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IETF-105 saag minutes

Session 2019-07-25 1330-1530: Place du Canada - saag chatroom


minutes-105-saag-00 minute

          # Security Area Open Meeting (SAAG) - IETF 105
          * Thursday July 25, 2019
          * Chairs: Ben Kaduk and Roman Danyliw
          * Minute taker: Rich Salz
          ## WG/BoF Reports and Administrivia
          * [Slides and Pointers to Activity
          Additional WG/BoF/Activity Reports:
          * Elliot Leer: OPSAWG is working on "MUD phone home"
          * Wendy Seltzer, points to W3C security and privacy activity, including
          a presentation to PEARG
          * Dave Thaler: TEEP WG taking a dependency on the SUIT and RATS WGs now
          * Dave Thaler: ITU-T SG17 work on IoT security, Liaison with SUIT
          [misspoke at mic, I co-chair both, I meant SUIT] and overlapping
          * Linda Dunbar: IDR is looking at configuring IPsec/IKE; IPsecME didn't
          know, they had a joint meeting, it went well
          * Rich Salz: See
          It is very bad
          * Yoav Nir: LAKE had some enthusiasm, AD's figuring out next step since
          scope is not yet nailed down.
          ### Privacy Issues in Identifier Locator Separation Protocols
          * presenter: Dirk von Hugo
          * Eric Rescorla: Are the problems you identified solvable? -- See pg11
          * Tim Shepherd: You didn't mention HIP and its ephemeral identifiers,
          might be worth looking at
          * Ran Atkinson: RFC 4941 (IP privacy) techniques could be used
          * Bob Moskowitz: HIP concepts could be helpful; I lurk over there. Will
          post a comment there.
          * Robin Wilton: glad to see privacy high on the list, degrees of solutions
          are worth considering
          * Hannes Tschofenig: Where is this being used in IoT? -- there's some
          text in the draft referencing this use case
          * Bob Moskowitz: how do you deal with other long-lived data (port, etc);
          still work to be done
          * Dino Farinacci: encrypt the fields for privacy
          (Editor note: Discussion on this topic can continue on the [pidloc
          mailing list](https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pidloc))
          ### Do we need an expanded Internet Threat Model
          * presenters: Stephen Farrell
          * drafts:
          * Mohit Sethi: Yes this is useful, as engineers we need to think about
          this kind of compromise
          * Dominique Lazanski: This is extremely relevant
          * Dave Thaler: I'm interested; RATS and TEEP are designed for environments
          where end-points aren't fully trusted (Thing2 in the slides)  RATS is
          about attestation, TEEP is about remediation of that.
          * ? : I am surprised to see this; did we move to communication
          post-snowden, losing sight of this?
          * Jeffrey Yaskin: I will join the list; this would have been helpful to
          my work. W3C probably has interesting things to say about privacy
          * Ali Rezaki: important to get definitions and use-cases right; I look
          forward to working on this.
          * Harald: talk to folks outside the IETF
          * Eric Rescorla: If you build a protocol, and you have to assume the
          other side is compromised, you are in very bad shape
          * David Waltemire: not something we can solve with one protocol
          * ?: This work should progress somewhere. Is this the right model to
          use? Draft makes a good point on social attacks.
          * Eliot Lear: Time to do something with 3552?  What formalisms (e.g.,
          protocol approaches) do you envision?
          ** Stephen: Mostly I don't know
          * Ben Schwartz: Maybe not "need a new threat model" but "have a a new
          threat model" is a better title
          * Lawrence Lundblade: You can look at attestation [???]
          * Daniel Kahn Gilmore: Linkability is important
          * Bret Jordan: important work, even at the end of the day if protocols
          just discuss risks/risk-management
          * Ben Kaduk: Consider not completely adversarial relationship
          * Eric Rescorla: +1 to Kaduk and DKG.  Also need to think about aspect
          of protocols
          * Wes Hardaker: I miss days when open to port
          * Kathleen Moriarty: Detection is also important, even if we can't
          actually protect.
          Please continue discussion on a planned new mailing list.
          (Editor note: This new mailing list is
          ## Open Mic
          Nothing discussed

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