections 4.4 and 5.3 of [WebRTC-SA]
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] further explains the value of further explain the value of obtaining and maintaining consent.
obtaining and maintaining consent.
Other Applications that have similar security requirements to verify Other applications that have similar security requirements to verify
peer consent before sending non-ICE packets can use the consent peer consent before sending non-ICE packets can use the consent
mechanism described in this document. The mechanism of how mechanism described in this document. The mechanism of how
applications are made aware of consent expiration is outside the applications are made aware of consent expiration is outside the
scope of the document. scope of the document.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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level consent; no human intervention is involved. level consent; no human intervention is involved.
Consent Freshness: Maintaining and renewing consent over time. Consent Freshness: Maintaining and renewing consent over time.
Transport Address: The remote peer's IP address and UDP or TCP port Transport Address: The remote peer's IP address and UDP or TCP port
number. number.
4. Design Considerations 4. Design Considerations
Although ICE requires periodic keepalive traffic to keep NAT bindings Although ICE requires periodic keepalive traffic to keep NAT bindings
alive (Section 10 of [RFC5245], [RFC6263]), those keepalives are sent alive (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and also [RFC6263]), those
as STUN Indications which are send-and-forget, and do not evoke a keepalives are sent as STUN Indications that are send-and-forget, and
response. A response is necessary for consent to continue sending do not evoke a response. A response is necessary for consent to
traffic. Thus, we need a request/response mechanism for consent continue sending traffic. Thus, we need a request/response mechanism
freshness. ICE can be used for that mechanism because ICE for consent freshness. ICE can be used for that mechanism because
implementations are already required to continue listening for ICE ICE implementations are already required to continue listening for
messages, as described in Section 10 of [RFC5245]. STUN binding ICE messages, as described in Section 10 of [RFC5245]. STUN binding
requests sent for consent freshness also serve the keepalive purpose requests sent for consent freshness also serve the keepalive purpose
(i.e to keep NAT bindings alive). Because of that, dedicated (i.e., to keep NAT bindings alive). Because of that, dedicated
keepalives (e.g. STUN Binding Indications) are not sent on candidate keepalives (e.g., STUN Binding Indications) are not sent on candidate
pairs where consent requests are sent, in accordance with pairs where consent requests are sent, in accordance with
Section 20.2.3 of [RFC5245]. Section 20.2.3 of [RFC5245].
When Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is used, the When Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is used, the
following considerations are applicable. SRTP is encrypted and following considerations are applicable. SRTP is encrypted and
authenticated with symmetric keys; that is, both sender and receiver authenticated with symmetric keys; that is, both sender and receiver
know the keys. With two party sessions, receipt of an authenticated know the keys. With two party sessions, receipt of an authenticated
packet from the single remote party is a strong assurance the packet packet from the single remote party is a strong assurance the packet
came from that party. However, when a session involves more than two came from that party. However, when a session involves more than two
parties, all of whom know each other's keys, any of those parties parties, all of whom know each other's keys, any of those parties
could have sent (or spoofed) the packet. Such shared key could have sent (or spoofed) the packet. Such shared key
distributions are possible with some MIKEY [RFC3830] modes, Security distributions are possible with some Multimedia Internet KEYing
Descriptions [RFC4568], and EKT [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt]. Thus, (MIKEY) [RFC3830] modes, Security Descriptions [RFC4568], and
in such shared keying distributions, receipt of an authenticated SRTP Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) [EKT]. Thus, in such shared keying
packet is not sufficient to verify consent. distributions, receipt of an authenticated SRTP packet is not
sufficient to verify consent.
The mechanism proposed in the document is an optional extension to The mechanism proposed in the document is an optional extension to
the ICE protocol, it can be deployed at one end of the two-party the ICE protocol; it can be deployed at one end of the two-party
communication session without impact on the other party. communication session without impact on the other party.
5. Solution 5. Solution
Initial consent to send traffic is obtained using ICE [RFC5245]. An Initial consent to send traffic is obtained using ICE [RFC5245]. An
endpoint gains consent to send on a candidate pair when the pair endpoint gains consent to send on a candidate pair when the pair
enters the Succeeded ICE state. This document establishes a 30 enters the Succeeded ICE state. This document establishes a
second expiry time on consent. 30 seconds was chosen to balance the 30-second expiry time on consent. 30 seconds was chosen to balance
need to minimize the time taken to respond to a loss of consent with the need to minimize the time taken to respond to a loss of consent
the desire to reduce the occurrence of spurious failures. with the desire to reduce the occurrence of spurious failures.
ICE does not identify when consent to send traffic ends. This ICE does not identify when consent to send traffic ends. This
document describes two ways in which consent to send ends: expiration document describes two ways in which consent to send ends: expiration
of consent and immediate revocation of consent, which are discussed of consent and immediate revocation of consent, which are discussed
in the following sections. in the following sections.
5.1. Expiration of Consent 5.1. Expiration of Consent
A full ICE implementation obtains consent to send using ICE. After A full ICE implementation obtains consent to send using ICE. After
ICE concludes on a particular candidate pair and whenever the ICE concludes on a particular candidate pair and whenever the
endpoint sends application data on that pair consent is maintained endpoint sends application data on that pair consent is maintained
following the procedure described in this document. following the procedure described in this document.
An endpoint MUST NOT send data other than the messages used to An endpoint MUST NOT send data other than the messages used to
establish consent unless the receiving endpoint has consented to establish consent unless the receiving endpoint has consented to
receive data. Connectivity checks that are paced as described in receive data. Connectivity checks that are paced as described in
Section 16 of [RFC5245] and responses to connectivity checks are Section 16 of [RFC5245], and responses to connectivity checks are
permitted. That is, no application data (e.g., RTP or Datagram permitted. That is, no application data (e.g., RTP or Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)) can be sent until consent is Transport Layer Security (DTLS)), can be sent until consent is
obtained. obtained.
Explicit consent to send is obtained and maintained by sending a STUN Explicit consent to send is obtained and maintained by sending a STUN
binding request to the remote peer's transport address and receiving binding request to the remote peer's transport address and receiving
a matching, authenticated, non-error STUN binding response from the a matching, authenticated, non-error STUN binding response from the
remote peer's transport address. These STUN binding requests and remote peer's transport address. These STUN binding requests and
responses are authenticated using the same short-term credentials as responses are authenticated using the same short-term credentials as
the initial ICE exchange. the initial ICE exchange.
Note: Although TCP has its own consent mechanism (TCP Note: Although TCP has its own consent mechanism (TCP
acknowledgements), consent is necessary over a TCP connection acknowledgements), consent is necessary over a TCP connection
because it could be translated to a UDP connection (e.g., because it could be translated to a UDP connection (e.g.,
[RFC6062]). [RFC6062]).
Consent expires after 30 seconds. That is, if a valid STUN binding Consent expires after 30 seconds. That is, if a valid STUN binding
response has not been received from the remote peer's transport response has not been received from the remote peer's transport
address in 30 seconds, the endpoint MUST cease transmission on that address in 30 seconds, the endpoint MUST cease transmission on that
5-tuple. STUN consent responses received after consent expiry do not 5-tuple. STUN consent responses received after consent expiry do not
re-establish consent, and may be discarded or cause an ICMP error. re-establish consent and may be discarded or cause an ICMP error.
To prevent expiry of consent, a STUN binding request can be sent To prevent expiry of consent, a STUN binding request can be sent
periodically. To prevent synchronization of consent checks, each periodically. To prevent synchronization of consent checks, each
interval MUST be randomized from between 0.8 and 1.2 times the basic interval MUST be randomized from between 0.8 and 1.2 times the basic
period. Implementations SHOULD set a default interval of 5 seconds, period. Implementations SHOULD set a default interval of 5 seconds,
resulting in a period between checks of 4 to 6 seconds. resulting in a period between checks of 4 to 6 seconds.
Implementations MUST NOT set the period between checks to less than 4 Implementations MUST NOT set the period between checks to less than 4
seconds. This timer is independent of the consent expiry timeout. seconds. This timer is independent of the consent expiry timeout.
Each STUN binding request for consent MUST use a new STUN transaction Each STUN binding request for consent MUST use a new STUN transaction
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including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
segments cannot cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer segments cannot cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
expires (30 seconds). expires (30 seconds).
An endpoint does not need to maintain consent if it does not send An endpoint does not need to maintain consent if it does not send
application data. However, an endpoint MUST regain consent before it application data. However, an endpoint MUST regain consent before it
resumes sending application data. In the absence of any packets, any resumes sending application data. In the absence of any packets, any
bindings in middleboxes for the flow might expire. Furthermore, bindings in middleboxes for the flow might expire. Furthermore,
having one peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols. having one peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols.
Absent better information about the network, if an endpoint needs to Absent better information about the network, if an endpoint needs to
ensure its NAT or firewall mappings do not expire, it can be done ensure its NAT or firewall mappings do not expire, this can be done
using keepalive or other techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and using keepalive or other techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and
see [RFC6263]). see [RFC6263]).
After consent is lost, the same ICE credentials MUST NOT be used on After consent is lost, the same ICE credentials MUST NOT be used on
the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new session, or an ICE the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new session, or an ICE
restart, is needed to obtain consent to send on the affected restart, is needed to obtain consent to send on the affected
candidate pair. candidate pair.
5.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent 5.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent
In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated In some cases, it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
rather than relying on a timeout. rather than relying on a timeout.
Consent for sending application data is immediately revoked by Consent for sending application data is immediately revoked by
receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g., receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g.,
a TLS fatal alert) or receipt of a valid and authenticated STUN a Transport Layer Security (TLS) fatal alert) or receipt of a valid
response with error code Forbidden (403). Note however that consent and authenticated STUN response with error code Forbidden (403).
revocation messages can be lost on the network, so an endpoint could Note however that consent revocation messages can be lost on the
resend these messages, or wait for consent to expire. network, so an endpoint could resend these messages, or wait for
consent to expire.
Receipt of an unauthenticated message that closes a connection (e.g., Receipt of an unauthenticated message that closes a connection (e.g.,
TCP FIN) does not indicate revocation of consent. Thus, an endpoint TCP FIN) does not indicate revocation of consent. Thus, an endpoint
receiving an unauthenticated end-of-session message SHOULD continue receiving an unauthenticated end-of-session message SHOULD continue
sending media (over connectionless transport) or attempt to re- sending media (over connectionless transport) or attempt to
establish the connection (over connection-oriented transport) until re-establish the connection (over connection-oriented transport)
consent expires or it receives an authenticated message revoking until consent expires or it receives an authenticated message
consent. revoking consent.
Note that an authenticated SRTCP BYE does not terminate consent; it Note that an authenticated Secure Real-time Transport Control
only indicates the associated SRTP source has quit. Protocol (SRTCP) BYE does not terminate consent; it only indicates
the associated SRTP source has quit.
6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent 6. DiffServ Treatment for Consent
It is RECOMMENDED that STUN consent checks use the same Diffserv It is RECOMMENDED that STUN consent checks use the same Diffserv
Codepoint markings as the ICE connectivity checks described in Codepoint markings as the ICE connectivity checks described in
Section 7.1.2.4 of [RFC5245] for a given 5-tuple. Section 7.1.2.4 of [RFC5245] for a given 5-tuple.
Note: It is possible that different Diffserv Codepoints are used by Note: It is possible that different Diffserv Codepoints are used by
different media over the same transport address different media over the same transport address [WebRTC-QoS].
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]. Such a case is outside the scope of Such a case is outside the scope of this document.
this document.
7. DTLS applicability 7. DTLS Applicability
The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in
Section 4.2 of [RFC7350]. Section 4.2 of [RFC7350].
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document describes a security mechanism, details of which are This document describes a security mechanism, details of which are
mentioned in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. Consent requires 96 bits mentioned in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [RFC7350]. Consent requires 96
transaction ID defined in section 6 of [RFC5389] to be uniformly and bits transaction ID defined in Section 6 of [RFC5389] to be uniformly
randomly chosen from the interval 0 .. 2**96-1, and be and randomly chosen from the interval 0 .. 2**96-1, and be
cryptographically strong. This is good enough security against an cryptographically strong. This is good enough security against an
off-path attacker replaying old STUN consent responses. Consent off-path attacker replaying old STUN consent responses. Consent
Verification to avoid attacks using a browser as an attack platform Verification to avoid attacks using a browser as an attack platform
against machines is discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of against machines is discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security]. [WebRTC-SEC].
The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be
taken into account. taken into account.
9. IANA Considerations 9. References
This document does not require any action from IANA.
10. Acknowledgement
Thanks to Eric Rescorla, Harald Alvestrand, Bernard Aboba, Magnus
Westerlund, Cullen Jennings, Christer Holmberg, Simon Perreault, Paul
Kyzivat, Emil Ivov, Jonathan Lennox, Inaki Baz Castillo, Rajmohan
Banavi, Christian Groves, Meral Shirazipour, David Black, Barry
Leiba, Ben Campbell and Stephen Farrell for their valuable inputs and
comments. Thanks to Christer Holmberg for doing a thorough review.
11. References
11.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment [RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5245, April 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5245, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5245>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5245>.
[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing, [RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5389, October 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5389, October 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5389>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5389>.
11.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt]
Mattsson, J., McGrew, D., and D. Wing, "Encrypted Key
Transport for Secure RTP", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-03
(work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security]
Rescorla, E., "Security Considerations for WebRTC", draft-
ietf-rtcweb-security-08 (work in progress), February 2015.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch]
Rescorla, E., "WebRTC Security Architecture", draft-ietf-
rtcweb-security-arch-11 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos] [EKT] Mattsson, J., McGrew, D., and D. Wing, "Encrypted Key
Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., Druta, D., Jones, P., and J. Transport for Secure RTP", Work in Progress,
Polk, "DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-03, October 2014.
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-04 (work in progress), July
2015.
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K. [RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830, Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3830, August 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3830, August 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3830>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3830>.
[RFC4568] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session [RFC4568] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
Streams", RFC 4568, DOI 10.17487/RFC4568, July 2006, Streams", RFC 4568, DOI 10.17487/RFC4568, July 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568>.
[RFC4953] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks", [RFC4953] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks", RFC
RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007, 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4953>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4953>.
[RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's [RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961, Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>.
[RFC6062] Perreault, S., Ed. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using [RFC6062] Perreault, S., Ed. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", Relays around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations",
RFC 6062, DOI 10.17487/RFC6062, November 2010, RFC 6062, DOI 10.17487/RFC6062, November 2010,
skipping to change at page 9, line 40 skipping to change at page 9, line 21
Keeping Alive the NAT Mappings Associated with RTP / RTP Keeping Alive the NAT Mappings Associated with RTP / RTP
Control Protocol (RTCP) Flows", RFC 6263, Control Protocol (RTCP) Flows", RFC 6263,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6263, June 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6263, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6263>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6263>.
[RFC7350] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport [RFC7350] Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, DOI 10.17487/RFC7350, Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, DOI 10.17487/RFC7350,
August 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7350>. August 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7350>.
[WebRTC-QoS]
Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., Druta, D., Jones, P., and J.
Polk, "DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS",
Work in Progress, draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-04, July
2015.
[WebRTC-SA]
Rescorla, E., "WebRTC Security Architecture", Work in
Progress, draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-11, March 2015.
[WebRTC-SEC]
Rescorla, E., "Security Considerations for WebRTC", Work
in Progress, draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-08, February 2015.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Eric Rescorla, Harald Alvestrand, Bernard Aboba, Magnus
Westerlund, Cullen Jennings, Christer Holmberg, Simon Perreault, Paul
Kyzivat, Emil Ivov, Jonathan Lennox, Inaki Baz Castillo, Rajmohan
Banavi, Christian Groves, Meral Shirazipour, David Black, Barry
Leiba, Ben Campbell, and Stephen Farrell for their valuable inputs
and comments. Thanks to Christer Holmberg for doing a thorough
review.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal
Ericsson Ericsson
Ferns Icon Ferns Icon
Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura
Bangalore, Karnataka 560037 Bangalore, Karnataka 560037
India India
Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems
821 Alder Drive
Milpitas, California 95035
USA
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
United States
Email: dwing@cisco.com Email: dwing@cisco.com
Ram Mohan Ravindranath Ram Mohan Ravindranath
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Cessna Business Park Cessna Business Park
Sarjapur-Marathahalli Outer Ring Road Sarjapur-Marathahalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103 Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India India
Email: rmohanr@cisco.com Email: rmohanr@cisco.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy Tirumaleswar Reddy
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103 Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India India
Email: tireddy@cisco.com Email: tireddy@cisco.com
Martin Thomson Martin Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
Suite 300 650 Castro Street, Suite 300
650 Castro Street
Mountain View, California 94041 Mountain View, California 94041
US United States
Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com
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